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NEANDER'S HISTORY OF DOGMAS  
IN THE MIDDLE AGES.

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SECOND PRINCIPAL PERIOD.

FROM GREGORY THE FIRST TO THE REFORMATION.

# LECTURES

ON THE

## HISTORY OF CHRISTIAN DOGMAS;

BY

DR. AUGUSTUS NEANDER.

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# THE HISTORY OF CHRISTIAN DOGMAS.

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## THE INTERNAL RELATION OF PELAGIAN CONTROVERSIES.

When Cælestius began with representing the importance of the controversy as trifling, this caution was extreme, and at least not the opinion of the Pelagians generally, who rather held the opposite opinion. This is evident from the assertion of Julian—that the God of the Traducians was not the God of the Gospels; they made either Satan to be the Author of human nature, or God to be the Author of evil. For the doctrine of hereditary depravity appeared to them contradictory to the perfection of the Creator, to his holiness and justice, and the doctrine of grace also to his love and justice; thus both seemed to be practically injurious, since moral efforts were unnecessary and impossible, and a sanction was given to immorality. Augustin on his part regarded the questions in dispute as objects of the highest importance. “The Christian faith,” he says, “properly consists in what relates to two men, one by whom we are sold under sin, the other by whom we are redeemed from our sins,” i. e. Pelagianism is at variance with the first principles of Christianity, since whoever denies Original sin, sets aside the need of redemption.

In our investigation of the internal connexion and exact principle of the particular points of controversy, we must distinguish between what the parties themselves consciously regarded as the main point, and the deeper difference to which everything was really to be traced. The subjects of controversy were, the original state of Man, the character of the first transgression and its consequences to the human race, the present moral condition of mankind, the nature of Free Will, its relation to Grace, the method of the Redeemer's work, the relation of the Christian and pre-Christian stand-points; and in addition there was the controversy respecting the efficacy of Baptism in freeing human nature from sinfulness, and making those who receive it members of the kingdom of God. Now the different views entertained of the present constitution of human nature might seem to involve the highest principle, and certainly it was a point of

prime importance, since according to the representations of the moral power which is still left to men, the doctrines of grace and redemption, and the influence of Christianity on human nature will be determined. But this question leads back to that respecting Original Sin and its effects, and the various opinions regarding this point are again dependent on the view taken of Man's primeval state. If we accepted the immediate assertion of both parties we might stop here ; but does not the difference lead us to a more general ground of contrariety? The contending parties differed also on another point which is independent of that we have just mentioned—namely, in their notions of Free Will. Pelagius understood by it the power of choosing which can at any moment decide between good and evil, whence it follows that every moment of life is like another, the operation of the earlier having no effect on the later, and consequently the differences between the primeval and the present state of Man is inconsiderable ; and by this the whole point of view of the development of human nature is determined. Augustin on the contrary held that in the Free Will, the element of a self determining choice between good and evil was not at all necessary. Here then is a difference on which various views of the original and later state of mankind are founded. But we may trace the condition of human nature still further back to the relation of rational creatures generally to God. Here also the difference is founded on Free Will. Pelagius assumed that man was furnished once for all with the powers which are necessary for his development ; the logical carrying out of this *datum* excludes the Supernatural. Augustin regarded such an Autonomy of the creature as contradicting its relation to God ; it stands in continual dependence on him, and its highest destiny is to be his organ. But whatever is true of the relation of the rational Creature to the Creator, rests again on the view of the world generally whether as prepared at Creation and developing itself independently or as upheld by a continued Creation, and therefore must be considered either as only a mediate interference of God, or as an immediate operation of his power and absolute dependence upon him. And here lies the deepest ground of the whole difference. And we find some indications that this principle was not wholly concealed from the contending parties.

Innocent says;\* "Wilt thou be superior in providing for thyself, to Him who has given thee thy being? and how is it that to whom thou thinkest thyself indebted for thy life, thou dost not think that thou art indebted for grace to enable thee to live as thou dost?" And Jerome says, These men by [their doctrine of] freedom make men not such as are dependent on their own will, but place human power on a level with the divine as being self-sufficient; yet we ought to know that we are nothing if God does not preserve what he has granted to us. He charges them with the sentiment, "If I will to bend my finger, is God's help necessary for me?" In the same way Orosius remarks that God has not merely in virtue of natural Creation granted all men grace, but daily to all and each one at every moment he specially imparts his gifts. He appeals to the passages in Holy Writ which speak of the divine *concursus*; but perhaps thou answerest me, Nature preserves its unvariable order, and after God has once arranged it he effects through it whatever happens (therefore mediately), but certainly he who gives, gives when and where he will, either by guiding the arrangements he has made in its development, or by pouring forth his bounty in new Gifts.

As to the fundamental difference in the consideration of the general relation between the created spirit and God, Augustin lays down as a principle that the Divine Spirit is alone autonomic, and the self-subsistent origin of the True and the Good; the created spirit, on the contrary, cannot possess the Good and the True, as its absolute possession, but attains to them only through communion with God; it has only the susceptibility of appropriating that higher life, and of revealing it in action. Hence arises the contrariety between a life in communion with God, in which all true goodness is placed, and in Grace, and the life of human nature estranged from God.† As the eye is circumstanced to the light of the sun, so is the created Spirit to the Grace of God. He does not deduce primarily from sin the need of human nature‡ for

\* Ep. ad Conc. Carth. § 3.

† De Peccat. Meritis et Remissione, ii. § 5.

‡ De Corrept. et Grat. § 32.—Si hoc adjutorium vel angelo vel homini, cum primum facti sunt, defuisset, quoniam non talis natura facta erat, ut sine divino adjutorio posset manere, si vellet, non utique sua culpa cecidissent, adjutorium quippe defuisset, sine quo manere non possent.

grace, in order to realize its destiny, but thinks it is principally founded on the relation of the creature to God, though he thus affixes to the term *gratia* a different idea from that contained in Scripture. Even in the highest state of the spirits in heaven, and in the original state of man, the *gratia justificans* was the source of all good, only the Spirit freely continued in divine communion, without having to overcome an opposition. As soon as it forsakes this communion, there can be nought but evil in itself. Love to God is the source of all Good; and, inversely, Selfishness is the principle of Evil.

Pelagius, on the other hand, regarded the creature as endowed with the powers of its existence and left to itself; hence the moral nature has likewise its powers, in order to fulfil its destiny; these faculties belong to it as an inalienable possession, and can suffer no essential alteration. It depends on man himself to make use of these powers. In reference to Goodness, Pelagius distinguished a *posse*, a *velle*, and an *esse*.\* The *posse* comes from God; the *velle* and the *esse* are man's affair. That the eye can see, is a gift of God; to see ill or well depends on ourselves. Thus, God has imparted to us the ability for goodness—whether we perform it depends upon ourselves. Accordingly, the essence of virtue consists in the free application of our moral powers—in this lies the *meritum* of man, without which there is no virtue. With this

\* De Gratia Christi, iv. § 5.—Primo loco *posse* statuimus, secundo *velle*, tertio *esse*. Posse in natura. velle in arbitrio, esse in effectu locamus. Primum illud, id est posse; ad Deum proprie pertinet quod illud creaturæ suæ contulit; duo vero reliqua, hoc est velle et esse, ad hominem referenda sunt, quia de arbitrii fonte descendunt. Ergo in voluntate et opere bono laus hominis est, immo et hominis et Dei, qui ipsius voluntatis et operis possibilitatem dedit quique ipsa possibilitatem gratiæ suæ adjuvat semper auxilio. Quod vero potest homo velle bonum atque perficere, salvis Dei est; potest itaque illud unum esse, etiam si duo ista non fuerint; ista vero sine illo esse non possunt. Itaque liberum mihi est nec voluntatem bonam habere nec actionem; nullo autem modo possum non habere possibilitatem boni; inest mihi etiam si voluere, nec otium sui aliquando in hoc natura recipit. Quem nobis sensum exempla facient clariorem. Quod possumus videre oculis, nostrum non est; quod vero bene aut male videmus, hoc nostrum est. Et ut generaliter universa complectar, quod possumus omne bonum facere, dicere, cogitare, illius est, qui hoc posse donavit, qui hoc posse adjuvat: quod vero bene vel agimus vel loquimur vel cogitamus, nostrum est, quia hæc omnia vertere in malum etiam possumus.

also is connected the definition of Free Will\*—the ability, at every moment, of doing good or evil. Augustin rejoined† that such a state of self-determining moral indifference is inconceivable. Good and Evil cannot come from the same source.‡ Man lives either in communion with God, and in that state professes moral freedom, that is, the ability to determine himself according to the internal law of his moral nature, or he is estranged from God. The definition of Pelagius supposes something which does not belong to the essence of a moral nature—the temptation to Evil. Such a self-determining choice proceeds from a tendency, already existing, to Evil; in this consists the moral misery of man, that he who ought to live only in goodness is attracted by that Evil which is opposed to his nature.

According to the Pelagian definition of Freedom, there was no special necessity to discuss man's original state, since his moral nature was asserted to have been always in the same equilibrium of the will as at first. Pelagius was prompted to explanations upon it only by the Bible and the doctrine of the Church. It was otherwise with Augustin, in whose system this doctrine necessarily had a place, in order to explain the phenomena of the present, which point back to a preceding derangement, since man could not have been so created originally. "How comes it to pass," he asks, "that man, who subdues lions, knows not how he ought to live?" Hence, from the first, he occupied himself with this inquiry. Both these theologians connected their views with the Bible and the Church, and understood the narrative in Genesis, for the most part, in a literal sense. But so much the greater was the internal difference. According to Pelagius, every child is in the same state as the first man before the Fall,

\* *De Gratia Christi*, § 19.—*Habemus possibilitatem utriusque partis a Deo insitam, velut quandam, ut ita dicam, radicem fructiferam, quæ ex voluntate hominis diversa gignat et quæ possit ad proprii cultoris arbitrium, vel intere flore virtutum vel sentibus horrere vitiorum.*

† *Opus Imperf. contr. Julianum*. iii. 117.—*Libra tua quam covaris ex utraque parte per æqualia momenta suspendere, ut voluntas quantum est ad malum, tantum etiam sit ad bonum libera, &c.* See Müller's *Christian Doctrine of Sin* (transl. by Pulsford: Edinb. 1853), vol. ii. 37, &c.

‡ *De Gratia Christi*, 21.—*Aliud est caritas radix bonorum, aliud cupiditas radix malorum, tantumque inter se differunt quantum virtus et vitium.*

only that the powers of the latter were mature. Then, as now, man must have been compounded of Reason and Sensuousness, the latter ruled by the former; but he was different from what he was at a later period, because he had no experience, no practice in goodness, and no example before him. Instead of this, Augustin asserts a great difference; that in man's original state, there reigned uninterrupted communion with God; that Goodness was his proper element, and temptation to sin could never approach him; he lived in the *gratia justificans*, the source of all goodness, and in consequence of communion with God, all the parts of his nature were linked in harmony with one another. The Body was a willing organ of the Soul. Man was not yet an immortal nature, but he was not subject to Death, and would have been translated, without suffering it, to a higher state of existence.

Augustin\* ascribed great importance to the first sin, as an act by which man's pure moral nature was separated from communion with God. Pelagius, on the contrary, lowered the moral importance of the first sin; he could not imagine that this single act could exert so great an influence on the development of the human race. God required from the first man a proof of his obedience, since he was bound to overcome sensual desire. That he was allured by it, was purely natural, for God had implanted the desire in his nature, but the Evil consisted in allowing himself to be led astray, and permitting it to transgress the Divine Law.† But the transgression took place with more facility, because man was unpractised and inexperienced in virtue, and was not strengthened by any example. Augustin, on the other hand, denied that the desire for the forbidden fruit was innocent. Thus the conflict was supposed to take place in the state of innocence. In the untroubled harmony of the Divine and the Human, Adam was not exposed to such a temptation, which was only possible through his own blameworthiness. The internal disobedience and opposition of the human will to the divine, must have preceded, ere Sensuousness and Reason could have been brought into collision.‡

\* J. Müller, D. Lehre v. d. Sünde, i. 395.

† Cf. Op. Imperf. contr. Julian. 4, 38.

‡ Ibid. 5, 17.

According to the Pelagian representation, the consequences of the first sin were rendered less important for Adam himself, because he was awakened to repentance by the punishment. The Free Will remained in him as in his posterity, equipoised between Good and Evil; death was regarded by Pelagius as founded in human nature as such. He was willing, indeed, to grant, that the first man, if he had not sinned, might have been spared from suffering it, by a special privilege, but in itself it was the law of his nature. And not the less were the maladies of human nature founded on it, and could not be attributed to Adam's transgression. On the other hand, Augustin taught that death had its origin in the discord which arose through sin between man and God, and in its consequences in human nature. Guilt and the punishment of sin, with all other evils, has passed over to the whole development of humanity. In Adam the whole human race sinned and became estranged from God, a *massa perditionis*. For the Scriptural confirmation of this view, which rested in the depths of the consciousness of sin, he attached great weight to the translation of Romans v. 12, *in quo (Adamo) omnes peccaverunt*. He supported it also by his philosophic Theory of general ideas, a Platonic-Aristotelian Realism, according to which the Universal must be expressed and contained in single individuals (*universalia in re*). As the human race were first of all contained and expressed in a single example, the whole race must be laden with the first sin and guilt, as common to all. The ascendancy of the selfish tendency in the conflict between Sensuousness and Reason has extended itself over the whole development of humanity. He considered it important to notice in the law of development, that sin punishes itself by sin. Julian explained that passage in the Epistle to the Romans correctly,\* and believed that he had thus quashed the whole theory of Augustin. The assertion that sin

\* Contr. Julian, 6, 75.—*Frustra sensum alium novum atque distortum et a vero abhorrentem molius exsculpere affirmans, ea locutione dictum esse; in quo omnes peccaverunt, ac si diceretur; propter quod omnes peccaverunt sicut dictum est: in quo covirgit junior viam suam ut scilicet non in uno homine omnes homines peccasse intelligantur originaliter et tanquam in massæ unionem communiter, sed propterea quia primus hominum ille peccavit; id est, cum imitantur illum, non cum generantur ex illo. Non ergo huic sensui convenit illa locutio, ita dictum esse: in quo, velut dictum esset: propter quod.*



punishes itself by sin was to him inconceivable\*—that would be a punishment by which God would multiply sin itself and drive men into the necessary commission of sin. Yet, in another passage,† he does not altogether conceal from himself the truth of the case, for he says, “Goodness enjoys itself, Evil inflicts suffering on itself.” Augustin makes original sin to consist in that selfish tendency of desire which manifests itself in the *concupiscentia*. He who had so long succumbed to the power of sensuality, felt its yoke peculiarly hard, and hence was disposed to give prominence to the sensuous element in sin. His elevated soul longed after a perfect command over it, and hence cherished a partiality for asceticism; but the charge brought against him by the Pelagians was false,—that he adopted Manichean principles, and placed the ground of sin in Sensuousness itself in the Body, and thus made God the Author of Evil. The controversy ought to have led to the more exact determination of the boundary between the natural and the moral; but as each party took for granted the correctness of his own standpoint, the one did not appreciate the other; the Pelagians, especially, could not do justice to the profound ethical conceptions of Augustin. Julian appealed to the fact, that the sensuous tendency existed also in the brute creation, and, therefore, was founded in nature, and could not be ascribed to Sin. To this Augustin rejoined that the misery which was here in question, could not affect the brutes, but the *concupiscentia carnis* was only a punishment for men; that in the inferior animals the flesh could not lust against the spirit. The example of Christ proved that this discord did not necessarily belong to human nature. For this assertion, his opponents accused him of Apollinarism and Docetism. If

\* Opus Imperf. 4, 35.—Quo genere ultionis multiplicaret Deus flagitia non puniret, et qui iratus erat malæ voluntati, qua fuerat erratum, reliquam facerat peccandi necessitatem.

† Contr. Julian. 5, 36.—Augustin says, Meministine, quamdiu disputio eris contra lucidissimam, quæ per Apostolum deprompta est, veritatem, affirmans nullo modo esse posse aliquid, quod et peccatum sit et poena peccati? Quid est ergo nunc quod oblitus tantæ loquacitatis tuæ ideo laudas altitudinem divitiarum sapientiæ et scientiæ Dei quia extra futuram operum retributionem ex multa pacte liberum arbitrium fermam voluit implere iudicii? Justissime enim sibi, sicut definis, bonus homo malusque committitur, ut et bonus se finatur, utique in opere bono, et malus se ipse patiatur, utique in opere malo.

there had been no internal conflict in Christ, there would have been no virtue in him. Augustin defended himself by saying that he did not deny the reality of the sensuous nature in Christ, but only the contrariety arising from sin.

The question respecting the Origin of Souls had already been brought into connexion with the doctrine of the propagation of sin, by CÆLESTIUS. But AUGUSTIN endeavoured to prove that the controversy respecting the latter could be carried independently of the former. A man like JEROME\* settled the question more easily, for he inferred Creationism from the words of Christ in John v., "My Father worketh hitherto." Augustin did not consider this a valid proof, for even on the theory of Traducianism, the continuous agency of God must still be admitted. God† gives the souls, even if he gives them through the medium of natural descent. But though Traducianism was favourable to his doctrine of Original Sin, he hesitated to express his approval of it, because the view taken by Jerome seems to lead to sensuous representations. It redounds to his honour, that on this point he maintained the mastery over his dialectic turn of mind, and would not decide without a warrant from Scripture. "Where Holy Scripture,"‡ he says, "does not express itself clearly on an obscure subject, human presumption must be checked. Though I do not know how all things are to be explained on this point, yet I believe that the Scripture would have been explicit if we could not have been left in ignorance without injury." A conceited young theologian in North Africa, Vincentius Victor, treated this commendable modesty in Augustin as narrow-mindedness, and wrote a book against him in which he compared him to the "*pecoribus insensatis*," and would have decided the question on very insufficient grounds. Augustin answered him with moderation in his work *De Anima et ejus Origine*.

A progressive deterioration of the human race was allowed even by the Pelagians; but they accounted for it from the power of evil habits, and held that the influence of Adam

\* Hieron. contr. Error. Joann. Hierosol. § 22, vol. ii. 1, 427, ed. Vallarsi.

† *De Anima et ejus Origine*, lib. i. § 26.—*Ipsc quippe Deus dat, etiamsi de propagine dat.*

‡ *De Peccatorum Meritis et Remissione*, ii. § 59.

consisted in his bad example.\* Many die by imitating Adam. Augustin, on the contrary, remarked that it was impossible for bad example to exert such an influence on a pure nature. The assertion that there had been men altogether sinless corresponded to the Pelagian standpoint, according to which the passages in the Epistle to the Romans, in which all are described as having sinned, must be limited and understood only of the majority. Although Pelagius avoided expressing his meaning distinctly, yet it may be certainly found in some passages of his work on Free Will,† in which he gives a list of sinless persons in the Old Testament, and closes with John the Baptist and the Virgin Mary. In later times, he says, when a greater number of men were living, the sins of individuals could not be reckoned; but when Adam, Eve, Cain, and Abel lived, the Scripture has not mentioned one sin of Abel, if he ever sinned; hence, we may infer that he was without sin, and there we must rest satisfied, and not assert what is not said in Holy Writ. In the application of his views to the Virgin Mary, he was aided by the general tendency of the Church. Even Augustin shows in his reply that he also was affected by it. "The holy Virgin Mary excepted,"‡ he says, "of whom, out of reverence for the Lord, I do not wish to take account, when speaking of sins; for greater grace was granted to her to overcome sin entirely; but excepting her, if we could assemble all the holy men and women, and ask them whether they were without sin, what would they answer? Would they say what Pelagius says or what St. John says? 'If we say we have no sin, we deceive ourselves.' There is still another question, Whether a regenerate person could be sinless through divine grace.

\* Ep. ad Demeti, c. 8.—*Longa consuetudo vitiorum, quæ nos infecit a parvo, paulatimque per multos corrumpit annos ita postea obligatos sibi et addictos tenet, ut vim quadammodo videatur habere naturæ.*

† De Natur. et Grat. § 42, 44.

‡ L. I. § 42.—*Excepta itaque sancta Virgine Maria, de qua propter honorem Domini nullam prorsus, cum de peccatis agitur, haberi volo quæstionem: unde enim scimus quid ei plus gratiæ collatum fuit ad vincendum omni ex parte peccatum, bonæ concipere ac parere meruit, quem constat nullum habuisse peccatum; hac ergo virgine excepta, si omnes illos sanctas et sanctas cum hic viverent, congregare possemus et interrogare, utrum essent sine peccato, quid fuisset responsuros putamus? utrum hoc, quod iste dicit, an quod Johannes apostolus?*

To maintain this would be a great error. To be sinless is the aim and effort of our wishes ; for us it is enough that no believer, whatever progress he has made, will venture to say, that it is no longer necessary for him to pray, 'Forgive us our sins.'"

With this controversy was connected a question of importance in the History of Christian morals, — *the relation of Christian and heathen virtue*. The Pelagians often appealed to the virtues of the heathen as evidences of the moral powers of human nature. Julian, for instance, showed from the bravery, chastity, and self-control of the heathen, how much could be effected by the *bonum naturæ sine dono gratiæ*. He confined himself to the contemplation of isolated virtues, but he was not logical, for he sometimes lost sight of the internal difference between heathen and Christian virtue, and on the other hand ascribed a *meritum* to Christian virtues because they were *fructuose bona*, and heathen virtues were *steriliter bona*, because they had no faith, while the others would be rewarded on account of their faith. As to what Augustin said on the difference of the two standpoints, Julian so little understood his views as to put forward the objection, "If the chastity of the heathen were no chastity, it might as well be said their bodies were no bodies, their corn was no corn."\* In these ethical discussions, Augustin's merits were very great, for he drew attention to the nature of the disposition and the moral unity of life, on which everything depended ; the eye of the soul is the whole tendency of the inner man, from which all goodness must proceed. The right disposition consists in love to God, by which all the cardinal virtues are determined. Whatever does not proceed from this principle is not truly good, though it may appear so to the eyes of men. He defined Sin to be an act which either does not proceed from love, or where love is not so great as it ought to be. But that tendency of the disposition which is pleasing to God can only spring out of Christianity.

From the radically different views respecting the relation of the Creator to the Creature, and the present condition of Man, great contrariety would result in contemplating the effects of Christianity on mankind. The Pelagian principles would have led consequentially to a rationalist view, to the

\* Con. Julian. 4, 27. Neander's Ch. Hist. iv. 366.

entire rejection of the supernatural element, and to the opinion that Mankind might be self-developed, without revelation or communication from God, in order to attain its destiny. But the Pelagians did not carry out these principles so consequentially, and what they took from the Biblical element, rested certainly not on mere accommodation, but on the conviction that a supernatural Revelation was necessary in order to realize the destiny of Humanity. Julian repudiated as a calumny the assertion that the Free Will could attain to the right worship of God without divine aid. Reason could not of itself discover the truths imparted by Divine Revelation. No rational man could maintain this.\*

Julian's party did not deny the idea of grace absolutely, they felt themselves bound to it by the Scriptures, and thought they accepted it in a Christian sense, if they at the same time retained the equally necessary idea of Free Will. But under the influence of their principles, Grace became something very indefinite and superficial. Sometimes it was reckoned among the powers of human nature imparted to it by divine love, sometimes as belonging to the Revelation that was auxiliary to those powers, that is, to the Supernatural. But even in this case, Grace always remained an external communication, something foreign, and not what Augustin esteemed of the highest importance, an impartation of divine life through Christ. How they confounded things that differ appears from Julian's statements; † Man created by God with Free Will was aided by innumerable kinds of Grace,—by commands, blessings, sanctification, punishment, chastenings, invitations, illumination. God ‡ disposes the will to believe by admonitions, miracles, examples, promises, rewards, and punishments. He thus explains the words in the Epistle to the Phillippians, "God worketh in us to will and to do;" he works because he pleases carnal men by the rewards held out to them, and by

\* Opus Imp. 3, 106.

† Ibid.—Affirmamus a Deo fieri hominem liberi arbitrii eumque innumeris divinæ gratiæ speciebus juvari cui possibile sit vel servare Dei mandata vel transgredi. Et hoc est, ubi liberum arbitrium esse defendemus, ut cum Deus tam multis modis benignitatem suam asserat, i.e., præcipiendo benedicendo, sanctificando, coercendo, provocando, illuminando unusquisque eorum, qui jam ratione utitur liberum habeat voluntatem Dei, vel servare vel spernere.

‡ L. c. 238.

his revelations excites their longing after God. In this sense, Pelagius also asserts that God worked by his Grace,—that he enabled men to accomplish more easily what they ought to accomplish by their free will. We place this grace\* (he goes on to say) not merely in the communication of the Law, but in God's aid by teaching and revelation—since he reveals to us the Future—makes us acquainted with the wiles of Satan, and enlightens us by the manifold gifts of his heavenly grace.

Pelagius admitted various stages in the divine education of Humanity which corresponded to its progressive deterioration. As long as Nature continued better, it was left to itself, *justitia per naturam*; when evil habit had increased God gave the Law (*justitia sub lege*); when Sin had mounted still higher Christ appeared (*justitia gratiæ*). The office of the Redeemer consisted principally in the promulgation of a new and higher Moral Law, in presenting new motives to virtue, and in giving an example of perfect morality. But as there had been other sinless men, the question arose, what was his pre-eminent distinction? Julian answered: Christ was not the first pattern of righteousness, but the greatest; as in Adam there was the *forma peccati maxima* in relation to Eve, *non prima*, inasmuch as Satan had sinned before him. He distinguished between sinlessness and moral perfection: the latter, *forma exacta*, was in Christ. This gradation stood in connexion with the distinction of the standpoint of the fulfilling of the Law and of the *consilia evangelica*. Among the new motives to virtue Julian reckoned the Incarnation and Sacrifice of Christ, in which he showed such great love to mankind, in order that they might at last love God again; and thus become fellow-heirs of the Only-begotten.

The Pelagians not only did not deny the idea of objective Justification, but gave it special prominence, for Julian explains it as being the forgiveness of sins. It may indeed surprise us, that notwithstanding their notion of sinless men, they still spoke of the forgiveness of sins without limitation; but the controversy with AUGUSTIN referred not to whether the *justificatio* was to be regarded as objective, but turned on their not admitting it in that subjective and transitive sense, which AUGUSTIN claimed for it. Yet its objective

\* De Gratia Christi, 8.

importance must have been, at all events, lessened by their pre-suppositions respecting human nature.

In the consideration of redemption, it was of importance whether it was viewed in a negative sense, that is, in opposition to the corruption of human nature, or positively as a glorification of Humanity, by which it was raised to a higher standpoint not attainable by its original powers. The former was prevalent in the West, the latter in the East, to which the Pelagian view which attributed the greatest effects to Redemption without the pre-supposition of human corruption, was necessarily very much allied. It maintained that the work of Christ was far greater, than repairing the effects of human corruption. Adam stood as the representative of human nature in a development left to itself; Christ showed a more advanced development through divine aid. Thus Julian says, Under Adam's name the nature of humanity is represented; what was true of him, was true of all; but under the name of Christ, the power of Him who was the Creator, and who fostered his own workmanship, that is, whatever can be developed out of human nature by the omnipotence of the Creator.\* "Christ, who is the Redeemer of the beings whom he created, increases his benefits upon that which bears his image by his continual bounty, and those whom he formed good, he makes still better by renovation and adoption." Since in this manner the kingdom of Heaven was a standpoint attainable by men only through God's grace, it serves to explain the recognition of the necessity of Infant baptism by the Pelagians, without their admitting the doctrine of original Sin. But although Grace here seems a necessary requirement, the important difference between them and Augustin remains, that he regarded it as inwardly operative as a communication of divine life, and accordingly, understood the idea of Justification, not like the Pelagians, merely in an objective sense, but modified it in the manner in which it has been preserved by the Catholic Church. In common with the evangelical, he held indeed the idea of a living faith; but by *justificatio* he understood the making personally righteous, the internal sanctification by the communion of the divine life which is effected through Christ. Hence he says against Pelagius, after acknowledging that he taught the forgiveness of sin

\* Contr. Julian, iii. 8. Neander's Ch. Hist. iv. 360.

through Christ,—The Grace of God through Christ is that in which he justifies us, not by our righteousness, but by the communication of his own. What Pelagius regarded as most important, the Revelation of doctrine, he held to be subordinate, since by that alone man does not attain salvation, but all depends on the inward enlightening and sanctifying of the Soul. Although, he says, the communication of doctrine may be called Grace, this is only allowable in the sense that no outward miracle is intended, but God, by a higher and internal manner, infuses his doctrine into the consciousness with inexpressible joy. At the same time the threefold distinction of *Justitia* is set aside: there is only one which proceeds from communion with God through Christ. Even for the standpoint of the Old Testament there can be no other; the Revelation of the Law could not bring man to *justitia*, but only awaken the consciousness of sin. The letter could only kill; nothing but the Spirit of the Law which passes through Grace into the inner life can make alive. The pious men of the Old Testament have become partakers of the promises of Grace through faith; they were not under the terrors of the Law, but on the standpoint of Grace, which communicates to man joy in goodness, heals and sets at liberty the depraved Will. In his treatise *de Spiritu et littera*, he shows that what the Law of works enjoins with threatenings, the Law of Faith attains through faith. Under the divine guidance, through Grace man is led by degrees from Sin to Redemption. These first movements of the divine life do not proceed from human nature, but purely from grace, which operates as *gratia præveniens seu præparans*. Then Grace leads man to Faith. Faith frees him from moral evil: the power of grace sets the will at liberty. Man now freely and joyfully performs what is good. The *gratia operans* is active within him. But he will always require the co-operation of Grace in order that the free Will may persist in goodness. While he thus becomes progressively strengthened he finds himself on the stage of *gratia co-operans*. Augustin thus expresses it,—Grace anticipates us that we may be healed; it follows after us in order that after healing we may be full of life and vigour; it prepares the Will beforehand, and co-operates with it when prepared, effecting the work it has begun. Thus Man always requires in this life the support of divine Grace against Sin, and the



distinguishing mark of those who attain salvation is perseverance unto the end through the power of Grace (*donum perseverantiæ*). If, therefore, the Pelagians attributed so much to the Free Will as to deny every idea of Grace, which in the connexion of their ideas might seem to encroach upon it, Augustin thought it most important to maintain that Grace works unconditionally, and that the Free Will can do nothing till it has been healed by Grace. Grace, which should be conditioned by human worthiness, would be no Grace. As it precedes all movement towards Goodness, so it works irresistibly (*gratia irresistibilis*), not outwardly compelling, but by an internal necessity attracting the corrupted human will. The Pelagians saw in this the destruction of the Free Will, but Augustin only intended thus to maintain its freedom; for the will is first set at liberty by Grace. In this difference concerning Grace we may perceive the influence of the difference already noticed in the idea formed of Freedom by the two parties. In accordance with their ideas of moral Atomism the Pelagians maintained only the formal idea of Freedom. This was denied by Augustin, since he regarded as the essence of freedom, the free development of the higher nature of man under the influence of Grace. In support of this view he always asserted that man felt no compulsion, that Grace operated in the form of the Free Will. God does not impart his Grace to stones, nor does he operate on rational beings as he might on wood, but as on beings endowed with reason and will, that is, in the form of rational conviction. But since, according to Augustin, Man, although he believes himself free to act, acts so only in the form which is given him by Grace, this freedom regarded as power is only a seeming freedom. Julian, on the contrary, maintained that God himself would not compel the Free Will; he appealed to the examples of undaunted constancy among the Heathen, which certainly was nothing to the purpose. Augustin reasoned inconsequentially, since in Adam he made everything depend on free self-determination, but denied this in the case of other men; and thus made God unjust. This is certainly an inconsequence in Augustin, but one which is connected with the power of moral feeling. He was afraid of tracing back the causality of sin to God, and therefore placed the ground of it in the self-determination of Man.

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If it depends entirely on the *gratia irresistibilis* whether any man attains to Salvation, then the cause of the salvation of one portion of mankind, and the perdition of another, could be found only in God, in his absolute Predestination; for nothing is left but the assumption of a hidden decree of God, according to which he leaves the majority to perdition which they have merited, bestows grace on the rest and leads them to salvation. Augustin thus laid himself open to the charge of attributing injustice to God, and the Pelagians knew how to avail themselves of it. Augustin appealed to various passages in Holy Writ, especially Rom. ix., on the mysterious experiences of human life; the Gospel was made known to certain nations, and not to others; one child was baptized, another not. He would more readily infer a secret decree of God, since he pre-supposed that whoever did not become acquainted with the Gospel in this life would remain under eternal condemnation. To explain this, the Pelagian would find no ground in their Philosophy. I am disturbed, thou sayest, because one is lost and another is baptized; and I also am disturbed, for I am a Man. But wouldst thou not be justly angry if a beast were to reproach God and say, Why hast thou made me a beast? Yet he felt that by such arguments alone he could not pacify the moral feelings, and added;—We cannot explain the divine proceedings; we shall not understand them till we reach a higher state of existence; let us only believe that there can be no unrighteousness with God; there we shall obtain perfect knowledge; if thou wouldst here conceive the inconceivable, thou art already lost. Julian rejoined, that in God's revelations there can be no contradiction; and hence the Holy Scripture cannot contradict what he has inscribed on the moral nature of man. We call the Scriptures holy, because they agree with Reason and Faith. The difficult passages to which Augustin appealed, he wished to explain by those that were clear, and by which it was necessary to abide. Paul also says, that a man makes himself a vessel of honour or of dishonour.

AUGUSTIN thought, indeed, that by gaining the victory over Pelagius, his own system of absolute Predestination must be acknowledged, for on his standpoint there was no medium; but he was mistaken. Many joined with him in rejecting the Pelagian doctrine without acknowledging his doctrine of Pre-

destination; this may be observed in Innocent of Rome, and likewise in Jerome. The latter says, indeed, "The pride of Free Will is broken, because man is drawn, and that too, against his Will," but this may be probably taken as one of those extravagant expressions which frequently occur in his writings, since in other passages he pre-supposes free susceptibility on the part of Man: to will and to run is mine, but this *mine* will not be mine without the divine aid. More plainly still in the following expressions. Where the grace and mercy of God are, there the Free Will lies in part fallow, which only consists in this, that we will and desire. Now, it is in God's power that by his aid we are able to fulfil what we desire and strive after; it is ours to pray—God's to give; ours to begin—God's to complete; ours to offer what we can—God's to supply what we cannot.

The doctrine of Absolute Predestination could not have been propounded without practically injurious consequences if it had not been handled with Augustin's prudence and ability. Those men especially who had been brought to this doctrine through the whole development of their religious practice and thinking, obtained through their well-grounded faith inward peace and the assurance of their own predestination. But it was otherwise with those to whom this System had been brought from without, and who found themselves engaged in an internal conflict, among the monks of the cloister at Adrumetum, in the province of Byzacene, who by studying the doctrine of Predestination in Augustin's writings, had arrived at the conclusion that the efforts of men were entirely useless since God did everything; and that it was unjust to punish Sinners. Augustin being called upon to counteract them, composed (A.D. 427) his treatises *de gratia et libero arbitrio*, and *de correptione et gratia*. It was not in general his manner to shrink from the consequences of his System; he endeavoured to repel doubts by developing it dialectically. The doctrine of Grace did not deny Free Will, but pre-supposed it, since Grace ignored not, but took account of the human will. Here again he involved himself in the ambiguity remarked above of the idea of Free Will. In the second work he wished to explain how blame and punishment could be awarded to men on his system. In the first place, all mankind sinned in Adam; hence individuals could not excuse

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themselves on account of the general sinfulness, and must bear their sins as their own criminality; but then God had so arranged, that human means must be applied, though they are fruitless without grace. He wished to leave it undetermined, what persons belonged to the predestinated, in order to preserve men from pride. Hence there is no more certain mark of predestination to salvation, than the *donum perseverantie*. Since, therefore, it is uncertain, we must at all events do our part. On the presumption that sinners who are now in error, belong to the predestinated, we must yet seek to operate upon them in Christian love. But this method of removing the difficulty was not suited to satisfy all minds, as Augustin himself experienced. As far as other dogmas were treated by him in the controversy between himself and Pelagius, he had on his side the general Christian consciousness, the prevailing spirit of the Church; but it was otherwise with the doctrines of unconditional Predestination and irresistible Grace. These, equally with the Pelagian doctrine, were opposed to the hitherto developed consciousness of the Church teachers; and the consequence was, that a middle party was formed, which, in the vindication of the doctrines of an original moral state—of the consequences of the first transgression; of the sinfulness of human nature, and its need of redemption; and of Grace, as the communication of an internal divine life, agreed with Augustin; but could not reconcile itself to his two other Dogmas.

#### 4. THE SEMI-PELAGIAN CONTROVERSY.

Walch, V. J. Geffken, *Historia Semipelagianismi Antiquissimi*. Gottg. 1826.  
4, Wiggers, *Augustinismus u. Pelagianismus*. Th. 2.

Two pupils of AUGUSTIN in Gaul, PROSPER AQUITANUS, and HILARY, gave him information by letter of the opposition to his views that had appeared in the way we have mentioned in the South of Gaul. They apprised him, that their opponents certainly combated the Pelagians, but maintained that they could do this without admitting the doctrine of absolute Predestination; that Augustin explained the biblical passages quoted in favour of it in a manner foreign to the doctrine of the Church; even if the doctrine of Predestination were true, it ought not to be made public, since it could only injure; for these things could be comprehended by no man. They

supposed that Grace was conditioned by Free Will, though they also spoke of a *gratia præveniens*. Augustin composed his treatises *de prædestinatione sanctorum*, and *de dono perseverantiæ*, in which he acknowledged (which from his standpoint was saying a great deal) that his present opponents were different from the Pelagians, since they admitted the doctrine of original sin, *gratia præveniens*, and *justificatio*, and granted that no one was sufficient of himself to begin and to complete the good work. If they acted according to this truth and prayed to God, they would, after all, attain to a right knowledge of predestination. It is deserving of notice that he adduces Christ in proof of the doctrine, and designates him the *præclarissimum lumen prædestinationis et gratiæ*, because on the side of his humanity no such merit could be attributed to him by which he could attain to this dignity. He had previously said in his treatise *de correptione et gratia*, that there was no one so blind in the faith as to maintain that Christ had merited by his free will to be the Son of God. We recognise here the connexion of different views in Christology and Anthropology. This is shown in Theodore of Mopsuestia, for according to his doctrine of Free Will in human nature, he represented the sinlessness of Christ as a *posse non peccare*, while Augustin, from his anthropological standpoint, supposed in Christ a *non posse peccare*. The Pelagians did not allow their anthropological ideas to influence their Christology consequentially. Yet it is worthy of notice, that Julian charged Augustin, when he denied *concupiscentia* in Christ, with not holding him to be a true man. Moreover, it is remarkable that Cassian and Gennadius assert of Leporius, that he was a Pelagian. Augustin, in behalf of his assertion that according to the judgment of the Church everything depended on grace alone, appealed to the Church prayers for the conversion of Unbelievers and the strengthening of Believers. He was not of opinion that the doctrine of absolute Predestination ought not to be publicly announced; this might be right respecting truths which only made a person more knowing, but not better; but this doctrine was very important for the Christian edification of those who rightly understood it. They would be induced by it to humble themselves, and to put their trust in God alone. If misunderstood it might indeed be attended with practical ill effects, but this

might be said of all truths, as, for example, of the divine foreknowledge. In propounding this doctrine a person should always speak with the consciousness that he had believers, therefore predestinated persons, before him, and should speak of the reprobate only in the third person ; then this doctrine would infuse into a man so much greater confidence in his sanctification. These rejoinders were so far from satisfactory that the Semi-Pelagians came forward with greater boldness. The re-action proceeded from some of the monks in Southern Gaul, rather owing to a practical than a speculative interest. At the head of the party stood JOHN CASSIAN, an Abbot of Marseilles, and a pupil of Chrysostom, and hence biassed on this question by an Oriental influence. The practically Christian guided him in treating the doctrines of the Faith ; he admitted nothing which was not suited to satisfy thoroughly the religious wants of men. His attention was turned to experience ; he observed religious natures ; a system of mere logical speculation had no charms for him. His doctrines, which are scattered through his writings, were designed to represent in its simplicity the faith of the Galilean fishermen, which had been garbled by Ciceronian eloquence. Free Will and Grace agreed, and hence there was an opposing oneness which maintained either Grace alone, or Free Will alone. Augustin and Pelagius were each wrong in their own way. The idea of the divine justice in the determination of man's lot after the first transgression did not preponderate in Cassian's writings as in Augustin's, but the idea of a disciplinary divine love, by the leadings of which men are to be led to repentance. He appeals also to the mysteriousness of God's ways, but not as concerns predestination, but the variety of the leadings by which God leads different individuals to salvation. Nor is one law applicable to all ; in some cases Grace anticipates (*gratia præveniens*), in others, a conflict precedes, and then divine help comes to them as Grace. In no instance can divine Grace operate independently of the free Self-determination of Man. As the husbandman must do his part, but all this avails nothing without the divine blessing, so man must do his part, yet this profits nothing without divine Grace.

Augustin died about A.D. 430, but even after his death the controversy was warmly carried on, for the Semi-Pelagian

party had great influence ; yet it was opposed by men of eminence,—PROSPER, for instance, the leader of the Augustinians, a man whose deep piety bore the impress of that system with which his whole life and thinking were closely connected. He developed the Augustinian ideas in his writings with deep feeling, acuteness, and cautious dialectic ; in his poem *de ingratis*, he vindicated unconditional Predestination and Grace against the other party, whom he termed Ungrateful. Eulogizing Augustin, he says, “ All his pleasure was the one love of Christ ; as he ascribed nothing good to himself, God was all to him.” Relying on the reputation which Augustin possessed in the Roman Church, Prosper and Hilary attempted to draw from bishop Cœlestin a declaration against the Semi-Pelagians ; they complained of the monks, who had ventured to revile the memory of Augustin, and hoped to obtain a verdict in favour of the Augustinian doctrine. But they were disappointed. Cœlestin, about A.D. 431, addressed a letter to the Gallic Bishops, and censured those who had not held Augustin’s memory in honour, and stated that his Anti-Pelagian writings were always acknowledged as correct in the Roman Church. He intimated that even bishops agreed with the opponents of Augustin ; but gave no dogmatic decision, and left it even doubtful whether the complaints made to him were well founded. In some ancient manuscripts of ecclesiastical laws certain decisions of the Roman bishops and of the North African Councils, approved by them, and which were held during the Pelagian controversy, are joined with this letter of Cœlestin ; but it cannot be doubted, that these *capitula* do not belong to Cœlestin, but were added at a later period. It is remarkable that the compiler of this collection did not venture, in precise terms, to maintain the doctrine of Predestination. For it is said, “ As to those difficult questions with which they are occupied who oppose the Heretics—as we do not venture to despise them, so neither do we consider it necessary to meddle with them.” It is easy to perceive that Cœlestin’s decision, which every one could interpret as he pleased, brought no advantage to Augustin’s party. When Prosper wrote against certain assertions of a Vincentius, it is supposed he could be no other than Vincentius Lerinenses, the author of the famous *commonitorium*, for he, too, was a Semi-Pelagian, since he names Pelagius and Cœlestius, but

not the Semi-Pelagians, among the false teachers; and when he recounts the most eminent Church teachers, he never mentions Augustin. He designed to show that no utterance of opinion by a Church teacher could determine any point against the unanimous doctrine of the Church. We have grounds for presuming that he had Augustin in his eye, on which account it is not improbable that this controversy induced him to compose this work. He appealed to the words of Cælestin in his letter,—*desinat, si ita res sunt, incessere novitas vetustatem*, and according to his own views takes *novitas* to be the Augustinian, and *vetustas* the Church doctrine. He adds the striking remark, that certain Towns and Provinces were complained of, because they were disposed to ignore these novelties.

During the conflict which was carried on in Southern Gaul, three parties might be distinguished. (1.) The adherents of absolute Predestination, in the extreme form of the doctrine. (2.) Those who, by the opposition of the Semi-Pelagians, had been induced to seek a more acceptable representation of this doctrine, and (3.) The Semi-Pelagians of various grades. The latter were gratified when Predestinarianism was presented in its harshest form, since they could then find a more ready admission for their own theory. Among those works which, by a temperate and mild representation, aimed at gaining friends to the Augustinian system, was an anonymous and very remarkable book that has come down to us, *de vocatione gentium*,\* an able attempt to place the repulsive points of the Augustinian system in the background without surrendering its main principles. The difference between mere apparent Virtue, Legality, and true Virtue, which is animated by love to God, is contrasted. In proportion to the energy of Man's will is its liability to fall into sin, until it has submitted itself to the divine guidance. Animated by the divine will it is spiritual (*voluntas spiritalis*), it contains the germ of all true virtue, but such it becomes only by divine grace. But this acts not compulsorily, but with the constant co-operation of the understanding and the heart; the operation of divine grace takes place only in the form of the natural determination of the human will. God has destined no one to perdition; he wills that all men should be saved; Christ died for all. The

\* Neander's Ch. Hist. iv. 391.



universal revelations of God serve for a proof (*dona generalia gratiæ*), in which the means are given to all to attain to the knowledge of God. According to this, the Author appears to keep aloof from the Augustinian Particularism; and yet again he seems to retract his opinion, and asserts that no man can attain to salvation by that general Grace, but only by that special Grace (*gratia specialis*), which begets the spiritual Will. Can Man do anything in order to gain this? The author denies it. He distinguishes from the general divine will which makes itself known in Creation, a special Universality (*specialis universitas*) of the divine Will, according to which God predestines to salvation, all to whom he imparts his *gratia specialis*. The ground of the Election is hidden from us. Three principles must be maintained: God wills that all men should be saved; no one can be saved by his own merits; every one only by God's Grace; the human Understanding cannot penetrate into the depths of the divine councils. If the last truth be only rightly considered, and no search be made after the incomprehensible, there will be no variance between the first and the second. Here then, a *gratia irresistibilis* is admitted, but its compulsory character is concealed as far as it is represented, as operating under the form of free self-determination. Predestination is not clearly expressed, but only represented on its negative side. But there are several contradictory positions connected with it, such as, God wills that all men should be saved, and others which cannot have been seriously maintained. Since men are disposed to deceive themselves by formulas, so the able dialectic form of the book led to a wider spread of the Augustinian doctrines. The question respecting the authorship of this book is difficult to answer. It has been ascribed to Ambrose, to Prosper, and to Leo the Great. It certainly does not belong to Ambrose, for it suits neither his times, nor his doctrine; with the doctrine of the two others, it agrees on the whole. Paschasius, Quesnel, and Griesbach,\* have attempted to adduce proof of Leo's authorship, but they have not fully established it.

About this time it was asserted, that there was a sect of Predestinians, who entirely, and even in form, denied Free Will, and made everything in man depend on divine predesti-

\* Abhandlungen Herausggb. Von Gabler. i.

nation. It has been asked whether there really was any such a sect diverging in this manner from the Augustinian doctrine. The existence of an absolutely distinct sect we must deny. The report of it proceeds only from a Semi-Pelagian quarter. Advantage was taken of the harsher representations of the Augustinian system, in order to brand the author with heresy. In a chronicle of the fifth century, ascribed to Prosper, the heresy of the *Predestinians* is dated from the year 418, and it is added,—*quæ ab Augustino dicitur cœpisse initium*. As this seemed offensive, a correction is found in another reading,—*ab Augustini libris male intellectis*. The most remarkable document belonging to this period, is a book which SIRMOND the Jesuit published in 1643, under the title of *Prædestinatus*, at the time of the controversy between the Jesuits and Jansenists. The Jesuits were readily charged with having forged it; but it bears indubitable marks of its origin in the Semi-Pelagian period. The work consists of three parts; the first gives an account of all the heresies to the times of the writer.\* The second book describes the ninetieth heresy, that of the *Predestinians*, in a document ascribed to them, and asserts that the author had imputed it to Augustin. The third book contains a refutation of this heresy. The author of the first and third books must have been a Semi-Pelagian, for he counts the Pelagians among the heretics, but not the Semi-Pelagians. He states his own doctrine in the third book. He admits a *gratia præveniens*, but understands by it the Redemption of men through Christ, which is presupposed objectively, as granted to all, and without which the efforts to obtain eternal life would be useless. In many particular instances, God also has aroused men to believe by extraordinary leadings, but never without their free self-determination; Grace every day awakens the slumbering will. All this accords with Semi-Pelagianism. In the second book, the doctrine of absolute Predestination is represented with designed harshness. God has predestined Man either to righteousness or to sin. The predestined may sin ever so much and resist; without his own will he will attain salvation; and inversely he who is destined to death, strives in vain. This is proved by the example of Judas. Dost thou think with thy praying and fasting to be more holy than Judas, who was a disciple of

\* The first book is in Corp. Hæresiologie, ed. F. Oehler: Ber. 1856.

Christ, and yet, because he was predestined to it, sinned to eternal death? On the other hand, the Apostle Paul had committed greater sins than any man, and yet, because he was predestined to be an Apostle, he at once was set free from all his sins. Such designed harshness may fairly raise the suspicion, whether any one wrote this book from an honourable standpoint, or whether it was not forged by that Semi-Pelagian. But since he says that it was attributed to Augustin, and yet the document contains no trace of the author's wishing to pass for Augustin, it seems to follow that the Semi-Pelagian did not write it, but met with it and held it to be really the work of a Predestinarian. This is rendered more probable by the fact that many assertions in it could not proceed from a Semi-Pelagian. And why should it be thought incredible that some one might have gone such lengths in a blind zeal for the doctrine of Predestination? The question arises whether the author only gives a harsh representation of Augustinian doctrine, or really deviates from it. The latter may be inferred from Free Will not being acknowledged in the first man, and hence he was thought to be destined to the Fall by God's will, which was the later Supralapsarian doctrine. This is certainly, not directly expressed in the book, but many other things show that the Author went as far. And if Augustin had sufficient tenderness of feeling to except the first Man, at least, from absolute Predestination, yet this ground would be wanting to an author who often enough set the moral feelings at defiance. Among the Semi-Pelagians who carried on the controversy against the doctrine of Predestination, FAUSTUS of Rhegium (Rhji) is particularly distinguished. He disputed against the Presbyter LUCIUS, an adherent not of the doctrine of the *Prædestinatus*, but only of Augustin. First of all, he tried in a letter\* to prevail upon him to recant the following positions,—that a man is destined by a decree of God to perdition; that a baptised person or a heathen will be condemned not because he has not received grace through his own fault, but because sufficient grace has not been given him; Christ did not die for all men. He who is a vessel of dishonour cannot make himself a vessel of honour. The true doctrine, Faustus said, is, that it depends on Man, whether he receives grace or not. Lucius at first opposed, but was prevailed upon to recant by the

\* Mansi vii. p. 1008.

Council, at Arles, about A.D. 472, and Lyons, A.D. 475. The first Council commissioned FAUSTUS to draw up a representation of the pure doctrine, which occasioned his work *De Gratia Dei et Humanæ Mentis Libero Arbitrio*.\* He compares the contrast of Freedom and Grace with that of the divine and human in the person of Christ; as in that its peculiar qualities are to be attributed to each nature, so in man we must distinguish what proceeds from the grace of God and what is of Man. The Free Will must not be regarded as annihilated, but it belongs to Man to regain the divine favour by his own exertions and God's help. A spark is placed within him which it behoves him to cherish by the help of grace. A more moderate defender of the same doctrines was GENNADIUS, a Presbyter of Marseilles. In his treatise, *De Dogmatibus Ecclesiasticis*, he says,† God first of all warns Man and invites him to salvation; it is in the power of Man to follow him. In his work *De Viris Illustribus*, cap. 38, he speaks of Augustin with commendation, yet does not hesitate to add, that by writing so much he fell into the error of which Solomon says in the 10th chapter of Proverbs, "In the multitude of words there wanteth not sin." He makes mention of an error which had arisen from much speaking, and evidently refers to the doctrine of Absolute Predestination. This arose from carrying things to an extreme, but for all this Augustin had not fallen into heresy.

Along with the Semi-Pelagians, Augustin had a considerable party who favoured his views in Southern Gaul. Among them were two men of distinguished discretion, intelligence, and personal authority, AVITUS, bishop of Vienne, and CÆSARIUS, bishop of Arles, the latter especially a man of genuine piety, eminent for practical energy, zeal, and ability in pastoral duties. Augustin's doctrine was blended with his entire conception of Christianity, he kept close to the practical side, and avoided all extravagance and enthusiasm in his views. His development of the doctrine of Predestination is analogous to that of the treatise *De Vocatione Gentium*. Man can do nothing; everything proceeds from grace, and hence the need of humility. The moderate representations made by so influential a person must have contributed greatly to the

\* Bibl. Patr. Lugdun. tom. viii.

† Ed. Elmenhorst, 1614, Oehler Corp. Hæresiol. t. i.

victory of the Augustinian doctrine. Moreover, in North Africa important effects resulted from the Augustinian School. Many excellent men, who ranked among its adherents, were driven by the ravages of the Vandals to take refuge in Sardinia, Corsica, and Constantinople. By them, and, in another quarter, by a number of monks on the borders of the Black Sea; the so-called Scythian monks, who belonged to the Greek and Latin Churches, and were zealous abettors of Augustinian Orthodoxy, a new impulse was given to the controversy. The monks in Constantinople, under the reign of Justin, began the agitation, and directed their efforts especially against the works of Faustus. Through a North African bishop POSSESSOR, who had fled to Constantinople, they applied to HORMISDAS, the bishop of Rome, and requested his judgment upon it. He expressed himself with moderation. He pronounced the writings of Augustin, especially those addressed to Hilary and Prosper, to be standards of Orthodoxy, yet he would not condemn Faustus. It seems that he wished to repudiate neither party entirely. His reserve displeased the monks; either he must condemn the work of Faustus, or pronounce the Augustinian doctrine to be false. They tried to find out a contradiction in the language of Hormisdas. They next sent the works of Faustus to FULGENTIUS, bishop of Ruspe, in Numidia, the most distinguished of the African exiles. He wrote a work against Faustus in vindication of the Augustinian System.\* Logically, indeed, but without the extravagancies of the *Prædestinatus*, he maintained a *prædestinatio duplex*, a phrase which acquired importance in later controversies, but by which he only meant the predestination of the elect to salvation, and of the condemned to everlasting punishment. As the controversy was now renewed in Southern Gaul, a scheme of doctrine, drawn up by CÆSARIUS, was adopted by a Council held at Oranges, A.D. 529, which maintained the Augustinian doctrines of Grace against the Semi-Pelagians. Anathemas were pronounced on all who represented the divine mercy to be conditioned in its operation by human efforts. Repentance and Faith were brought about by divine Grace, for Paul says, “*What hast thou, that thou hast not received?*” and “*By the grace of God I am what I am.*” When we do

\* De Veritate Prædestinationis et Gratiae Dei, 3 libb. Bibl. Mtr. Lugdun.

good, God works in us; whatever goodness Man has, proceeds from that source. But at the same time the bold assertions of the Predestinarians were contradicted. That any one is predestined to evil, *that*, they said, we do not believe, but condemn such a doctrine with perfect abhorrence. These resolutions were confirmed by the following Council of VALENCE, and by BONIFACE II. of Rome. He condemned those who maintained that faith in Christ proceeded from the freedom of Nature, and that native goodness availed more than Christ. Thus the Augustinian doctrine of grace was victorious in the Western Church; but the mild manner is noticeable in which the doctrine of a *gratia præveniens*, as the source of all instigation to goodness, was expressed, instead of a *gratia irresistibilis* and absolute Predestination.

A similar phase of the Augustinian doctrine appeared in the writings of GREGORY the GREAT, and through him was communicated to the following age. The good which we do, he says, is as much God's as ours; it comes\* from God through the *gratia præveniens*, it is ours by the obedience of the Free Will. When the *gratia præveniens*† operates, and the human Will follows it, we may venture to say, that we free ourselves, since through our freedom we coincide with divine Grace. In such passages the Free Will conditioning Grace is not in any instance clearly excluded. He thus describes the transforming power of Grace,‡—"Oh, how great is this Artist, the Holy Spirit, who, without any delay in learning, instructs the soul in everything he wills, as soon as he touches it; for in an instant he changes it; in an instant it renounces what it was, and becomes what it was not." But still more plainly than in this passage we find the Augustinian doctrine of Predestination in his expressions on the creative knowledge of God.§ "In God's sight everything is present; everything which God knows he knows, not because it is, but it is as it is, because he so knows it." But how anxious he was to separate the causality of Evil from God, is evident from his explanation of Isaiah xlv. 7, "I make peace and create evil"—which he understands of the evil which is ordained by God for good. The hardening of hearts by God, he explains in this way, that God does not vouchsafe them that Grace by

\* Job i. 33, § 40.

† Hom. in Evangel. i. 2, 30, § 8.

† Job i. 24, § 24.

§ Job i. 20, § 68.

which they might become softened ; but this is owing to their own fault.\* The doctrine of the perdition of unbaptized children also led him to the belief of absolute Predestination. " If we ask why some are baptized and others not, the answer is, the greater the mystery the more humbly we ought to reverence the divine councils." † He taught with AUGUSTIN, that no one can tell before death, whether he belongs to the predestined. Hence he exhorts to work out salvation with fear and trembling. ‡

Where this moderate mode of expressing the Augustinian doctrine was maintained, the doctrine of absolute Predestination was kept in the background by many as compared with the doctrine of Redemption ; but still the adherents of the harsher mode of expression kept their ground, and new conflicts were prepared between these opposite parties. 2. 3 2. 2

#### THE EASTERN CHURCH.

These controversies were not carried on in the Eastern Church according to their intrinsic importance ; it was only agitated by them, when introduced from the West ; more particularly when brought into connexion with the Nestorian disputes.

JULIAN of ECLANUM appealed to his agreement with THEODORE of MOPSUESTIA, and paid him a visit. But according to an account given by MARIUS MERCATOR, THEODORE attended and agreed with a Synod in Cilicia which condemned JULIAN. But this account comes from too prejudiced an opponent to be trustworthy, and even in this case it would not prove that he denied his conviction, and had rejected Pelagianism unconditionally ; for generally in the East an unconditional condemnation of this doctrine could not be effected ; and it may be asked in what respect it was condemned by the Synod. It is easily understood that Theodore in many points had rejected Pelagianism. Yet he is said, according to MARIUS MERCATOR, § to have also written a work against AUGUSTIN, fragments of which have been preserved by PHOTIUS. || Even the title—Against those who say that Man sins according to a natural

\* Job i. 3, § 15.

† Job i. 27, § 7.

‡ Epp. l. viii. Ep. 25.

§ Ed. Garn. p. 97.

|| Cod. 177.—πρὸς τοὺς λέγοντας φύσει καὶ οὐ γνώμῃ πταίνειν τοὺς ἀνθρώπους.

necessity, and not according to free determination—shows a tendency against AUGUSTIN's doctrines of original sin and Predestination. But according to PHOTIUS the book was not directed against AUGUSTIN himself, but against JEROME, whom he calls ARAM, and this is in itself more probable, since THEODORE could know little of AUGUSTIN.

The System of THEODORE is far more consequential, and far more self-consistent than the Pelagian. With him it was a fixed principle that the whole divine administration was so arranged according to an unchangeable and wise decree that its realization could be disturbed by no accidental event. This was true of the sin of the first man. God might have prevented altogether the entrance of Sin, if he had deemed it desirable, but he willed that man by his own experience should gain the consciousness of his weakness and know the difference between Good and Evil. The History of the Creation is divided into two great sections; \* the first, which reaches to the general Resurrection, is the period in which the rational Creature is left to itself, and therefore necessarily subject to change and temptation; in the second period a revelation of the divine unchangeable life will be supreme, a kingdom of unchangeable holiness in the human nature glorified and exalted above itself through communion with God. Redemption effects the transition between the two sections under the conditions of freedom. Man by conflict raises himself from a lower to a higher state; he assumes the most important place in the Creation because he is God's representative in it, and even the Angels must acknowledge him as such.† Hence

\* Marius Mercator, p. 100, ed. Garn.—Quod placuit Deo, hoc erat in duos status dividere creaturam, unum quidem, qui præsens est, in quo mutabilis omnia fecit, alterum autem, qui futurus est cum renovans omnia ad immutabilitatem transferet.

† Philoxenus de Creatione, vi. cap. 10, 17; cf. Comment. in Epist. ad Rom. Spicilegium Romanum, iv. p. 527; cf. also Coloss. 1, 16, sqq.—Propter hominum enim malitiam omnis ut ita dixerim creatura disrupti videbatur propter propinquitatem eam, quam ad hominem cuncta habere videbantur. Avertebant enim se nobis angeli et omnes invisibiles virtutes propter indevotionem nostram, quam erga Deum exercebamus. Insuper etiam nos ipsi morte solvimur, ex qua accidebat animam separare a corpore. Etenim et omnis connexio creaturæ hinc solvebatur. Fictus enim est homo a principio quasi aliquod animal cognitione omnibus junctum, eo quod corpus quidem generaliter ex omnibus consistebat, i. e., ex quattuor elementis, anima



the development of the World must proceed from human nature, in which Redemption is accomplished. Everything appears to be effected through Freedom; by it temptation to Evil entered, and by it must man return to Goodness. God gave him a command to test his obedience; he foresaw his disobedience and included it in the scheme of the World; when it took place God pronounced the sentence of death upon man. Death was from the beginning implanted in human nature;\* but the divine tutelage presented it as the punishment of transgression, in order that the primitive deserts of Sin might be known.

Although THEODORE, in his doctrine of the original transgression and its consequences, might agree with Pelagius, this dogma occupied a different place in its connexion with the two standpoints of the development of the world. If, on the one hand, he derived sin from human Freedom, on the other hand, it was grounded as something necessary in the changeableness of a rational nature. But equally had Redemption and Grace (not as with PELAGIUS a merely accidental, but) a necessary place in the System. Only in this point he agreed with him, that he placed Redemption, not in opposition to the ruin that proceeded from the first transgression, but rather to Nature left to itself. He contemplated it in a preponderating degree on the positive side as the glorification of human nature and the advancement of the natural powers of ADAM. From this conception of human nature and its importance in the universe, it was evident how it was necessary for the

vero ad invisibiles virtutes propinquitatem habere videbatur. Una vero quædam universorum copulatio ex hinc fieri videbatur, omnibus id ipsum concurrentibus, ita ut et uno consensu Deo redderent debitam culturam cum cauta sollicitudine, omnis etiam illis, quæ illius legibus consentanea erant, obtemperare prosperabant. Quia propter peccatum facti sumus mortales, anima etiam a corpore separabatur; solvebatur hinc propinquitatis copulatio ita ut nec ultra existimarent invisibiles virtutes aliquam sibi nobiscum esse communionem secundum corporis nostri diligentiam.—Unde et hi, qui insistebant visibilibus naturis et commovebant eas pro nostra utilitate secundum positum sibi terminum, nolebant ea ultra implere, si non promissione percepissent, quod omnia aspera solverentur.

\* Catena Nicephori, i. p. 98.—*ἡ μὲν πλάσις ἡτοιμάσθη τῷ θνητῷ βίῳ· ἡ δὲ τῆς ἐντολῆς δόσις καὶ τὸ αὐτεξούσιον προεγύμνασε καὶ ἰδῶκε τῇ γνώμῃ τῶν ἀσθαιρίων ἀγώνων τὴν πρόφασιν καὶ τὸ τῆς θνητότητος συμφέρον ἰδείξεν.*

realization of Redemption, and the second period in the history of Creation, that the divine Logos in Christ should assume human nature, and that this should advance by degrees in free development to be the Organ of the Logos until that development was completed at the Resurrection. Redemption stands in close connexion with the Creation ; it is its consummation, the realization of its final aim, and Sin is a means to it. Accordingly he understands the forgiveness of Sins through Christ in the positive sense ; it is the impartation of the *ἀναπαρρησία* of the divine life in communion with him, exalted above sin. Under this point of view THEODORE could not contemplate the death of Christ as if he had undergone it in a strict sense as a punishment for the sins of mankind ; but it behoved Christ to pass through all the developments of human organism, and hence through Death, which at the same time was requisite in order to lead him on to the higher standpoint of the divine life.

CHRYSTOM and AUGUSTIN, the most influential men in the two churches, are particularly suited to make us acquainted with the one Christian spirit that subsists under important dogmatical differences,—the same Christian sincerity which manifests itself in the greatest diversity of forms conditioned by individual character and the course of culture. Had they come in contact, a conflict might easily have arisen between them. CHRYSTOM was of a thoroughly practical nature. In AUGUSTIN the practical element was connected with a predominance of the speculative, dialectic turn of mind ; his talent was systematic ; he delighted in following out logical consequences. In the former feeling and practical experience preponderated ; the interest in systematizing was less powerful, and he had a natural aversion to extremes ; his spirit was more like JOHN'S, that of AUGUSTIN like PAUL'S. In both, an education by a pious mother laid the foundation of the Christian life, but their further development was widely different. AUGUSTIN was converted to the Gospel after violent conflicts of his inner and outer life ; CHRYSTOM, on the contrary, pursued his way more quietly in his outer life ; he was not at first agitated so violently, and his milder nature attained peace more easily. Like PELAGIUS, he had been educated in monastic life, but he far surpassed him in depth of feeling and intellect. To him who strove so longingly after true holiness, the monastic

life was a source of rich inward experience. His practical tendency did not, like that of PELAGIUS, accompany his religious life, but sprang out of it. As he felt assured, that the whole life of the believer was rooted only in communion with Christ, he never acquiesced in the external moral doctrine of PELAGIUS. Christ was the centre of his life; his highest aspiration was, to live entirely in him. On the other hand, an ascetic tendency was developed in him, just as he had freely developed himself from within, so he also deemed it of importance to make sanctification dependent on the free determination of man's will.

AUGUSTIN had wandered through Manicheism, Scepticism, and Platonism, before he retraced his steps to the Holy Scriptures; in CHRYSOSTOM an equable religious progress was connected with the persevering study of the Bible. Moreover, he did not read it, like AUGUSTIN, with an individual religious tendency already formed, but studied it profoundly in order to form his doctrinal belief from it; the sober principles of the Antiochian school guided his interpretation, and his inward Christian life furnished him with a commentary upon it. While in AUGUSTIN everything revolved round certain leading points of Christian doctrine, both his life and his thinking were formed harmoniously from Scripture; and while AUGUSTIN, in his study of the Bible, dwelt chiefly on particular portions, especially Paul's Epistles, CHRYSOSTOM applied himself to all parts equally. The great metropolis which was the scene of his labours, had a considerable influence on his views. The experience of PELAGIUS was confirmed by his own; the great world which wore the garb of a superficial Christianity, exercised its vices by appealing to the power of sensuousness, to the temptations of Satan, and to a fate which determined men by necessity to good or evil. The conflict against such pretences, against the perversions of the Christian faith, confirmed him in regarding and designating Free Will as the lever of all the moral and religious development of Man. This moral interest led him to a Christian Stoicism which expressed itself in the maxims—that morally Man makes himself—that he can be forced to nothing—that nothing can injure him if he does not injure himself—that everything depends on a right use of the means of grace. Under the varied circumstances and fortunes of life which he

passed through, he became more confirmed in these principles, and, supported by them, he testified in his exile of Christ, and adhered to them even to his glorious death.

In AUGUSTIN's fundamental principles, along with divine love still greater importance is given to the divine punitive justice; from CHRYSOSTOM's point of view, on the contrary, divine love is the most prominent; he strives on every occasion to magnify it, and to make it visible in the training of the human race. According to his doctrine the original state of Man was one of unclouded purity and happiness. Exempted in his ἀπάθεια from all temptations to sin, he led a painless life, a type of the Immortality to which, if he lived without sin, he would be translated without a struggle.\* Yet in this state he might more easily forget his dependence on God. In order that he might retain the consciousness of it, and practise obedience, God gave him a command. Man transgressed it from moral negligence, since he did not sufficiently exert his power of will. He now became subject to punishment, but which was intended principally to subserve his education; he was driven from Paradise, and into a world of conflict, in order to form his character. Death was necessarily connected with this state; he had a σῶμα παθητόν,† and was now exposed to sensual temptations. CHRYSOSTOM did not ignore the universal sinfulness of human nature.‡ “Who can boast,” he said, “of having a holy heart?” Yet we find no very decided expression of the doctrine of Original Sin. The words in Rom. v. 19, “By one man's disobedience many were made sinners,” he explains metonymically of the punishment of sin,§ and denies that anything damnable existed in children. He is still farther from believing in the transference of Adam's guilt to his descendants; he proposes the question, how then could Death pass on all the rest? and replies—that no man is without sin, although he has not committed the same sin as Adam. Yet all these evils might serve for the advantage of man, if he makes use of his Free Will; they would then be

\* Hom. 17, in Genes. cap. 3, tom. iv. p. 133.—πάντα γὰρ ἐποίησε—ὥστε τὸ ζῶον τοῦτο τὸ λογικὸν τὸ ὑπ' αὐτοῦ δημιουργηθὲν ἐν πάσῃ τιμῇ τυγχάνειν καὶ κατὰ μηδὲν ἐλαττοῦσθαι τῆς τῶν ἀγγέλων διαγωγῆς, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν σώματι τὴν ἐκείνων ἀπάθειαν κεκτῆσθαι.

† For the whole train of ideas, compare Hom. in Gen. 16, 17, 18.

‡ Hom. 8, in 1 Corinth, § 2, tom. x. p. 67.

§ Ibid. 10, in Rom. § 2, 3, tom. ix. p. 523.

incentives to the moral conflict. Not the mortal body, but the depraved Will is the root of Evil.\* From the importance which he ascribes to sin, follows an acknowledgment of the necessity of grace and redemption; hence he asserts that we obtain Justification, not by our own merits, but owe salvation to the Will of God.† It is equally clear that he considers all the divine dealings with man to be jointly determined by his free will, and that he could not approve of absolute Predestination and Grace, acting unconditionally. "The All-sufficient One," he says, "does not need us, but since he does everything on account of our salvation, he lets it depend on our will. Wherefore he employs no compulsion, for to be drawn against our will to worship him, is the same as not serving him at all.‡ God does not anticipate our wills with his gifts, but if we only begin, then he gives us many an opportunity for salvation.§ Faith is no little thing, but requires divine Grace; yet it needs also our own wills that man may allow himself to be taught of God.|| Men are not inferior to Angels because of their sensuousness, but everything depends on Free Will. Even among spiritual beings there are those who are worse than Men. Do not complain of the Creator, and say not as a sensuous Man I cannot be good."¶ He understands by Predestination the general preceding design which God formed before the Creation of the World, to redeem the world through Christ. God's choice does not compel those who are called, but only arouses them. The manner in which he treats the history of PAUL's conversion illustrates his views on this subject.\*\* AUGUSTIN makes the unconditionality of the divine grace and predestination conspicuous in this event; CHRYSOSTOM, on the contrary, says, "Grace effected it through him, but yet it was his own affair, since he had made himself worthy of such extraordinary grace. Without his will grace could have effected nothing in him. Seek not after PAUL's miracles but after his love. Many who saw the greatest miracles, apostatized. Paul speaks of grace that it may not

\* Hom. 17, in 1 Corinth, § 4, p. 150.

† Hom. 1, in 1 Corinth, § 1, pag. 3; Hom. in Rom. 7, § 1, 8.

‡ Hom. in Joh. 10, § 1, tom. viii. p. 57.

§ In Joh. Hom. 18, § 3, p. 107.

|| Hom. 45, § 3, p. 265.

¶ Hom. 75, § 5, p. 445.

\*\* Hom. tom. iii. p. 98, sqq

seem as if he had all of himself, but he also speaks of his own striving."\* From these premises we may infer that CHRYSOSTOM, like the other Orientals, gave a special prominence to the positive side of Redemption without altogether excluding the negative side. ANNIANUS, a deacon of Celeda, a Pelagian, who belonged to the more resolute of the party who had resigned their offices, translated these homilies on the conversion of PAUL and on MATTHEW into Latin, with a preface, in which he endeavoured to explain the system of CHRYSOSTOM as favourable to Pelagianism.

In PHOTIUS† there is a notice of a remarkable writing, in which it is said that the heresies of the Pelagians and of NESTORIUS were the same; the assertion is quoted from a letter of CYRILL to THEODOSIUS: what the Pelagians said of the members of Christ, that NESTORIUS said of Christ himself. In principle this is correct; yet the connexion of the two parties in the Nestorian controversy rests not so much on this subjective ground, since the reunion of the Christology and the Anthropology was not consciously carried out,—but rather on accidental causes. NESTORIUS was, from motives of kindness, not willing to sacrifice JULIAN and other bishops who had taken refuge in Constantinople, and thereby prejudiced the bishop of Rome against himself. At that time he delivered four discourses containing a representation of his Anthropology, of which we have three translated into Latin by MARIUS MERCATOR, and the fourth in Greek in CHRYSOSTOM's works.‡ They show that he was far from agreeing with AUGUSTIN, yet by no means an adherent of THEODORE of MOPSUESTIA. The Alexandrian party at the Council of Ephesus condemned PELAGIUS and CÆLESTIUS with NESTORIUS; but this was hardly owing to an exact knowledge of the internal connexion of the points in dispute; it proceeded rather from deference to the Roman Church, which had declared itself against NESTORIUS. The Eastern Church continued to maintain the more ancient doctrine of the co-operation of Grace and Freedom, without entering into a closer examination of their mutual relation. For the most part it had a leaning to Semi-Pelagianism. This also appears from the letters of ISIDORE, the abbot of PELUSIUM, who derives the corruption of human nature from Adam's sin:

\* Cf. Hom. 2, in Rom. § 3, tom. x. pag. 440.

† Codex 54.

‡ Tom. x. p. 733.

it is sunk from ἀπάθεια into ἐμπάθεια, into passions and temptations. Evil is increased by the negligence of men; yet there is a seed of goodness left; whoever cherishes it, makes progress in goodness, but not others. Free will requires the aid of Divine grace, but the latter is never wanting if man only does his part. He denies an irresistible grace, but admits in certain cases a prevenient grace. Absolute Predestination he zealously rejects; all communications of Grace are conditioned by Man's Free Will. No arbitrary election exists, for otherwise the kingdom of Heaven would be no reward of conflict.\*

#### d. THE DOCTRINE OF THE CHURCH.

THE unspiritualizing of the Church was already become general in the West; it was regarded as an outward organism, continued by the succession of Bishops, who formed the necessary medium of communication with Christ, and for partaking in the Holy Spirit and Salvation. AUGUSTIN adopted this view, (which before his time had been principally developed in North Africa), because it corresponded to his own religious life, and carried it out more systematically. In the change of his standpoints, tossed also hither and thither by Scepticism, he was led, at last, to resign himself to an outward Authority as founded by God; it is implied in his maxim *fides præcedit intellectum*. The operations of Christianity were to him one and the same with those of the Church. Thus on one side he became a pillar of the Catholic principle and standpoint, as on another side by his doctrine of a living faith and the internal divine life of Grace he presented a point of attachment for the Protestant element, and laid the foundation of a reaction against Catholicism.

It was DONATISM, a form of separatism resembling Novatianism, which developed the doctrine of the Church in opposition to AUGUSTIN. On both standpoints the visible and invisible Church were confounded, and the predicates of purity and holiness were sought in the former. Separatism is pre-eminently subjective; the Catholic standpoint objective; on the latter, the idea of the Catholic Church, and therefore holiness and purity are made dependent on the objective, on the continuation of the Church by the succession of Bishops. Therefore this controversy was deemed so

\* See his Epistles, lib. iii. 204, 171; 13, 165; ii. ep. 2.

important by AUGUSTIN, since he saw many led away by Separatism from the communion of the Church, which seemed to be the only connecting medium with Christ and Salvation. In reference to this view he says,\* "No one can attain to Salvation who has not Christ for his head; but no one can have Christ for his head who is not a member of his Body the Church." On the Donatist standpoint the predicate of Catholicity was made to depend on the subjective of purity and holiness. A Church which allowed unworthy members to remain in it, becomes defiled and ceases to be Catholic. The Donatists said, "Whoever is shown to be a Christian in a right and lawful manner, is to me a Catholic.† The Catholics wished to let the worthy and unworthy remain mixed together, and to defer the separation to the final Judgment. They appealed to the Parable of the wheat and the tares; they maintained that the Field mentioned in it was the visible appearance of the Church; the Donatists, on the other hand, understood by it the World in which good and evil are mixed, and therefore the tares and the wheat must remain mixed, not in the Church but in the World. The distinction in the idea of the Church as *visible* and *invisible*, might have led to an agreement. The Catholics sometimes alluded to it in their discussions, and the Donatists charged them on that account with making two Churches. The other party vindicated themselves, since they referred the distinction to the various states of the one Church in its temporal and eternal life, as Christ's state was distinguished before and after the Resurrection. AUGUSTIN endeavoured to establish a proper distinction, but as he was afraid to follow out the idea to its full extent, his notions became obscure. He spoke of those‡ who are in the house of God *per communionem sacramentorum*, and those who are outside of the house *per perversitatem morum*. "Many§ by partaking of the sacraments are *with* the Church and yet are not *in* the Church." Further, "those who appear to be in the Church, and to contradict Christ, and therefore do not belong to that Church which is called the body of Christ."

\* De Unitate Eccl. c. 49.

† OPTATUS of Mileve, De Schism. Donat. ed. Du Pin, 1700. Gesta collat. Carthag. iii. c. 99, p. 467.

‡ De Baptismo, iv. 1—4.

§ De Unitate Eccl. 74.—Multi sunt in sacramentorum communione cum ecclesia et tamen jam non sunt in ecclesia.



In these expressions lies the distinction of a true Church, which is the proper body of Christ, and one which only appears to be; the former would be the invisible Church. The same assumption lies in the words—"The unworthy are not in that communion of the Church which grows together in the members of Christ and increaseth with the increase of God; that Church rests upon the Rock."\* He distinguishes the *corpus Christi verum et permixtum*, and says—"That does not truly belong to the body of Christ which is not always with him. Hypocrites are not with him, though they are in his Church."

In the Eastern Church the externalized idea of the Church certainly prevailed, but it was not moulded so systematically, and allowed many faint glimpses of a more spiritual conception. CYRILL of JERUSALEM† defined the Catholic Church as that which was scattered over the whole world, which handed down the entire circle of Christian truth, and led men without distinction of culture to piety. Here also no reference was made to the necessity of a mediation by a succession of bishops, but the distinguishing character of Catholicism attaches to doctrine and spiritual unity. CHRYSOSTOM in explaining the words, "His praise is in the congregation of the Saints," says,‡ "Church is a name of association, and of meeting together." "The Church consists not in a roof and walls, but in faith and life."§ ISIDORE of PELUSIUM|| places the Church in the communion of Saints, which consists in the right faith and the right course of conduct.

The externalism of the Catholic idea of the Church called forth a reaction by a man in whom the movements of a Protestant element are discernible, JOVINIAN.¶ In this spirit he

\* *Contra Literas Petiliani*, ii. § 247.—*Nec ideo putandi sunt esse in Christi corpore, quod est ecclesia, quia sacramentorum ejus corporaliter participes fuint. Illa enim et in talibus sancta sunt, et eis indigne tractantibus et sementibus ad majus judicium valebunt. Ipsi autem non sunt in illa ecclesiæ compage, quæ in membris Christi per connexum et contactum crescit in incrementum Dei. Illa quippe ecclesia in petra est.*

† *Catech.* 18, § 23.

‡ In *Psalm* 149, tom. v. p. 498.—*ἡ αἰνεσις αὐτοῦ ἐν ἐκκλησίᾳ ὁσίων* —*ἐκκλησία γὰρ συστήματος καὶ συνόδου ἐστὶν ὄνομα.*

§ *Tom.* iii. p. 386, *Hom. De Eutropio.*

|| *Epist.* lib. ii. 246.

¶ Cf. Hieronym. *contr. Jovinian.* lib. ii. Augustin. *de Hæresib.* 82. B. Lindner, *De Joviano et Vigilantes Purioris Doctrinæ Antesignanis.*

carried on a warfare against hypocrisy, the quantitative scale of morals, the *consilia evangelica*; he laid the utmost stress on the principle of a living faith and the unity of the principle of the Christian life. Not only in this respect but in the doctrine of Grace, he agreed fundamentally with AUGUSTIN. The affinity of the two is as remarkable as their difference. JOVINIAN attained consequentially to a recognition of the immediate relation of the Christian consciousness to Christ, and to an idea of the Church derived from it and hence subordinated to it. He expressed this in the words, "The Church is founded on Faith, Hope and Love."\* Accordingly he looked upon it as a community developing itself from within. "In this Church there is nothing impure; every one is taught of God; no one can break into it by violence, or steal into it by artifice." As JOVINIAN taught the Pauline doctrine of faith, so he did the Pauline idea of the invisible Church, while AUGUSTIN obstructed the development of his similar fundamental idea by a mixture of the Catholic idea of the Church.

From the necessity of an external Church-Unity, the farther consequence was already drawn, that it must have an external representative, and it began to be sought in Rome as the *Cathedra Petri*. The North African Church (though it showed its independence in particular cases) and AUGUSTIN especially entertained this view. It had obtained the summit of authority because it had propagated itself from the *apostolica sedes* (of PETER)† through all ages by the succession of bishops. Accordingly he founds the succession of bishops principally on their succession in the Roman Church. "Who does not know," he says, "the supremacy of that Apostle which is to precede every other episcopal dignity?"‡

\* I. 2.—Scimus ecclesiam spe, fide, caritate inaccessibilem, inexpugnabilem; non est in ea inmaturos, omnes docibiles; impetu irrumpere vel arte eludere (Neander, illudere) potest nullus. II. 19.—Sponsa, soror, mater et quæcunque alia putaveris vocabula unius ecclesiæ congregatio est, quæ nunquam est sine sponso, fratre, filio. Unam habet fidem, nec constupratur dogmatum varietate nec hæresibus scinditur Virgo permanet. Quocunque vadit agnus sequitur illum; sola novit canticum Christi.

† De Utilitate Credendi, 35.—Dubitavimus nos ejus ecclesiæ condere gremium, quæ usque ad confectionem generis humani ab apostolica sede per successiones episcoporum culmen auctoritatis obtinuit?

‡ De Baptismo contra Donatistas ii. 2.

But in the explanation and application of those words of Christ, on which the primacy of PETER is especially grounded, AUGUSTIN is not consistent with himself. In his *Retractations*\* he gives close together two different explanations of the words, "Thou art PETER," &c., first, PETER is the rock on which the Church is founded; but he often adopted the meaning that Christ is the rock, and that PETER is so called on account of his confession, and that he in this confession represents the Church.† To the same effect he says, "The rock is not called after PETER, but PETER is called after the rock, as Christ is not called after Christians, but Christians after Christ." Here again we have a mark of the Protestant element in AUGUSTIN, for the development of this interpretation leads to the result, that all religious consciousness is immediately to be traced up to Christ and that with him the community originates which is called the Church. On the other hand in the Roman bishops, especially in LEO the GREAT, consequences were developed from the first interpretation of Christ's words and from the idea of a necessary outward representation of the Church, in which the mediæval Papacy was foreshadowed.‡

#### e. THE DOCTRINE OF THE SACRAMENTS.

##### 1. OF THE SACRAMENTS IN GENERAL.

THE idea of a Sacrament, and the extent of its application, was as yet undefined, and was formed into distinctness by practice. The rhetorical extravagance with which the Greek Homilists described the efficacy of the Sacraments, cherished the faith in their magical virtue. AUGUSTIN first of all applied

##### \* I. 21.

† Tract. in Joan. 124, § 5.—*Ecclesia non cadit, quoniam fundata est super petram, unde Petrus nomen accepit. Non enim a Petro petra, sed Petrus a petra, sicut non Christus a Christiano, sed Christianus a Christo vocatur. Ideo quippe ait Dominus: super hanc petram ædificabo ecclesiam meam quia dixerat Petrus, tu es Christus filius Dei vivi. Super hanc ergo petram quam confessus es ædificabo ecclesiam meam. Petra enim erat Christus, super quod fundamentum etiam ipse ædificabatur est Petrus. 1 Cor. iii. 11.*

‡ Leo, Sermo 80.—*Civitas sacerdotalis et regia per sacram b. Petri sedem caput orbis effecta, latius præsidens religione divina, quam dominatione terrena. See Perthel, Leo d. Gr.*

himself to a thorough investigation respecting the idea of a Sacrament and its relation to Christianity, and was thus led to many things which did not agree with the prevalent Church belief. He opposed to the magical notion one that was more spiritual, although he also presented elements of the Catholic mode of contemplation which were eagerly made use of by its abettors. A Sacrament, according to his definition, was nothing else than a visible sign which represented a divine fact, *sacramentum* or *signum sacræ rei* denoting the *res sacramenti*;\* what the audible word otherwise represents is here represented by the visible word (*verba quædam visibilia*).† The sign is temporal and changeable; the divine fact is unchangeable.‡ He develops this subject in opposition to the Manicheans, who objected against the derivation of Christianity and Judaism from the same God. How could God, they asked, contradict himself and disannul an arrangement established by himself? To this he replied that the Divine continues the same, only the signs for its representation must be changed. According to him, there was only one *Justificatio* which was foreshadowed in the Old Testament. Sensible signs are necessary in a religious community; but again, these can have no effect on the Spirit, they cannot impart Holiness and *Justificatio*, but merely serve as the signs and vehicles of the divine grace, which is the only source of *Justificatio*. MOSES could not impart sanctification, for he was only an organ of the Most High;§ it is God whose invisible grace imparts sanctification by his Spirit. This invisible grace operates through the Sacraments, but it can also operate without them. It is absurd to say that that invisible sanctification cannot profit without the *visibilia sacramenta*; it is only the usual arrangement appointed by God that grace should make such sacraments its organs, and if any one despises this divine arrangement, he pronounces himself thereby to be destitute of grace.

\* De Catechiz. Rudibus, 50.—*Sacramenta signacula quidem rerum divinarum esse visibilia, sed res ipsas invisibiles in eis honorari.*

† Contra Faustum, 19, 16.

‡ Ep. 138, 8.

§ Quæst. in Levit. lib. iii. questio 84.—*Quomodo et Moses sanctificat et Dominus? Non enim Moses pro Domino, sed Moses visibilibus sacramentis per ministerium suum; Dominus autem invisibili gratia per spiritum sanctum, ubi est totus fructus etiam visibilium sacramentorum.*

The question respecting the objectivity of the Sacraments was brought to a decision at this period on the occasion of the controversy with the Donatists. They made an earnest effort to fix an earlier standpoint in the development of the Church. We may observe the same peculiarity in their conclusions respecting the Sacrament, as respecting the Church and State; they were inclined to subordinate the objective to the subjective, and accordingly kept to the older subjective standpoint in asserting that the Sacraments were only valid when they were administered by worthy members of the Catholic Church. Hence PETILIAN maintained\* that those who received baptism from an unbeliever received not the faith (baptism) but only guilt: for in everything the root is of the chief importance, and if any one has not the right head, the act is nugatory; he must belong to the true holy Church. In opposition to this tendency, AUGUSTIN says—"Christ alone is the true Origin, Root, and Head; he alone can justify men. Hence the Sacraments are everywhere valid wherever his Institutions are administered. It does not signify what Man is, but what Christ is; everything proceeds from him. Anciently the Christian calling was compared to military service and baptism to entering into the service. The *stigma militare* was impressed on those who enlisted. AUGUSTIN wishing to give effect to the objective in baptism, says, in allusion to this custom,\* "As when any one deserts, still he always has this stigma, so also there is something indelible in the mark impressed by Baptism; though it testifies only against him who does not remain faithful to the Christian calling." With this view the Catholic doctrine coalesced, of the *character indelebilis* which certain sacraments must impart. AUGUSTIN contrasts the standpoint of slavery and of freedom, that of Judaism and that of Christianity. On the latter there are only a few symbols, but there is also different relation of these to the religious consciousness; on the legal standpoint there is the dependence of the consciousness on the religious signs, and on the Christian a distinction between the sign and the divine reality, with a clear consciousness and a correct understanding of the relation of the one to the other. Every Sacra-

\* Contra Literas Petil. i. 6, 7.

† Contr. Epistolam Parmeniani, ii. 29.

ment, he says,\* leads to the contemplation of the thing signified, and its application to the life; the contemplation of Truth raises the soul to the love of God; the application to the life consists in love to Man. The signs are taken from common life; hence they cannot make the same impression as something miraculous. Only if the Sacrament is not understood it produces a certain unconscious awe, and on the other hand, if understood, it gives birth to a devout joy.†

## THE NUMBER OF THE SACRAMENTS.

AUGUSTIN, according to his free and spiritual views of worship, names expressly Baptism and the Lord's Supper as the Sacraments of Christianity, though certainly adding, "if anything else is enjoined in the New Testament."‡ In other passages, he is disposed to admit four sacraments. In the preceding age, the beginning of a sacramental mode of viewing them had been made in reference to Confirmation, Penance, and priestly Ordination. Still more was this the case in this age; the language used respecting Ordination implied that it made the priest into another man; and since a sudden magical communication of the Spirit was ascribed to it which then effected everything that was necessary, many persons held a special training for the clerical office to be unnecessary. Yet this error met with a refutation both from AUGUSTIN and GREGORY of NYSSA. Confirmation (*confirmatio*, *σφραγίς*) was among the Greeks completed by anointing, and served as a ratification of Baptism. We may gather from the spurious

\* Posteaquam resurrectione Domini nostri manifestissimum indicium nostræ libertatis illuxit, nec eorum quidem signorum operatione gravi onerati sumus, sed quedam pauca pro multis eademque factu facillima et intellectu angustissima et observatione castissima ipse Dominus et apostolica tradidit disciplina. Quæ unusquisque cum percepit, quo referantur imbutus agnoscit, ut ea non carnali servitute, sed spiritali potius libertate veneretur.—De Doctrina Christiana, iii. 13.

† Nihil tam pie terret animum, quam sacramentum non intellectum, autem gaudium pium pacit et celebratur libere, si opus est tempori.—Expositio Epistolæ ad Galat. iii. 19; cf. Ep. 54 et 55, ad Januarium.

‡ Ep. 54, ad Januarium.—Primo tenere te volo—Dominum nostrum—leni jugo suo nos subdidisse et sarcinæ levi; unde sacramentis numero paucissimis, observatione facillimis, significatione præstantissimis societatem novi populi colligavit, sicuti est baptismus trinitatis nomine consecratus, communicatio corporis et sanguinis ipsius, et si quid aliud in scripturis canonicis commendatur, exceptis iis, quæ servitutum populi veteris—onerabant.

writings of DIONYSIUS the Areopagite, how strongly the mystic liturgic element of the Greek Church tended to the multiplication of the Sacraments. The liturgic elements of worship and those of the hierarchy receive in them a mystic, symbolic meaning. These writings, although not of great intrinsic value, exerted no inconsiderable influence, since they conveyed the existing spiritual tendencies to the following Period. The Sacraments which they enumerate, are the following: Baptism (φώτισμα), the Lord's Supper (κοινωνία συνάξεως), Priestly Ordination (τελείωσις ἱερατική), Monastic Ordination (τελείωσις μοναχική), the rites used at the burial of believers (τὰ ἐπὶ τῶν ἱερῶν κεκοιμημένων). AUGUSTIN laid the foundation in the West, of a new Sacrament. Partly the term *μυστήριον*, which is applied to Marriage in Eph. v., and partly his controversy with the Pelagians, who accused him of regarding the procreation of children as something Satanic, and against whom he urged so much the more the sanctity of Christian wedlock, determined him to call Marriage a *Sacramentum*, and to infer its indissolubility.

## 2. BAPTISM.

In the East as well as in the West it was now the prevalent belief that Infant Baptism was of apostolic Institution. but in the East especially, the Practice was not in accordance with it; on the whole, Infant Baptism was not very frequently observed, and many remained Catechumens to a late age. For the indifference towards Christianity, which again had been increased by the neglect of Infant Baptism, and the false views of the magical efficacy of Baptism, and in many a superstitious reverence for the ceremony which would not venture to apply its benefits to children, caused its postponement. Often when any general calamities occurred, great multitudes flocked to baptism. The Church teachers GREGORY NAZIANZEN, GREGORY of NYSSA, BASIL and CHRYSOSTOM, pronounced Infant baptism of apostolic origin, recommended its use, and at the same time protested against faith in its effecting a magical forgiveness of sins.

But in establishing its necessity and in explaining the formula—"for the forgiveness of sins," which was also used at the baptism of Infants, a difference arose between the East and the West, corresponding to the difference, generally, in

the view of the work of Redemption, just as the Positive aspect of it in the ennobling of human nature, or the Negative, the opposition against sin, was rendered most prominent. Accordingly, in the East, Baptism was regarded chiefly as indicating exaltation to a higher stage, for which the original powers of man were not sufficient. GREGORY NAZIANZEN says,—“It is a more divine Creation, and something higher than the original formation of Nature; participation in the kingdom of God is communicated, which human nature of itself could not attain.\* This may be applied equally to children as to adults.” Hence in determining the object of baptism, GREGORY goes on to say, it is a seal for infancy, the forgiveness of sins for adults, a restoration of the defaced image of God. He justifies Infant Baptism by asserting that from the first a higher element must be communicated to human nature, and the child become dedicated to the Holy Spirit.† That positive view of the Eastern Christians found a point of union with those of the West in their admission that the first Man, if he had not sinned, would have immediately attained to higher communion with God. Through Sin his body became a *σῶμα παθητόν*. Thus the Eastern Church found in this new creation also, a reference to the consequences of the first sin.

GREGORY of NYSSA says, “The child is by Baptism placed in the Paradise from which Adam was expelled;”‡ “the marks of evil which were brought upon human nature, are taken away by baptism.”§ Only the Eastern Churches were opposed to giving prominence only to the negative effect of Redemption.|| JULIAN of ECLANUM appealed to a Homily of CHRYSOSTOM, addressed to the newly baptized,¶ in which he speaks of the operations of the divine grace in baptism, and asserts against those who make the baptismal grace to consist only in the forgiveness of sins, “that we baptize children although they are not defiled by sin, in order that they may partake of

\* Orat. 40, εἰς τὸ ἅγιον βάπτισμα, fol. 640, D.

† νήπιον ἔστι σοι; μὴ λαβίτω καιρὸν ἢ κακία· ἐκ βρέφους ἁγιασθήτω, ἐξ ὀνύχων καθιερωθήτω τῷ πνεύματι.

‡ λόγος πρὸς τοὺς βραδύνοντας εἰς τὸ βάπτισμα, ii. p. 216.

§ Orat. Catech. c. 40.

|| Cyrill. Hierosolym. Catech. 17, c. 18.

¶ Augustin. contra Julianum, i. § 21.



holiness, righteousness, sonship, adoption, and brothership through Christ." These words may be made to harmonize well with Chrysostom's doctrine, for they do not imply that human nature is born altogether in the same state in which it originally was. Hence, we are not justified in attributing to JULIAN a designed forgery of these words, as even AUGUSTIN does not deny their genuineness. ISIDORE of PELUSIUM says\* that those persons have a mean idea of baptism who refer it only to the remission of sins; this alone would not be so great a thing; but there are many other gifts of grace communicated to human nature which far transcend its original state, a divine regeneration, adoption, justification, communion with Christ; the remedy goes much further than the healing of the wounds. THEODORE of MOPSUESTIA† gives a peculiar phase of the Eastern representation; the most important operation of grace, he regards as the participation in the ἀναμαρτησία of Christ, the induction into the communion of his divine life which rises above temptation. The formula of the forgiveness of sins in the Baptism of infants he explained as relating to the ἀναμαρτησία.

Hence, it is evident how the Pelagians could enforce the necessity of Infant Baptism without admitting the doctrine of Original Sin. CÆLESTIUS maintained that children by baptism acquired a share in a higher stage of blessedness in the kingdom of God, than they could attain by their natural powers. From this arose the idea of a middle state for unbaptized children; while the highest stage, the kingdom of God, depends on baptism. Thus we must understand what PELAGIUS says: "Whither unbaptized children go, I know not; but whither they do not go, I know." And what he wrote to INNOCENT, bishop of Rome: "Why should they who

\* Epp. v. 195.

† In Ephes. 5, 22—24. Spicileg. Solesm. i. 118.—Et quod mortales sequitur ut peccent, immortales vero effecti in futuro seculo peccare ultro non poterimus. Forma autem illius est spiritalis regeneratio, quam in baptismo implere videmur, quasi hinc jam recreati, et secundum formam regenerati spei illorum quæ et fieri exspectamus. Hoc dicit, quoniam non ignorat dissolutum quidem esse veterem illum hominem mortalem. Novus vero ille quidem pro illo indutus est incorruptus, in cuius formam illa quæ in baptismo est præcepistis, simul et primitias spiritus accipientes. Itaque justum est, vos consentaneos illis et sapere et conversari, qui maxime cum spiritu regeneratione etiam sensus renovationem estis assequuti.—[JACOBI.]

are born to an uncertain life, not be born again to an eternal and certain life?" AUGUSTIN represents to the Pelagians the inconsequence of excluding from the kingdom of God those who are the image of God. He proceeds on the principle that there can be no middle state between the happiness or salvation that consists in communion with God, and unhappiness or damnation. But at an earlier period he had been himself an advocate of this doctrine.\* AMBROSE inferred, from misunderstanding Christ's conversation with Nicodemus, that no one could enter the kingdom of heaven without baptism; but what would become of unbaptized children, he did not venture to decide.† In the East also we find the representation of a middle state for unbaptized children in the writings of GREGORY NAZIANZEN.‡

In the North African church this doctrine met with opposition, and since, according to AUGUSTIN, the only alternative was the kingdom of God or perdition, and Baptism was necessary for the kingdom of God, all unbaptized children must be doomed to damnation. In the second Canon of the Council of Carthage, in the year 418, the doctrine of an intermediate state for unbaptized children was rejected, and the conclusion above mentioned was of course approved. But this Canon is not found in all the copies of the proceedings of the Council; probably there was a reluctance directly to affirm it. For those who in this connexion maintained the necessity of Infant Baptism, it was a question, in what way its efficacy might be supposed to operate. AUGUSTIN in this instance did not follow out the inferences which were deducible from his idea of the Sacraments in general, but was fettered by the church doctrine. He says, the *Sacramentum fidei* in children is called faith, and if the child comes to mature age, the sacrament is not repeated, but he only learns to understand it, and enters into the truth with the determination of his Will; till this can take place the Sacrament acts as a protection against the influence of the powers of evil. As yet there is at least no tendency of the consciousness directly opposed to faith, and hence the child is freed by Baptism from perdition.§

\* De Libero Arbitrio, iii. 23.

† De Abrahamo, ii. 84.

‡ Orat. 40.

§ Ep. 98, ad Bonifacium, c. 10.—Itaque parvulum, etsi nondum fidei

## 3. THE DOCTRINE OF THE LORD'S SUPPER.

THE three-fold gradation which we noticed in the former period, is also now visible in the representations of the Lord's Supper.

1. The sensuous realistic view of JUSTIN and IRENÆUS, which taught an actual interpenetration of the bread and wine with the body and blood of Christ was adopted by CYRILL of Jerusalem, who infers from the words of the Institution, that undoubtedly the body and blood of Christ were present, and introduces as a parallel the change of water into wine at Cana. The body and blood of Christ are presented under the image of bread and wine, in order that whoever has partaken of his body and blood may become one body and one blood with him. Thus we enter into the most intimate communion with Christ, since we carry himself within us, and thus acquire a divine nature.\* Be assured, that the wine is not wine, but the blood of Christ.† It is evident that CYRILL meant to say, that by a miracle the body and blood of Christ are present and are transferred to the communicant, so that in spirit and body he is pervaded by a principle of divine life. But how does he conceive this union? The comparison with the miracle at Cana, the assertion that the bread and wine are only an image, have been referred by Catholic Expositors to a peculiar change by which nothing but the outward *species* is left. But the term μεταποιεῖν in this writer, is certainly not to be taken strictly, and is used to

illa, quæ in credentium voluntate consistit, jam tamen ipsius fidei sacramentum fidelem facit. Nam sicut credere respondetur, ita etiam fidelis vocatur, non rem ipsa mente annuendo, sed ipsius rei sacramentum percipiendo. Quum autem homo sapere cœperit, non illud sacramentum repetet, sed intelliget ejusque veritati consona etiam voluntate cooptabitur. Hoc quamdā non potest, valebit sacramentum ad ejus tutelam adversus contrarias potestates; et tantum valebit, ut si ante a rationis usu ex hac vita emigraverit, per ipsum sacramentum commendante ecclesiæ caritate, ab illa condemnatione, quæ per unum hominem intravit in mundum Christiano adjutorio liberetur. Hoc qui non credit et fieri non posse arbitratur, profecto infidelis est, etsi habeat fidei sacramentum; longeque melior est illo parvulus, qui etiamsi fidem nondum habeat in cogitatione non ei tamen obicem contrariæ cogitationis opponit, unde sacramentum ejus salubriter percipit.

\* Orat. Mystagogica, iv. c. 1—3.

† C. 5.

express the potentiating a natural power into something higher, which previously did not lie within it. As far as something higher, the blood of Christ, is connected with the wine, CYRILL says, that the wine is no longer wine. That the comparison with the miracle at Cana does not imply an absolute transmutation appears from this, that in another passage he compares the higher potency which the bread and wine receive, with that communicated to the consecrated oil,\* in which he certainly did not imagine any transmutation. CYRILL's opinion therefore is, that the body and blood of Christ are supernaturally combined with the bread and wine, and partaken therewith.

With this view CHRYSOSTOM in general agrees. The supper was instituted by Christ, in order that we might unite ourselves not merely by love, but in fact with the body of Christ. This is the proof of his exceeding love; he wishes not merely to be seen by believers, but to be touched and eaten by them.† He says further: "Why does Paul make use of the term *κοινωνία* and not *μετοχή*? for this reason, because he intends not merely a participation, but a full communion, into which we enter by union. For, as that body was connected with Christ, so we are united by it to Christ."‡

Among the Western writers who held these views, was HILARY of POICTIERS. If Christ, he says, truly became flesh, and we truly feast upon the Word that became flesh, why should he not abide with us in a natural way? since he assumed our body, and has connected the nature of his own body, under the Sacrament, with our body, in order to communicate to us eternal life.§ AMBROSE also speaks of the *Sacramentum* which by prayer is changed into the flesh and blood of Christ; by the word of Christ, the *species elementorum*

\* Orat. *Mystagogica*, iii. 3.—ὥσπερ γὰρ ὁ ἄρτος τῆς εὐχαριστίας μετὰ τὴν ἐπίκλησιν τοῦ ἁγίου πνεύματος οὐκ ἐστὶ ἄρτος λιτός, ἀλλὰ σῶμα Χριστοῦ, οὕτω καὶ τὸ ἅγιον τοῦτο μύρον οὐκ ἐστὶ ψιλόν οὐδ' ὥς ἂν εἶποι τις κοινὸν μετ' ἐπίκλησιν, ἀλλὰ Χριστοῦ χάρισμα καὶ πνεύματος ἁγίου παρουσία τε αὐτοῦ θεότητος ἐνιργητικὸν γινόμενον.

† In Joannem, Hom. 46, 3.

‡ In 1 Cor. Hom. 24, 2.

§ De Trinitate, viii. 13.—Quomodo non naturaliter manere in nobis existimandus est qui et naturam carnis nostræ jam inseparabilem sibi homo natus assumsit, et naturam carnis suæ ad naturam æternitatis sub sacramento nobis communicandæ carnis admiscebat.

is changed.\* Yet he expresses himself not more plainly respecting the kind of change.

In the controversy about the two natures of Christ, a comparison was drawn between the relation of the divine nature to the human, and that of Christ's body and blood to the bread and wine. A fragment, erroneously ascribed to CHRYSOSTOM,† yet certainly an ancient and important testimony, illustrates the doctrine of the Son of God in his two natures, which remain peculiar and distinct, by a comparison with the Lord's Supper; the bread after the consecration loses the name of bread; as the divine and human natures remain unchangeable in their attributes, and yet we speak only of one Christ, so we speak only of one body of Christ, although the bread and wine are united with Christ's body and blood. THEODORET‡ gives an equally plain testimony against the transmutation of the bread; the bread and wine remain in their former *οὐσία*, and yet to the soul they seem as that which they have become, and as such are believed and revered. He distinguishes the *μεταβολὴ τῆς χάριτος* from the *μεταβολὴ τῆς φύσεως*, which here does not take place. Also the Roman Bishop GELASIUS, at the end of the fifth century, thus expresses himself: the two natures of Christ must be thought of like his image in the Supper; just as this by the operation of the Holy Spirit passes into the divine substance, although its nature retains its peculiar attributes, &c.§ GREGORY of NYSSA|| comes nearest to the doctrine of a transmutation of the bread and wine. He proposes the question, how the one body of Christ can be divided into so many thousand, and answers: as through the divine Logos bread is changed into the nature of the body, united with the

\* De Mysterioris, 9.

† Epistola ad Cæsarium, Opp. ed. Bened. t. iii. fol. 742.—Sicut enim antequam sanctificetur panis, panem nominamus; divina autem illum sanctificante gratia, mediante sacerdote, liberatus est quidem ab appellatione panis, dignus autem habitus dominici corporis appellatione, etiamsi natura panis in ipso permansit, et non duo corpora sed unum corpus Filii prædicamus.

‡ *ἐναντιότης*. Dialogus 2, Opp. ed. Hal. t. iv. p. 126.

§ De duabus naturis in Christo adversus Eutychem et Nestorium, in the Bibl. Patr. Lugd. t. viii.—In divinam transeant Spiritu sancto perficiente substantiam, permanente tamen in sua proprietate natura.

|| Orat. Catech. Magn. c. 37.

divinity, so here also in the Supper, the bread and wine are changed into the body that is united with the Logos. Therefore, a miracle is here effected immediately, which there was effected by eating. Hence we have an assertion, not of the presence of the glorified body of Christ, but of a repetition of the Incarnation. But he was far from maintaining, with a clear consciousness, the idea of a proper transubstantiation; thus, he says: As\* the bread is common until it has become and is called the body of Christ, by the offering of the Sacrament, so the mystic oil becomes efficacious after consecration, just as the priest, by his newly received consecration, is separated from the common multitude. Here the substance is regarded as the same, and only a higher element is transferred to it.

The second stage of a more spiritual view, but which has a realistic element at its basis, is to be found in ATHANASIUS,† who refers to John vi., and tries to show that the eating and drinking of the body and blood of Christ is not to be understood literally; Christ wished to lead his disciples to representations of a spiritual nourishment. Still more distinctly this view is taken by AUGUSTIN, who had adopted the doctrine of the African Church on this subject. He applies his general ideas of a Sacrament to the Lord's Supper, and speaks of signs, through which God reveals and shadows forth certain truths; for this purpose, the external part of the Lord's Supper is also intended. Since these signs are taken from common life, they may, indeed, inspire reverence on account of their association with religion, but not excite astonishment, as if they were something miraculous.‡ The Sacraments have a resemblance to that of which they are the sacred signs; from this resemblance they receive the names of the things they represent: thus as the Sacrament of the

\* De baptismo Christi, t. iii., p. 370.

† Ep. iv. ad Serapionem.—See especially the Festal Letters of St. Athanasius, translated by Larsow. Letter 7: "Bread and wine, as symbols of the nourishing divine power of the Logos. Not only here is this bread food for the righteous, not only do the saints who walk on earth, nourish themselves with such bread and blood, but also in Heaven we eat such food, for the Lord is also the nourishment of the higher spirits, and of angels, and is the delight of the collective heavenly host."—[JACOBI.]

‡ De Trinitate, iii. 10, 19.

body of Christ is, in a certain sense, the body of Christ, and the Sacrament of the blood of Christ is the blood of Christ, so the Sacrament of Faith is Faith.\* If AUGUSTIN had believed in an interpenetration of the Natural and the Divine, he would not have so expressed himself. This is shown when he remarks,† that in the Old Testament the name of the thing is transferred to the sign, and that Christ, at the Supper, said this is my body, when he had merely given a sign of his body. When he further vindicates the typical interpretation of the Old Testament, he urges that even heterogeneous things may be used as symbols, and adduces, as an instance, the language used at the Supper, which seems harsh, that Christ gives us his blood to drink.‡ But although he regarded the bread and wine, in and for themselves, as symbolical signs, he certainly did not deny a supernatural power connected with them. Without doubt he believed that a higher communion with Christ was obtained by their means, only not bodily and confined to the outward signs. The *res sacramenti* in the Supper was, in his opinion, the connexion of the faithful as members of one body with their head, and with one another, therefore, the union in one Church. Christ gave a sign of his presence for men who could not see him. "Only have faith, and He is with thee whom thou seest not. The eye sees only Bread and Wine; faith must see the Body and Blood." He asks how Christ can impart his body. Here he had an opportunity of developing an idea, such as GREGORY of NYSSA entertained, if he had been favourable to it; but he pursued another method: he sought not to show how Christ could miraculously present his body, but referred to the difference between the sensuous and the spiritual. What the senses perceived was one thing; what was to be understood by it was another. Christ told the Jews that he should be taken up to heaven altogether; they would then see that his body could not be as they imagined, portioned out in any way: he spoke not to them of a bodily enjoyment, but of a spiritual appropriation. The external fruition, the flesh, would profit nothing without the spirit. Hence we receive eternal life in

\* Ep. 98, ad Bonifacium, c. 10.

† Contra Adimantum, c. 12, § 3.—Non enim Dominus dubitavit dicere, "hoc est corpus meum" quum signum daret corporis sui.

‡ Contra Adversarium Legis et Prophetarum, ii. c. 33 (10).

the participation of his body, because Christ himself is eternal life.\* Believers receive the internal enjoyment of the Supper, Unbelievers only the sign. Yet AUGUSTIN thought it important to maintain against the Donatists the objective significance of the Sacrament, and hence he says, that even the unworthy receive sacramentally the body of Christ at the Supper.

The third stage, which kept apart more distinctly the symbol and the divine reality, continued in the school of ORIGEN, with the exception of GREGORY of NYSSA. EUSEBIUS of CÆSAREA was very partial to such expressions as the following: Christians are admonished to celebrate the remembrance of Christ by the symbols of his body and blood.† In the interpretation of the sixth chapter of John's Gospel, he develops Christ's design;‡ we must not believe that Christ spoke of the body which he bore in his own person, or enjoined the drinking of his sensuous and corporeal blood; but the words that he spake were spirit and life, so that his words themselves are his flesh and blood. Accordingly, it is the highest object of the Supper to represent how Christ imparts himself to believers by the word that proceeds from him; this, however, did not prevent EUSEBIUS from connecting a supernatural sanctifying power with the outward Supper. GREGORY NAZIANZEN calls the Supper an image of the great mystery of the Incarnation§ and a type of salvation;|| it is that by which we come into communion with Christ, partake in his sufferings and divine nature.¶ Hence he calls it the sacred initiation that leads us upwards.\*\* He explains himself more fully in his letter *ad Amphilochium*.†† He enjoins on him to pray when he partakes of the Supper: "When through the words of Consecration, thou bringest down the Logos, and in an unbloody manner carvest the body of the Lord, so that the words serve thee for a knife." It would be possible so to understand these words, as if the Logos, by a

\* Sermo, 235, 272; Tract. 26, in Evang. Joannis.

† Demonstratio Evang. i. c. 40.

‡ Theolog. Eccl. iii. c. 12.

§ Orat. i. p. 38.

|| Orat. xvii. p. 272.

¶ Orat. iii. p. 70.

\*\* τὴν ἱεράν καὶ ἄνω φέρουσάν ἡμᾶς μυσταγωγίαν.

†† Ep. 240.



miracle, presented the body of Christ; but it better suits GREGORY's style of thinking, that the bread and wine were called the body and blood of Christ after the consecration, inasmuch as a certain operation of the divine Logos, an immediate sanctifying power was connected therewith.

How very much the realistic element predominated in the doctrine of the Supper was proved by the practice that came into vogue in the fourth Century, of preserving the consecrated bread and carrying it about, since a sanctifying power was believed to be connected with it.

This supposition of a supernatural sanctifying influence was implied in the practice still continued of *Infant Communion*. GELASIUS of ROME writes thus about A.D. 495. No one should venture to exclude any child from this sacrament, without which no one can attain to eternal life. Also in another direction, the notions entertained of the virtues of the Supper were constantly becoming more superstitious. The intercessions which were offered at its celebration not only for the living but the dead, now referred to the Purgatory to which it was supposed some persons were consigned, and were made use of to obtain release from it. The view of the Supper as a Sacrifice was promoted by the use of such prayers; it was depicted in a highly rhetorical manner by the Greek Homilists, and acquired more of an Old Testament character, in connexion with the formation of a peculiar priestly order. CYRILL of Jerusalem\* expatiates on the advantages of intercessory prayers at the Supper. "Many say, what advantage is it to the Soul which leaves this world with or without sins, if mention be made of it in the prayer? But as some persons present a golden crown for those who have fallen under the displeasure of the Emperor, in order to propitiate him, so we offer intercessions for the dead although they are sinners, and present not indeed a crown, but Christ offered for our sins, in order to reconcile them and ourselves to a gracious God." Here the Supper is evidently regarded not only as a sacrifice, but also as an appropriation of the Sacrifice of Christ for others. AUGUSTIN makes a moral and religious application to the congregation of the idea of a Sacrifice; while celebrating the remembrance of Christ we sacrifice ourselves in self-renunciation, which is well pleasing to God.

\* Orat. Mystag. v. 10.

The whole redeemed community is the universal offering which Christ presents to God, who has offered himself by his sufferings for us, in order that we may be the body of so great a head. We ourselves are the sacrifice,\* and this is represented in the Sacrament of the Supper. He distinguishes the sacrifices of the Jews as typical—the sufferings of Christ as the true sacrifice, and this after his ascension to Heaven is celebrated by the *sacramentum memoriae*.† Yet the Sacrifice for the dead is not in his view something merely symbolical, but has a peculiar and great advantage for the deceased. GREGORY the GREAT, according to his warm but sensuous devotion, developed the idea of the Sacrifice of the Mass, and its magical effect on Purgatory, in an exceedingly impressive manner; the holy Sacrifice at the Supper repeated the death of Christ in a mysterious way. Although Christ lives now unchangeably, yet he is still sacrificed for us. Hence we may imagine how much this sacrifice may effect which constantly imitates for us the Sacrifice of the Only Begotten.‡ Here the representation of the Supper is altogether changed into an objective copy of the Sacrifice of Christ. GREGORY's legends of its efficacy promoted the errors in this mode of considering the Supper. He did not, indeed, altogether overlook the moral and religious reference, he declares it necessary that we should sacrifice ourselves to God in the contrition of our hearts; for it will be in truth a sacrifice presented to God for us, when we present ourselves as a Sacrifice.§

#### f. ESCHATOLOGY.

THE general spirit of the Church certainly declared itself against the *ἀποκατάστασις*, which was taught by ORIGEN; yet traces of it are found in later times, particularly in the Church teachers of the fourth Century, who approached more closely to him, the two GREGORIES and DIDYMUS. GREGORY of Nyssa elaborated it in an original manner, and expounded it most freely. He would not allow reward and punishment to be regarded as something extraneous to man, but as both proceeding from the relation of rational creatures to God. Hence everything depends on the degree in which they are susceptible, in order to enter into communion with this source

\* De Civit. Dei, x. 5, 6.

† Dial. iv. c. 58.

‡ Contra Faustum, xxi. 22.

§ Neander's Ch. H. v. 186.

of blessedness. The final end is that nothing more should oppose the divine, but that all rational beings purified from all foreign elements should serve for a revelation of God. He infers this from Redemption, since Christ must operate through all rational existence and receive the whole creation to himself. When all rational existences have attained to his likeness, it will come to pass, that God shall be all in all (1 Cor. xv.). Evil has its limit over which it cannot pass; and which arises from the nature of the moral order of the Universe.\* In a tract on the early death of children he propounds these ideas, and attempts to connect them with a Theodicy; the development is not finished with the present life, it must therefore be also applied to children. The Patriarch GERMANUS of CONSTANTINOPLE, in the eighth century, endeavoured in his *ἀνταποδοτικός* † (so called because that book was intended to restore to GREGORY what belonged to him), that all the passages which treat of the *ἀποκατάστασις* were interpolated by heretics. But this is a forced conclusion; the idea entirely suits GREGORY's system. GREGORY NAZIANZEN did not venture to express his own doctrine so openly, but allows it sometimes to escape when he is speaking of eternal punishments. The Antiochian school were led to this doctrine, not by ORIGEN, but by their own thinking and examination of the Scriptures. They regarded the two-fold division in the development of the Creature as a general law of the Universe. This led to the final result of universal participation in the unchangeable divine life. Hence the *ἀποκατάστασις* was taught by DIONORIUS of TARSUS, in his treatise on the Incarnation of God (*περὶ οἰκονομίας*), and also by THEODORUS.‡ He appealed to Matt.

\* Orat. Catech. Magna. 8, 35; in 1 Cor. xv. 28, tom. ii. pag. 6; De Anima, pag. 90.

† Photius Cod. 233.

‡ Fragments communicated by the Nestorian Bishop Solomon of Bassara, in the 13th century, in Assemani Bibl. Orient. tom. iii. P. i. pag. 323, sqq. See especially in Ephes. i. 10. Spicileg. Solesm. i. 103. The Apocatastasis is placed in connexion with the person of the Redeemer. In Him the Divine and Human, the Heavenly and the Earthly, are combined, and thereby the Reconciliation of the World divided by sin is rendered possible. Recapitulavit (i. e. *ἀνεκεφαλαιώσεν*) in Christo omnia quasi quandam compendiosam renovationem et redintegrationem totius faciens creaturæ per eum.—Hanc ergo capitulationem omnium vocavit (sc. Apostolus), eo quod omnia collecta sunt in unum, et ad unum quoddam inspiciunt concordantes sibi; eo quod

v. 26, to prove a rule of proportion, and an end of punishment. God would not call the wicked to rise again if they must endure punishment without amendment.\* If CHRYSOSTOM in his homilies, often develops the doctrine of the eternity of punishment, it is to be observed, that those to whom he preached had not been brought to have doubts upon it by an impartial examination of the Scriptures, but only through their frivolity. They comforted themselves with thinking that God, like a tender father, would not take so strict an account of the sins and frailties of men: those passages of the Bible contained threatening only in order to alarm, and were not meant in real earnestness;† it is remarkable that he mentions in his exposition of 1 Cor. xv. 28, that the ἀποκατάστασις has been inferred‡ from that passage without contradicting the opinion as he otherwise would do, if he held it to be erroneous. Probably he had in his thoughts his teacher DIODORUS. In the controversies during the time of JUSTINIAN, this doctrine, with others that were held by ORIGEN, was denounced as heretical.

AUGUSTIN, by the whole spirit of his system, and by the important place which the idea of the primitive justice of God occupied in it, was made an opponent of this doctrine. But from his own vindication of eternal punishment we learn that even in the West, an opposition was maintained against it.§ In like manner GREGORY the GREAT appears as an opponent of the ἀποκατάστασις.|| But though the doctrine of such a development after death by which all evil would finally vanish, remained only the opinion of a few, the same cannot be said of the doctrine of a progressive development after death generally.

With this is connected the doctrine of *ignis purgatorius*, or

hanc intentionem olim opifex habuit, et ad hoc omnia a principio construxit, quod nunc implevit cum multa facilitate in illis, quæ erga Christum exstitisse videntur. Hoc autem in futuro sæculo erit, quando homines cuncti, nec non rationabiles virtutes ad illum inspiciant, ut fas exigit, et concordiam inter se pacemque firmam obtineant.—[JACOBI.]

\* See the fourth fragment in Marius Mercator.

† Hom. viii. in I. Ep. ad Thess. tom. xi. pag. 477; in II. Ep. ad Thess. Hom. iii. ibid. p. 522.

‡ Hom. 39, in I Ep. ad Cor. tom. x. pag. 372.

§ De Civit. Dei, xxi. 11, 12.

|| Dial. iv. 43.

purifying fire. We find a representation of this as preceding the last judgment, spread widely in the East. CYRILL of JERUSALEM\* speaks of a fiery flood in which men would be purified. In the West, this doctrine spread more in the form that this state of purification would be entered upon immediately after death. AUGUSTIN† finds this doctrine in Malachi iii., also Matt. xii., especially verse 32; and 1 Cor. iii. 13, confirmed him in admitting a state of purification for certain sins. It is not incredible, he says, that as God purifies us in this life by a variety of discipline, a similar course may follow after death, and it is to be inquired whether it may be of such a kind that many Christians, according as they loved earthly goods more or less, may be saved after passing through a purifying fire for a longer or shorter time. He therefore presupposes that in such persons, love to God as the Supreme Good has been predominant, but that the love of the World has not been entirely suppressed; but he puts forward the opinion only as problematical, though inclined to it himself.

With this notion of a purifying process was connected the representation that a satisfaction was to be rendered after death for sins committed after baptism, and not yet atoned for on earth,—and likewise the efficacy of good works, and of prayers for the dead at the Lord's Supper. The main outlines of this doctrine of the Catholic Church are plainly visible. GREGORY the GREAT also confirmed the doctrine of a purifying fire by his investigations and his legends.‡ He compared the passages of the Bible which declare that men's conduct in this life is decisive for their salvation or perdition, with those above mentioned, and used by AUGUSTIN as indicating a state of purification after death, and reconciles them thus,—that the conduct of men on earth is indeed decisive of their eternal state, yet a purification may be necessary for those who, though fitted by their lives, on the whole, for salvation, have yet left the world clogged with many imperfections. Therefore it is

\* Catech. xv. c. 21.—*ἔρχεται πρὸς τὸν πατέρα ὁ υἱὸς τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ἐπὶ τῶν νεφελῶν τοῦ οὐρανοῦ ποταμοῦ πυρὸς ἐλκοντας δοξίμαστικων τῶν ἀνθρώπων. Εἰ τις χρυσοῦν ἔχει τὰ ἔργα, λαμπρότερος κίνετα· εἰ τις καλαμῶδη ἔχει τὴν πρᾶξιν καὶ ἀνυπόστατον, κατακαίεται ὑπὸ τοῦ πυρὸς.*

† De Civit. Dei, xx. 25. Compare xxi. 13, 26. Enchirid. ad Laurent. c. 68.

‡ Dial. iv.

believed, that some to whom the Christian disposition has been wholly wanting, will find at death everlasting punishment to be their portion; others will attain salvation without undergoing purification, because the degree of their Christian perfection did not require it; and between these two classes, those stand who have a Christian disposition, but yet mixed with foreign elements, and requiring purification. In this manner an attempt was made to obviate practically injurious consequences; for many would make use of the doctrine as an expedient for a light-minded acquiescence in their sins; they indulged in a Jewish notion of faith; everything was made to depend on Orthodoxy; by means of it even the profligate would attain to salvation, although they must previously pass through the fires of Purgatory. For this reason PELAGIUS declared himself opposed to the doctrine of Purgatory, and AUGUSTIN, in his treatise *de fide et operibus*, combated that abuse. In his school this opposition continued on account of its deeper views of Morality, and FULGENTIUS of RUSPE, expressed himself in a similar manner.\*

\* De Remissione Peccatorum, l. ii

## SECOND PRINCIPAL PERIOD.

### THE HISTORY OF DOGMAS IN THE MIDDLE AGES,

FROM GREGORY THE FIRST TO THE REFORMATION.

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#### FIRST PERIOD,

FROM THE DEATH OF GREGORY I. TO GREGORY VIII., AND THE  
BEGINNING OF THE SCHOLASTIC THEOLOGY.

(THAT IS, FROM THE BEGINNING OF THE SEVENTH TO THE END OF THE  
ELEVENTH CENTURY.)

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#### GENERAL HISTORY OF DOGMAS.

In the preceding period, the truths of Christianity had been moulded into a compact system, a form in which they could be more easily presented to the acceptance of uncivilized nations. The period which we have now to contemplate was a period of transition from an ancient form of culture to one that was radically new. It accomplished much for the extension of the Church among the Germanic tribes, for the rudiments of their civilization, and the preparatory steps for the transformation of their entire life; but in the same proportion was it less powerful for the development of doctrine. The opposition between the Eastern and Roman Churches was in this period carried to the length of an outward disruption. A new opponent to Christianity altogether, came forward in Islamism,\* which was capable of

\* The Koran. ed. Maracci, Patav. 1698. Translations: Sale, Lond. 1734, 1836; Wahl, 1828; Ullmann, 1840. On the Dogmatics of Islamism; Dettinger, Zur Theologie des Koran. Tübinger Zutsche. für Theol. 1801; Umbreit. Stud. u. Krit. 1811; G. Weil, Mohammed der Prophet, Stuttg. 1843; Maier, Christ Bestandtheile des Kor. Freiburg Zeitschr. f. Theol. ii.; Dollinger, Muham. Religion nach Entwickl. und Einfluss. Regenb. 1838; Geiger, War hat Moh. aus den

extension, because Christian doctrine had lost its power by an excessive intellectualism, and no living youthful enthusiasm for Christianity was left to make head against it. In Islamism we see a revived Jewish standpoint, but a carnal Judaism severed from organic connexion with the development of God's kingdom, and sunk to the level of Natural Religion. Even in the Church, the objective Catholic element had been the means of forming a mixture of Christianity with Judaism which during this period especially, developed its results; but yet there was a Christian spirit under a Jewish covering. Islamism was enthusiastic for one God, whom it regarded chiefly on the side of his omnipotence. It was pre-eminently deistical, and hence its opposition to the doctrines of the Trinity, the Divinity of Christ, and Redemption. The Divine was set in opposition to the Human; moral liberty was given up, and Fatalism introduced. The early conflicts of Christianity with Judaism and Heathenism were important for the development of doctrines; in the conflict with Islamism this was not the case, partly because the antagonism was too absolute, and partly because the Greek Church wanted the element of vitality requisite for a wider development. The only traces of such an influence on doctrines is perhaps to be found in the Church of Spain.\*

As henceforward the Western Church comes far more into notice for the development of Christianity, than the Greek Church, which was rapidly sinking into formalism, we shall begin with a description of the first. At two points in its history the beginning of a new spiritual Creation are visible, in the Carolingian age, and at the end of the Period; here therefore we shall have to seek for the developments that were fruitful in reference to doctrines.

After the succession of the classical teachers of the Western Church had been closed in the person of GREGORY the GREAT, a time followed, in which the department of Exegesis and Dogmatic was cultivated by means of Collections. Compendiums were formed in which the dogmatic statements of the Fathers, especially AUGUSTIN and GREGORY, were collected,—the *Sententia Patrum*. Among these the most noted are the

Judenthum aufgenommen? Bonn, 1833. Gerock, Versuch einer Darstellung d. Christologie des Kor. Hamb. 1839

\* Neander's Ch. Hist. v. 216.



*Sententiæ* of ISIDORE of SEVILLE (Hispalis\*) a man whose studies comprehended all the knowledge of his age. Rome was the Mother of Christian culture for most of the Western churches, and hence the influence of the Roman dogmas was everywhere predominant. All the elements of the Catholic Dogmatic were communicated to the newly converted nations. Yet it must be admitted that we find traces of a reaction which in its further progress might have had a most important influence on doctrines; a Protestant tendency might have developed itself in opposition to the Catholic element. Its starting point was from Britain and Ireland. For although the Anglo-Saxon Church was founded by Rome, yet among the ancient Britons who probably received Christianity originally from Lesser Asia and remained in connexion with the Greek Church, a freer spirit in Church matters was preserved which was confirmed in its peculiar character by its opposition to the Anglo-Saxon Church. The Church of Ireland was not even founded by Rome, but formed independently by PATRICK. It was more allied to the Britons, and the Greek Fathers were studied; the authority of Roman Tradition was impugned, and the Holy Scriptures were made the sole standard. It is remarkable that even at that time this germ of a Protestant Element was found in the Germany church; for BONIFACE had to dispute with Irish missionaries of this tendency, and it now became the question whether the Roman dogma which he wished to introduce, was to prevail, or the freer tendency. Yet the latter was not sufficiently powerful, nor suited to these rude tribes. BONIFACE, on the other hand, coalesced with the general development of the Western Church. God had so ordained its course that first of all, the Catholic Element was matured to its full extent, in order that afterwards the reaction of the Christian consciousness, when the nations were prepared for it, might be so much the more powerful and efficient. The Irish spirit could not render this important reaction victorious, but receded more and more; yet the peculiar culture which emanated from the Irish monasteries always exerted an influence in the development of dogmas.

After the Church among the Germans had obtained at last

\* Opp. ed. Faustus Arevalo. Rom. 1797; 7 vols. 4. Bähr, Christlich-Römische Theologie, p. 455.

a firm settlement in the seventh and eighth centuries, and so much had been effected that what remained of a former stage of culture was surrendered in Italy, Spain, England, and Ireland, a new Epoch began under CHARLEMAGNE, in which the various elements of earlier theological production were concentrated.\* The peculiar constitution of the German mind was apparent in its mode of receiving Christianity; there was a greater freedom of development,—an endeavour to go back to the original foundations of Christianity, in opposition to Roman Traditionalism; there were already prognostics of the Reformation. Although CHARLEMAGNE revered the Roman Church, yet the dogmatic theological culture which proceeded from him and his theologians was more spiritual than the superstitious sensuous character of the Roman theology. A work which appeared under his name, and in which he took part, the *libri Carolini*,† is remarkable in this respect; it advocated the worship of God in spirit and in truth, and protested earnestly against Superstition and those apocryphal writings which promoted it. This work breathes a peculiar and pure spirit, the expression of personal inquiry; what a contrast, if we compare with it the letters of the Popes in those times! We perceive the reaction of this mental tendency in the distinguished Theologians,—ALCUIN,‡ who was the principal author of the above-mentioned work; AGOBARD of LYONS,§ and CLAUDIUS of TURIN,|| in whom the counteraction of the Pro-

\* Joannes Launojus de Scholis Celebrioribus sive a Carolo Magno sive post eundem per occidentem instauratis, Par. 1672; re-edited by J. A. Fabricius, Hamb. 1717. Bähr, Geschichte der Rom. Literatur im Karolingischen Zeitalter, 1840.

† Ed. Heumann, Hannov. 1731. Neander's C. H. v. 324—335.

‡ Died 804; De Fide Sanctæ Trinitatis, libb. 3. Controversial writings against the Adoptianists; 232 letters. Opp. ed. Frobenius, Ratisb. 1777, 2 t. fol. Alkuins Leben von F. Lorenz, Halle, 1829.

§ Died 840. Liber contra Judicium Dei; Epistola ad Barthol. episcopum de quorundam Illusione Signorum; De Picturis et Imaginibus, Opp. ed. Steph. Baluzius, Par. 1666, 2 voll. 8. Gallandi, Bibl. t. xiii. p. 404. C. B. Hundeshagen, De Agobardi vita, Gissæ, 1831, 8. Bähr, p. 383.

|| Prefatio in Libros Informationum Literæ et Spiritus super Leviticum ad Theodemirum Abbatem; Commentarii in Libros Regum ad Theodemirum; in Bedæ et Claudii Taurenensis aliorumque Opuscula a Canonicis Regularibus Sancti Salvatoris edita: Bonon 1757. Fragments in F. A. Zachariæ, Bibliotheca Pistoriensis, Augustæ Taurin. 1752. Commentarius in Epistolam ad Galatas. Biblioth. Patr. Lugd. t. xiv.

testant spirit is still more strongly exhibited. In him and AGOBARD these movements may be traced back to AUGUSTIN, who, in this age, on the one hand, certainly contributed much to propagate the Catholic element, and, on the other hand, counterworked superstition by the principles of a purer and more vital Christianity in his views of divine Grace. Hence, when in the doctrine respecting the Lord's Supper the Catholic element had reached its culminating point, the opposite and more spiritual view of it found its strongest supporter in AUGUSTIN. He was also not uninfluential in stimulating the speculative and dialectic spirit, although in the theology of the Carolingian era this gave way to the historical and practical tendency which occupied itself with the Bible, Tradition and the Fathers.

In the ninth century the PSEUDO-DIONYSIAN writings excited great influence. They were brought to France as a present from the Emperor MICHAEL to LOUIS the PIOUS, who caused them to be translated into Latin by the Abbot HILDUIN\* of St. Denis. The authority of the book was enhanced by the Apocryphal collection of accounts respecting the History of DIONYSIUS, which were compiled by HILDUIN. They effected the connexion between the results of New Platonism, and the mystic Theology of the East; they introduced a new element into the Western Theology, which was capable of being developed by the living spirit of the modern nations into something greater than was contained in the dead outward works of Mysticism. The most important effect of these writings on Theology consisted in their gaining an entrance for the contemplative tendency of Neo-Platonism, at a later period when the Aristotelian Philosophy was in the ascendant.

p. 134. *Præfatio Expositionis in Epistolam ad Ephesios*, in Mabillon, *Vetera Analecta*, ed. ii. p. 91. Other Fragments, *Spicilegium Romanum*, t. iv. p. 301, t. ix. p. i. pag. 109. *Scriptorum vett. nov. Coll.* t. vii. p. i. 274. His *Apologeticus ad Theodemirum*, in Jonas of Orleans, *De Cultu Imagin.* libb. 3. *Bibl. Patr.* Ludg. t. xiv. p. 190. Fragments from the Commentary on Matthew and the Epistle to the Romans, in Claudii Taur. *Episc. inedit.* Opp. *Specimina Præmissa de ejus Doctrina Scriptisque Dissertatione exh.* A. Rudelbach, Haviniæ, 1824, 8. Claudius of Turin, by C. Schmidt, in Illgen's *Zeitschr. f. Hist. Theol.* 1843.

\* *Areopagitica*, ed. Matth. Galenus : Colon. 1563, 8.

The Irish Monasteries were the spots where, first of all, a more dialectic Theology was cultivated, which spread still wider at the end of the eleventh century. Here not only AUGUSTIN but the Teachers of the Eastern Church were studied, and served to introduce Platonism. It was not impossible that the Pseudo-Dionysian writings were known at an earlier period in the Irish monasteries. The complaint of the Abbot BENEDICT of Aniane (in Languedoc), in the time of LOUIS the PIOUS, alludes to a peculiar theological tendency, when he speaks of the *moderni scholastici apud Scotos*, and charges them with falsifying the simplicity of the Gospel by their *sylogisticas illusiones*. More accurate knowledge of this phase in the Irish Church is wanting to us, but one man may serve instead of all the rest as a representative of this Theology, JOHN SCOTUS ERIGENA.\* In order to understand the mental training of this very remarkable man, we must take into account his education, in an age, and surrounded by connexions of deep Christian piety. If he admitted principles which were contrary to Christianity, the influence of the Christian piety, which he had imbibed in the Irish monasteries, prevented their development into full consciousness; yet they remained concealed under Christian ideas, and opposite elements were blended in his mind; a Christian feeling, and a mode of thinking which, intellectually considered, was not reconcilable with the Christian Faith. Add to this the influence of the Greek Fathers, especially ORIGEN, GREGORY of NYSSA, and MAXIMUS, perhaps also still earlier the PSEUDO-DIONYSIUS whom he afterwards translated into Latin, whereby his mind was impregnated with a mystical and dialectic element. From those teachers he received a free speculative

\* De Divisione Naturæ, libb. 5, ed. Thomas Gale, Ox. 1681, fol.; De Prædestinatione Dei, Opp. ed. H. J. Floss, in the Patrologia of Migne, 1853. See the Prolegomena on the Life and Writings of Scotus. F. A. Staudenmeier, Johannes Scotus Erigena und die Wissenschaft seiner Zeit. Thl. 1. Frankf. a. M. 1814. Nikolaus Möller, Joh. Scotus Erigena, Mainz. 1844. Fronmüller die Lehre der Joh Scotus Erigena vom Wesen des Bösen in the Tüb. Zeitschr. f Theol. 1830. Baur, Lehre von der Dreieinigkeit, ii. 274. Ritter, Gesch. der Christ. Philosophie, iii. 206. That he was called only Johannes Scotus by his contemporaries, and that Erigena is identical with the latter name, see ed. Floss Proem. xix. According to Floss's not even probable opinion, Erigena is to be derived from Jerugena, i. e., ex insulæ sanctorum natus; rather from Erin, Ireland.—[JACOB.]

tendency, though developed in a peculiar manner. He was not so much the recipient of the opinions of others, but rather was indebted to them for an impulse towards the construction of a system of his own. For its leading principles we must consult his chief work *de divisione naturæ*. He distinguishes the two standpoints of *fides* and *ratio*. *Fides* in the order of Time is first; the religious development of Man proceeds from Authority; but in the order of ideas *ratio* is first, for from it everything is known as necessary. SCOTUS might, therefore, with AUGUSTIN, regard the standpoint of *Fides* as a necessary preparation for knowledge; the difference is that he allowed *Ratio* to exalt itself above *Fides*, and maintained, not merely a formal but a material distinction between them. In this respect he very much resembled the Alexandrian school, but placed *γνῶσις* still higher than they did, above *πίστις*. Philosophy and Religion were one throughout; the one was the Theory, the other the Practice.\* Religion supported itself on a symbolic revelation of God; Philosophy rose by itself to a knowledge of Truth; the former remained fettered by human anthropopathic representations; the latter set the Truth from them. On the standpoint of Religion the human Subjective was supreme—on that of Philosophy, objective Truth. At the head of all existence he placed the Absolute, the *ἓν*, and like *Πῦλο*, distinguished between the Being of God in itself, and his Revelation in all existence. The Absolute was, according to him, not the idea of the living God, but a mere logical Abstraction, the idea of the highest simplicity, to which all definite attributes are to be denied. With this idea of mere absolute Being, he mingled mystical representations which proceeded from an exuberance of feeling; God revealed himself to the feelings and to the intellect as this ineffable something. Although the idea of an unpersonal Absolute, would strictly not admit of Prayer, yet in the works of SCOTUS we find prayers, which give evidence of Devotion. In accordance with abstract speculation, he professed to deny to the Absolute Being, everything which is attributed to Him, on the stand-

\* Quid est aliud, de philosophia tractare, nisi veræ religionis, qua summa et principalis omnium rerum causa Deus et humiliter colitur et rationabiliter investigatur, regulas exponere? Conficitur inde, veram esse philosophiam veram religionem, conversimque veram religionem esse veram philosophiam.—De Prædestinat. i.

point of the religious consciousness, of scriptural Revelation, and of the Church doctrine. All the attributes ascribed to Him are only various phases under which the simple Absolute presents himself in condescension to the human consciousness, it is a subjective Phenomenology without reality, an optical refraction of the Absolute. There is therefore a twofold Theology, the *Θεολογία καταφατική* and *ἀποφατική*, the positive and the negative, that which invests the Divine Being with human (or analogous to human) attributes, and that which divests Him of all such attributes (*die vermenschlichende und die entmenschlichende*). Since we cannot remain fixed to the highest negative standpoint, but must have something on which our conceptions may rest, it is not an arbitrary but a necessary Symbolic by which Holy Writ represents the Absolute according to human conceptions. Not merely the simple believer, but we ourselves must be shocked, if we say, that Love on the highest standpoint cannot be affirmed of God. He deduces all existence from the Absolute, every phenomenon of the former is a necessary development of the latter; hence all existence is only a Theophany, a necessary phenomenal form of the Absolute Being. He speaks of a Creation, but only from a Cataphatic standpoint. Instead of saying, God created all things, we should say more truly, God is in all.\* His Pantheism is also shown by the manner in which he classifies Existence. (1.) That stage of Existence which creates and is not created, the Absolute. (2.) The Existence which is created and creates, i.e. the divine Ideas, the first and original causes of all Being. (3.) The Existence which is created but does not create, that is, the operations which take place in Creatures. (4.) The Existence which neither creates, nor is created, this stage coincides with the first,† and means, God is all in all; the only true Existence in

\* Quum audimus, Deum omnia facere, nihil aliud debemus intelligere, quam Deum in omnibus esse, hoc est, essentiam subsistere. Ipse enim solus per se vere est, et omne quod vere in his, quæ sunt, dicitur esse, ipse solus est. —De Divis. Nat. i. § 72, ed. Floss.

† Prima et quarta forma unum sunt, quoniam de Deo solummodo intelliguntur; est enim principium omnium, quæ a se condita sunt, et finis omnium quæ eum appetunt, ut in eo æternaliter immutabiliterque quiescant. Quoniam ad eandem causam omnia, quæ ab ea procedunt, dum ad finem perveniunt reversura sunt, propterea finis omnium dicitur et neque creare neque creari perhibetur, nam postquam in eam reversa

all. According to these representations of God, he says, God does not know, see, or love; but he performs all this in men; in them he knows and loves himself.\* The consciousness of the created spirit is therefore nothing else than a form of the consciousness of the Absolute, who, by himself, has no consciousness. All Existence is a necessary development of the Absolute; so that we cannot speak of Evil. There can be no Evil for God, for then Evil would be something necessary; it vanishes in the harmony of the Universe, and only when the individual is considered apart from the whole, the idea of Evil arises as the *μὴ ὄν*. Dr. BAUR in his History of the doctrine of the Atonement, justly combats the assertion that the development of Scholasticism is to be traced to SCOTUS. For in this system, Knowledge stands related to Faith, and Philosophy to Christianity and Theology, very differently from what they do in SCOTUS; it shows far more of the influence of AUGUSTIN. But Dr. BAUR is wrong in regarding SCOTUS as the closing point of the older development; rather, it is evident that he distinguishes himself from all former developments of Theology; and only in regard to single elements of the Neo-Platonic kind can he be compared with the ancient ones. He presents quite a peculiar stage in Theology and Philosophy, the prognostic of a future development. Two methods of representing the relation of God to the Universe, diverging from Theism, the Dualistic and the Pantheistic, might be mingled in Christianity, and it was reserved for it, to develop Theism victoriously in opposition to them. In the first Period it had to combat Dualism, which not merely presented itself in open antagonism, but mixed in the development of Dogmas, and found a point of connexion in the powerful contradistinction which Christianity made between Good and

*sunt omnia, nil ulterius ab ea per generationem loco et tempore generibus et formis procedet. quoniam in ea omnia quæta erunt et unum individuum atque immutabile manebunt.—De Div. Nat. ii. § 2, ed. Floss.*

\* Non vos estis, qui amatis, qui videtis, qui movetis, sed spiritus patris vestri, qui loquitur in vobis veritatem de me et patre meo et seipso, ipse amat et videt me et patrem meum et seipsum in vobis, et movet in nobis seipsum, ut diligatis me et patrem meum. Si ergo seipsam sancta Trinitas in nobis et in seipsa amat et videt et movet, et a seipsa in seipsa et in creaturis suis amatur, videtur, movetur.—S. l. l. i. § 76.

Evil. But it was overcome, by the contradiction in which it stood to the Unity of the Christian consciousness of God. Pantheism could connect itself with Christianity exactly in the point where it was opposed to Dualism, by a one-sided Monism, which wants what there is of Truth in Dualism. It accepted the Christian doctrine of communion with God, but took away the consciousness of dependence on God, and of the contrariety between Good and Evil. In the attempt of SCOTUS the Period is foreshadowed, which would aim at blending Pantheism and Christianity, from which a new form of Dogmas might proceed. But this was too foreign to that Age; it neither received this, nor was it capable of rightly understanding what was true and profound in SCOTUS. The part he took in some controversies exposed him to the charge of heresy; but he was misunderstood. We perceive the influence of his system in the speculations of the thirteenth century.

The developments of the Carolingian age were succeeded by times of devastation and barbarism which checked the unfolding of this germ of a new culture; so that it only existed in an occult state. The tenth century produced only a few men of scientific genius; among these was RATHERIUS of Verona or Lüttich,\* a man who, with Augustinian views, denounced Anthropomorphism, Superstition, and Ceremonies. But about the end of the tenth, and in the eleventh century, and when the end of the world was expected, a new order of things was preparing. In France a more scientific spirit, and the reaction of a freer standpoint proceeded from GERBERT † against papal Absolutism. FULBERT, ‡ the superintendent of a flourishing school at Chartres, contributed also to the establishment of a new theological development. LANFRANC, § Abbot

\* Died, 974. *De Contemptu Canonum*; *Apologia sui ipsius*; *Liber Apologeticus*, &c., in d'Achery, *Spicilegium*, i. 345. *Præloniorum libb. vi.* in Martene et Durand *Ampl. coll.* ix. p. 785. Opp. ed. Ballerenii fratres, Ver. 1765. *Histoire Littéraire de la France*, t. vi. Engelhardt, *Kirchengesch. Abhandlungen*, 1832. Neander, *Deutsche Zeitschr.* 1851, Nr. 36. Ratherius von Verona vom Lic Vogel. 1854.

† *De Corpore et Sanguine Christi*; *De Rationali et Ratione uti in Pezii Thesaurus*. Vol. i. p. 133. C. F. Hock, *Gerbert oder Papst Silvester II. und sein Jahrhundert*. Wien. 1837.

‡ Died, 1028. *Epistolæ et Sermones*, ed. Villiers: Par. 1608, and *Bibl. Patr. Lugd. t. xviii.*

§ *De Corpore et Sanguine Domini*; *Epistolæ*; *Commentarii*. Opp. ed. d'Achery: Par. 1648. *Histoire Litt. de la France*, viii. 260.



of Bec in Normandy (A.D. 1070, Archbishop of Canterbury; died A.D. 1089), brought with him from Italy the seeds of a scientific spirit. But the traces of the new scientific life which are visible at various points, are marked by another spirit than that of the Carolingian age; it is no longer a historical and practical, but a speculative and dialectic spirit. The newly awakened understanding felt its powers, was fond of exercising itself in Dialectics, and applied itself with greater ardour in that direction, since it had been separated from the connexion with the earlier historical development. But in the eleventh Century it was still doubtful, whither this new path would lead. AUGUSTIN powerfully influenced Speculation, and the question now was, whether his maxim *fides præcedit intellectum*, would be strictly followed, and the Tradition of the Church be regarded as an object of faith, or whether a freer spirit of investigation would be developed. LANFRANC was the representative of dialectic Speculation which allied itself altogether to the Church. But he was met by an opponent of superior powers,—BERENGARIUS,\* trained in the school of FULBERT, superintendent of the school at Tours, and afterwards deacon at Angers. His ideas became chiefly known by the part he took in various controversies, but a more general, original, mental tendency forms the basis of his doctrines, as in that of the Lord's Supper. He had formed his views according to AUGUSTIN, and had been stimulated by his writings to an earnest religious life, and to advocate his doctrine of grace, and of the Sacraments. He vindicated against LANFRANC, the right of free rational inquiry, and spoke against the dependence of Reason on the faith of authority. When LANFRANC charged him with not holding the doctrine of the Church, he replied, that Christ made use of logical deductions; that it belonged to a noble-minded disposition to have recourse to Dialectic, in other words, to appeal to Reason; and whoever did not adopt this method, denied his own dignity (since Man by Reason was created in the image of God), and could not be renewed day by day in the

\* C. F. Stäudlin Berengarius von Tours, in Stäudlins und Tzschirners Archiv für Kirchengesch. Bd. 2, H. 1. Sudendorf, Berengarius oder eine Sammlung ihn betreffender Briefe, 1850. See J. L. Jacobi in Herzogs Encyclopädie. Art. Berengarius.

image of God.\* We see in this controversy the germ of a more Catholic and of a more Protestant tendency. BERENGARIUS was indeed put down by the other party, but the conflict was not decided, and the points in dispute re-appeared in the twelfth century. Among the controversies in which he was involved, a peculiar tendency was exhibited by EUSEBIUS BRUNO, Bishop of Angers, which aimed at maintaining the simple biblical character of the doctrine of faith, and was satisfied with bringing to light the simple truths of the Holy Scriptures in opposition to those who only followed the authority of the Church doctrine, and likewise to the prevalent spirit of Speculation.

#### THE GREEK CHURCH.

IN the Greek Church there was more of scientific precision than in the newly-formed Latin Church, but it wanted the spiritual motive power; it had forgotten the substance of vital Christianity in one-sided dogmatizing, and in altercations about intellectual formulas. There was, in addition, the despotism of the State, which checked the free development of the religious spirit in the Church. It had sunk into a state of stagnation, and while its living spirit retired into the West, it first beheld in the Future the growth of a new principle of life. The dialectic tendency was greatly fostered by the Monophysite controversies. It sought support from ARISTOTLE. The Pseudo-Dionysian writings operated in favour of the mystical element. They not only established the Hierarchy more firmly, by investing it with a sort of spirituality, but superstition of other kinds was spiritualized to a certain degree from this standpoint, and was received into the Church System. We find a remarkable blending of these two mental elements in MAXIMUS.† The mystic element in him attempted the dogmatic; hence there was a less abrupt mode of conceiving the Supernatural, and an attempt to reconcile it with the Rational. He expressed ideas respecting both sides which might have been very productive in an age and community of greater mental activity. The controversies that had been carried on, occasioned the production of one important

\* Ep. ad Ricardum in d'Achery Spicilegium.

† Disputatio cum Pyrrho. Opp. ed. Franciscus Combesisius : Par. 1675, 2 vols. Baur, Lehre der Dreieinigk. ii. 263.

work for the Greek Church, the doctrinal manual of JOHN of DAMASCUS,\* the last original dogmatic production of the Greek Church. The various opinions of the Fathers are placed together, and an attempt is ably made to reconcile them. But this work could not create a new scientific tendency, as similar dialectic works written in the Church spirit gave birth in the West to the Scholastic Theology. The combined action of the Dialectic, the Mystic, and the Ecclesiastic, only served to establish what was ancient. All the popular superstitions were only strengthened by these means, the various branches were not purified by the Dogmatic, and hence it was so much more difficult to separate the foreign elements from the Church, and to overcome them. The reactions which occurred, did not proceed from the Church Dogmatic. Some arose from the after-effect of the Gnostic sects. The original movement of these sects was a reaction of Jewish and heathen elements against the fundamental truths of Christianity; but since in the Church the Christian element had connected itself with the Jewish, the opposition took a more advantageous direction, for it combated this mixture. As MARCION had formerly taken such a position, so in the seventh Century the PAULICIANS appeared in the Greek Church,† offsets indeed of Marcionitism (they called themselves Χριστοπολίται), who attempted to carry out the Pauline element in a one-sided manner, and confounded it with dualistic views. They combated the mixture of Light and Darkness which they found in the Church, and wished to restore the Apostolic Christianity freed from all impurities. Yet even this sect did not make any deep impression on the Church. Another reaction which proceeded from the Church itself, combated the sensuous tendency of the religious spirit, though it was directed more against a particular branch of it, than against it as a whole.

\* Died, 760. Principal work, *πηγή γνώσεως*: (1) *τα φιλοσοφικά*; (2) *περι αἱρέσεων*; (3) the most important part in reference to Dogmas, *ἐκδοσις* (*ἐκθεσις*) *ἀκριβὴς τῆς ὀρθοδόξου πίστεως*. Opp. ed. Michael le Quien: Par. 1712, 2 vols. f. Ritter Gesch. der Christl. Philosophie, ii. 553.

† Petri Siculi (870) *Historia Manichæorum*, ed. M. Raderus, Ingolst. 1604. J. C. L. Gieseler: Gotting 1846. Photius adv. Recentiores Manichæos, libb. 4, in J. Chr. Wolfii *Anecdotis Græcis*: Hamb. 1722, 23. Gallandii *Bibl. Patr.* xiii. 603. Gieseler, *Abhandlung über die Paulicianer*, Theol. Stud. und Krit. 1829.

This was the war against *Image-worship*.\* It is remarkable that this opposition proceeded from the laity. This might have been a symptom of the power of the Christian consciousness, and important in reference to the renovation of the Church. But owing to the peculiar standpoint of the Greek Church, things took a different turn ; for this reaction did not proceed from the main body of Christian people, but from persons holding civil offices, and was connected with faulty elements, the dogmatizing temper of the Emperors, and the dependence of the Church on the State, hence the Emperors used their political power to prescribe to the Church what they deemed to be the truth. In a contest which was not founded on conviction, the Truth itself would be changed into falsehood. This reaction applied itself, first of all, to questions of no immediate dogmatic importance ; it was occupied about the mode of worship, or the use of works of Art in Churches ; but the dogmatic element was soon blended with it, for the relation of the image to the object it represented necessarily demanded inquiry. But generally, a deeper and more widely extended opposition of the religious spirit was at the basis of this reaction. The entire sensuous and objective tendency of the religious sentiment was connected with the worship of Images, hence that particular outgrowth of it could not be permanently checked without a revolution in the entire spiritual tendency of the Church. On the other hand, in the efforts of the Iconoclasts certain general principles were at work, which would certainly have been carried further, if they could have expressed them. There was not only a reformatory principle which might have removed other foreign elements in the Church, but a more definite Protestant principle which concerned the sources of Christian knowledge. The advocates of Images took their arguments from Tradition, and their opponents from the Bible ; hence the Holy Scriptures, as the highest source of Christian knowledge, were set in opposition to Tradition. Traces of such a view are to be found, though there was a reluctance to express them openly. Yet it cannot be affirmed, that the opposition against Image-worship, in every instance, proceeded from a pure Christian interest, and was a conflict undertaken on behalf of

\* Walch's *Ketzerhistorie*, Th. 10, u. 11. F. Ch. Schlosser *Gesch. der Bildersturmenden Kaiser des Ostrom. Reiches*.

Christian truth. We find in the Iconoclasts a fanaticism of a negative kind, which betrayed itself in a special hatred against Art. They would have revived that earlier antagonism of Christianity against the World, which had also directed itself against the æsthetic character of the Pagan worship, as in all cases right and absolute, though Christianity was not intended to disown anything purely human, but rather to appropriate and elevate it. This Truth presented itself to the worshippers of Images, though misunderstood; they recognised the principle of the humanizing of the Divine in Christianity. After God had become Man, they said, and the divine essence had been humanly presented in Christ, God must be revered in Humanity. Their opponents, by ignoring this truth, were liable to fall into a tendency that divested God of human attributes, and by giving prominence to the distance between God and Man, to place themselves on a Jewish or Deistical standpoint. It was, therefore, still disputable, whether the pure Christian principle of faith would be developed by them, in opposition to Superstition, or Negation and Deism, and whether with the want of a living Christianity at that time in the Greek Church, the victory of this tendency would lead to the development of a truly Protestant principle. In spite of external force the Iconoclasts could not succeed against the conviction, which had its support in the whole structure of ecclesiastical Superstition, and after the conflict of a century no trace of this great commotion was left.

If we look at the dogmatic contrarieties, it follows from the character of this Period that they could only come forward in an isolated form. The ground of the controversies rested in part on the earlier contrarieties. Respecting the doctrine of the Holy Spirit, a foundation was laid for a difference between the Eastern and Western Churches; it was traceable to more important differences between the two Churches, and owing to accidental external influences, a dispute arose in the ninth century which led to their complete disruption. Moreover, in the Monophysite controversies there was a new development of the dispute occasioned by the question respecting the one or two Wills of Christ. The Adoptionist controversy in the eighth and ninth centuries appears as a repetition in the West, of the difference between the Antiochian and Alexandrian Schools respecting the Person of Christ. The

result of the Semi-Pelagian controversy was the victory of the Augustinian system ; the more offensive side of the Augustinian doctrine was thereby concealed ; but the consequence was, that it was again brought out in GOTTSCHALK's controversy. In the doctrine of the Lord's Supper different views had hitherto co-existed with a substantial agreement. But the prevailing sensuous mental tendency gained a general and increasing acceptance for that view of the Supper which was congenial to it, and as this was expressed in the ninth century in the most unqualified manner, the reaction of a spiritual tendency rose up against it.

## THE HISTORY OF SPECIAL DOGMAS.

### A. THE HISTORY OF INTRODUCTORY DOGMAS.

#### THE DOCTRINE OF INSPIRATION.

THIS is the only doctrine of those that belong to the Introduction in Dogmatic that we have still to touch upon. Since the idea of it had been subjected to examination so little in the preceding period, it could scarcely be expected, that it would be canvassed in the ninth century. The exaggeration of the prevailing view was the occasion of calling forth a reaction. The Abbot FREDEGIS, who was educated in ALCUIN's school at York, did not belong to the opponents of free inquiry, but rather showed the germ of the dialectic tendency, which was developed in Scholasticism. We find him maintaining,\* that Reason is first of all to be used, and then recourse must be had to authority, but an authority which would be consonant to Reason. But the same FREDEGIS took offence at an expression of AGOBARD, Archbishop of Lyons, that there was a want of grammatical accuracy in the Apostolic writings. He maintained, on the contrary, that in the Holy Scriptures there was nothing contrary to the rules of grammar, unless there was a special reason for it. It could not be credited that the Holy Spirit, who had endowed the Apostles with the languages of all nations, would have taught them a rude and not a polished language. AGOBARD replied, that the absurd position

\* *Primum ratione utendum, in quantum hominis ratio patitur ; deinde auctoritate, non qualibet, sed ratione dumtaxat, quæ sola auctoritas est solaque immobilem obtinet firmitatem.* See Baluz. *Miscell.* i. 404.

would follow, that the Holy Spirit not only inspired the meaning of the Scriptures, the contents, and the general mode of development, but the identical words (*ipsa corporalia verba*) themselves of the writers. The dignity of the divine word consisted not in the pomp of words, but in the power of the thoughts.\* This implies the denial of Verbal Inspiration, and the admission that in the Holy Scriptures everything is not equally the Inspiration of the Holy Spirit, but that something is to be ascribed to Man in the form of the language. He therefore held that the individuality of the Apostles was animated by the Holy Spirit, though even this he has not clearly developed.

MAXIMUS gives no express statement of his idea of Inspiration, but it may be gathered from what he says generally of the relation of the Divine and the Human. There are powers implanted in human nature by which it inquires after divine things. Divine Revelation presupposes this constitution as an organ, but in consequence of sin it is weighed down by the predominance of sensuousness. By the operation of divine grace it is restored to a free development in the case of those who present a susceptible tendency of the Will, freed from the deceptive influence of sensuousness, and becomes animated by divine grace, under the guidance of which Man inquires after divine things.† The Holy Spirit does not operate apart from those natural powers; otherwise, the prophets would not have understood what was communicated to them by inspiration. The Holy Spirit does not annihilate the powers of Nature, but restores their efficiency to the powers which have been perverted from their natural use, by employing them for a purpose that is agreeable to their nature.‡ Therefore, there is not a mere passive condition of the human mind to the divine agency, but a co-operation of the human individuality. He considered that every *χάρισμα* was conditioned by the peculiar constitution and capability of the individual.

\* Neander's Ch. History, vi. 161. Adv. Fredeg. Opp. ed. Baluz, i. p. 177.

† *Quæstiones in Scripturam*, Opp, t. i. p. 199.

‡ P. 201.—*ἡ χάρις οὐδαμῶς τῆς φύσεως καταργεῖ τὴν δύναμιν, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον καταργηθεῖσαν πάλιν τῇ χρήσει τῶν παρὰ φύσιν τρόπων ἐνεργὸν ποιεῖ πάλιν τῇ χρήσει τῶν κατὰ φύσιν πρὸς τὴν τῶν θείων κατανόησιν εἰσαγούσα.*

## B. THE DOGMAS OF SPECIAL DOGMATIC.

## a. THEOLOGY.

## THE CONTROVERSY RESPECTING THE PROCESSION OF THE HOLY SPIRIT.

WHILE the Theology of SCOTUS ERIGENA passed away without leaving any impression, Theologians were much occupied with the difference between the Eastern and Western Churches,—whether the Holy Spirit proceeded from the Father alone, or from the Father and the Son.

JOHN of DAMASCUS firmly held the fundamental proposition of the Greek Church, that the Father is the efficient cause of everything in the Trinity, and consequently that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father. Hence, he remarked that the Father communicates everything to the Son, and performs all things through the Son. And thus he was in favour of the harmonizing representation that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father through the Son. He makes use of an illustration taken from the sun, the ray of light and the illumination it gives.\* This conciliatory representation in this form is found only in a section (cap. 12) which is wanting in the most ancient manuscripts; but elsewhere he thus expresses himself,—the Holy Spirit is the Spirit of the Father, and from the Father; the Holy Spirit is not from the Son, but is the Spirit of the Son.

SCOTUS ERIGENA, who had been trained under the influence of both churches, expressed himself in a conciliatory manner; † though the light from a fire is through the medium of the ray, yet there are not two causes of the light, but only one,—the present power of the fire which operates in both. He also makes use of AUGUSTIN'S illustration taken from the human mind, thus: ‡ the human spirit produces its own self-

\* Lib. i. cap. 7—12.

† De Divin. Nat. ii. 32.—Taken strictly, he inclined more to the Greek church; cap. 31. *Ex duobus namque causis unam causam confluere, rationi non facile occurrit, præsertim in simplici natura et plus quam simplici et, ut verius dicatur in ipsa simplicitate omni divisione et numerositate carente.*—[JACOBI.]

‡ *Mens et notitiam sui gignit et a se ipsa amor sui et notitia sui procedit, quo et ipsa et notitia sui conjunguntur, et quamvis ipse amor ex mente per notitiam sui procedat, non tamen ipsa notitia causa amoris est, sed ipsa mens, ex qua amor inchoat esse, et antequam ad perfectam notitiam sui mens ipsa perveniat.*—C. 32, p. 610, ed. Floss.



consciousness, and from this proceeds the knowledge of itself, and the love which connects the spirit and its self-consciousness with one another; yet the self-consciousness is not the cause of the love, but the Spirit itself from which the love is first of all derived, before the Spirit attains its perfect self-knowledge.

External influences checked the operation of the conciliatory representation on the controversy between the Western and Eastern Churches. It may appear strange that exactly such a difference should be so prominent in the controversy, and that far more important points in Anthropology and Soteriology were passed over. Yet these were more concealed, they were not brought forward in any Creed, and it needed a deeper examination of the two churches than the slightly cultivated dogmatic criticism of the age could effect, to discover them. The attention was first of all turned to that which lay on the surface, and an age little versed in theology attached great importance to words and phrases. The diversified recension of the Creed of Nice and Constantinople in the Greek and Latin form, excited the attention of the Synod of GENTILIAEUM (Gentilly) in A.D. 767, which anathematized the Greek doctrine of the Holy Spirit. In the Council held at FORUM JULIUM (Friuli) (A.D. 791 or 796) the Patriarch PAULINUS of Aquileia defended the Western Church against the charge of falsifying that Creed; if the creed was explained according to the meaning of its author, it could not be said that it was altered. As the Fathers of the Council at Constantinople had enlarged the Nicene Creed according to the mind of the original framer of it by the statements respecting the Holy Spirit, in the same manner it was added by the Church that the Spirit proceeded from the Son. If, as Christ himself said, the Father is inseparably in the Son and the Son in the Father, but the Holy Spirit is of the same nature with the Father and the Son, must we not say that he proceeds from both essentially and inseparably? The Council of AACHEN (Aix-la-Chapelle) asserted this doctrine afresh against the Greek Church. CHARLEMAGNE sent its decision to Pope LEO III. whose adhesion he desired. The Pope had a remarkable conference with the deputation. He gave his assent to the dogmatic propositions, but declared that the Council of Constantinople which had followed the guidance of the Holy

Spirit, had left out this position not without reason; that, therefore, it ought to be received expressly into the Creed, for all persons were not possessed of the dogmatic culture that would qualify them to understand it. Many things which belonged to dogmatic truth, were yet not necessary to Salvation; and we ought to distinguish between what is necessary to attain it, and what is not absolutely needful to be known. Thus moderately the Pope at that time expressed himself respecting the gist of the controversy. In consequence of these transactions several Frankish theologians occupied themselves with the subjects, made compilations, and wrote treatises. Among them, **ALCUIN** and **THEODULF** of Orleans are particularly to be noticed. The difference first acquired more importance, when the Patriarch **PHOTIUS** of Constantinople, who, from other external causes, had fallen out with Pope **NICHOLAS I.**, and had been excommunicated by him, issued in A.D. 867, a Circular, calling a Synod, in which he made use of this doctrine of the Latin Church as a handle for attacking the whole Church, and charged it with heresies, and with falsifying the ancient Creeds. After that, this Point was regarded as a more important question of Polemic. **ÆNEAS** of PARIS\* defended the Western doctrine in the controversy of that age, A.D. 868. On the side of the Greek Church, it was maintained that the Western doctrine overthrew the monarchy in the Trinity, and introduced a Dyarchy. The Western Clergy asserted, on the contrary, that the *ἐμμορφίον* between the Father and the Son could not be maintained, unless the Procession of the Spirit from the Father and the Son was taught.

## b. THE DOCTRINE OF THE PERSON OF CHRIST.

### 1. THE MONOTHELETIC CONTROVERSY.

Mansi x. xi. Anastasii Bibliothecarii (879) Collectanea de iis, quæ spectant ad historiam Monothelitarum; ed. J. Sirmond: Par. 1620, 8vo.; also Bibl. Patr. Lugd. xii. Gallandi, xiii. Theophanis (ob. 817) Chronographia, vol. 2: Bonon. 1839, 4l. F. Combesisii Historia Hæresis Monothelitarum ac Vindicis Actorum Sextæ Synodi, in Novum Auctuarium Patrum Græco-Latin.: Par. 1648, fol. t. il. Walch, ix. Dörner, ii. 203. Neander's Church History, v. 242.

THE doctrine of two natures in Christ, as it was more exactly determined in the former period, seemed legitimately to lead to the conclusion of two modes of operation, corresponding to the two natures. In the writings of **DIONYSIUS** the Areopagite,

\* Adv. Objectiones Græcorum, in d'Achery Spicil. t. 1.

the phrase *ἐνέργεια Θεανδρική* was employed, and the question was suggested whether from the standpoint of the one person of Christ, in virtue of the *ἀντίδοσις τῶν ἰσχυμάτων*, such language could be used, and yet the special operation of each nature be distinguished. That ancient disagreement of the Antiochian and the Alexandrian Schools, the tendency which gave prominence to the unity in the divine and human natures, and the other which strove to maintain the divine and the human in their distinct peculiarity, once more made itself felt. The Antiochian view had been set aside by the attempt at a compromise, and its main point had not met with the attention it deserved, owing to the preponderance of the Alexandrian scheme. The disagreement which had never been fully settled, came afresh into view on the point which had been left undetermined. That party who had logically adhered to the Alexandrian standpoint, took offence, whenever the purely Human in Christ was rendered at all prominent, and if everything in him was not in all cases referred to the divine Logos. To this internal ground of disagreement the external was also added, that the Greek Emperors had not only a religious but also a political interest for bringing the controversy between the Monophysites and the Catholics to a settlement. Often as it had been found in the Greek Church, that an outward (*Henotikon*) pacification called forth a counteraction, still the wish for union always made the experience of the past to be forgotten. Some theologians led HERACLIUS to think of a union by representing to him that the formula of a divine-human agency of Christ might be accepted by both parties, and serve as a point of union. CYRUS, bishop of Phasis, in Lozica, allowed the Emperor to make use of him as an instrument for effecting his plans, and in A.D. 630, was made Patriarch of Alexandria, in order to gain over the Egyptian Monophysites. He put forth articles of agreement, in which it was said that the one Christ and Son of God effectuates that which is human and that which is divine, by one divine-human agency. With many this was successful; but there was at Alexandria, a certain monk, SOPHRONIUS, a man of logical training, who endeavoured to show that, reasoning consequentially, two natures implied two corresponding wills and modes of operation. SERGIUS, the Patriarch of Constantinople, exerted himself to suppress the controversy and recommended moderation. For a while,

SOPHRONIUS was silent, but when, in A.D. 634, he was elevated to the Patriarchate of Jerusalem, he again brought forward, in his inaugural epistle,\* the sentiments he had formerly advocated. At the beginning of the controversy, SERGIUS had sought to obtain the opinion of HONORIUS, bishop of Rome,† who appears to have possessed no superior theological attainments, and treated the controversy as one of the idle questions of the schools. He wished, like SERGIUS, that it might be allowed to drop, but was himself inclined to the doctrine of one will, because the notion of two wills seem to put in opposition the Divinity and Humanity of Christ.‡ In A.D. 638, the Emperor issued a religious edict, *καθ' ἑνὴν φύσιν*,§ in which, while he discountenanced controversy on the subject, he yet advocated the doctrine of one will and one mode of operation. The edict only exasperated the controversy, as the Emperor CONSTANS found when in A.D. 646, he made a fresh attempt, by issuing a new edict, not very dogmatic, called the *τύπος*. He allowed each of the two opinions, but enjoined silence. But it was too late. The Roman bishop MARTINUS, at the first Lateran Council, pronounced Dyothelitism to be orthodox; but in the East this doctrine was suppressed by the iron hand of despotism. In that quarter the chief representative of Monotheletism was THEODORUS, bishop of Pharan in Arabia,|| and of Dyothetism the acute MAXIMUS. In them was represented the dogmatic interest of both sides, and the deeper contrariety it involved. THEODORUS acknowledged two natures in Christ, and the individuality of the human body and the human soul; he maintained that everything which the Lord said or did, took place through the instrumentality of the reason and the senses; but it was important to refer everything to the operation of the Logos, to regard Him alone as willing and acting, since He operated through the reason and body. Christ was subject to no affection of the senses by a necessity of nature, but all this was the free act of the Logos. The acting and resting, the doing and suffering of Christ were to be traced without separation to the wisdom, goodness, and power of the Logos, but were carried out through the medium of the soul and the body. The

\* Mansi, xi. p. 461.

† Ib. xi. p. 529.

‡ Ep. ad Sergium. Mansi, xi. p. 537.

§ Mansi, x. 991, sqq.

|| Fragments in the Acts of the Sixth Ecumenical Council. Actio xiii.

whole and each part of the Incarnation resulted from the highest divine operation of the Logos. This view had important practical consequences, inasmuch as in the acting and suffering of Christ the conception of the purely human was confused; for THEODORUS of PHARAN inferred that the human body of Christ was elevated above its natural properties, and thus approached to Docetism. But this operation could not take place upon the body through the human soul, therefore it must be traced back to the Logos, who effected everything. He appealed to the facts recorded respecting the body of Christ, his resurrection, his walking on the sea, and his entering the room through closed doors.\* MAXIMUS, on the contrary, placed Christology and Anthropology in systematic connexion. To both he applied his axiom of the universally harmonic relation between the Divine and the Human; everywhere the Divine operated according to the peculiar constitution of the Human. In this manner the Holy Spirit operated on believers, and thus the Divine stood in relation to the Human in Christ. If the Monothelites maintained that two wills and two modes of operation implied a contrariety between the Divine and the Human, he rejoined that everything depended on whether this contrariety was founded in nature or was the consequence of sin. To assert the first would make God the Author of Sin. This contrariety, therefore, originated in the disunion of the human and divine will which proceeded from sin. But Christ has redeemed human nature and restored it to its original condition; and hence it follows that the Human and Divine, each in its own peculiar way, could and must be in him without such contrariety. According to the view of Maximus the Logos formed Christ's personality; he operated through everything, but so as to allow each nature to work in its own peculiar way, in harmonious conjunction with his. Without admitting this, we could not explain certain affections in Christ's human life. In this connexion he gave remarkable prominence to the purely Human in Christ, his feelings at the approach of death which Maximus distinguished from the feelings disturbed by sin. He finds in them the natural impulse of self-preservation (*ἀφορμή πρὸς ζῶν*) which

\* Ἀόγκως καὶ ὅσον εἰπεῖν ἄσωμάτως ἄνευ διαστολῆς προῆλθεν ἐκ μήτρας καὶ μνήματος καὶ θυρῶν καὶ ὥς ἐπ' ἰδάφους τῆς θαλάσσης ἐπεζεύσεν.

does not disturb the harmony with the Divine Will.\* But certainly MAXIMUS in holding so firmly the peculiarly human in Christ was not perfectly consequential and approximated to THEODORUS, in deriving the sensuous affections and sufferings not from the necessary connexion of nature, but from voluntary accommodation.

This controversy led to another remarkable disagreement. Monothelitism was the occasion of making the standpoint of perfection in the development of human nature generally to consist in this—that the human will becomes absorbed in the divine, as this was the case in Christ (*σύμβασις κατὰ θέλησιν*). If this Unity were asserted to be not merely objective but subjective, it would lead logically, to a pantheistic deification of man. On the contrary MAXIMUS maintained that the difference of the divine and of the subjective human will would endure in everlasting life, only both would be one as to their objects. The Monothelites, he said, confounded *θέλημα* and *θέλητόν*.

In the West, to which the power of the Emperor did not reach Dyothelitism gained ground. The schism increased continually, and the Emperor CONSTANTINE POGONATUS longed to put an end to it; with the consent of the Roman bishop he called the sixth ecumenical (first Trullanian) Synod at Constantinople, A.D. 680, in which it was determined that in Christ two wills and two modes of operation were to be admitted, connected with one another without division, mixture, or transmutation, so that no contradiction can exist between them, but the human will is always subordinated to the divine.† By this result which was

\* *Ἔστι γὰρ καὶ κατὰ φύσιν καὶ παρὰ φύσιν μὲν διελία ἐστὶ δύναμις κατὰ συστολήν τῶν οὐτος ἀνθεκτικὴ, παρὰ φύσιν δὲ παράλογος συστολή.* Disput. c. Pyrrho, ed. Combef. p. ii. f. 165.

† Mansi, xi. pag. 637.—*ἓνα καὶ τὸν αὐτὸν Χριστὸν, υἱὸν κύριον μονογενῆ, ἐν δύο φύσεσιν ἀσυγχύτως, ἀτρέπτως, ἀχωρίστως, ἀδιαρίτως γνωρίζομενοι, οὐδαμοῦ τῆς τῶν φύσεων διαφορᾶς ἀνηρημένης δια τὴν ἐνωσιν, σωζομένης δὲ μᾶλλον τῆς ιδιότητος ἐκατέρας φύσεως, καὶ εἰς ἓν πρόσωπον καὶ μίαν ὑπόστασιν συντρεχούσης.*—*Καὶ δύο φυσικὰ θελήσεις ἦτοι θελήματα ἐν αὐτῷ, καὶ δύο φυσικὰ ἐνεργείας ἀδιαρίτως, ἀτρέπτως, ἀμερίστως, ἀσυγχύτως κατὰ τὴν τῶν ἁγίων πατέρων διδασκαλίαν ὡσαύτως κηρύττομεν καὶ δύο μὲν φυσικὰ θελήματα οὐχ ὑπεναντία, μὴ γένοιτο, καθὼς οἱ ἀσεβεῖς ἐφῆσαν αἰρετικοὶ, ἀλλ' ἐπόμενον το ἀνθρώπινον αὐτοῦ θελημα, καὶ μὴ ἀντιπίπτον ἢ ἀντιπαλαῖον [ἀντίπαλον], μᾶλλον μὲν οὖν καὶ ὑποτασσόμενον τῷ θείῳ αὐτοῦ καὶ πανσθενεῖ θελήματι.*

further developed by JOHN of DAMASCUS, the victory of Dyothelitism was established also in the East.

## 2. THE ADOPTIANIST CONTROVERSY.

Chr. G. F. Walch, *Historia Adoptianorum*: Gotting. 1755, 8. His *Ketzerhistorie*, ix. Frobenii *Dissertatio Historica de Hæresi Elipandi et Felicis*, in Opp. Aleuini, ed. Frobenii, i. p. ii. 925. Neander's *Church History*, v. 226. Dörner, *Lehre v. d. Person Christ*.

THE Adoptianist controversy arose in Spain, in a district which was dissevered from a connexion with earlier developments, and without any immediate communication with those Oriental disputes. Two persons appeared as the chief representatives of a peculiar Christology, the aged ELIPANDUS, Archbishop of Toledo, and FELIX, bishop of Urgellis, the former in Saracenic, the latter in Frankish Spain. ELIPANDUS perhaps gave the first impulse to it, but FELIX, who was his superior in theological training, was properly its dialectic founder, and developed it with the greatest skill. Their standpoint brings us back to a view which apparently had been relinquished; it is strikingly similar to that of the Antiochian School, a reaction of it against the predominant view resembling the Alexandrian. It is surprising that a tendency which had commenced in a flourishing period of theological Science, should have re-appeared in an age and country which offered so many obstacles to its reception. Even the scientific culture of the Carolingian age scarcely accounts for the appearance of a view so free and original, since during that period there was in the main an adherence to the traditional element. This induces us to look more closely into the proximate causes. At one time these were traced to a peculiar phrase in the Spanish Liturgy then in use, the so-called *officium Mozarabicum*, in which the assumption of human nature by the Logos is designated *adoptio*. As this word was employed by FELIX and ELIPANDUS, it served also to mark their peculiar views. But such an isolated expression would not have given the impulse to the formation of a peculiar dogmatic theory, if the germ of it had not been given from another quarter. The term *adoptio*, and the connexion in which it is used, is only one mark of a general dogmatic tendency to which other peculiar ideas of the system are to be added. The agreement of this system in the ideas and development, in the arguments and proofs, with the doctrine

and method of THEODORE of MOPSUESTIA is so striking, that we naturally arrive at the conclusion that FELIX was led to his views and his opposition to the Church Doctrine by the study of THEODORE's writings. Certainly it is not improbable that Spanish theologians at that time were acquainted with the works of THEODORE, since they were translated into Latin during the controversy on the Three Chapters in North Africa, and might easily have been brought over from that country. Meanwhile we do not possess enough of the writings of THEODORE or of FELIX,\* to enable us to prove such an external connexion. However striking the agreement may be, yet it does not exclude the opinion that FELIX had been led simply by a congenial tendency of the dogmatic spirit to a similar development. We may believe that the views generally received by the Church did not satisfy him, that he endeavoured to represent the relation of the *Logos* to the Humanity of Christ in a more rational manner, that he thus adhered more closely to the New Testament, and in this way arrived at results similar to those of THEODORE. We should then only infer from this fact, as from later occurrences of the same kind, that the Church doctrine had not yet satisfied

\* The immediate influence of the writings of Theodore on Felix is now rendered somewhat more probable. It is ascertained that the Commentaries (edited by Pitra in the *Spicilegium Solesmense*, i. 170) on the lesser Pauline Epistles, which he ascribes to Hilary, are no other than a translation of Theodore's. Pitra found them in a manuscript which originally belonged to the monastery of Corbie, and which he dates about the ninth century. In this century also Rabanus Maurus made use of the Commentaries, and introduced the greater part of them into his own. But his Codex was not the same as that printed by Pitra, for Rabanus has many important deviations from that text; the Commentary also does not notice several Epistles, and therefore appears not to have had these in his copy. The variations of the two texts are so great, that one can scarcely be regarded as a copy of the other. There were also in the ninth century two copies at least of this Commentary in France. Now, since the writings of Theodore were known in the sixth century in North Africa, we may conclude at once that they reached France through the medium of Spain. Nor is it altogether surprising that they should be found there immediately after the Adoptianist controversy. They might spread with greater ease if Theodore's name was not attached to them, as then Rabanus might without suspicion copy the Commentaries, and not reject the thoughts which active minds might misplace in a dogmatic agitation, and which he would have probably condemned had he found them in Felix.—[JACOBI.]



minds that were disposed to follow the teachings of Holy Writ. From a letter of ALCUIN's it appears that FELIX had written a Dialogue against the Saracens. Now Islamism acknowledged Jesus as a prophet, hence FELIX had no occasion to prove the divine mission of Christ; but the original doctrine of Christ was regarded by Mohammedans as corrupted by the Church, especially in the dogmas of the Trinity and the Divinity of Christ. Hence the vindication of Christianity rendered it necessary to demonstrate the union of the divine Essence with the human nature in Christ. FELIX therefore might easily have attempted to present this doctrine in a manner which would recommend it to rational thinkers, and obviate the objections of Mohammedans. This however is only a supposition.

By the use of the term *Adoptio* this School wished to mark the distinction of proper and improper in reference to the Son. They made use of the illustration that as a son cannot have two fathers, but may have one by birth and the other by adoption, so in Christ a distinction must be made between his proper sonship, and his sonship by adoption. Still they regarded as the important point the different relation in which Christ is called the Son of God according to his divine or his human nature. The former relation marked something founded in the nature of God, the second something that was founded not in his nature but in a free act of the divine will, by which God assumed human nature into connexion with himself. Accordingly FELIX distinguished between how far Christ was the Son of God and God according to nature (*natura, genere*), and how far he was so by virtue of grace, by an act of the divine Will (*gratia, voluntate*), by the divine choice and good pleasure (*electione, placito*); and the name Son of God was given to him only in consequence of his connexion with God (*nuncupative*); and hence the expressions for this distinction, *secundum naturam* and *secundum adoptionem*. FELIX appealed to the fact that though the name of Son by adoption (*ὁ υἱοθεσίας*) is not applied in the Bible to Christ, yet there are other designations which express the same idea. He adduces John x. 34, when Jesus disputed with the Jews (*κατ' ἀνθρώπων*) and referred to the passage in the Old Testament, in which men are called *Elohim*, where Christ placed himself as a man in the category of those who were called

“God’s” *nuncupative*, and not in a strict sense. Then as to the passage, “None is good save one, that is God,” from this it appears that as Man he was not to be called good in the same sense as God, and that only the divine nature in him was the source of goodness. He would allow an interchange of the divine and human predicates, only in the same manner as THEODORE; it could not be made without limitation, but the different sense must be observed, according as they were attributed to the divine or human natures. He charged his opponents with so confounding the two natures by their doctrine of the *singularitas personæ*, that they left no distinction between the *suscipiens* and the *susceptum*. Expressions that were then in common use, such as *God was born, and died*, never occur in Scripture, which also never says that the Son of God, but that the Son of Man was given for us. On the latter point ALCUIN could easily have confuted FELIX by other passages, but both were wrong in not distinguishing the various biblical applications of the term Son of God from the Church use of it, and in taking the idea everywhere in a Church sense. Like THEODORE, FELIX asserted Agnoëtism of Christ. It is also a point of resemblance between them, that both sought for an Analogy between the union of the Man Christ with the divine Being, and the relation of believers to God. FELIX says that Christ in an improper sense (*nuncupative*) was called the Son of God conjointly with all who are not God according to their nature, but by the grace of God in Christ have been taken into communion with God (*deificati*). In this order also the Son of God is, in respect of his humanity, both according to Nature and Grace. He maintained that, as far as Christ as Man is reckoned among the sons of God, all believers are his members; considered according to his divine nature, believers are the Temple in which he dwells. He did not wish by that to deny the specific difference between Christ and believers; whatever resemblance existed between them belonged to him in a far higher sense; he was united to God by generation, and was the medium of the communion of the rest with God. FELIX also perfectly agreed with THEODORE in the thought, that the communion with God into which Christ was received as a man might be represented as a revelation of the divine being according to the measure of the various stages of the development of his human

nature, and thus supposed various degrees of it up to the highest revelation after the glorification of Christ. It might be peculiarly offensive that he should compare the baptism of Christ with the regeneration of believers; but he certainly did not mean to say that Christ thus became partaker of communion with the divine nature, but only to point out an analogy so far, as baptism marked a distinct stage in Christ's life, after which the operation of the divine life in Him was peculiarly conspicuous.

It is therefore evident that the doctrine of FELIX was altogether that of THEODORE, excepting that the latter could express himself more freely in an age when the doctrines of the Church were less rigorously defined, while FELIX was obliged to use a terminology which was opposed to his own system. The great importance of the antagonism in which he stood to the Church doctrine is likewise manifest; it included not merely Christology but also Anthropology; for the doctrine of the revelation of the Divine Being in Christ, conditioned by various stages of development, was connected with one of special importance, the principle of free self-determination. It is uncertain how far FELIX consciously developed his principles; but there is no question that these were throughout contradictory to the prevalent Augustinian doctrine. As FELIX lived in the Frankish territory, the Frankish Church was drawn into the controversy. In A.D. 792, CHARLEMAGNE convoked an assembly at Regensburg, at which FELIX appeared, and was induced to recant. He was then sent to Rome, where he made similar explanations.\* But on being permitted to return home, he repented of the steps he had taken, took refuge in Saracenic Spain, and again promulgated his doctrine. ALCUIN, who had been summoned to take a part in the controversy, endeavoured to win him over by a friendly epistle; but FELIX regarded the subject of the controversy as too important, and thus it was carried on in his writings.† The Spanish bishops interceded for FELIX with the Emperor, and applied for a new investigation.‡ In consequence CHARLES

\* Alcuinus adv. Elipandum, i. c. 16. Acta Concilii Romani 799, Mansi, xiii. 1031.

† Alcuini Libellus adv. Hæresin Felicis ad Abbates et Monachos Gothiæ Missus. Opp. Alc. i. pars. ii. 759. Ep. ad Felicem, p. 783.

‡ The letter is in Alcuin's Works, ii. p. 567.

called a second Synod at Frankfort-on-the-Maine, in A.D. 794, which again decided against FELIX,\* and since the Adoptionists had spread themselves even as far as France, the Emperor sent a commission of three persons into those parts in order to oppose them. FELIX came with them and was prevailed upon to appear before the Synod at Aachen (Aix), A.D. 799. After ALCUIN had disputed with him for a long time, FELIX declared himself to be convinced. He made a recantation in Spain;† yet he was not altogether trusted, and was placed under the oversight of LEIDRAD, bishop of Lyons. He could not at once give up a dogmatic tendency, which was so deeply rooted; he still was always inclined to Agnoëtism, and after his death a series of questions was found which showed that he firmly adhered to his fundamental views. AGOARD, LEIDRAD's successor, was induced on this account to write a treatise against Adoptionism.

This important controversy passed away without leaving a trace of its existence, since the theological life of the age was not suited for a new investigation of questions which were believed to have been decided long before. Since the reaction of so important a theological tendency could not again assert its claims, this was an omen of new reactions following.

#### C. THE CONTROVERSY RESPECTING PREDESTINATION.

Jacob. Usserii, Gottesealci et Predestinatianæ Controversiæ ab eo Motæ Historiæ: Dubl. 1631, 4to. Gilberti Manguini, Vett. Autorum, qui Seculo Nono de Predestinatione et Gratia Scriptorum, Opp. et Fragmenta: Par. 1650, t. 2, 4to.; t. ii. Dissert. Historica et Chronica Gottesealcanæ Controversiæ. Ludov. Cellotii Historia Gottesealci Predestinatiani: Par. 1655. Jo. J. Hottengeri Diatribe Histor. Theol. qua Predestinatianam et Gottesealci Pseudo-Hereses Commenta esse Demonstratur: Tig. 1710, 4to.

THE Augustinian system had so far triumphed over Pelagianism and Semi-Pelagianism, that the doctrine of *Gratia præveniens*, and its anthropological presuppositions were received; but not that of *Gratia irresistibilis* and absolute Predestination. The consequence of this was, that in later times, and even in the ninth century, admission was found among theologians, not, indeed, for the Semi-Pelagian tendency, but for the milder construction of the Augustinian doctrine, corresponding to its development in the book *de vocatione gentium*. Hence we may see how it was possible

\* Mansi, xiii. 863.

† Confessio Fidei Felicis, Mansi, xiii. 1035.

for the more rigorous form to excite a reaction, and to descry in the milder, Pelagianism or Semi-Pelagianism.

This reaction proceeded from GOTTSCHALK, a monk, of Saxon origin, in the monastery of Orbais, in the diocese of Soissons. From his youth he had occupied himself with dogmatic speculations, especially with the Augustinian; and had adopted this system, with all its consequences. His ideas coincided with his interest for religious truth. He could imagine no true conception of the divine will, of humility and resignation, except in the system of AUGUSTIN. He expressed himself more strongly in opposition to the milder view than even AUGUSTIN. While AUGUSTIN generally applied the term Predestination to those who were appointed to salvation; but distinguished the rest of mankind as the *præciti* and *reprobati*, GOTTSCHALK taught a *prædestinatio duplex* of the good to salvation, and of the ungodly to damnation; in this phraseology he copied FULGENTIUS of RUSPE. He applied the idea of Predestination, both to the *beneficia gratiæ* and the *judicia justitiæ*. It was an object of prime importance with him, to maintain that the divine decrees are unchangeable, and that nothing in them can be altered by human caprice; for in God Foreknowledge and Willing are the same. Least of all could he allow that the reprobate could alter anything in the divine decrees. Unless this were admitted, it would be unreasonable and idle to say that God had destined the reprobate to the punishment of eternal death. His language appears to lead to Supralapsarianism, and, in this case, he would have diverged from AUGUSTIN; but his representations do not necessarily involve so much; for when he speaks of God's knowledge and Predestination, he refers only to what is positive: evil he regards as negative, as properly nothing. Nothing, indeed, is really altered by the view he takes; but it is doubtful how far he clearly saw the consequences of these speculations. In fact, he always set out from the premises of AUGUSTIN, that through the first man's transgression, all mankind fell into condemnation, and that God, in accordance with his justice, left one part of mankind to this condemnation, and predestinated them to it, and, in accordance with his mercy, predestinated the other part to eternal life. He was earnestly desirous to announce his doctrine publicly, and to procure the general

acceptance of the Augustinian system, in opposition to the prevailing views of his age, which he regarded as Pelagian. On his return from a pilgrimage to Rome, A.D. 847, he met, at Count EBERHARD'S of FRIULI, with the newly-elected bishop NOTTING of VERONA, and there laid before him his doctrine of the *prædestinatio duplex*. This excited attention, and a person of note, RABANUS MAURUS, Archbishop of Mentz,\* wrote letters against it. He examined it, not without prejudice and a certain asperity, in which, perhaps, he indulged a personal feeling against GOTTSCHALK. The latter, when a child, had been placed in the monastery of Fulda, as an *oblatus*, of which RABANUS was at that time Abbot. Monastic life was not agreeable to his free spirit; he wished to leave it, and obtained a favourable decision from a synod, which had been reversed, through the influence of RABANUS with the Emperor LEWIS. Upon this, GOTTSCHALK left Fulda, and betook himself to Orbais; a step which, perhaps, offended RABANUS. Yet we are not warranted to admit this statement as certainly true; and whatever personal feeling might exist, a Christian interest was mingled with it. He accused GOTTSCHALK† of holding the doctrine that the divine predetermination acted compulsorily upon men, so that if any one wished to be saved, he would labour in vain, unless he were predestinated. This doctrine would drive some to presumption and others to despair. But in reference to the first point, RABANUS imputed consequences to GOTTSCHALK which he had never granted; for, like AUGUSTIN, he had supposed the sanctifying operations of grace as a necessary intermediate link for fulfilling the decree of Predestination, and could therefore say, that wherever there was true faith and piety, it was the effect of grace. RABANUS, in reference to the wicked, distinguished between prescience and predestination; he made assertions which were at variance with absolute predestination, that God wished the salvation of all men, and that Christ died for all. But it is not clear, that he expressed and granted the consequences, which were founded on these expressions; for he never ventured to regard the impartation of grace and appointment to salvation as conditioned by man, but traced

\* Manguin. i. 1, 3.

† Rabani Epistola Synodalis ad Hincmarum, Mansi xiv. 914.

everything to the divine causality. He inquires how it happens that some children are baptized, and others are not, and answers: Argue like Paul, or set him right when he says that God does all things in mercy and justice. He makes use of the secret decrees of God. His standpoint, therefore, is not irreconcilably opposed to that of GOTTSCHALK. GOTTSCHALK, conscious of maintaining the original and pure doctrine, appeared A.D. 848 at Mentz, before a council, over which RABANUS presided. His doctrine was condemned, and he was sent to HINKMAR, Archbishop of Rheims. This prelate allowed him to defend himself before a council at CHIESY\* A.D. 848. As he refused to recant, he was scourged, and condemned to imprisonment for life. In his confinement, he composed two confessions of faith,† and remained so firmly convinced of the truth of his doctrine, that he offered to submit to an ordeal, not as if he believed that he could work a miracle, but in the assurance, that if it were necessary, God would work one for his cause. On his death-bed, he desired to partake of the Lord's Supper. HINKMAR refused his request, except on the condition of his recanting; and he died without it peacefully, after twenty years' imprisonment.

Not only sympathy at his fate, but also interest in the Augustinian doctrine, called forth vindicators of GOTTSCHALK; of these the most noted were PRUDENTIUS, Bishop of Troyes,‡ RATRANUS, a monk of Corby,§ and SERVATUS LUPUS, Abbot of Ferrieres; the last was the most distinguished, clear, logical, and temperate. He had been connected at an earlier period with GOTTSCHALK, and had endeavoured to moderate his speculations; he wrote to him not to trouble himself any further with such unprofitable questions, but to examine the Holy Scriptures with humility. He now composed his work, *de tribus quæstionibus*,|| namely (i.), concerning Free Will. (ii.) The twofold Predestination. (iii.) Whether Christ died for all, or only for the elect. He was an enthusiastic adherent to the Augustinian doctrine, knew its im-

\* Mansi, xiv. 919.

† Manguin, i. 1, 7.

‡ Prudentii Treccassini Epistola ad Hincmarum Rhemensem et Pardulum Laudunensem, in Cellot. p. 425.

§ De Prædestinatione, libb. 2. Manguin, i. 1, 27.

|| Manguin, i. 2, 9.

portance for the Christian consciousness, and pointed out the striking contrast between the peculiar Christian standpoint of humility and the ancient standpoint of self-sufficiency: the motto of the latter was *sibi quisque spes*; of the former, *cuique Deus vera spes*. He also derives the need of grace not from the Fall, but from the general relation of the creature to God. "Must not the first man," he asks, "have needed the help of Him who is the life of the soul?" As he maintained, with GOTTSCHALK, that Christ died only for the elect, he was much perplexed to explain Paul's language: "God willeth all men to be saved." This could only be understood in a limited sense; it could refer only to real believers, or to all kinds of men, Jews and Heathens. In a certain sense, it might be said that Christ died for all who received the same sacraments. Since to many it seemed to detract from the dignity of the Redeemer, not to maintain the universality of Redemption, he declared that he was ready to waive the question, and would be satisfied, if it were said, that all will be redeemed whom God wills to be redeemed. Every one must adhere to the Scriptures, and to that which the Spirit reveals to him; for since we all have only one heavenly doctrine, why should we wish to find anything that is peculiar? He combats the notion of conditioning Predestination by Prescience, which was received by some who gave the dogma in this form—God predestinated those whom he foreknew would be pious. He also took notice of the practical objections against absolute Predestination. Some one might say, Why should I not give myself up to my lusts, if I am destined to perdition? But, he rejoined, no Christian will reckon himself among the lost; far be it from him that he should doubt his own conversion, and the inexpressible grace of God. He refers to the connexion of Predestination and Sanctification, and to the Objective in the grace of Redemption, and in baptism, which all have received. Who has ever placed all his hope in God, and not obtained the forgiveness of his sins? If every one must condemn himself, let him take his refuge from an offended God in a reconciled God. The above objection proceeds from a love of sin, and those who are animated by it plunge into despair. Attacked by opponents of such eminence, HINKMAR sought to gain advocates, and found one in JOHN SCOTUS, who was little fitted to be



a defender of orthodoxy in that age.\* He wrote a treatise, *de Prædestinatione*.† The solution of the question is derived from the principles of his philosophical and theological system; but as this treatise is, in many points, not fully developed, it must be taken in connexion with his principal work. His opinion is—we can only speak in an improper or figurative sense of a divine foreknowledge and predestination; since for God there is no time; consciousness and knowledge, in a proper sense, can never be ascribed to him. All this belongs to the *Θεολογία καταφατική*. For God there is no Evil; he is only the cause of Good.‡ When all things are viewed in connexion, everything is necessary for the harmony of the whole. Evil only arises through detached contemplation. It carries its own punishment along with it; hence it lies in every sin, in this life it is still hidden, but manifest in the life to come. Proper punishment consists in estrangement from God—all punishment is grounded in this. Accordingly, in his treatise, *de divisione naturæ*, he maintains that everything which the Bible says of Hell, is only a figurative description of spiritual suffering. In the other

\* Mauguin, i. 1, 103. Opp. ed. Floss, p. 347.

† De Prædestin. ix. 5.—Eodem modo Deus vidit, prævidit, scivit, præscivit omnia facienda, priusquam fierent, quo videt et scit eadem, postquam facta sunt, quoniam sicut ipse semper æternus est, ita universitas quam fecit, semper in ipso æterna est. 6. Quo jure potest dici prædestinatio, i. e. præparatio in eo, qui nullo temporis intervallo præcessit, quo disponderet ea, quæ facturus esset, cujus operationem non præcedit præparatio. Non enim aliud ei est præparare et operari. Quo modo autem facturus esset aliquid, qui omnia semel et simul fecit?—Nec tamen in illo fuerunt, nec futura sunt, sed tantummodo sunt et omnia unum sunt. Proinde, quoniam aliter sub illo sunt ea, quæ per illum facta sunt, aliter in eo sunt ea, quæ ipse est in eis quæ sub illo sunt, quia locis temporibusque suis et creata et ordinata sunt, proprie fiunt verba locorum temporumque significativa, in eis vero, quæ æterna liber in illo sunt, translativè proferri possunt.—[JACOBI.]

‡ C. x. 4.—Quis non videat, nisi qui sensu caret, totum, quod dicitur peccatum, ejusque consequentias in morte atque miseria constitutas, nihil aliud esse, quam integræ vitæ beatæque corruptiones? ita ut singula singulis opponantur, integritati quidem peccatum, vitæ mors, beatitudini miseria. Illa sunt, ista penitus non sunt; illa sursum versus appetunt unum omnium principium, ista deserunt, deorsumque in nihilum bona, quæ corruptunt, redere contendunt; illorum causa Deus est, utorum nulla; illa intra terminos naturalium formarum intelliguntur, ista in eorum defectu atque privatione nesciendo utuntur.—[JACOBI.]

work he adheres more closely to the Church doctrine; he is willing to allow that a sensible fire is meant, but this, in itself, is not the cause of suffering; only in virtue of the subjective character of the ungodly is it the ground of their sufferings. All Evil is a stage in the development of good, and hence the last end of the development is the return of all to God. "If the visible fire," he says, "wherever it is kindled, always tends upwards, and can be kept down by nothing, how can the spiritual flame of the rational nature in man be kept down for ever?" His doctrine, therefore, leads to an universal predestination.\* In his doctrine of Grace, he does not deviate from the Augustinian system, to which the connexion of his own doctrine is related by a necessary process of development. Verbally, he aims at maintaining Free Will; he distinguishes for this purpose the idea of power and of freedom. As a man in the thickest darkness still retains the power of seeing, but does not really see till the light comes from without, so the Will of Man always has the power of being good, though corrupted by original sin and his own sin, and surrounded by darkness; but he cannot attain to the exercise of this power till the light of grace cures the infirm will. He calls natural freedom the desire for happiness implanted in the rational nature (*appetitus beatitudinis naturaliter insitus*), which can find its satisfaction in God alone.

By such a development little assistance was rendered to HINKMAR. New opponents came forward and took advantage of these weak points. In order to call in the aid of ecclesiastical authority he held, A.D. 853, a second synod at CHIERSY, at which four propositions were drawn up against the doctrine of GOTTSCHALK.\* HINKMAR set out from the Augustinian doctrine, that by Adam's sin men were become a *massa perditionis*, that the ground on which some attained salvation, and others not, was simply to be sought for in the divine predestination. He maintained that God in consequence of his justice had predestined punishment to sinners, but he would not say with GOTTSCHALK that God has predestined them to punishment. So far he controverts the doctrine of the *prædestinatio duplex*. The principal difference lay in his asserting that God wills that all men should be saved;—that

\* Hincmar. De Prædestinatione, c. 2.

some will be saved, is the gift of divine grace—that others are lost is owing to their demerit; Christ suffered for all; whoever does not appropriate these sufferings has himself to blame. To this milder representation the stricter Party presented in opposition six doctrinal articles at the Council of VALENCE.\* They maintained the twofold Predestination, but guarded against God's being the author of Sin or predestinating any one to Evil. The doctrine of general Redemption was rejected; redemption, indeed, applied to all the baptized, yet only some of these attained to salvation, because through the grace of God they remained faithful in their redemption. Yet this party endeavoured to avoid what would violate the moral feelings. They might indeed have been well agreed had they not been so ready to lose sight of thoughts, while occupied about formulas, and if they had got over the want of clearness, caused by defect of dialectic skill. The difference was not settled, and so both phases of doctrine passed over into the following Age.

As JOHN SCOTUS enlarged the extent of Redemption to the length of universal Restoration, some other isolated traces were to be found of this opinion. It was reached from two points. The thought suggested itself to Missionaries of Christianity among the Heathen, How could it consist with the love of God and Redemption that all these heathen should be lost? That CLEMENT, who came into Germany from an Irish monastery and was opposed by BONIFACE, must have maintained, as he was charged by him, that Christ in the *descensus ad inferos* had redeemed not merely the Old Testament Saints, but also others.† Or the revived study of the classical authors might have led them to reflect on this question. SERVATUS LUPUS speaks of one PROBUS who taught Grammar in the monastery at Fulda, and broached the opinion that CICERO, VIRGIL, and all the better heathens were taken into the fellowship of the elect, since Christ had not shed his blood in vain.‡

\* Mansi, xv. 1.

† Bonifacii, Epp. 135; Serrar. 39, Würdtw.—Qui contra fidem sanctorum contendit dicens: quod Christus filius Dei descendens ad inferos, omnes quos inferni carcer detinuit, inde liberasset, credulos et incredulos, laudatores Dei simul et cultores idolorum; et multa alia horribilia de prædestinatione Dei contraria fidei catholicæ affirmat.

‡ Neander's Ch. Hist. vi. 362.

d. THE DOCTRINE OF THE LORD'S SUPPER AND THE  
CONTROVERSIES RESPECTING IT.

WE have already remarked, that, up to this period, various shades of sentiment on the relation of the Body and Blood of Christ to the outward signs might co-exist, but that by this time the predominant sensuous realistic element operated with increasing force on the development of this doctrine. Under this influence, and because the religious consciousness directed itself only to the supernatural presence of Christ, the representation of the miracle of Transubstantiation was formed..

THE ORIENTAL CHURCH.

The antagonism of spiritual tendencies, which traversed one another in the controversy on Images, could also exert its influence on the doctrine of the Supper. Had the opponents of Images proceeded to greater lengths they would have come into open collision with the doctrine of the Church. At a council held by this class of persons under CONSTANTINE COPRONYMUS, a statement was also made regarding the Supper; for the Image which Christ made of himself in the Supper and had instituted as a means of keeping him in remembrance, was set in opposition to all other images. A distinction was made between the Image and the proper Body of Christ. The Image instituted by Christ himself corresponded to the natural Body of Christ, since in virtue of its consecration it became like that, a Bearer of Divine Life. It is difficult to obtain distinct ideas from such tumid phraseology; yet this thought appears to be at the basis of it, that as the Body of Christ had life through the indwelling fulness of the divine Logos, so a divine power is imparted to the bread by the immediate operation of the Logos. The party of the Image-worshippers opposed this representation. At the SECOND NICENE COUNCIL,\* A.D. 787, it was expressly denied that the Bread could be called an Image of the Body, for after consecration it was no mere Image, but rather in a proper sense the Body of Christ.† JOHN of DAMASCUS expresses himself, in agreement with them, having been guided in his views by a passage already quoted from GREGORY of NYSSA. The Bread and Wine are not

\* Mansi, xii., xiii.

† Actio 6.

merely an Image of the Body of Christ. The Body of Christ is that which was born of the Virgin Mary ; not that it descended from Heaven, but the bread and wine were changed into the Body and Blood of Christ. The immediate miraculous operation of the Logos here produces the body of Christ in a new mode. As Christ partook of food while on earth, and nourishment by such means became changed into his body, so this now takes place in believers by an immediate miracle. He thus expresses himself:—One nature is not here, but two, which may mean that there are two substances, the Bread and Wine, and the Body and Blood of Christ. But he really meant to say, that the divine Logos is connected not immediately with the Bread and Wine, but mediately through the Body of Christ.\*

#### THE WESTERN CHURCH.

Here the different views held on this subject appear with greater decision. PASCHASIUS RADBERT, abbot of the monastery of Corbie, was an adherent of the strictest Supranaturalism. He had already proved himself to be such in a dispute with RATRAMNUS† on the birth of Christ. His fundamental principle is,—that as the Will of God is the cause of the whole Creation, so also it continues to be the only cause of all the changes in it. In this light he presents the doctrine of the Supper.‡ He sees in it the culmination of miracles. He impugns those who say that by this Sacrament only the soul is nourished, that there is only a spiritual communion with Christ, and maintains on the contrary, that Christ comes into corporeal connexion with our Body which he has also redeemed. By means of the consecration of the Priest, God, through his all-powerful Word, creates the true body and blood of Christ out of the substance of the bread and wine. The change goes on in secret, in order not to alarm our senses, and the colour and taste of bread and wine remain, although the substance is changed. This was connected with RADBERT's scheme that he regarded the religious point of view in the Lord's Supper not only subjectively but also objectively as alone valid. The Natural was supposed to vanish entirely, since it was of no value for the religious feeling. Not merely internally was the

\* *ἐκθεσις*, 4, 13.

† D'Achery, *Spicilegium*, part 1.

‡ *De Sacramento Corporis et Sanguinis Christi*.

body of Christ enjoyed, but the spiritualized senses received truly the very body of Christ. We recognise here the character of this view, that the outward world was altogether spiritualized by the inner world, and from this arose the idea of Transubstantiation.

But the harsh representation of PASCHASIUS did not remain without contradiction from various quarters. A monk, FRUDEGARD, opposed him by citing various passages from AUGUSTIN. PASCHASIUS was obliged to allow that many persons had doubt on this subject, though he could appeal in favour of the antiquity of his doctrine to legends which certainly required some time for their formation. Many indeed had not the spiritual views of AUGUSTIN who yet did not like the coarse expressions of PASCHASIUS; even RABANUS MAURUS found them offensive.\* As PASCHASIUS, about A.D. 844, prepared a second edition of his book, and dedicated it to CHARLEMAGNE, this monarch was induced to ask the opinion of several eminent theologians upon it, among others, RATRAMNUS, who took this occasion to write his treatise *de corpore et sanguine Domini*.† There were two questions which he set himself to investigate: 1st. Whether the participation of the body and blood of Christ was something spiritual, which could only be perceived by the eye of faith, or whether the bodily senses perceived without a veil what the spiritual eye inwardly beheld. PASCHASIUS had indeed not asserted such a visible sensuous presence, but RATRAMNUS was of opinion, that this was necessarily involved in his doctrine; he offered him this dilemma, either the outward signs are merely for faith, are an image of Christ's body, or if an outward change takes place this must be perceptible to the senses. Hence, if the body of Christ be really in the Supper, it must be also visible; if it be not visible, then there is not a sensible body of Christ, but only the spiritual; consequently only a spiritual participation. 2nd. Whether it is the same body of Christ in which, as PASCHASIUS maintains, he was born, and suffered, and ascended to Heaven. The doctrine of RATRAMNUS was as follows; the body of Christ is not present as an object of sense, but only for faith; it is not there in relation to the outward appearance, but only in relation to its spiritual power. He appeals to the ancient custom

\* Rabani Mauri Ep. ad. Heribaldum Episc. Antissidor. c. 33.

† Ed. Jac. Boileau, Par. 1712.

of mingling water and wine at the Supper. As the water was regarded as an emblem of the Church, and the wine as an emblem of Christ, he infers that if the Water is an emblem of the Church then is the Wine only an emblem of the body of Christ. Besides, he supports his view by John vi., which he explains spiritually. He thinks that only a spiritual communion with Christ can be effected by the Supper. The Word of God, which is the invisible bread, is ours in that Sacrament; he imparts himself invisibly to believers and animates their souls. Faith is the only organ by which the Spiritual and the Divine can be received. The Bread and Wine represent to faith Christ with his body and blood. A sanctifying influence proceeds from the outward signs,—for as far as the body and blood of Christ are represented to Faith will the Man be placed in communion with him by the bread and wine. Hence, RATRAMNUS wished properly to say: The bread and wine are the vehicle through which by means of the excitement of the religious consciousness the supernatural communion of Christ for the sanctification of men is imparted. But yet in the expression, *conversio panis et vini in carnem et sanguinem Christi*, he allies himself to the other party, which may be explained from his inability to separate the objective from the subjective. Since the bread and wine after consecration produce an effect upon the soul which they could not of themselves, he transfers this to the bread and wine; they become something higher, he thinks, because they produce a higher effect.

We have yet to notice the difference between these two writers, in the representation of the Supper as a Sacrifice. PASCHASIUS firmly held the opinion, that though Christ had redeemed the world once by his sufferings, yet he is daily offered for us in a mystical manner, since human infirmity still continues after baptism. On the contrary, RATRAMNUS maintained that the bread and wine are to bring Christ to our remembrance; but when we have attained to beholding Christ himself we shall no more need such a memento of his infinite love. PASCHASIUS defended his view in his commentary on Matt. xii. 14: "What would be the difference between the Jewish and Christian standpoints," he asks, "if in the Supper all was typical and not real?"

JOHN SCOTUS is also said to have written a book on this con-

troversy at the desire of CHARLES the BALD. Only these words from it are known to us by quotations in other writers: the Sacrament of the Altar is a *similitudo, figura, pignus* of the body and blood of the Lord. In modern times it has been questioned, particularly by LAUF, whether SCOTUS ever wrote such a book, and this supposition has been explained on the ground that the work of RATRAMNUS has been ascribed to SCOTUS. LAUF\* has shown that this was a fact, yet it is not clear that the whole account of a treatise by SCOTUS on this subject, is unfounded. It is not improbable that the opinion of SCOTUS on this important question would be sought for, on account of his great reputation. HINKMAR of RHEIMS, a contemporary, who was well acquainted with the position of the different parties, ascribes to SCOTUS as an error respecting the doctrine of the Supper,† that it was *memoria veri corporis et sanguinis Christi*. What the view of SCOTUS really was, is after all evident from his work *De divisione naturæ*. He taught, like some of the Greek Fathers, that the glorified body of Christ by its union with the divinity was freed from the defects of a sensuous nature. He impugned those who said that the body of Christ after the Resurrection occupied a limited space somewhere, and maintained a ubiquity of the glorified body. In accordance with this opinion he denied the doctrine of Transubstantiation, and admitted a spiritual participation at the Supper. He made the presence of Christ at the Supper not a presence of a peculiar kind, but a symbol of Christ everywhere present to believers. As in the thirteenth century we can recognise the general influence of the system of SCOTUS in that of AMALRICII, so perhaps a trace of his view of this doctrine may be found in it. In the age immediately succeeding, the spiritual view continually gave way to the power of the predominant sensuous tendency. A trace of the former is found about A.D. 950, among a number of the clergy, with whom ODO, archbishop of Canterbury, disputed, and who maintained that the Bread and Wine remained after Consecration the same substance as before, and were only an image of the body and blood of Christ, not the real body.‡ GERBERT on the other hand, defended the doctrine of PASCHA-

\* Theol. Stud. u. Krit. 1828.

† Hincmar. De Prædestinatione, c. 31.

‡ Mabillon Analecta Vett. t. i. p. 207.



SIUS, in his treatise *De corpore et sanguine Domini*. Between the two views was a third, which was intended to maintain the doctrine of the true body and blood of Christ without approving the harsh expressions of PASCHASIUS.

With the revival of a more spiritual tendency in the eleventh century these conflicting views were promulgated still more strongly. BERENGARIUS is the representative of the more spiritual mode of thought. Probably the more indefinite language of his teacher FULBERT led him to further reflection. Arguments both from Scripture and Reason appeared to him to speak against Transubstantiation. He studied AUGUSTIN and other Fathers, and found in them much that was opposed to it. Being thus confirmed in his views, he hoped to obtain a hearing from his friend LANFRANC, prior in the monastery of Bec. He expressed his surprise\* that he should approve the doctrine of PASCHASIUS, and urged him to a joint investigation of the subject. But this letter arrived when LANFRANC was absent at Rome; it was sent after him, but was opened before it reached him, and brought under the notice of LEO IX. The doctrine was discussed in a Synod at Rome, A.D. 1050; LANFRANC came forward as an opponent of BERENGARIUS, whose doctrine was condemned as heretical, and he was excommunicated. Yet LEO consented to renew the discussion and cited him before a Synod at VERCELLI, A.D. 1050. Meanwhile he had been put in prison by his enemies in France, and was thus unable to comply with the citation. At this Synod no one dared to utter a word on his behalf, and his book was committed to the flames. Yet BERENGARIUS obtained protection from some patrons of eminence, among whom was EUSEBIUS BRUNO, bishop of Angers. While the clamour against him was still violent, Cardinal HILDEBRAND came to France, conversed with BERENGARIUS himself, and was convinced that he did not deny in *every* sense, that the bread and wine after consecration were the body and blood of Christ. At the Council of Tours, A.D. 1054, he succeeded in satisfying the assembly with a general confession on the subject which BERENGARIUS made. He designed to have taken him to Rome, but was prevented at that time. BERENGARIUS had the courage to go there of his own accord, A.D. 1059, in order to silence his opponents by the authority of Pope NICHOLAS II.

\* Letter to Lanfranc, in Mansi, xix. 768.

But he found himself deceived; the party of blind zealots were too powerful there, and he did not possess the boldness to avow his convictions in the prospect of death. In a Synod held at Rome, a confession drawn up by Cardinal GUMBERT was proposed to him, from which the spiritual view of the Supper was designedly expunged; the body of Christ (it said) was touched by the hands of the Priest, and masticated by the teeth of believers. He subscribed it; but on his return to France, retracted his assent, and ventured to call the doctrine of PASCHASIUS a *recordia vulgi*. When GREGORY VII. had ascended the Papal throne, and the affair was every day assuming a more important aspect, he summoned BERENGARIUS to Rome, certainly with the design to procure repose for him. First of all,\* he induced him to make a confession similar to that at Tours, and used every means in his power to make persons satisfied with it. He was obliged to remain a long time at Rome, but the party opposed to him were more active than ever; they even began to cast suspicions on GREGORY himself, and hence he resolved to sacrifice the cause of truth to political considerations. BERENGARIUS, who had been previously alarmed by reports of a threatened imprisonment for life, was obliged to appear before a new Synod, and confess that he had been in error. His opponents were satisfied, and he was dismissed on friendly terms by the Pope. But he was convinced that nothing could any longer be effected by his contradiction of that doctrine. He withdrew into solitude filled with sorrow for his recantation. As to the doctrine of BERENGARIUS, he opposed Transubstantiation on the grounds of Reason and Holy Scripture. The words of consecration showed plainly that the bread and wine were still present. If a transmutation were admitted, then he who is emphatically the Truth, must be chargeable with deception and falsehood. A transmutation, in which the outward signs of bread and wine must be left behind without the substance would be absurd and contrary to the divine laws of Nature. The words

\* Acta Concilii Romani ab ipso Berengario Conscripta, Mansi, xix. 761.

† Lanfranci de Eucharistiæ Sacramento contra Berengarium Liber. Bibl. Patr. Lugd. t. xviii. 763. Berengarii De Sacra Cœna adv. Lanfrancum Liber, discovered in the Wolfenbuttle Library by Lessing. Werke, xii. p. 143, ed. 1825; first published by A. F. and F. Th. Vischer, Berlin, 1834.

of consecration are to be understood figuratively; the Bread and Wine represent the Body and Blood of Christ, as in other passages Christ is called a Rock, a Corner-stone, a Lamb. He denied the proper, bodily presence of Christ in every sense; Christ descends not from Heaven, but believers are raised by him to Heaven. Yet he maintained that the true body of Christ is present, but in a spiritual manner, and partaken of by the inner man in a spiritual manner. His view very much resembles that of RATRAMNUS; he regards the Bread and Wine as the vehicle by which the body and blood of Christ is presented to believers, and they are placed in communion with Christ. This he transferred objectively to the Bread and Wine itself. They exert an influence which according to their natural qualities they could not effect. Their value and efficiency are augmented by the power of God, as far as virtue is imparted to them for such an operation. The expressions *sacramentum*, *consecrare*, denote a consecration which elevates what is common to something higher, but does not annihilate. He says the Bread and Wine are the true Body and Blood of Christ, for there is no other Body; but he understood this metonymically, inasmuch as for believers the Bread and Wine is the same as the Body and Blood of Christ. He appeals to the fact that the glorified body of Christ will not be seen again on earth till his second Advent, and is now only present to faith. It would be blasphemous to assert that this body had come down to Earth. He rejected the legends of PASCHASIUS as derogatory from Christ's dignity. He also did not sanction the representation of a repeated sacrifice; he says we only commemorate the one sacrifice of Christ. The view of BERENGARIUS is diametrically opposite to that of LANFRANC and others, who advocated Transubstantiation. In the meantime between the two there was another representation which was held by EUSEBIUS BRUNO, bishop of Angers. He had seen with pleasure that BERENGARIUS had been allowed to retire in peace, but he did not entirely agree with him. He had been appointed an arbitrator in a dispute of BERENGARIUS with several of the clergy, and declared himself, in a remarkable letter,\* against both sides. In these inquiries, he said, we ought not to appeal to the Fathers but

\* Compare with this letter, that of Berengarius to Eusebius Bruno. Sudendorf. Ep. 12.

adhere to the Holy Scriptures, and abide most of all by the simple words that the Bread and Wine are the true Body and Blood of Christ. He remarks that in this respect he agreed with HILDEBRAND. In fact, the conduct of the latter indicated as much. Yet this view would appear more clearly if a fragment of a comment on Matthew,\* which was ascribed to a Master HILDEBRAND, proceeded from him; but this is not quite certain.

The doctrine of Transubstantiation came forth victorious from this controversy, and met with still more general acknowledgment in the following Period.

## THE SECOND PERIOD.

### THE SCHOLASTIC AGE.

#### FROM GREGORY THE GREAT TO THE REFORMATION.

Bossuet, continued by Cramer, v. 2; vi., vii. Tiedemann, *Geist der Speculativen Philosophie*, iv. v. *Geschichte der Philosoph.* v. Tennemann, viii. v. Ritter, vii. viii. *Christliche Philos.* iii. iv. v. Cousin, *Ouvrages Inédits d'Abelard*, Introduction, Par. 1836.

THE great importance which attaches to this Period in the History of Dogmas, consists in the fact, that CATHOLICISM was the animating principle in its great developments. It was indebted chiefly to Scholasticism for the maturing of its System. The transmutation of the kingdom of God into an ecclesiastical Theocracy, after the germ had been once implanted, was continually developed till it experienced its logical completion in the entire structure of the Papacy. As such a theocracy, the Church claimed the right of determining and controlling all other culture, every department of moral and religious development. Since the Church aimed at exalting itself above the State, it required all secular culture, particularly the newly awakened philosophic mode of thought, to be subordinated to it. One of the characteristics of the

\* Published by Allix in the Preface to *Johannis Parisiensis, Determinatio de Modo Existendi Corp. Christi in Sacramento Altar.*, London, 1686.

Age was the mixture of the theological and the philosophical interests under the predominance of the former, and as in the Middle Ages we remark many reactions of political power against the Church, so we also find philosophical reactions against Theology, till the latter gained the Victory. Exactly in this lies the peculiar nature of mediæval culture. It is evident, of what importance was this great phase of the development of Christianity, as the form in which its blessings were to be conveyed to the human race in order to train it to maturity, and in which a part of Christendom is still involved. Hence the knowledge of this period is very important for Protestant Theology. What has been expressed at a later period as the antagonism of Catholicism against Protestantism, is nothing else than what already existed in the Scholasticism of this age. The modern Catholic standpoint is easily idealized in a false manner if its formation during this period is not understood. Hence in order to discern and to combat the corruptions of pure Christianity which it contains, it is necessary to understand the utmost extent of the mediæval development. Even the Reformation cannot be understood without this knowledge ; for it was the reaction of the Christian consciousness striving after freedom as opposed to the concealment of the Gospel, which was consequentially effected. The collective Polemic in the first Confessional writings of the Reformation has reference to Scholastic Dogmas, and is only to be understood along with the doctrines it impugns. Yet, in another respect, this History of the form of Christian doctrine is important. If in the earlier ages we have seen the process of development in the form of classical Antiquity, so here we behold it in the form more akin to our own, that of German culture, the ground-work of all that has existed since. Many tendencies and contrarieties of modern times meet us in Scholasticism ; many controversies which are still developing must be traced to this period for their seminal principle. In the scholastic dogmas there was not only the systematizing of the Catholic dogmas, but the Christian truth, both in dogmatics and morals, was in many points more deeply grounded and systematically built up by the great minds of this age, so that in these two departments of knowledge we may still learn much from those distinguished thinkers. LEIBNITZ formed a more correct estimate of them, and in

modern times we have begun to contemplate this great intellectual Creation with greater impartiality.

The Scholastic development of Dogmas forms one great whole, which is marked by the various stages of a beginning, middle, and end; the first section reaches from the end of the eleventh to the end of the twelfth Century, the time of its rise; the thirteenth, and a part of the fourteenth century, forms the time of its prime; and then it suffered a gradual decline down to the Reformation.

## THE FIRST SECTION OF THE SCHOLASTIC AGE.

FROM THE ELEVENTH TO THE END OF THE TWELFTH CENTURY.

### GENERAL HISTORY OF DOGMAS.

IN modern times it has been debated from what point we should date the beginning of the Scholastic Age. RITTER, who deserves credit for the attention he has paid to it, sets the beginning farther back. We may easily come to an understanding on this point. It is certainly true that even in the ninth century there were movements in Dialectics, which were only checked by the rudeness of the following age, and they are to be placed in connexion with the scholastic development of dogmas. But this later scholastic period differs essentially from all that preceded it. In the Carolingian age the tendency of the dialectic spirit was far behind that of the practical and the historical. We have already remarked that JOHN SCOTUS is not to be regarded as the commencement of Scholasticism. Philosophy had not in Scholasticism the leading position which he assigned to it, but was the *ancilla* of Theology. Hence we place the commencement of Scholasticism at the end of the eleventh century. In reference to the name, RITTER decides that it is too indefinite, and that in reference to Philosophy, it should have the designation of Mediæval. The name is not of great importance; it is cer-

tainly indefinite, but yet it has acquired a definiteness by his torical use. *Scholasticus* was in this age the designation of *the learned man, the Scholar*, so we find it used in a letter of BENEDICT of ANIANE.\* As the name denotes the peculiar scientific tendency of the Middle Ages, it may also serve to distinguish the corresponding form of Dogmatics.

It was significant, that in the consciousness of the general want of culture, there was during the eleventh Century a wide-spread apprehension of the impending end of the world; it contained a foreboding that a new life would break forth. Manifold beginnings, and symptoms of a religious revival might be perceived, and still it was doubtful what direction they would take. The enthusiasm with which the call to the Crusades was received, the wide-spread feeling of Penitence which proceeded from the consciousness of decadence, were signs of this renovation. This state of mind prepared for the Crusades, and they reacted upon it by imparting to men's minds a religious elevation. Contemporaneously, from the twelfth Century, the monastic orders extended themselves with fresh power. The monks went about as preachers of repentance, and deeply agitated their hearers; multitudes were seized with contrition. Under such an excitement many became inclined to a monastic life, and embraced its solitude, while others took up arms for Christianity. Every great undertaking at that time easily found persons ready to combine in its behalf; hence associations for the erection of immense Churches, and societies among the laity for the support of the Poor, and the like. To this we may add, the spread of sects who bore witness to the religious agitation of the times. Though the age was marked by no small degree of coarse sensuality, yet the religious interest predominated, and the sensuality received a counterpoise in one of the most important appearances of this new spiritual life, the scientific tendency. It did not take, as in the Carolingian age, the direction to the Empirical, but the Spirit which began to feel its own power, gave itself to the study of Dialectics and Speculation. This tendency did not proceed immediately from a religious source, and was not connected originally with the religious excitement, but existed independently of the Church. Indeed it is

\* Apud modernos Scholasticos, maxime apud Scotos iste Sylogismus Delusionis. Baluz. Miscell. v. 54.

quite true that the first objects of Dialectics to which it applied itself were given from without, by the commentary of BOETHIUS on the *Isagoge* of PORPHYRY,\* through which it formed its first connexion with the Platonic and Aristotelian Philosophy, and began to treat of questions respecting the reality of universal ideas. That such questions should occupy men's minds rested on a deep internal ground in the general tendency of thought. When dialectic schools raised discussions on whether the general ideas of the human mind had an objective reality, whether anything corresponded to them in actual Existence, whether an objective connexion was to be admitted between Thinking and Being, or whether general ideas were nothing but a subjective product of human thought, a necessary help in order to comprehend the multiplicity of things, and to which there was no corresponding reality ;—when the Schools started these questions, the deepest principles of human knowledge lay at the basis—questions on the objective reality of human Thought and Knowledge generally—on the opposition of Empiricism and Rationalism, or whether Knowledge proceeded from Experience or from human thought. With this again was connected the decision of the question, whether we must confine ourselves to the knowledge of individual things, nor venture beyond the outward perception, or whether our mind in thinking upon the outward world follows an indwelling Law, therefore respecting Realism and Idealism. On the other side, with this inquiry was connected the discussion respecting the reality or non-reality of human knowledge, the contrast of Dogmatism and Scepticism, of an organic systematic mode of conception or an atomistic. Hence it is evident how influential must have been the difference of the mental tendencies which lay at their basis, though these antagonisms often lost themselves in barren subtleties. ●

AUGUSTIN had the greatest influence in reference both to speculation and practice ; from him proceeded first of all the deeper theological investigation ; through his authority, and

\* *Αὐτὶκα περὶ γενῶν τε καὶ εἰδῶν, το μενεῖτε ὑφίστηκεν εἴτε καὶ ἐν μόναϊς ψυλαῖς ἐπινοίαις κείται, εἴτε καὶ ὑφιστηκότα σώματά ἐστιν ἢ ἀσώματα καὶ ποτερον χωριστά ἢ ἐν τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς καὶ περὶ ταῦτα ὑφίστατα παραιτήσομαι, λεγειν βαθυτάτης οὐσης τῆς τοιαύτης πραγματειας, καὶ ἄλλης μείζονος διομένης ἐξετάσεως.*



owing to its connexion with religious interests, Realism, that is, the doctrine of the reality of universal ideas (*universalia esse realia*) became predominant. This relation could be conceived of in a twofold manner, either the divine ideas were regarded as the original patterns of all existence, or the Universal was regarded as expressed in the multiplicity of individual being, the one more Platonic, the other more Aristotelian (*universalia ante rem*, or *in re*). The two were originally less clearly distinguished, the general ideas in the Universe were regarded as a representation of the divine archetypes.

But at the end of the eleventh Century an opponent of Realism appeared,—ROSCELLIN,\* a Canon of Compeigne, a man of great intellectual boldness, who established a peculiar school of Dialectics, in short, the Founder of Nominalism. It is to be regretted that we have no writings of his own, but we recognise in his whole tendency the germ of a sceptical and atomistic element which might have given another tendency to the spirit of the Middle Ages could it have gained the ascendancy. He maintained that in knowing we are only made acquainted with individual objects; that general ideas are only *nomina*, not *res*. A fragment that has been preserved in ABELARD's Dialectics, is peculiarly characteristic.† He carries his opposition against the reality of Ideas so far as to maintain, that even the ideas of a whole and a part have no objective reality, for in order to think of a part as a part, we must have the idea of the whole, and the whole again presupposes the idea of the part. A fondness for logical sequences led to the use of such language, as we find in a letter among the

\* Victor Cousin, Introduction aux Ouvrages Inédits d'Abelard, pag. 86. Roscellin's Letter to Abelard was published by Schmeller in the Münchener Gelehrte Anzeigen, Dec. 1847.

† *Ouvrages Inédits d'Abelard*, p. 471.—Fuit autem, memini, magistri nostri Roscellini tam insana sententia ut nullam rem partibus constare vellet, sed sicut solis vocibus species, ita et partes adscribebat. Si quis autem rem illam quæ domus est, rebus aliis, pariete scilicet et fundamento constare diceret, tali ipsum argumentatione impugnabat; si res illa, quæ est paries, rei illius quæ domus est, pars sit, eum ipsa domus nihil aliud sit, quam ipsa paries et tectum et fundamentum, profecto paries sui ipsius et cæterorum pars erit. At vero quomodo sui ipsius pars fuerit? Amplius omnis pars naturaliter prior est suo toto. Quomodo autem paries prior se et aliis dicetur, cum se nullo modo prior sit?

works of ABELARD, in which it is inferred from ROSCELLIN'S principles, that when in the Gospels it is said that Christ, after his Resurrection, eat part of a fish, as the part is only a *nomen*, so Christ must have eaten only a *nomen*. RAIMBERT at Lisle stood at the head of the Nominalist School. Before the Universities were established there were certain individuals from whom the various schools proceeded. In the Cathedral and monastic schools, men distinguished for their dialectic and scientific abilities appeared, and the tenets they had sown, were propagated by their pupils. These investigations were carried on with incredible zeal. In opposition to RAIMBERT, ODO, a secular clergyman of the Cathedral at Tournay, founded a Realist school among the canons. A contemporary relates that the young priests flocked to him from France and Great Britain, and even from Germany and Italy. These studies spread beyond the school among the citizens. If a person walked through the streets he would see multitudes of disputants—or if he visited the school he would see Odo sometimes walking about like a Peripatetic philosopher, at other times sitting surrounded by his pupils; oftentimes he did not leave off even at night, but disputed with them before his door.\* But this enthusiasm for Dialectics not only in many instances swallowed up all other scientific interest, but even higher interests were neglected for it. Every one wanted to shine with a new theory in dialectic inquiries. JOHN of SALISBURY (A.D. 1150), the advocate of empirical science, describes this mania.† Poets and Historians were held in light esteem, and if any one occupied himself with the ancients, he was ridiculed; for everybody attended only to his own inventions and those of his teacher. Everything was described in scholastic language; to call an ass an ass, or a man a man, was considered a grave offence. Even the enthusiasm for classical Antiquity took a false direction; the more scanty the knowledge of it, so much the more was everything idealized, and Christian truth was found in single expressions of the Philosophers. The life and virtues of the Ancients were viewed unhistorically, and contrasted with the immorality of the Clergy. This tendency might even form an antagonism

\* Hermann De Tournay, in D'Achery's *Spicilegium*, ii. 889.

† Metalogicus, i. c. 3.

to Christianity, since it knew not how to distinguish its peculiarities, and weakened the distinction between Reason and Revelation. But the religious revival was too powerful, especially in the twelfth century, not at last to lay hold of the above direction also. As it often happened that those who had hitherto led worldly lives, were brought by sudden impressions to thoughtfulness, and withdrew into the monasteries, so many persons often sought satisfaction there who had busied themselves for a long time with dialectic inquiries, and in this external employment had arrived at a feeling of emptiness. In the midst of their dialectic investigations they were sometimes reminded of a higher interest, and awakened to a new and more serious life. It happened here, as is said in an old verse in the History of BRUNO, the founder of the order of the Carthusians :—*Ad logicam pergo quæ mortis non timet ergo*, that is, “Logic which fears not the syllogistics of death.” Many, indeed, only made this change in their course of life, because it happened to be the fashion. It also was found that the old spirit revived again in the cloisters. But those who were more open to deeper considerations sought for a connecting link between their earlier and later standpoint, and resumed their former method, but in a much higher manner; and since they applied it to the examination of Christian subjects, the result was an amalgamation of Philosophy and Dogmatics. A remarkable example of this is the above-mentioned ODO of TOURNAY. He had already led a strict life, but it was generally said, that he lived more after one of the old Philosophers than after the Church. He once bought AUGUSTIN’S work, *De libero arbitrio*, but took no further notice of it, and laid it in a corner of his library. But it happened that as he was explaining to his pupils the treatise of BOETHIUS, *De consolatione Philosophiæ*, and came to a passage which treated of free Will, he recollected this work of AUGUSTIN’S; he brought it out, and was so pleased with it, that he continued to expound it to his hearers. At last he found the passage in which AUGUSTIN contrasts a divine life with a worldly one, and speaks of the nothingness of the latter. ODO was so affected by it, the emptiness of his inner life was so laid open, that he burst into tears, hastened to the Church, and was followed by his pupils. From that time his mind took quite another direction, he became a monk, then an

abbot, and lastly Archbishop of Cambray. He now transferred his scientific method to Dogmatics.

Since philosophical and theological inquiries became thus blended, it followed that philosophical controversies were changed into theological ones. Already ROSCELLIN had become the object of a fierce attack, from a standpoint in which the two interests were mingled. This related, first of all, to his doctrine of the Trinity. We cannot say, that he followed a different method from others in his theological inquiries; his views of the relation of knowledge to faith, and of philosophy to Dogmatics, appeared to be those current in his time, resting on the maxim, *fides præcedit intellectum*, and a freer tendency which came into collision with Church interests, does not appear to have been indulged by him. His design was not to subject the Church doctrine to a new examination, but he laid down as his leading maxim, that his inquiries must serve for the vindication of Christian doctrines. If Jews and Mohammedans give an account of their faith, ought not Christians to do the same? His doctrine of universal ideas would fulfill this object chiefly, in reference to the dogma of the Trinity. But certainly, the subjective, sceptical, and atomistic, which lay at the basis of his Nominalism, were in internal opposition to the objective interests of religious persons, and hence it is not surprising that ROSCELLIN in this age was obliged to succumb. And since both he, and his realistic opponents, applied their categories erroneously to the doctrine of the Trinity, they came to an open conflict. At the Council of SOISSONS (A.D. 1093) he was obliged to recant; he then went to England, and there engaged in fresh controversies as a champion of the hierarchical interest and the celibacy of the clergy, in the cause of HILDEBRAND'S reform movement. The persons in England who were not disposed to conform to it, induced him to return to France, where he lived in solitude and quiet.

The principal opponent of ROSCELLIN, and the first representative of Realism, was ANSELM of CANTERBURY.\* If we look

\* Opp. ed. Gabriel Gerberon, Par. 1675, 1721, 2 vols. fol. Vita Anselmi, lib. 2, by his pupil Eadmer. Acta SS. Aprilis, ii. 866. Möhler, Anselm von Canterbury in Dessen Schriften und Aufsätzen, b. i. G. F. Franck, Anselm v. Canterbury, Tübg. 1842. F. R. Hasse, Anselm v. Canterbury, 1841, 1852.

at the principle of the scholastic tendency, at the subordination of the philosophical interest to the religious, and at the first germ of a widely applied Dialectic, AUGUSTIN may be called the Father of the Scholastic Theology. As far as LANFRANC was the first to elaborate the dialectic form, he might not improperly be so designated; but if we look at the whole character of the scholasticism of the twelfth century, ANSELM deserves this name; in him we find the interpenetration of the two leading tendencies of the age, the religious and the ecclesiastical on the one hand, and on the other, the dialectic and scientific, that of the feelings and that of the intellect, the mystical and the speculative. Thus he established this Theology both materially and formally. ANSELM was born about A.D. 1033, at Aosta, in Piedmont. He was educated under the influence of a pious mother, and the deeply religious spirit which he received, determined the whole tone of his thinking. Owing to the unkind treatment of his father, he was forced to leave the parental roof, and spent three years wandering through Italy and France till the fame of LANFRANC attracted him to the monastery of Bec in Normandy. He became his most devoted pupil; henceforward the Dialectic Art was combined with his religious zeal. After he had risen to be the Prior of the monastery, he occupied himself chiefly with the education of his monks. He was distinguished by the spirit of love with which he guided them. He came forward as an opponent of the gloomy method of training which was practised in the strict monastic discipline.\* An abbot once complained to him of his ill success in the education of boys, notwithstanding all his severity; ANSELM replied, "It is a poor compliment to your method that it turns human beings into brutes." In A.D. 1093, he succeeded LANFRANC in the Archbishopric of Canterbury. As the vindication of the rights of the Church was with him a matter of conscience, he was involved in contests with WILLIAM II. and HENRY I. He appealed to Rome, and spent several years there, highly esteemed by URBAN II. At last, he returned to England, and died soon after in A.D. 1109. In this agitated life, occupied with the business of education, or of conducting the affairs of the Church, and involved in controversies, he maintained sufficient mental composure to devote himself to speculative inquiries,

\* Neander's Ch. Hist. viii. 11.

in which he obtained great eminence. He is entirely to be distinguished from those men who, from a worldly tendency by a revolution of their inner life, turned their attention to Theology, and from those who agitated by doubts, have been led to investigate the grounds of the Christian Faith. In ANSELM, the warmth and confidence of the faith of his childhood appears never to have subsided. Independent of all speculation, his faith was rendered sure by inward experience, and his heart needed no other grounds for it. But since with the fervent religious element, he combined great speculative and dialectic power, he could not suppress the latter, and was from the first convinced, that no schism could exist between the truth of the heart and the convictions of the Reason. He was satisfied that the subject matter of Faith must verify itself to the Intellect as Truth; the dignity of the Image of God in the Reason required this. Confidence in divine truth gave him the impulse for speculation. He felt impelled to examine with his reason what was certain to his Faith. But he was very far from expecting to attain absolute knowledge, or from indulging the proud dogmatism that might be connected with it: he remained conscious of the limits of Reason, and was convinced that full satisfaction could only be attained in eternal life. He only wished to penetrate as far in the present life as was possible with the powers of Reason enlightened by God.

The relation in which he places knowledge to Faith\* corresponds to his setting out in his inquiries from internal religious experience. Against ROSCELLIN, he says: The Christian may hold fast his faith, love, and live according to it, and humbly strive as far as his abilities allow, after a rational knowledge of it; if he can attain it let him thank God, if not, let him practise reverential submission.† First of all, Faith must purify the heart; we must humble ourselves, and become as little children. He who believes not cannot experience; he who has not experienced, cannot understand.

\* See Hasse, *Anselm v. Canterbury*, ii. 34.

† Nullus quippe Christianus debet disputare, quod catholica ecclesia corde credit et ore confitetur, quod non sit, sed semper eandem fidem indubitantur tenendo, amando et secundam illam vivendo humiliter, quantum potest, quærere rationem, quomodo sit.—*De Fide Trinitat. et Incarnatione Verbi*, c. 2.

Nothing can be effected till the wings of the soul rise by faith to God. The theoretical in its principles proceeds from the practical; we must first renounce the flesh and live in the Spirit, for the natural man understands nothing of the Spirit of God. Two leading tendencies are observable in ANSELM; one, to maintain the operations of Faith against a one-sided Dialectic; and the other, to exhibit the harmony of *Ratio* and *Fides*, in contradistinction to a blind faith of authority. ANSELM attempted this in reference to several doctrines. Certainly, there is to be found in his writings an obscure mixture of the Philosophical and the Religious: hence he often believes that he has demonstrated something of which the certainty rests on other grounds. It is necessary to distinguish between the idea lying at the basis as that which immediately proceeded from the depths of his contemplation, and the false dialectic medium of proof. Nominalism appeared to him a mode of thinking which never rises above the sensuous and empirical, and denies the reality of the Idea; but that which does not know the reality of the idea, can know nothing whatever. The Reason, he says, is so beclouded among the Nominalists by sensuous images, that it can never free itself from them.\* He was convinced of the objectivity of Truth which lies at the basis of ideas, because thinking and being proceed from God. He derives an argument against Nominalism from the original connexion of the human Spirit with the divine. Since the Truth on which the being of things rests, is the effect of the highest Truth, so likewise it is the cause of the Truth which is in thinking. Everything comes from that light from which all truth radiates, and which also enlightens the rational Spirit.

If the two leading tendencies of life, the religious and emotional on the one hand, and on the other, the scientific and dialectic, had remained harmoniously connected, the development would have been quiet and regular; but fresh contraries made their appearance. The mystic religious, and the

\* De Fide Trinitatis, c. 2.—Prorsus a spiritualium quæstionum disputatione sunt exsufflandi. In eorum quippe animabus ratio, quæ et princeps et judex omnino omnium debet esse, quæ sunt in homine, sic est imaginibus corporalibus obvoluta, ut ex eis se non possit evolvere nec ab ipsis ea quæ ipsa sola et pura contemplari debet, valeat discernere.

dialectic speculative tendency were represented in two great men of the twelfth century—BERNARD of CLAIRVAUX, and ABELARD. The conflict in which they encountered one another, so far resembled that between LANFRANC and BERENGARIUS, that here also there was an antagonism between the doctrine of the Church and free inquiry. But there was still the difference, that, in reference to the depth of religious feeling, LANFRANC had no pre-eminence before BERENGARIUS, whereas here, on the one side, there was the predominant interest of devout feeling, on the other, that of dialectic art; on the one side there was the Mystical theology, on the other, the Scholastic. The contest of these parties involves the same general antagonisms which repeat themselves in all ages, not excepting our own.

BERNARD\* was born (A.D. 1091) at Fontaines in Burgundy. The new excitement of the religious spirit which took place in his youth, affected his development, but especially the influence of a very pious mother. Thus he early acquired the love of monasticism and a contemplative life. But after his mother's death his friends tried to give him a taste for a more secular life. By his enthusiasm for science, they almost succeeded in inducing him to forget Monasticism; but this did not last long. His mother's image was perpetually before his eyes, and the recollection that she had dedicated him to God.

After some struggles, the original inclination prevailed, and once, while travelling, it so overpowered him, that he vowed to enter a monastery. In his three-and-twentieth year he entered the strictest order—that of the Cistercians, and soon was made abbot of Clairvaux. He was a monk with his whole soul; his religious life was supported by silent meditation and prayer;—in the hours of solitude he enjoyed the liveliest feelings and the clearest contemplations. He endeavoured also to direct others to prayer and the contemplation of Christ, in order to lead them to that repose and light which he had gained. “Thou,” he writes,† “who occupiest

\* Opp. ed. Mabillon, Par. 1690, 6 t. f; 1719, 2 t., Par. 1839, 2 t. Biographies of William de Thierry, Gaufried. and Alanus de Insulis, in Mabillon. t. i. t. vi. Neander, *Der Heilig Bernhard u. sein Zeitalter*, Berlin, 1813, 1848. J. Ellendorf, *Bernhard und die Hierarchie*, 1838, 2 bde., Ratisbonne. *Histoire de St. Bernard*, Paris, 1843, 2 t.

† Ep. 106.



thyself with the study of the Prophets—understandest thou what thou readest? If thou understandest it, thou knowest that Christ is the sense of the Prophets, and if thou wouldst lay hold of him, thou canst do this more easily when thou followest him than when thou readest. He who hath ears to hear, let him hear him cry, 'Whosoever thirsteth, let him come to me and drink.' Trust my experience; thou wilt find more in the forests than in books. True science proceeds from the soul. The disposition makes men wise; knowledge makes them learned.\* The sun does not warm all on whom it shines; it is not the knowledge of divine things, but the fear of God which moves the soul, and makes it wise; mere knowledge easily leads to pride." He has developed in the fifth book of his treatise, *De consideratione*,† his doctrine respecting the relation of faith, rational knowledge, and intuition. He distinguishes between the standpoint of rational knowledge (*intellectus*), that of faith (*fides*), and that of mere opinion (*opinio*). The *intellectus* is based on the *ratio*, Faith on Authority, and Opinion only on Probability. *Intellectus* and *fides* both have a certainty of Truth; but the latter has a closed, veiled Truth, the former an unveiled conscious Truth. Faith is an anticipation of Truth not yet unveiled by the direction of the Will; the *intellectus* is the certain and clear knowledge of an invisible object. Opinion wants the certainty which belongs to the two others. There is nothing we would rather know than what we already know by faith. It is, therefore, peculiarly important—rightly to separate these three divisions, that the uncertainty of Opinion may not be made an object of Faith, and that the certainty of Faith may not be exchanged for doubt. It is outrageous, when the *intellectus* would force the sealed Sanctuary of Faith.‡ He supposes an elevation of Intuition in

\* Sermo on the Song of Solomon. 23, § 14.

† De Consideratione, lib. v. curante. C. F. Th. Schneider. Breol. 1850.

‡ De Considerat. v. c. 3, § 5.—*Intellectus rationi innititur, fides auctoritati, opinio sola verisimilitudine se tuetur. Habent illa duo certam veritatem, sed fides clausam et involutam, intelligentia nudam et manifestam; ceterum opinio certi nihil habens, verum per verisimilia querit potius quam apprehendit.*—6. Omnino in his cavenda confusio, ne aut incertum opinionis fides figat, aut quod firmum fixum que est fidei, opinio revocet in quæstionem. Et hoc sciendum, quia opinio si habet assertionem temeraria est, fides, si habet hæsitationem,

certain moments of Inspiration, which anticipates what the Intellect has not yet discovered. What is elevated above us is not taught by words, but by the Spirit; but what no discourse can reach, is sought for by prayer, and obtained by purity of heart. Disputation does not apprehend divine things, but holiness of life and prayer. But BERNARD was by no means a despiser of Science. "I acknowledge," he says, "how much the Church owes to science; but the great point is to hold fast the right measure and object. This consists not in the desire of glory or over-curiousness, but in edification. Self-knowledge is the first thing, since it does not puff up, but produces Humility; the structure of the spiritual life cannot stand firmly without it." But the highest standpoint on which man can be raised, even above the form of Faith, is, according to BERNARD, religious Intuition, which is gained in these highest moments of Inspiration. Ecstatic contemplation leads man to the anticipation of that which he will see perfectly in eternal life; it is a sudden rapture (*raptus*), by which the spirit for a time is borne to the greatest heights.\* We recognise here the tendency to a renunciation of the world, which was closely connected with his monasticism. He made no effort, like ANSELM, to harmonize Faith and

infirmā est; item intellectus, si signata fidei tentet irrumperē, reputatur effractor, scrutata majestatis. Fides est voluntaria quādam et certa prælibatio necdum propalatae veritatis; intellectus est rei cujuscunque invisibilis certa et manifesta notitia. Opinio est quasi pro vero habere, aliquid quod falsum esse nescias. Ergo fides ambiguum non habet, aut si habet, fides non est, sed opinio. Quid igitur distat ab intellectu? Nempe quod etsi non habet incertum non magis quam intellectus habet tamen involucrium, quod non intellectus. Denique quod intellexisti, non est de eo, quod ultra quæras, aut si est, non intellexisti. Nil autem malumus scire, quam quæ fide jam scimus. Nil supererit ad beatitudinem, cum quæ jam certa sunt nobis fide, erunt æque et nuda.

\* V. § 3.—Magnus ille, qui usum sensuum, quasdam veluti civium opes expendere satugit, dispensando in suam et multorum salutem. Nec ille minor, qui hunc sibi gradum ad illa invisibilia philosophando constituit; nisi quod hoc dulcius, illud utilius, hoc felicius, illud fortius esse constat. At omnium maximus, qui spreto ipso usu rerum et sensuum, quantum quidem humanæ fragilitati fas est, non ascensoris gradibus sed inopinater excessibus, avolare interdum contemplando ad illa sublimia consuevit. Ad hoc ultimum genus illos pertinere reor excessus Pauli. Excessus, non ascensus, nam raptum potius fuisse, quam ascenditer ipse se perhibet.

Knowledge; but where so much intensity of feeling was combined with seeking after rational knowledge, he might easily have come to an understanding on the subject. But it was otherwise in the case of one of his contemporaries, who seemed to assign a much larger domain to Dialectic and Rational Knowledge than his predecessors.

This man was PETER ABELARD.\* He was born A.D. 1079, at Palais, not far from Nantes in Brittany, and on that account frequently called *Peripateticus Palatinus*. His development was very different from that of BERNARD. He prosecuted his studies at Paris and Melun, and acquired an early reputation by his talents which were combined with great self-esteem, a fault which his splendid success tended to cherish. At first he occupied himself only with philosophy: the ardour of inquiry and vanity soon brought him into collision with his teachers. By degrees, he applied himself to Theology. The fame of ANSELM attracted him to Laon; but in a short time he came forward as his rival. He declared himself desirous of showing, that without much study, a person could do more in the interpretation of Holy Writ, than an educated pedant. When he appeared in Paris, as a philosophical and theological lecturer, crowds flocked to hear him. Here he became a sacrifice to his great talents and faults, among which he afterwards acknowledged as most conspicuous in his *Historia calamitatum*,† his luxury and pride. They involved him in those heavy misfortunes which led him to alter his course of life. Through violent mental agitation and heavy trials, he was brought at last to a deeper religious interest. He rose from a state of doubt to Faith; but the conflict in his mind never wholly ceased between the religious element and the tendency to speculations and dialectic inquiry. His system, not completed into a harmonious development, is an image of the discordancy of his inner and outer life. Greatly depressed, he retired (A.D. 1169) to the Abbey of St. Denis, near Paris. But his wide-spread repu-

\* *Ouvrages Inédits d'Abélard*, publiés par Victor Cousin, Par. 1836. Schlosser, Abälard und Dulcin, Leben eines Schwärmers und eines Philosophen, Gotha, 1807. Goldhorn de Theologia Abælard., Lips. 1836. Franck, Beiträuf zur Würdigung Abälards, Tübg. Zeitschrift, 1840. Ritter, der Philosophie, Thl. 7.

† Abælardi et Heloisæ, Opp. ed. Amboise, Par. 1616.

tation, and the multitude of young men who flocked to him, induced him to recommence his lectures. The monks were glad to be relieved from the inspection of so severe a censor, and gave him a neighbouring priory for the delivery of his lectures. Being now principally occupied with religious subjects, he applied his dialectic method to Dogmatics. But as his views became more widely known through the enthusiasm of his scholars, a party in the Church was soon formed against him. At the request of his hearers, he published his *Introductio ad Theologiam*. But in accordance with the standpoint of theological science in that age, the idea of *Theologia* was confined, and embraced only Dogmatics. The work was originally, and remained a mere fragment of the doctrines of religion. He agreed so far with ANSELM's principles, as to assert that the *Intellectus* can only develop what is given in the *Fides*; but he differs in determining the manner in which Faith is brought into existence; nor does he recognise so readily the limits of speculation, and, in some points, he goes beyond the doctrinal belief of the Church; yet the tendency of the rational element lying at the basis, and his method of applying it, are different. The former was checked in its logical development by the limits set to it in the Creed of the Church; many things also are only put down on the spur of the moment. The work not only created a prodigious sensation, but also showed traces of a preceding hostility. We may detect this, when he charges some of his opponents with seeking consolation for their ignorance, by extolling a faith which believes before it knows. He maintained, on the contrary, that a Faith which does not rest on evidence, is so much more easily shaken, and appealed to Sirach xix. 4: "He who quickly believeth, is fickle-minded, and his faith stands not firm." On the principles of his opponents, no one could gainsay idolaters, for every one might appeal to their notion, that it was only necessary to believe. It would lead to Montanism and every sort of fanaticism, for we must admit that the Apostles were only blind instruments of the Holy Spirit. There are different ways to Faith. Some are led to it by speculation; others by miracles. Christ confuted the Jews not only by miracles, but by arguments. We are, therefore, guided by him, as those who seek after wisdom, and must be led to the Faith by

arguments; and since miracles no longer take place, only this way is left for us, the arguments of Reason. There were at that time many, who were asserted to have worked miracles; and it is characteristic of his critical method of examination, that he called in question the narratives of these occurrences; but it does not follow that he admitted no miracles whatever. He argued that Paul placed a higher value on Prophecy than on the gift of tongues; for in the former was the ability to develop religious truth for the benefit of others. He, therefore, considered rational inquiry as the way to Faith; he would not say that vital Faith might originate in this, but it was a preparation for it, to which Grace might afterwards be added, and Faith would arise, when inward Experience was thus added to investigation. He also ascribes to Reason the function of developing and bringing into consciousness the contents of the appropriated Faith. Two men might agree in the matter of their faith and experience, and yet one might excel the other in the gift of knowledge, because he possessed the corresponding mental constitution. A PAUL was not superior to a PETER, nor an AUGUSTIN to a MARTIN in piety, but yet PAUL and AUGUSTIN excelled in a knowledge of the Faith, because their minds were specially adapted to it.\* It is evident that this view rests on a distinction between the essence and form in the representation of divine truth, and on a peculiar apprehension of the operation of the Divine Spirit; for it implies, that we must not only regard what is identical in the work of the Holy Spirit, but also what is conditional in human nature, in which individual peculiarities originate. He endeavoured to show how progressive knowledge reacts on the life—the more we know God, so much the more we shall also love him. ABELARD,† so far, was not quite just towards his opponents, as they were not all prejudiced against inquiry altogether; but many only maintained, that divine things, in order to be understood, must first be matters of experience; but this again he did not

\* *Introduct. ii. p. 1053.*

† *Nunc plurimi solatium suæ imperitiæ quærunt, et quum ea de fide docere nituntur, quæ ut etiam intelligi possint, desserere non sufficiunt, illum maxime fidei fervorem commendant, qui ea quæ dicuntur, antequam intelligat, credit, et prius his assentit ac recipit, quam quæ ipsa sint videat, et an recipienda sint agnoscat, sive pro captu suo discutiat.* —*Introduct. ii. p. 1061.*

deny; and as little was he an opponent of the Supernatural, but rather stood at a distance from Rationalism. He only impugned the unqualified antagonism of Reason and Faith—of the Natural and the Supernatural. "The Nature of things," he said, "which is constituted by God, cannot stand in contradiction to Faith. God himself makes use of Nature in his works of grace, since he would rather develop the Truth by images from Nature, than by language itself. Revelation and Nature depend on the same God." He endeavoured to find a mediating tendency, the presentation of a harmonious connexion between the natural and the supernatural, History and Revelation. Thus he reached, though obstructed in the consequential development by the Church doctrine, some points of a tendency which had not appeared since the times of the Alexandrian Theologians.

ABELARD's scholars, who propagated his opinions and expressed themselves with less reserve in some respects than he did; for many of them asserted that there was no mystery in the Faith, and that ABELARD had taught them to know everything clearly, increased the excitement against him. He himself, indeed, said that the first attacks against him proceeded purely from personal jealousy; but if this had its share in the matter, it certainly was not the principal thing. The first person who appeared against him, WALTER of MORTAGNE, in Flanders, a distinguished theologian in Paris, had sometime before been led to notice ABELARD's doctrinal deviations by the assertions of his presumptuous pupils. He was the adherent of a practical Church tendency, which aimed at combining with itself the dialectic Dogmatics, and was one of his more moderate opponents. As soon as he had obtained a copy of ABELARD's *Introductio*, he applied to him for an explanation. We now see how this theologian, in combating one error, fell into another. When ABELARD's scholars had adduced such a passage as that in John xvii. 3, to prove that even in this life perfect knowledge is possible, WALTER committed the mistake of referring all these expressions to the future life, and indulged in supposed emendations of biblical passages. Thus ABELARD could not satisfy him on any point. On one occasion he accused him of ascribing too much to human reason; but ABELARD said that he made no absolute assertions, but only wished to give his opinion; Walter replied

that he made everything uncertain, that Faith according to him was a mere opinion. Other opponents, more violent, appeared against him. It so happened that at the Council of Soissons (A.D. 1121) ABELARD and his doctrines were brought under review. He was overcome far more by outward force than by the arguments of his adversaries. As the voice of the multitude was against him, he gave way, and was prevailed upon to commit his work to the flames. He was condemned to confinement in a monastery. But the Papal legate, who was present at the Synod, is reported to have said that this attempt to crush him would turn out for his advantage, and that soon he would be triumphant. In a short time, through the intervention of some of his principal adherents, he obtained his liberty, and returned again to St. Denis. But as he here asserted that the patron saint of this abbey was not DIONYSIUS the Areopagite, he roused a violent storm on the part of the monks against him. He left the monastery and found a refuge in the territories of the Count THEOBALD of CHAMPAGNE. In the district of Troyes he built a small chapel of reeds and dedicated it to the Paraclete. But, in a short time, he was again surrounded by a crowd of pupils. He was obliged to begin his lectures again, his pupils shared all privations with him and built for him a handsome stone chapel. Among those who joined him, from an enthusiastic attachment to his doctrines and led a life of privations, was probably ARNOLD of BRESCIA; he was indeed of a more practical, ardent nature; but, in ABELARD, there was more than mere speculation, for he presented in his lectures the ideal of a truly spiritual life; and when, on such occasions, he inveighed against the secularity of the Church, and contrasted with its corruption the examples of ancient virtue,\* this so inflamed ARNOLD that, at a later period, he came forward as a reformer, and strove to check the downward tendency of the Church to worldliness. But the attention of ABELARD's adversaries was again roused. In order to be beforehand with their persecutions, he accepted the office of Abbot at Ruits, in Brittany, A.D. 1128. Yet he could not endure this retirement longer

\* Constat quippe philosophos maxime, continenter vixisse, atque ad continentiam tam scriptis quam exemplis multas nobis exhortationes reliquisse. *Introd.* ii. 1007. *Theol. Christiana* in Martene et Durand *Thesaur. Anecd.* v. 1210, seq.

than eight years, and began about A.D. 1136 to deliver lectures again in Paris. His school so widely spread, and his writings occasioned a fresh attack. Instead of his "*Introductio*," he put forth the substance of it recast, under the title of \* *Theologia Christiana*. Even in this work, he did not present a complete exposition of Christian doctrine, but proceeded no further than the doctrine of the Trinity. The book gave offence, among other things by the judgment which he expressed on the ancient philosophers. As he sought out the traces of truth in History, he believed that he could prove the agreement in morals of the Grecian Philosophy and Christianity. If in the former the love of goodness was spoken of, it referred ultimately to God, who is the original source of all good. The morality of the ancient Philosophers was more allied to Christianity than that of Judaism, since the Ethical was not mixed as in the latter, with the Ritual. The Gospel was strictly only a *reformatio legis naturalis*. He thus manifestly mistook the peculiarity of the Christian Life, and the essence of Christian Morals. He was misled, in part, by the standpoint of the times, the ascetic tendency of the moral teaching, which aimed rather at divesting men of what belonged to humanity than at rendering the human divine. He founded the relationship of Christianity and Philosophy on the fact that Christ was the Wisdom of God. He might have arrived at a Pelagian view if his thinking on the subject had not been so isolated and without sequence. It deserves notice that he maintained the strict connexion of feeling and knowledge; they were reciprocally conditioned by each other, and the Religious principle develops itself with advancing knowledge. His Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans is remarkable for original thoughts; his treatise on Ethics, though only a fragment, is important on account of its plan; it bears the title *Scito te ipsum*.† His opponents frequently mention a work under the name of *Sententiæ*; the quotations from it do not always appear in the same form. ABELARD himself complained that it was flagrantly unjust, to bring forward anything against him from such a work, since he had not written it. WALTER of ST. VICTOR says it was either written

\* *Theologiæ Christianæ*, lib. v. Martene et Durand *Thesaurus Anecdotorum*, t. v. 1139.

† *Pezii Thesaurus Anecdotorum*, t. iii. P. ii. p. 627.



by him or taken from his writings, and in his other works expressions are actually found, similar to those quoted from the *Sententiæ*. Yet it is only of late that a more certain judgment has been formed in relation between them. RHEINWALD, in 1835, published a manuscript in the library of Munich, which bore the title of *Epitome Theologiæ Abelardi*, but this does not correctly describe it; it is rather identical with those *Sententiæ*, one of those common collections from the Fathers, which were made the basis of farther dogmatical development. ABELARD could truly say that he had written no such book; they were passages which had been taken down during the delivery of his lectures on Dogmatics. In one transcript the words are preserved with which he began a lecture: "All who thirst, come to the waters and drink, O my friends! drink to the full, O my beloved!" This work contains a compendium of his Dogmatics, and forms the desired completion of his *Theologia Christiana*. One other work published by RHEINWALD from a manuscript in the Vienna Library, a dialogue between a Jew and a Philosopher on the highest good, manifestly contains ABELARD'S Ideas. In the works of an enthusiastic pupil of ABELARD, BERENGARIUS, a fragment is found of this dialogue. His work *Sic et Non*, is more important and more noted, in which he has collected the expressions of the ancient Church Teachers on a variety of subjects in 157 Rubrics. He allows these contradictory opinions to stand without attempting to reconcile them, evidently that they may be distinctly seen. He himself says, that he had collected them in order that the readers might be stimulated to inquiry, and thus undergo a mental training: *inquirendo veritatem percipimus*. Christ says, "Seek and ye shall find;" by questions, therefore, we ought to learn. He wished thus to vindicate his own standpoint; he seems also to have had in view to establish a freer tendency in opposition to that which would have impressed a complete uniformity on Dogmatics. He was not afraid to assert that the Church Teachers had erred in many things, and hence drew the conclusion: Who does not see how presumptuous it is for one man to judge respecting the intention of another, since God alone knows the heart and the thoughts, and He says, "Judge not, and ye shall not be judged?" The Church Teachers may have expressed different opinions, but in doing so, they were

acting under the impulse of Love; the *intentio* is the *oculus animi*. We recognise here the germ of a new mental tendency. He wished to separate more sharply from each other the Interest of Faith and that of Dogmatics, and to point out the difficulties of finding the right expression for religious truths. He ventured also to apply a similar test to the sacred Writers. The Abbot WILLIAM of St. THIERRY appeared against him in a document which he addressed to BERNARD of CLAIRVAUX. This monk was easily aroused by such an appeal to take a part in the dispute, and in a *Tractatus de erroribus Abalardi* pointed out the dangerous tendency of a number of ABELARD's opinions. When ABELARD appealed to the passage in the Book of Sirach against Credulity, BERNARD replied, that it referred not to faith in God, but to that between man and man. It was otherwise as to faith in God. ABRAHAM's faith was approved, because he had believed contrary to human appearances. ABELARD confounded faith and opinion. In Heb. xi. it is said, "Faith is the substance of things hoped for;" this could not be understood of an arbitrary opinion. The clamour against him on the ground of heresy had now become so violent that ABELARD himself requested an investigation from the Council of Sens, A.D. 1140. He and BERNARD both appeared there. The general feeling was in favour of the latter; instead of a calm examination, all that ABELARD could obtain was a disputation with his opponent, who easily obtained a condemnation of ABELARD's opinions as heretical. ABELARD was firmly convinced that injustice had been done him; during these disputes he wrote to the Abbess HELOISE that he was unshaken in his faith; that he despised the reputation of a philosopher, if he were denied to be a believer. "I will be no philosopher, if I must separate myself from PAUL, for there is no name under Heaven but Christ's, whereby we can be saved. I embrace him in the arms of faith." He appealed to the Pope, depending on the influence of his pupils at the Court of Rome; but BERNARD was more powerful. As ABELARD was on his way to Rome, he received the Papal decision which condemned him to confinement in a monastery. In his misfortunes he met with kindness and sympathy from a man who was distinguished by his ready acknowledgment of every good quality in others, and the firmness of his faith, the mild and

venerable PETER, Abbot of Cluny, who succeeded in reconciling him with BERNARD and the Pope, and gave him a place of refuge in his monastery. Here ABELARD wrote an apology in which he said, that everything, however well intended, might be misconstrued. Many things which had been attacked, he justified, and others he modified. He is said also to have composed a fuller vindication, in which he expressed himself more strongly. He lived for some years at Cluny; he there was seized with a fatal illness, during which he received the utmost attention from PETER. In A.D. 1142, he died, and PETER bore testimony to his true piety at the close of life. In the inscription on his tomb he calls him the CHRISTIAN PLATO, who gained the greatest victory over himself when he embraced the Christian Philosophy.

Although the free dialectic tendency received a check in ABELARD, yet speculation generally was too deeply rooted in the spirit of the Age, to be kept down; it only became more sober and cautious, and more allied to the Church tendency. Hence, many distinguished men were able to treat Theology in this manner unmolested. Of this class was ROBERT PULLEYN,\* Archdeacon of Rochester, at that time a teacher of Dogmatics at Paris, afterwards Professor at Oxford, and last of all, Cardinal and Chancellor of the Roman Church, and a friend of BERNARD. He was also connected with the great HUGO of St. VICTOR.† HUGO was a native of Ypern, but brought up under the care of his uncle, a Canon of Hamasloben, afterwards he became Canon of the Church of St. Victor in Paris, and was one of the most powerful advocates of the Theology developed in this school. In him were blended the chief tendencies of the Church, the mystical and speculative, the ecclesiastical and the dialectic; he was distinguished by acuteness, depth, and intensity of Christian feeling; but he was more mystical than ANSELM, and with a smaller proportion of dialectic subtlety. He combated in his

\* Died about A.D. 1150. *Sententiarum, libri 8*, ed. Mathoud, Par. 1655. Cramer, vi. p. 442.

† Opp. ed. Rotomagi, 1648, 3 t. f. Liebner Hugo v. St. Victor u. Die Theolog. Richtungen Seiner Zeit, Leipzig, 1832. Schlosser, Vincentius von Beauvais, Th. 2, über den Gang der Studien in Frankreich und die Schule von St. Victor. Cramer vi. Ritter, vii. p. 597.

writings the one-sided speculation which neglected experimental knowledge. Whoever should attempt to make a leap, would fall into the Abyss.\* He wrote two scientific works, *De Sacramentis Christianæ fidei, libb. II.*, and the *Summa Sententiarum*. One part of the latter has been ascribed to HILDEBERT of TOURS, or MANS, a pupil of BERENGARIUS, who for this reason has been reckoned among the Schoolmen. But LIEBNER has proved that the work belongs to HUGO.† HUGO entered deeply into the question respecting the relation of knowledge to Faith, and aimed at doing justice to both. He endeavoured to connect free inquiry with the maintenance of the dignity and independence of faith. He recognised in the Creation a God both revealing and hiding himself. God designed neither to remain altogether hidden from the human spirit, nor altogether to reveal himself, in order that the value of Faith might not be lost, and yet that Faith might be developed into knowledge. He regarded the disposition as that which determined Faith.‡ Three eyes have been given to man,—one for the world of the senses, one for the knowledge of the spirit, by which it knows itself and what is homogeneous to it, the department of the Reason, and one for what is elevated above the world—the Divine. Since, by sin, the eye of the Reason has been darkened. Faith comes in its stead, and is the organ of the knowledge of the super-terrestrial.§ It is a profound thought, that divine things cannot be known by the senses, by the power of

\* *Eruditio Didascalia*, vi. c. 3.

† *Stud. u. Krit.* 1831.

‡ *Fides in affectu habet substantiam, quia affectus ipse fides est, in cognitione habet materiam, quia de illo et ad illud quod, in cognitione est, fides est; credere igitur in affectu est, quod vere creditur in cognitione est.*

§ *De Sacram. i. x. c. 2.*—Hos igitur oculos quamdiu anima apertos et revolutos habebat, clare videbat et recte discernibat. Postquam autem tenebræ peccati in illam intraverunt, oculus quidem contemplationis extinctus est, ubi nihil videret; oculus autem rationis lippus effectus, ut dubie videret; solus ille oculus carnis in sua claritate permansit. Hinc est, quod corda hominum facilius sibi consentiunt in his quæ oculo carnis percipiunt, quam in his, quia acie mentis et sensu rationis attingunt; quia, ubi in videndo non caligant, in iudicando non discrepant. Homo ergo, quia oculum carnis habet, mundum videre potest et ea quæ in mundo sunt. Item quia oculum rationis ex parte habet, animum similiter ex parte videt, et ea quæ in animo sunt. Quia vero oculum contemplationis non habet, Deum et quæ in Deo sunt videre non valet. See Liebner's *Hugo v. Set. Vict.* p. 177.

the Imagination and the Intellect, but they have an organ for themselves, for the exercise of which the surrender of the Spirit to God, the tendency to a vital communion with Him is required. He makes Heb. xi. the basis\* of his definition of faith, the divine and invisible are received into the Spirit, and become a thing of life and experience, not of mere imagination. He distinguished various stages of Faith; when the living faith is in existence, the heart is purified by the devotion which springs from it, so that the believer anticipates what he does not yet know. By experience and daily intercourse with God the heart is so far advanced, that in meditation God is realized as present.† There is a stage of Faith which no longer requires miracles, but is strong in itself. On the other hand there is a mere outward Faith, when faith does not correspond to its objects, and the name of believer is merely conventional. Its absence of doubt is owing merely to a defect of interest, and the form of faith is associated with a disposition altogether worldly. In such cases, he considered the springing up of doubt as real progress, as a transition from a dead to a living faith. He has the following striking remark: We see that doubt, although it does not show itself under the predominance of a dead faith, lies nevertheless concealed in it. Hence, we cannot wonder, if in this age there appears a reaction of unbelief; for such doubt lies not merely in any given period, but at all times in the nature of Man. But where the freer tendency of Dialectics react against a dead Faith, it may easily lead to Unbelief. MONTZ, Archbishop of Paris, wished, since so many educated persons had no faith in the Resurrection, to give a testimony to it at his own death, and left directions that a card should be placed on his coffin with these words, "He died with a firm faith in the doctrine of the Resurrection." ●

About the middle of the twelfth century, the conflict between the two tendencies of the Age again made its appearance; for the apprehensions of the Church party were easily roused by any new manifestation, and hence it did not require a man of ABELARD's originality, in order to give an impulse

\* *Voluntaria quædam certitudo absentium supra opinionem et infra scientiam constituta.*

† *Munda conscientia invisibilibus documentis et secreta et familiari visitatione de Deo suo quotidie eruditus.*

to the controversy. GILBERT DE LA PORREE,\* Archbishop of Poitiers, was a man of fine dialectic acuteness, but one in whom we do not find deep religious thought. As far as we can learn the character of his theology from his commentary on BOETHIUS, he was inclined to dry subtleties. ABELARD had forewarned him at Sens, that he was exposed to a fate similar to his own, by quoting the line, "*tua res agitur, paries quum proximus ardet.*" He was a Realist, and the application of his formula to the Trinity appeared dangerous to BERNARD, who was easily prejudiced against Dialectics. At the COUNCIL of RHEIMS (A.D. 1148) he was accused by him before EUGENIUS III., and engaged in a disputation with him. GILBERT, certainly, could not justify his doctrinal views; but he had many friends, and BERNARD was not successful in attempting to introduce a Confession in opposition to him. GILBERT was permitted to return with honour to his bishopric, so great was the power of the dialectic tendency.

About this time, PETER LOMBARD,† of NOVARA, Teacher of Theology, and finally Bishop of Paris, made a memorable attempt to reconcile the ecclesiastical and dialectic tendency which impressed a character on the dominant theology of the following centuries. This was effected by his *Quatuor libri sententiarum*; or, *Four Books of Sentences*.‡ By making the testimonies of the Fathers the basis of his work, he gratified the ecclesiastical party; he satisfied the requirements of the Dialecticians by the arrangement of the subjects in four sections: God and Spirits, the Nature of Man, the Incarnation of God, and the Sacraments; he also cited opposing sentiments, and endeavoured to reconcile them by dialectic discussion. Four Books of Sentences were published by his contemporary BANDINUS, which strictly agree with those above mentioned, only in a more compendious form. Many have taken this to be the older work; but from a comparison of the two, it is evident that a mind of PETER's skill and originality would have had no need of such a groundwork. Hence

\* *Gaufrædi Epistolæ de Rebus Gestis in Causa Gilberti Porretani*. Mansi, xxi. 728. Otto Fusigenses, *De Gestis Friderici*, i. 46, 50, sqq. Cramer, vi. 530; Ritter, vii. 437; Baur, ii. 509. According to Nieder's *Krchgesch.* p. 472, he was a Nominalist.

† Died 1164, bishop of Paris.

‡ Ed. Basil, 1507; ed. John Aleaume, 1546; Cramer, vi. 586; Ritter, vii. 477.

we have no reason for deriving his work from the shorter one.\* His own became the text-book, on which the most noted schoolmen delivered commentaries. He derived from it the name, by which he was usually known, of *Magister Sententiarum*. His school was continued by PETER of POICTIERS,† Chancellor of the University of Paris, who signalized himself by giving a finish to the Dialectic Forms. ALANUS AB INSULIS (Ryssell) called the Great, wrote a dogmatic work,‡ after a freer method than LOMBARD, since he endeavoured to prove Christian doctrines without a groundwork of Sentences, and independently of all authorities. Yet he says, although these arguments lead men to the Faith, they will not be sufficient to beget true Faith; perfect knowledge will be attained first in the heavenly land.

But even the moderate Dialectics of LOMBARD did not attain a predominant influence without a conflict. WALTER of ST. VICTOR attacked Dialectics in his work, *Contra quatuor Gallie labyrinthos*, by which title he meant to designate ABELARD, PETER LOMBARD, PETER of POICTIERS, and GILBERT DE LA PORREE.§ The Provost GEROCH, of Reichenberg, in Bavaria, a zealous advocate of ecclesiastical discipline and the Hierarchy, feared that injury would arise to the Faith from Speculation. The Abbot JOACHIM of Floris in Calabria opposed this Theology, more from a mystical standpoint.|| As in another direction the secularization of the Church by the State, so he here combated the secularization of the Faith by Science. He longed for the independence of the Church and of Faith; in

\* See Retberg, *Comparatio inter Magistri Baudini Libellum et Petri Lombardi Sententias*, Gottg. 1834.

† *Sententiarum*, l. 5. ed. Mathoud, Par. 1655 (together with Pulleyn's works). Cramer, vi. 754.

‡ Died A.D. 1203.—*De Arte Sive Articulis Catholicæ Fidei* in *Pez. Thesaurus Anecdotorum*, t. i. p. ii. pag. 475. Cramer, v. ii. 445.

§ An abstract of it is to be found in *Bukei Historia Universitatis Parisiensis*, t. ii. A. Planck on the Writings of St. Victor, *Stud. u. Krit.* 1844. Neander identifies Walter of Mauritania and this Walter of St. Victor, but on chronological grounds they are doubtless different persons. See Planck. p. 861.—[JACOBI.]

|| *De Concordia Utriusque Testamenti*, l. 5; *Expositio Apocalypsis*, ed. Venet. 1519; *Psalterium Decem Cordarum*, Venet. 1527; Commentaries on Jeremiah, Isaiah, &c.; an Epitome in *Walfii Lectiones Memorabiles*, t. i. 443, sqq.; *Acta Sanctorum Maji*, t. vii. p. 89, sqq. Engelhardt, *Kirchengesch. Abhandlungen* Erlg. 1832, über das ewige Evangelium der Joachim v. Floris.

short, for the independence of the spiritual life in every respect. He distinguished three Periods in the History of the Kingdom of God: 1st. The Kingdom of the Father in the Old Testament, when God was acknowledged in the works of His almighty power. 2ndly. The Kingdom of the Word, the Revelation of the Son when the divine wisdom was studied in the Mysteries. But he foretold a regeneration of the Church, which would be, 3rdly, the age of the Holy Spirit or of St. John, when the Intellectual would give way to the Contemplative, and the subtle distinctions of ideas to Love. But Mysticism was not a match for the acuteness of Dialectics; it gave way to LOMBARD, for INNOCENT III. decided at the Council of Lateran against JOACHIM. A pious man, PETER CANTOR, of ST. VICTOR,\* strove from a scriptural, practical standpoint against this scholastic Theology which aimed at the ascendancy by means of its glosses on the Scriptures. PETER of BLOIS complains of those who mooted questions respecting Time and Space, and the nature of Universals (*universalia*) before they had learned the Elements of Science. They strove after high things, and neglected the doctrine of salvation.

However much the connexion of Acuteness and Depth, the intensity of religious feeling and zeal for the Christian Faith, must be acknowledged in Scholasticism, yet by following the principle of AUGUSTIN and ANSELM, that the *intellectus* has only to develope what is given by the *fides*, it was led to an erroneous endeavour, to receive everything, even the errors of Church doctrine, into the system, and to confirm them. The scholastic method certainly promoted Acuteness, but it also tended to Formalism; when most profound, it spent itself in barren subtleties. It is often necessary to distinguish what belonged to the dialectic form, and what to the underlying Christian consciousness. The mystical Theology formed a wholesome counterpoise against the one-sided, hair-splitting intellectual tendency, partly where it proceeded separately from Dialectics, but chiefly in cases where they were in unison.

\* In his *Verbum Abbreviatum*, Montib. 1634.



## HISTORY OF SPECIAL DOGMAS.

## A. Among the introductory Dogmas we class,

## THE DOCTRINE OF INSPIRATION.

THE doctrine of Inspiration was as yet only occasionally touched upon, and nothing more than unconnected statements were made respecting it. ABELARD expressed his peculiar views (which might have been very important had they been followed out more consecutively), with great freedom in the introduction to his treatise, *Sic et Non*: he there asserts that everything in the Scripture did not proceed in an equal degree from Inspiration. The Prophets sometimes had not the gift of prophecy, and from the custom of prophesying, and from supposing that they had the spirit of prophecy, they uttered many things that were false, and mixed with their own conceptions. God permitted this, in order to humble them, and to make them see more distinctly what proceeded from the Divine Spirit, and what from their own. And when the holy writers of Scripture possessed this Spirit He did not grant all His gifts to every one, nor enlighten the soul respecting everything, but revealed or concealed sometimes one thing, sometimes another.\* In this language was implied the idea of a successive development of divine Revelation, and of a necessary reciprocal supplementing of its organs. Hence, he says, PETER might be mistaken in his opinion respecting the observance of the Law, and PAUL might rightfully reprove him. But if Prophets and Apostles were not free from error, how much less would the Church's teachers be so.†

\* Ed. Henke, p. 10.—*Constat vero et Prophetas ipsos quandoque prophetiæ gratia carnisse, et nonnulla ex usu prophetandi, cum se spiritum prophetiæ habere crederent, per spiritum suum falsa protulisse; et hoc eis ad humilitatis custodiam permissum esse, ut sic videlicet verius cognoscerent, quales per spiritum Dei et quales per suum existerent, et se eum qui mentiri vell falli nescit ex dono habere, cum haberent. Qui etiam cum habetur, sicut non omnia uni confert dona, ita nec de omnibus mentem ejus, quem replet, illuminat sed hoc, modo illud revelat, et cum unum aperit, alterum occultat.*

† Ibid.—*Ipsam etiam apostolorum principem—post illam quoque specialem a Domino promissam sancti spiritus effusionem—lapsam in errorem de circumcisionis adhuc et quorundam antiquorum vitium observantia, cum a coapostolo suo Paulo graviter atque salubriter publice correctus esset, a perniciosa simulatione desistere non pudit.*

IN ANSELM of CANTERBURY no doubts could arise about the prevalent theory of Inspiration, but he endeavoured to make this object of Faith clear to the Reason and was led to reflect on the nature of Prophecy. EADMER relates, that once on waking, he occupied himself with meditating how to conceive of the intention of future things by the Prophets, and while he was musing with his eyes fixed on the ground, he saw through the wall, the monks rise up and set everything in readiness for the Mass. Applying this, he inferred—as here Space is annihilated for human intuition, so also the Prophets in their moments of Inspiration beheld the Divine independently of the separation occasioned by Time. Whether this was imagination, or a somnambulist vision which thus affected ANSELM, certain it is that it was the immediate occasion of his entering on an examination of Prophecy.

With the question of Inspiration was connected a diversity of views respecting the identity of religious Truth in the Old and New Testament. The point in debate was, whether all the Christian articles of Faith were already contained in the Old Testament. Those who had adopted a stricter view of the influence of the divine Spirit on the Sacred Writers maintained that all the New Testament articles of Faith must be found already developed in the Old Testament. A difference of opinion therefore arose at the same time on the question, what articles of Faith, generally, were necessary to Salvation. Some made the circle smaller, others larger; the former had a freer, the latter a more restricted, dogmatic tendency. The difference led at last to a fundamental distinction in the relation of Dogma and Faith, according as Religion was placed more in the Intellect or the Feelings. The one-sided ecclesiastical dogmatism embraced a view which did not distinguish between the dogmatic idea and the element of faith, and therefore placed the essence of Religion in the former. Its advocates required in the Old Testament the same extent of developed articles of Faith, necessary for Salvation. Others like HUGO of ST. VICTOR transferred the essence of Religion to the disposition and regarded knowledge

*Quid itaque mirum, cum ipsos etiam prophetas et apostolos ab errore non penitus fuisse constet alienos, si in tam multiplici sanctorum patrum scriptura nonnulla propter suprapositam causam erronee prolata atque scripta videantur?*

as secondary. He assumes that in believing, *affectus* and *cognitio* meet together; its objective is knowledge, but its subjective importance consists in *affectus*, and on that depends the real importance of the internal religious life. There may be agreement in the *affectus*, when there is a difference in the *cognitio*. Accordingly he impugns those who regard the articles of faith as equally necessary in order to salvation for all.\* On the contrary he urges that we see how the Apostles themselves not till a late period and with difficulty recognised the necessity of the redemptive sufferings of Christ, and that this doctrine was to them for a long time a stone of stumbling; and yet this article of faith was clearly developed in the Old Testament! Christ said of John the Baptist, that he was greater than all the Prophets, and yet he was in doubt, because Christ erected no outward Messianic kingdom; how then could all the Prophets of the Old Testament have as much knowledge on this subject as believers in the New Testament? According to this view the Old Testament standpoint would be higher than the Christian, for there would be nothing wanting to it which Christianity has revealed; without the outward manifestations there would have been the same certainty of Faith. By means of a pure spiritual intuition they would have attained to the same certainty, which is now reached by faith in the Gospel. According to this view God would either have been too severe on the Old Testament standpoint, since he only vouchsafed to a few that grace which revealed to them the higher truths that were necessary to Salvation, or the Revelation must have been far more general than under the New Testament. Hence this opinion is erroneous, and we must distinguish the fundamental article of Faith. Faith in God as Creator and Redeemer which is common to the Old and New Testament, is requisite for all standpoints of piety and necessary for Salvation. But whatever besides is contained in this Faith, must be gradually developed by divine Revelation; and to this belongs the manner in which Redemption is accomplished by God. Hence we recognise an identity in the doctrine of Salvation and yet a continued development in the knowledge of it, which is not the same in all persons at different periods, or even at the same period.

\* Qui quasi quadam pietate impii in Deum efficiuntur, et dum ultra id, quod in veritate est, sentiunt, in ipsam veritatem offendant.

## B. THE DOGMAS OF SPECIAL DOGMATICS.

## THEOLOGY.

## 1. THE IDEA OF GOD IN GENERAL.

ANSELM is signalized by his construction of the ontological proof of the Divine Existence, the foundation of which was already to be found in AUGUSTIN, but the completion of it is due to ANSELM.\* He laboured for a long time to find a simple argument to prove the existence of God. Though as an article of faith this stood immoveably firm, yet a proof was required for the Reason. What was matter of feeling, intuition, and religious certainty, required to be briefly put into a syllogistic form. But here was his mistake. Everything was to be demonstrated. But here the inadequate syllogistic form is to be distinguished from the fundamental laws of thought and of the religious consciousness. As in ANSELM's mind Speculation and Religion were continually mingled, he did not keep apart the idea of the Absolute and the idea of the living God. He confounded the necessity of the thinking faculty, which cannot exist without an Absolute, and the inward necessity of the religious nature, which cannot exist without faith in a living God. As the necessary recognition of an Absolute for the thinking Reason was obvious to him, so he transferred it without any intermediate process to the Idea of the living God. His argument is connected with the essence of Realism; accordingly, all thinking appeared to him as ultimately traceable to God, as the source of Truth, and as affording evidence of an immediate connexion with God. The basis of his argument was formed from these Ideas: the idea of God carries the evidence of its reality in itself; it is immediate; deducible from nothing else, and to be assumed in all thinking. Without this assumption there could be no thinking. The human mind can invent nothing and create nothing of itself: all thinking is only a taking up of what is given—a perceiving. If, generally, there is no absolute error but everywhere there is a foundation of Truth, so much the less could the human Mind invent the Idea of the Perfect. This idea is rather a Revelation of the most perfect Being himself, an evidence of the connexion of the created Reason with the

\* See his *Monologium* and *Proslogium*. Baur, *Lehre von der Dreieinigkeit*, ii 372. Hasse, *Anselm*, ii. 233.

Eternal Atheism is therefore something which cannot be matter of thinking. ANSELM\* distinguishes between a thinking of ideas, the thinking of that which is connected with things material and the merely formal, which consists in expressions which are uttered without real thinking. Hence, we find in the 53rd Psalm, "The fool saith there is no God," but this is only an utterance; he cannot really think that there is no God. He thus describes in his *Proslogium*† the connexion of the Religious and the Speculative;—"Thou art so truthful, O Lord, my God, that thou canst not be conceived as non-existent; for if any spirit could conceive something better than thyself, this Creature would rise above the Creator." This thought he wished to present in a syllogism;‡ the Idea of God is the idea of the Being, *quo nihil majus cogitari potest*. But an existence is more than a thought; consequently, in the idea of the most perfect Being his existence is founded to whom this idea refers; otherwise there would be something greater by the supposition. In this conclusion is the error of a *petitio principii*. ANSELM concludes that if something be granted as merely thought of, it must also be granted really to exist; but existence does not belong to the completeness of the thought. The Monk GAUNILLO correctly exposed this error; he objected § that if a person gave a description of the lost Island of Atlantis it might as well be inferred that the Island was in existence. In logical acuteness he was superior to ANSELM, but inferior in profundity and hence he was not able to extricate the Idea itself from the defective form. ANSELM might have rejoined that there was a difference between the idea of an accidental existence, and that of God the necessary Being.||

\* *Proslogium*, c. 2, 4.

† C. 3.

‡ *Ibid.* c. 2.—*Et certe id quo majus cogitari nequit, non potest esse in intellectu solo. Si enim vel in solo intellectu est, potest cogitari esse et in re, quod majus est. Si ergo id, quo majus cogitari non potest, est in solo intellectu id ipsum, quo majus cogitari non potest, est quo majus cogitari potest; sed certe hoc esse non potest. Existit ergo procul dubio aliquid, quo majus cogitari non valet, et in intellectu et in re.*

§ *Liber pro Insipiente adv. Anselmi in Proslogio Ratiocinationem in Anselm's Works*, ed. Gerberon. Hasse, ii. 241.

|| See *Anselmi Liber Apologeticus contra Gaunilonem*.

## 2. THE DOCTRINE OF THE TRINITY.

THE dialectic differences of the Schools in reference to general Ideas, when applied to the doctrine of the Trinity, occasioned a controversy respecting it. On both sides it was mis-stated according to their respective assumptions; categories were applied to the nature of God, which only suited created beings ROSCELLIN. in accordance with his Nominalism maintained that only the individual was the real thing (*res*). If his opponents said—That inasmuch as the three persons are only one divine Being, they might be called *una res*—he disputed it, because it appeared to him to follow that in God there is one real Being which has three *nomina*; he on the contrary regarded the Trinity as *tres res*,\* and thus gave a handle to the charge of Tritheism. GILBERT PORRETANUS laid himself open to the same imputation by the application he made of Realism.† His method somewhat resembles that of JOHANNES PHILOPONUS. He wished to distinguish with precision the various meanings of the word *Deus*; either it was equivalent to *divinitas*—that is, *substantia quæ est Deus*, as far as there is One essence of the Divinity in three persons, or *substantia quæ est Deus*, as far as the individual persons are considered, distinguished by their personal attributes. He held these distinctions to be necessary in order to guard against Sabellianism. Certainly it was beneficial to set aside the application of dialectic theories to this doctrine. ABELARD also opposed it.‡ Dialectic divisions, he says, are suited only to compound beings. It was an important remark of PETER LOMBARD that the determinations of the Church were rather designed to exclude from the simplicity of the Divine Essence what is not in it, than to place anything in it.§

In their attempts to construct a rational view of the doctrine of the Trinity, the scholastic Theologians in general followed the analogy with the created spirit which had been suggested by AUGUSTIN. ANSELM takes the lead in this:

\* Baluz. Miscell. iv. 478.—*Si tres personæ sunt una tantum res, et non sunt tres res per se sicut tres angeli aut tres animæ ita tamen, ut voluntate et potentia sint idem; ergo Pater et Spiritus Sanctus cum Filio incarnatus est.*

† Baur, *Lehre v. d. Dreieinigkeit*, ii. 508.

‡ *Introductio in Theologiam*, ii. 1073.

§ *Sententiæ*, lib. i.; *Distinctio* 4.

"We cannot know," he says, "the Supreme Being in himself, but only after a certain analogy with created beings, therefore most of all with the rational spirit. The more this spirit enters into itself and observes itself, the more will it succeed in raising itself to the knowledge of the Absolute Spirit.\* The human spirit is a mirror in which we may see the Image of that which we do not directly behold. The Supreme Spirit presupposes his own existence, knows himself; the Word begotten from himself, is one with his own essence. Thus the Supreme Being expressed himself. As everything which is produced by human art, was before in the idea of the formative spirit, and as this idea remains even when the work perishes, and is, in this respect, one with the art of the formative spirit itself so it is not another, but the same word by which God knows himself and all creatures. In the divine Word Creatures have a higher being than in themselves; the ideal Being rests in the divine thoughts. The relation of the Son to the Father is something elevated above all language. The expression *generation* is best suited to represent the relation, but yet it is symbolical. Further, as God knows himself, he loves himself; his love to himself presupposes his being and knowing. This is also denoted by the procession of the Holy Spirit from both; all three pass completely into one another, and thus constitute the unity of the Supreme Being." In this manner ANSELM vindicated the Western doctrines of the procession of the Spirit from the Father and the Son. During the time of his banishment, he defended this doctrine at the Council of Bari in Apulia, against the Greek Church,

\* Monologium, c. 64, sqq.—Patet, quia sicut sola est mens rationalis inter omnes creaturas, quæ ad ejus investigationem assurgere valeat, ita nihilominus eadem sola est, per quam maxime ipsam et ad ejusdem inventionem proficere queat. Nam jam cognitum est, quia hac illi maxime per naturalis essentiæ propinquat similitudinem. Quid igitur assertius, quam quia mens rationalis quanto studiosius ad se discendum descendit, tanto efficacius ad illius cognitionem ascendit, et quanto se ipsam intueri negligit, tanto ab ejus speculatione descendit, c. 65. Aptissime logitur ipsa sibi met esse velut speculum dici potest, quo speculetur, ut ita dicam imaginem ejus, quem faciem a facie videre nequit. Nam si mens ipsa sola ex omnibus, quæ facta sunt sui memor et intelligens et amans esse potest, non video cur negetur esse in illa vera imago illius essentiæ quæ per sui memoriam et intelligentiam et amorem in Trinitate ineffabile consistit.

with such general approbation, that he was commissioned by the Pope to reduce it writing.

ANSELM was followed by PETER LOMBARD and the other theologians of this period. HUGO of St. VICTOR carries out the analogy in the following manner;\* the Spirit,—the knowledge of itself begotten from it, or Wisdom, and the Love proceeding from both, with which it embraces its wisdom. In God there are not changeable affections as in Man, but each is one with his own essence, and this higher relation is designated by the term Trinity.

ABELARD agreed in principle with this view, but went still further. While the above-mentioned theologians acknowledged that the doctrine of the Trinity was a mystery, and only sought an analogon to it in the human spirit, he wished to prove necessarily and *a priori*, that this doctrine was an adequate expression for the doctrine of God as the Supreme Being. In order to think of God as the most perfect, we must attribute to him omnipotence by which he creates what he wishes,—and the highest wisdom by virtue of which nothing is hidden from him, and according to which he arranges all things,—and the highest love and grace by which he governs and guides whatever he has created by his omnipotence and wisdom. This corresponds to the relation of the Father as begetting, of the Son as the begotten, and of the Holy Spirit as proceeding from both.† Procession (*procedere*) is a natural designation of Love, for it denotes expansion towards other beings, in order to connect them with One's self by Love.‡ In like manner he says—"Man as the image of God represents the Father by his power over other creatures, the Son by his Reason and the Holy Spirit by his original innocence."§ He seeks to point out an analogy to the Trinity in the whole Creation; hence his comparison of the Seal; the brass, the form, and the seal, which through both is effected; or of the Sun, light, and heat, the heat is an image of the Holy Spirit, as the love of God; even as Christ said that he came to kindle a fire on earth, namely, a fire of love. This comparison of the Sun gave a pretext for accusing him of Sabellianism. Since

\* De Sacramentis, i. p. iii. c. 23. De Tribus Diebus, Opp. i. f. 24, sqq. Liebner, p. 374.

† Introductio, i. pag. 985.

§ Ibid. i. 979.

‡ Ibid. ii. pag. 1085.



ABELARD held the doctrine of the Trinity to be a necessary idea of Reason, he endeavoured to show traces of it in Antiquity.

ALANUS AB INSULIS says, according to the words of HERMES TRISMEGISTUS, Unity begets Unity, and reflects its glow back upon itself.\*

### 3. OF THE DIVINE ATTRIBUTES.

OMNIPRESENCE. ABELARD was charged with not acknowledging God's essential Omnipresence. WALTER understood him, as if he resolved the Omnipresence into an universal agency, like the Socinians. But we can hardly admit such a tendency in ABELARD, at least from the beginning. Since he was obliged to vindicate himself from the charge of transferring ideas of Time and Space to God, how could he have thought of the relation of God to the World in so abstract a manner? That charge rests on a misunderstanding. The essential point of his view consists in this, that he regarded the Omnipresence of God as efficient without separating the essence and the agency of God; his omnipotence was to be thought of only as omnipresent, his Presence only as an efficient presence. When it is said in Holy Scripture that God came down, this cannot be understood of a movement in space, but it only denotes the visible beginning of a fresh agency of God.† God comes or goes in reference to the impartation or withdrawal of his gifts.‡ He, who is everywhere by his essential Presence, cannot move anywhere in relation to Space; but that he is everywhere by virtue of his Essence, is to be thought of as his being everywhere according to his omnipotence and efficiency. All Space is present to Him; he never ceases to operate; for all Space can only be maintained in existence by God's omni-

\* Regula Theolog. ed. Mingarelli, p. 180.

† Introductio in Theol. iii. 1126.

‡ Quum in quosdam venire vel a quibusdam recedere dicitur, juxta donorum suorum collationem vel subtractionem intelligitur, non secundum localem ejus adventum vel recessum qui ubique per præsentiam suæ substantiæ semper existens, non habet, quo moveri localiter possit. Quum itaque Deus in virginem venire dicitur secundum aliquam efficaciam, non secundum localem accessionem intelligi debet. Quid est enim aliud eum in virginem descendisse ut incarnaretur, nisi ut nostram assumeret infirmitatem, se humillasse, ut hoc quidem humiliatio ejus videlicet intelligatur descensus?

potence, and in this respect he is present therein by his substance.\* Thus in ABELARD's mind the idea of an Omnipresence not resting but active was connected with that of the divine upholding. God upholds all things in existence, or he imparts to them fresh powers. We may, indeed, in the same way, say of a King that his power extends everywhere, and speak of his long arm, but it is not true of him that by his natural and essential presence he acts everywhere in his kingdom, but mediately and by his representatives. Thus also in ABELARD's *Sentences* God is everywhere by his Essence, since he acts everywhere by himself without mediation. It is observable that he attributes to omnipresence a relation to Time as well as to Space. Some of the profoundest thinkers among his contemporaries misunderstood this doctrine of ABELARD's. HUGO of ST. VICTOR impugns the *calumniatores veritatis*, who maintained that God was everywhere only by his power and not according to his essence. Certainly he quotes arguments which are not to be found in ABELARD, yet some things favour the supposition that he had ABELARD in his eye. He pronounces the arguments of his opponents to be partly absurd, as for example, that God may not be defiled by his essential omnipresence. The only question is, whether God according to his essence is nowhere, or everywhere, or only in some places. If we accepted the last supposition, God would be confined by the limits of Space; therefore we must admit that he is everywhere, and yet not enclosed in any space. Although we cannot perfectly comprehend this, yet we must necessarily believe it, since no created being can exist without Him even for an instant. HUGO, therefore, did not essentially differ from ABELARD's view; when we separate all relation to space from God's upholding activity, we arrive at the idea of Omnipresence.

OMNIPOTENCE. The Schoolmen of the twelfth Century aimed in their discussions to guard against two rocks; on the

\* Quod tamen ubique esse per substantiam dicitur, juxta ejus potentiam vel operationem dici arbitror, ac si videlicet diceretur, ita ei cuncta loca esse presentia, ut in eis aliquid operari nunquam cesset, nec ejus potentia sit alicubi otiosa. Nam et ipsa loca et quidquid est in eis nisi per ipsum conserventur, manere non possunt et per substantiam in eis esse dicitur, ubi per propriæ virtutem substantiæ aliquid nunquam operari cesset, vel ea ipsa servando, vel aliquid in eis per se ipsum ministrando.

one hand, against the admission of an infinite caprice with which Omnipotence would be confounded; and on the other, of the representation of a natural necessity in God. ANSELM says,\*—We must necessarily so understand Freedom and the Will of God that we attribute nothing to him inconsistent with his dignity. The true idea of Freedom regards only what is worthy of God. Goodness is not to be considered as if it were something settled by God's pleasure, which might have been otherwise, but it agrees with his essence. Hence if any one should say—What God wills is good, and what he does not will is not good, this is not so to be understood that if God willed something bad this would be good because he willed it; for it does not follow, that if God willed to lie, it would be right to lie, but rather that a Being who willed to lie would not be God. As truly as God is God, we cannot conceive that he would will what is bad. If we speak of necessity in God, it is only an improper expression for the unchangeableness of his goodness, which he has from himself, and is not derived from some other quarter.

ABELARD did not always remain satisfied with these moderate views; he lost himself in inquiries respecting the relation of God to the possible and the real, and was met by the difficulty† that we must allow many things to be possible to Man which we cannot attribute to God. He answers,—We cannot ascribe to God what is connected with human defect and limitation; yet, in a certain sense, we may reasonably refer to God's omnipotence what is done by his creatures; for God makes use of created beings in order to accomplish what he wills; so far, therefore, we may find his agency in what they do, and say that God effects all things. But proceeding further, he starts the question whether God could do anything more or better than he actually does, or could leave undone what he does. The affirmative of this question, he says, has difficulties, for since God in all that he does or leaves alone has a rational cause, and the Supreme Reason cannot act against Reason, we cannot perceive how God could have acted otherwise. Upon this he brings forward the absurd sentiment, that we should owe God no thanks for his goodness, which contradicts the language of Holy Writ and of the Church-teachers; we ourselves could do many things dif-

\* Cui Deus Homo, i. 12.

† Introductio, iii. p. 1109.

ferently from the way in which we actually do; and according to this notion, God's Omnipotence would be more limited than the ability of Man. Against this last position he says, that this belongs to our weakness; we should be better, if we could not do what is evil. He sets aside all objections by the distinction between an absolute and a hypothetical possibility and necessity. We must not allow ourselves to think of God's will separate from his nature, and we cannot call this compulsion. Since his goodness is so great, that he wills exactly what is good, he is so much the more to be loved. Should we love a person the less who in consequence of his great love cannot do otherwise than help us? God, who is good in the highest sense, is so inflamed by his inexpressible goodness,\* that what he wills he necessarily wills. He then again represents the difficulties on both sides; which shows how very much he was perplexed by this problem—"Since I wish in all things to preserve the honour of God, I hope that he who has freed us from the snares of sin, will also free us from those of words, and guide us so that no one may be able to charge us with falsehood or arrogance in what we say of Him. He who looks more at the disposition than at the act will graciously acknowledge our endeavour." As he was attacked on account of these sentiments, he justified himself in his *Apologeticus*. "I believe," he said, "that God can only do that which it becomes him to do, and that he can do much, which he never will do."

HUGO of ST. VICTOR attacked ABELARD's doctrine of omnipotence without naming him, and without differing essentially from him. We may remark the difficulties which he also found in this investigation. He argued against those† who wished to prescribe a limit to infinite might. God could certainly make that better which he has created, not as if he could do anything bad, but he can make the good still better; not that he does not always do what is best in and for itself, but he can cause that which has been effected by Him, to advance to a higher stage of excellence. Hugo avails himself of a distinction which has since been frequently applied by the schoolmen; he attributes a twofold will to God—the *voluntas beneplaciti* and the *voluntas signi*; the will of God in itself or

\* *Theologia Christiana*, Martene et Durand, v. 1337.

† *De Sacramentis*, i. 22.

immanent, and as it appears in commands and prohibitions, in events and in the works of God. If we understand the will of God in the first sense, he can do nothing otherwise than he wills to do; if we understand it in the second sense, everything which God has created, may be better than it is; he can make the good more perfect.\* God's omnipotence must apply to everything to effect which requires a real Power. For the theistic standpoint, his remark is important, that as Time is not commensurate with the eternity of God, so neither are the works of God commensurate with the extent of his Power.†

ABELARD's ideas of God's omnipotence and omnipresence led him to some peculiar views of the relation of the natural and the supernatural, and consequently of the idea of *miracle*. On this standpoint he did not separate outwardly the immediate and mediate agency of God, but ascribed everything to his immediate operation, and hence conceived of the upholding agency of God as a continued Creation. He impugned the miraculous narratives of his own times, not as an opponent of supernatural events generally, but only of an unmodified antagonism against the Natural; both, in his opinion, ought to be in unison, and a miracle should be regarded as a higher law of Nature, a view in which he had been anticipated by AUGUSTIN. Everything must be referred back to a divine arrangement of the universe which embraced all things. He distinguished the connexion of the order of the Universe as it was founded in the divine Reason, and its representation in actual appearance. In reference to the first, nothing can be conceived which goes beyond it; everything is settled in it without exception; the whole agency of God which was called forth in the phenomena and which was from Eternity in the divine Reason is comprised in it. In reference to the history of the Creation he calls it one connected Day.‡ The Word of the Father is the Wisdom by which God from the beginning arranges all things which become visible in his works. Here is nothing contradictory,

\* Summa, i. c. 13.

† Sicut æternitatem non æquat tempus nec immensitatem locus, sic nec potentiam opus.

‡ Expositio in Hexæmeron, Martene et Durand Thesaurus, v. pag. 1372. -- Diem unum vocat totam illorum operum Dei consummationem prius in mente habitam et in opere postmodum sexta die completam

nothing abrupt, nothing isolated, but everything is connected agreeably to Reason in the divine Wisdom. It is the Platonic idea of the *mundus intelligibilis*. Over against this ideal order of the Universe he placed what proceeds from the powers and capabilities of the phenomenal world, in which only a part of the divine plan of the world is made known. When we would examine\* the powers of Nature in anything whatever we do not look upon the original creative act of God, but upon powers and arrangements which he has founded in Nature, and which bring forth all things without miracle. Only the question arises whether the powers of Nature that have been already given are sufficient to account for certain phenomena. He does not regard a Miracle as a phenomenon which was not included in that ideal constitution of Nature, but as one which cannot be accounted for, from the powers of phenomenal Nature. We say of Miracles,† that they take place *contra vel supra naturam*, inasmuch as the original constitution of Nature was not sufficient for them, but new powers implanted by God were requisite. Miracles are marks of a new creature power introduced by God, which presents itself to us as new in relation to the natural constitution of the phenomenal World. When Philosophers pronounce a miracle to be impossible, they look, no doubt, at the common course of Nature, but not at the superabundance of the divine Omnipotence, on which it depends to create a new thing beyond and above the common course of Nature. The same thing takes place as when he, first of all, created the world out of nothing. ABELARD did not maintain that henceforth no more miracles can happen; nor does he allow that miracles were merely necessary for the founding of the Church; miracles might also serve to kindle a true living Faith and to confute Heretics, Pagans, and Jews. The reason why they do not now take place is because we are not worthy of them, we

\* *Expositio in Hexæmeron*, Martene et Durand Thesaur. v. 1378.

† *Ibid.* i. 1.—Unde illa, quæ per miracula fiunt, magis contra vel supra naturam, quam secundum naturam fieri fatemur, cum ad illud scilicet faciendum nequaquam illa rerum preparatio prior sufficere possit, nisi quandam vim novam rebus ipsis Deus conferret, sicut et in illis sex diebus faciebat, ubi sola ejus voluntas vim naturæ obtinebat in singulis efficiendis.—*Theologia Christiana*, iii. 1133. Contra naturam vel præter naturam fieri, eo quod primordialium causarum institutio ad hoc minime sufficere possit, nisi Deus præter solitum propria voluntate vim quandam rebus impertiret, ut hoc inde fieri posset.

desire them not for the salvation of souls, but from motives of vanity. Hence that Faith has vanished of which Christ declared that it could move mountains. Yet he did not overlook the subordinate position of miracles in relation to the whole religious life. He regarded spiritual miracles as of the highest order; and this was not merely his own peculiar view; in writers who differ widely on other points we find the sentiment that the true miracle and the end of all miracles is the impartation of divine life.

The doctrines of Providence and the Government of the World had no special place in the dogmatic Manuals of this period, but were discussed under the chapters relating to the divine Will, Prescience and Predestination. The views of Theologians were for the most part strictly Augustinian; yet far from the extravagance of the earlier Predestinarians, they sought, at least in their language, to save human Freedom, and were unwilling in any respect to refer the causality of Evil to God. Hence they made distinctions, which, indeed, testify their zeal for maintaining the purity of religion and morals, but are of little service in reference to the subject under consideration. PETER LOMBARD endeavoured to explain the relation of the divine Will to Evil, without touching on either the Omnipotence or the Holiness of God, and arrived at the conclusion that we cannot say, God wills that Evil should happen; nor that he wills it should not happen, for nothing can happen against his will; we can only say, He does not will that evil should happen.\*

ANSELM and HUGO occupied themselves especially with these discussions. ANSELM composed a treatise on the harmony of prescience, Predestination and Free Will.† He endeavoured to prove that the free self-determination of Man was not at all affected by God's infallible Prescience. God foresees the Necessary and the Free, each in its kind; everything depends on keeping apart the two standpoints of eternal and temporal development. As there is no contradiction in this, that from the standpoint of Eternity all is one immediate Present, and yet in the development of Time there is a Past

\* *Sententiarum* i. Deit. 46, f.—Non enim Deo volente vel nolente, sed non volente fiunt mala.

† *De concordia præscientiæ et prædestinationis nec non gratiæ Dei cum libero arbitrio.* See also his treatises *De Libero Arbitrio* and *De Casu Diaboli*.

and a Future, there is no difficulty in admitting that what presents itself from Eternity as unchangeable and necessary, appears in reference to its temporal development as changeable and dependent on the free self-determination of the creature. The freedom of contingency appears as a necessary transition point\* for the development. This distinction, by which nothing is really gained for the maintenance of freedom, makes contingency a necessary appearance for the temporal development; that which in the divine plan of the world is fixed as something necessary realizes itself in the form of an apparent contingency. ANSELM felt it necessary to obviate the consequences that might be drawn from this view. To the question "if God acknowledges nothing, not even evil, as something existent, but his prescience precedes everything, must not the causality of Evil be traced back to God?" he replies, Everything positive is to be deduced from the divine prescience, but Evil is something merely negative. On examining more closely how Evil is to be defined, he would not regard it as a mere negative of good, but as a privation; it is, where good ought to be and to manifest its influence, but is absent. The Evil Will cannot otherwise be explained and derived. It presupposes no cause, but is itself cause and effect, because Evil is not strictly an effect, but a *defectus*, a falling off from God. ANSELM has merit in his statements on the justice of God; he establishes more firmly the connexion between Sin and Punishment; he views as correlate, and considers the divine punitive justice as revealing itself in relation to them. If Sin remained unpunished there would be no difference between sinning and not sinning. HUGO of St. Victor distinguishes in Evil the subjective of the tendency of the Will, and the objective of the act coming into manifestation. Evil consists essentially in the subjective tendency of the will opposing itself to God. Sin as subjective cannot be otherwise explained, and is an act of Freedom, but that it takes this or the other direction, does not depend merely on its subjective character, but on certain limits set by the divine arrangement of the World. Therefore, as soon as the subjective tendency of Evil would become objective, it is no

\* Hoc propositum secundum quod vocati sunt sancti, in æternitate in qua non est præteritum vel futurum, sed tantum præsens, immutabile est, sed in ipsis hominibus ex libertate arbitrii aliquando est mutabile.



longer free, but bound by the divine arrangement and must be subservient to it. This determined evil Will is in itself something evil, but it must ultimately be broken up by its own vileness, yet it cannot arbitrarily rush forth in any direction, but only where the divine Will gives it room. Thus subjective Freedom and the higher causality may be harmonized in the objective manifestation.\*

## b. ANTHROPOLOGY.

### 1. OF MAN'S ORIGINAL STATE, THE FALL AND ITS CONSEQUENCES.

As in the preceding period the difference between AUGUSTIN and PELAGIUS was rendered most apparent in their sentiments respecting human Freedom, so the standpoint of the Schoolmen is marked by the way in which they express themselves on the same subject. In this period they were the opponents of the Pelagian definition of Freedom, and take as their basis AUGUSTIN'S view. ANSELM examined this doctrine in his treatise *de libero arbitrio*. A definition, he says, must suit everything to which the idea is applied. The definition of free Will as freedom of choice does not apply to God and the blessed Spirits; indeed, the more freely we advance in goodness by moral development, so much the farther are we removed from the possibility of sinning, and so much less do we decide according to a choice between good and evil; Goodness then becomes Nature. Hence the possibility of sinning and the choice belong not to the essence of Freedom. He defines† Freedom as the ability to preserve the *received* purity of the Will *for its own sake*. In the first place, he presupposes the reception, since Autonomy can be ascribed only to God, but not to created Reason. God is the original source of all good: but the creature originally had the capability of persisting in this tendency. The qualifying clause "for its own sake" is also important; according to ANSELM the essence of the ethical consists in the disposition, and therefore in love to God and Goodness for their own sake. ABE-LARD on similar grounds agreed in rejecting the Pelagian

\* De Sacramentis Fidei, i. p. v. c. 15, 23, 29. See Liebner, p. 391.

† C. 3.—*Arbitrium potens servare rectitudinem voluntatis propter ipsam rectitudinem.*

definition. He defines Freedom as the ability to do that which we have decided to be agreeable to Reason. Also PETER LOMBARD says, Free will in the original state of man was the ability to strive after and to perform what any one has resolved to do without any constraint, on rational grounds.

Like AUGUSTIN, the Schoolmen of this period regarded the original relation of rational creatures to God as conditioned by Grace; therefore there was a dependence of Man on grace before the Fall, distinct from his dependence on grace after it; but on both Standpoints Grace was necessary for the performance of goodness. In this respect the views of PETER LOMBARD are very important; he divides the endowments of the first man into *dona naturalia*, what he had in virtue of his original natural constitution; and the *dona gratia*, which were founded in communion with God and added to his original constitution. The *dona naturæ* he makes to consist in purity and vigour of all the powers of the soul.\* The Free Will of Man was inclined to good, and was opposed by no inclination to Evil; but this Nature was not sufficient of itself to realize the destiny of Man. Left to himself Man could only work evil; hence he needed grace in order to will what was good in an effective manner, and not merely as *co-operans* but as *operans*. The distinction of these classes of gifts did not in itself lead to Pelagianism, to which it was set in direct opposition by AUGUSTIN; but it certainly might be so applied, that the original righteousness of Man might be explained as something accidental and only given from without. Now if man lost this righteousness by Sin, no important alteration would take place in his nature, and it would follow next, that his Redemption was only something accidental. Neither could it be rightly viewed as a restoration of human nature, nor could moral doctrine according to these presuppositions be properly apprehended. Scholasticism did not exhibit this erroneous view in the course of this Period, yet towards the close of it some trace was noticeable, since PETER DE LA CELLE, afterwards bishop of Chartres, protested against it.† He

\* Lib. ii. Dist. 24, D.—Considerandum est, quod fuerit illud adiutorium homini datum in creatione, quo poterat manere, si vellet. Illud utique fuit libertas arbitrii ab omni labe et corruptela immunis atque voluntatis rectitudo et omnium naturalium potentiarum animæ sinceritas atque vivacitas.

† Epist. l. iii. Ep. 4.

treated respecting the difference of the ideas of the Image and Likeness of God, the natural powers of the Soul, and what it was capable of according to its original constitution. He disputed against those who regarded the likeness of God only as an accidental gift, so that even salvation and glorification would be something contingent. It might also be inferred that even Life is only contingent for Man. As the Soul is the Life of the body, so is God the Life of the Soul, and communion with him is what belongs to the true essence of the Soul.

PETER LOMBARD makes the consequences of the first sin to consist in the withdrawal of the *dona gratuita* from Man, and not the entire loss, but the corruption of the *dona naturalia*. If the latter had been altogether lost, there would have been no point of connexion for his amendment and for Redemption.

Most of the Schoolmen explained the first sin and the propagation of hereditary depravity according to AUGUSTIN. The whole of Humanity was contained in the first man, and hence is like him, polluted. The realist Standpoint which was supported by the translation—*in quo omnes peccaverunt*—favoured this view. ANSELM, in his treatise on original sin, distinguishes the *natura qua est homo, quomodo omnes alii*, and the personality by which an individual differs from the rest. Thus the *peccatum connatum* or *naturæ* is to be distinguished from the *peccatum personæ*. ODO, who for a long time contested with Nominalism, developed this view still further from the realist standpoint in his book *De peccato originali*.

On this point ABELARD showed the contrariety between the influence of the Church doctrine and the peculiar principles of his own speculations. The latter would have led him consequentially to Pelagianism. Between him and AUGUSTIN a remarkable psychological relation existed; both had to contend with a powerful sensuousness, but AUGUSTIN was so much the more disposed to throw off the slavery of the spirit by sensual allurements; ABELARD on the contrary passed a milder judgment on sensual allurements, and excused it as given by Nature. In his treatise, *Scito teipsum*, he says, One man has a greater

\* Vera quoque virtus, vera bonitas, vera justitia, immo ipsa veritas est Deus; sine his igitur, si fuerit anima. moritur; et dicis esse accidentalibus bona?

proneness to this sin, and another to that. This allurements is not in itself sinful, but rather serves for the exercise of Virtue; only the conscious contempt of God is sin; for it is sin not to do or to leave alone for God's sake what we ought to do or to leave alone for his sake; it is precisely in conflict that Virtue\* must verify its power, and Sin only is committed, when we surrender ourselves to allurements by a sinful Will. This view consequently would lead to the conclusion that there can be virtue without conflict, that the antagonism between sensuousness and Reason was originally implanted in human nature. According to these premises, the doctrine of Redemption would assume a different shape. He denied that sins of ignorance were really sins, and merely allowed wilful sins to be such; though there is a passage in his works in which he distinguishes between an innocent and a culpable ignorance.† It is important to observe also that in connexion with this view he maintained that everything depended on the disposition, not on the outward act, while he did not take into consideration that the strength or weakness of the *intentio* has a share in the realisation of the Act. In his commentary on the Epistle to the Romans he finds difficulties in the common view of the imputation of the first Sin, and the propagation of depravity, the development of virtue in relation to it, the condemnation of unbaptized children and of the Heathens, of whose virtues he was a warm admirer. The passage—"In Adam all have sinned"—he explains as meaning His sin has become the cause of our eternal condemnation; we may in this sense say that in Adam his posterity has sinned, as we might say, "A Tyrant lives in his children." He made an approach to the doctrine which was afterwards propounded, that the effects of Redemption are retrospective on the better class among the Heathen; but he did not give his assent to this position and even adduced it as an error of a contemporary. On the other hand, he was so far influenced by the received doctrines of the

\* Quid enim magnum pro Deo facimus, si nihil nostræ voluntati adversum toleramus, sed magis, quod volumus, implemus.

† In Romanos, l. i. pag. 522.—Quia opera indifferentia sunt in se, nec bona nec mala, sive remuneratione digna videntur, nisi secundum radicem intentionis, quæ est arbor bonum vel malum proturus fructum. Non quæ fiant, sed quo animo fiant, pensat Deus, nec in opere, sed in intentione meritum operantis vel laus consistit. Omnia in se indifferentia nec nisi pro intentione agentis bona vel mala dicenda sunt.

Church that he asserted the perdition of unbaptized Infants. He says—Those children die unbaptized, of whom God foresaw, that if they had lived longer they would have been guilty of the worst sins and deserved the heaviest punishments; he also appeals to the divine will, which he exhibited as arbitrary, in contradiction to his other views. When he was attacked on account of his doctrine of original sin, he apologized, but never expressed himself with perfect distinctness. Mankind has received guilt and the punishment of sin from Adam, in whom we all have sinned, since his sin has been the origin and cause of all our sins.

Although the universality of sin was admitted, yet the excessive veneration for the VIRGIN MARY made an exception in her case. At first there was a reference only to the committal of actual sins, not to original sin. PASCAL RABERT\* maintained that MARY before the conception of Christ was freed by special grace from all sins, in order to be a worthy organ for the birth of Christ. But in the twelfth century the doctrine was broached that she was free from original sin, and the Canonicals at Lyons instituted a *festum immaculatæ conceptionis*. But BERNARD of CLAIRVAUX declared himself decidedly against it—"We ought not," he said,† "to attribute to MARY what belongs only to one Being, by whom all must be purified. He alone excepted, all must say, I am born in sin." PETER LE LE CALLE also combated this new view, which had been advocated by NICHOLAS, an English monk. When the latter appealed to dreams and visions, PETER rejoined—*Evangelio, non somniis credo*.

## C. THE DOCTRINE OF THE PERSON AND WORK OF CHRIST.

### I. OF THE PERSON OF CHRIST.

THE difference between the older Augustinian and the Antiochian views whether the sinlessness of Christ was to be represented as a *non posse peccare*, or a *posse non peccare*, is to be found also among the Schoolmen. ANSELM touches upon it incidentally, and decides in favour of the former. "Christ," he says,‡ "could have sinned if he had so willed; but this possibility is only hypothetical; he did not, and could not, so

\* De Partu Virginis, D'Achery Spicilegium, t. i.

† Ep. 173.

‡ Cen Deus Homo, ii. 10.

will." But admitting this, how can we conceive of moral freedom and virtue in Christ? We can conceive of no sinful willing in God; whence we infer no necessity of nature, but it is founded in his unchangeable essence, with which Freedom coincides. We say of the Angels who persevere in goodness, that they have thereby attained to unchangeableness in goodness, and are no more able or willing to sin: they have won this for themselves, and there is this analogy between them and God, that they have attained this unchangeableness from themselves. In Christ this proceeds from the connexion of the divine and human natures.

ABELARD instituted more general inquiries respecting the relation of the indwelling of God in Christ to the divine operation on other holy men. In the latter, he says,\* there was only a partial indwelling, in Christ a personal union. As the Body is subject to the Soul, so that no action takes place in it which does not proceed from the Soul, so the Soul of Christ was related to the divine Logos, so that no motion was imparted even to the Body, which did not owe its origin to the divine Logos. He attributes to Christ a divine and a human Will. In proof of the purely human will, he adduces the prayer of Christ that the cup might pass from him. He explains this in a forced manner, that Christ said it only as the representative of believers, but adds, as Christ assumed a real Humanity, so also he was truly human in reference to weakness. Against everything bordering on Docetism, as in AUGUSTIN,† he expresses himself strongly, and maintains that sorrow and suffering imply something opposed to the inclination and the Will; therefore Christ suffered what he did not wish: yet, since he loved the Father, and wished that through his death the salvation of mankind might be effected, on that account he was willing to suffer; just as it might be said of a sick man, who was aware that he could not save his life without undergoing a surgical operation, that speaking generally he willed it not, but yet willed it under the circumstances. In reference to the possibility of sinning he remarks,‡

\* Sententiarum, c. 24.

† C. 25.—Dicat Augustinus voluntatem suam, nos vero dicimus, quia, sicut veram humanitatem assumpsit, ita humanæ infirmitatis veros defectus habuerit.

‡ Ad Roman. i. pag. 538.

If Christ be regarded as a man, simple and by himself, it may be doubted whether we could say of him, *nullo modo peccare posse*; for if he could not sin what *meritum* could he have? He would thus appear deprived of Free Will, and a natural necessity would be ascribed to him; nor could he be admitted to possess a real Humanity. Thus considered, therefore, we may speak of his having a *posse non peccare*, which was first determined by the direction of the Will. But it is different when we speak of Christ *in concreto* as of him who is at the same time God and Man. In this respect a *non posse peccare* alone is to be admitted.

HUGO of St. VICTOR quotes the opposing expressions of the Church Teachers on the question whether Christ was afraid of death. He says, there is a fear of death which so overpowers the Soul, that Man is thereby led into sin; but there is also a moderate fear which is innate to human nature and without sin, like hunger and thirst, and this Christ had. In the same way PETER LOMBARD \* says, Christ had real sorrow in his human nature, but not like believers. We must distinguish *passio* and *propassio*; the latter consists of those feelings which arise from corporeal infirmity, and belong to the essence of human nature, and by which the spirit is not drawn down from the Most High and weakened; and only this is attributable to Christ.

## 2. OF REDEMPTION.

EVERYTHING which in this period was developed from the Christian consciousness might be found in the former, but yet in the language of feeling; the ideas were blended with one another without an intellectual separation. AUGUSTIN, whose views are here to be considered, first of all occupied himself with the question, whether it was possible for God to redeem men in any other way, a problem which passed over from him to the Schoolmen. His reply is, † Another way might in itself be possible, since God is Almighty, but this is the only kind of Redemption suited for healing human misery, for nothing could more revive the hopes of men, than for God to show how very much he loves us, and he could not do this more effectually than by his entering into union with Humanity. He guards himself ‡ against the anthropopathical mistake, as if God were

\* Sent. iii. Dist. v. † De Trinitate, xiii. 10, 13. ‡ C. 11, 15.

reconciled to man, in time, through the blood of Christ. We are not so to think of the Atonement as if God desired blood ; for he loved Man before the Creation of the World, and his love moved him to send his Son. By the death of Christ\* we are reconciled to God, not as if God then first began to love us, but *we* are reconciled to God, with whom we were in a state of enmity through Sin.

At the beginning of this Period, the mythical view which had spread widely in the former period, was in the ascendant, that God must satisfy Satan's claims, who had attained by sin the right of possession over mankind. But ANSELM, partly in opposition to this view, first systematically presented and elaborated the doctrine of the Atonement, so that his teaching forms a period in its history. In his treatise *Cur Deus Homo*, which treats on the subject, he gives evidence how much it then occupied men's minds, and how generally the spirit of religious inquiry was spread abroad. Not merely educated persons, but even the uneducated inquired respecting it, and sought for a rational confirmation of it. He strove to prove the contents of his own Christian consciousness in the objective necessity for them felt by Reason. He proposes the question, Could not God, by a mere act of his will, remit the sins of Men? and replies,—We must not think of the Will of God as arbitrary, but in unison with his wisdom and holiness. So if a man says, God could lie if he would, we observe in such language a *contradictio in adjecto*. Hence God cannot allow sin to go unpunished ; for this would be, as if he made no difference between the sinful and the righteous. Punishment belongs to the objectivity of the idea of Sin.† ANSELM had a profound apprehension of sin, in opposition to the one-sided mode, in a former age, of contemplating the relation of the divine love to sin. Either man freely renders to God the due obedience, or God subjects him against his will, when he punishes him, and shows himself as the Lord of the Creature, so that Man against his will must acknowledge this lordship.

\* Tract. in Joann. 110, § 6.

† Si Deo nihil majus, aut melius est, nihil justius, quam quæ honorem illius servat in rerum dispositione summa justitia, quæ non est aliud quam ipse Deus. Nihil ergo servat Deus justius quam suæ dignitatis honorem.—Necesse est ergo, ut aut ablati honor salvator, et pœna sequatur ; alioquin aut sibi ipsi Deus justus non erit, aut ad utrumque impotens erit, quod nefas est vel cogitare.



ANSELM recognizes, therefore, in punishment the power of the divine Law, which, when voluntary submission is not given, produces a forced one.\* He considers all punishment as ultimately ordained by God; even that which depends on human government, has only so far its real significance: for government is ordained by God to administer justice. Sin is nothing else, but not rendering to God what a rational creature ought to render him. Every created will ought to be subject to the divine will; only such performs works acceptable to God. Since the essence of Sin lies in the opposition of the creature's will against God, the mere outward act in it makes no difference. Sooner must the world sink in ruins than that the least thing should take place against God's will. Now Man, who does not render to God what is his due, and withholds it through sin, is in debt; and not only what he has withheld, but also a satisfaction, is required from him. The law of the divine government demands either a satisfaction for sin, or punishment. If this were not effected, confusion would be permanent in the kingdom of God. Besides, man in his impurity could not enter into the communion of the holy, whose blessedness consists in this, that all their wants have been satisfied, and hence only the pure can hope for it. ANSELM supposes some one to say from the ascetic standpoint, Do I not honour God in abstinence, labour, self-denial, and obedience? He replies;—Supposing Man has never committed sin, yet he owes all this; but he cannot render it, on account of his criminal inability. But one man must render an equivalent, since sin proceeded, in the first instance, from one; and what he renders must be something exalted above the Creation: therefore no other than God himself can render it.† But

\* Sicut homo peccando rapit, quod Dei est, ita Deus puniendo aufert, quod hominis est. Quoniam ergo homo ita factus est, ut beatitudinem habere posset, si non peccaret, quum propter peccatum beatitudine et omni bono privatur, de suo, quamvis invitus solvit quod rapuit; quia licet Deus hoc ad usum sui commodi non transferat, quod aufert, sicut homo pecuniam, quam alii aufert, in suam convertit utilitatem; hoc tamen, quod aufert, utitur in suum honorem per hoc quia aufert. Auferendo enim peccatorem et quæ illius sunt, subjectu sibi esse probat.

† Hoc fieri nequit, nisi sit, qui solvat Deo pro peccato hominis aliquid majus, quam omne quod præter Deum est. Illum quaque, qui de suo poterit Deo dare aliquid quod superet omne quod sub Deo est, majorem esse necesse est, quam omne quod non est Deus. Nihil

satisfaction must also be rendered by one who was Man, since otherwise it could be of no service to man; accordingly it must be accomplished by a God-man. Christ was not subject to death on account of Sin, but voluntarily submitted to it. The notion is to be rejected that he arbitrarily sought to die, or that God arbitrarily doomed him to die; we must distinguish what Christ did in virtue of his obedience in the discharge of his duty, and what he suffered when it came upon him in consequence of this obedience.\* Death came upon him as a divine ordinance to which he surrendered himself, since he completed his obedience by suffering. Therefore the ethical and historical point of view precedes the higher dogmatic. Christ suffered death voluntarily, not that he was obedient in that he died, but in meeting death in the steadfast observance of obedience to God. ANSELM contrasts Christ's conflicts with the sin of the first man; the latter yielded to the enticements of pleasure, Christ conquered Evil under the severest sufferings. God owed him a recompence for this; he could not give it to Christ himself, because he was all-sufficient; but Christ could transfer it to others, to all who are in communion with him. The life of Christ, says ANSELM, was a life of infinite loveliness, and his death contained more than was necessary for all the sins of the world. Again, although Christ endured all kind of suffering, yet he was not to be called miserable, for as mere profit (*commodum*) is not essential to happiness, so it is not to be called Misery when any one endures outward suffering, according to his own wisdom, voluntarily. From the whole, it appears that ANSELM affirms the necessity of a *satisfactio vicaria activa*. The realization of the moral Law, which was necessary for filling up the chasm between God and Man, and the satisfaction, consists in active obedience, and by it punishment is at the same time rendered superfluous. We do not find in his writings the doctrine of a *satisfactio passiva*; he nowhere says that Christ had endured the punishment of men. He further proposes the question,

autem est supra omne quod Deus non est, nisi Deus. Non ergo potest hanc satisfactionem facere nisi Deus. Sed nec facere illam debet nisi homo alioquin non satisfacit homo. Ergo necesse est, ut eum faciat Deus homo.

\* Ipse sponte sustinuit mortem, non per obedientiam deserendi viam, sed propter obedientiam servandi justitiam, in qua tam fortiter perseverant, ut inde mortem incurreret.

whether any other being than God, for example, an Angel, could have accomplished Redemption in union with human nature, and answers it in the negative, since, for the restoration of Man's dignity it is proper that he should depend on God alone, and have to thank him alone for everything. If a creature had redeemed him, he would have been dependent on him. It also deserves notice, how he expresses the consciousness, that no intellectual development wholly corresponds to the nature of the Fact, and that the Life of Christ itself contains more. There are many other reasons, he says, why this method of Redemption was the most suitable, but which are more easily known by the contemplation of the Life of Christ.\* For who can explain, how necessary and congruous it was to the divine Wisdom, that the Redeemer not only presented his doctrines to mankind, but also by his life showed what they ought to do?†

On comparing ABELARD with ANSELM, we find in the former more acuteness and clearness, rather than a development proceeding from the depths of Christian consciousness. Many things said by the latter he did not understand, because he adhered to the outward form. On the other hand, injustice has frequently been done to him. In a remarkable manner he ignores ANSELM's Theory altogether; we cannot even assert, that indirectly he opposes it with conscious design, although he differs from him very much, and advocates the subjective view of the doctrine of Satisfaction. On the other hand, he agrees with ANSELM in rejecting the older mythic representation. In his commentary on the Epistle to the Romans, he propounds many questions and difficulties, but without giving any connected development whatever. He asks, why God did not redeem men by his mere will? why the death of Christ was necessary? how could it be sufficient for such forgiveness? The anger of God must be excited so much the more for the crucifixion of his Son, which was a greater sin than that of Adam. How awful it is, that God should require the death of an innocent person for his being reconciled to Man. He expresses himself in the following manner: It appears to me

\* *Sunt et alia multa, cur valde convenit, quæ facilius et clarius in ejus vita et operibus quam sola ratione monstrari possunt*, ii. c. 11.

† See on the whole of Anselm's doctrine of Satisfaction, Hasse, ii. 485, and Baur's *Lehre v. d. Versöhnung*, p. 155.

that by the blood of Christ we are so far made righteous, and reconciled to God, as through this special grace of God's allowing his Son to assume our nature, he has bound so much the closer in love to himself, so that we, inflamed by such divine beneficence, are no longer afraid in pure love. By the sufferings of Christ all are justified, inasmuch as they are thereby kindled to greater love. The benefit enjoyed must inflame them more than what is merely hoped for; therefore our redemption rests upon the great love of God revealed to us through the sufferings of Christ, whereby we are brought to the true freedom of the children of God; but this is equivalent to saying that all proceeds from love, nothing from fear. Redemption, therefore, according to ABELARD, consists in this, that God has in this manner assured men of his love, and then by their love in return an impulse is given to all goodness. Accordingly he explains *δικαιοσύνη* in Rom. iii. 25, of the Love of God, and *πάρεσις* of the forgiveness of sins; through this righteousness, i. e. the love of God, we obtain the forgiveness of sins; *justificatio* is therefore the consequence of the subjective appropriation of Redemption. In his *Theologia Christiana*,\* he gives the following explanation of the design of Christ's Advent: On this account the divine Wisdom became Man, in order that we might be enlightened by his doctrine and his life, by his sufferings and his death, and by his glorification; since he taught us by his sufferings how very much God loves us; by his Resurrection he gives us the pledge of eternal life, and by his Ascension to Heaven he receives our souls to Heaven. Also in his Lectures,† he combated the representation of redemption from Satan's proprietary right, and said—Christ gave himself for us as a ransom, and pure sacrifice to God, in order to deliver us from the bondage of Sin, and to prove his love unto us. In no other way could this have been adequately done, for since we were to be freed from sin, the example of true virtue must be represented in word and life. Christ died for us, in order to show how great his love was to mankind, and that Love is the essence of Christianity. In his Apology he expresses himself more indefinitely; the Son of God became Man, in order to free us from Sin, and through his death to open for us the entrance to eternal life.

\* Lib. iv. 1308.

† Sentent. c. 23.

BERNARD entered the lists against ABELARD,\* but without advocating ANSELM's doctrine, and without examining, like these two, the subject in a dialectic manner. To ABELARD's question, Why God has redeemed us through the sufferings of Christ, since it might have been effected by his mere will?—he replied, Ask himself; for me it is enough that so it was. In reference† to the difficulty that God required the blood of an innocent person, he rejoined,—Not Death in itself, but the will of Christ in dying voluntarily, was well pleasing to God, and as this voluntary offering, his Death had its significance in God's sight, not that he took pleasure in the death of an innocent person. The sin of man gave the occasion, and he accepted the blood, but what he longed for was the salvation of men. He does not represent ABELARD's doctrine sufficiently in its connexion, and treats it as if he wished to limit Redemption only to Christ's example and doctrine. What avails the instructions of Christ, he says, without our restoration? The example of Christ's humility and love is a great thing; but all this we cannot firmly hold if we do not obtain objective Redemption through him. It is in vain, unless the power of sin within us is broken; and how could Christ benefit infants by his example? The inscrutable council of God is the precise reason why this Redemption took place. But who can say, that the Almighty could not have chosen another method? But supposing that possible, the efficiency of this method would lose nothing of its importance; and perhaps it is the most suitable, since by the great sufferings of Christ we are reminded of the depth of our Fall. In his sermons on Solomon's Song, he gives special prominence to the reason why this form of Redemption was the most suitable. The principal reason why God appeared in human flesh, was, that sensuous man who could not so love him, if he did not present himself to the senses, might be gradually trained through his sensible appearance to the love of his invisible Essence.†

In PETER LOMBARD‡ we find various elements not well digested. He takes no notice of ANSELM. Like AUGUSTIN, he guards the idea of Atonement against anthropathic misconception, as if God had hated man, and was induced by the Atonement to love him. He adopts the old mythical repre-

\* De Erroribus Abælardi.

† Cantica Canticorum Sermo, 20, § 6.

‡ Lib. iii. Distinct. 20.

sentation; moreover, he terms Christ the only perfect and sufficient sacrifice: by this one sacrifice he has blotted out all the guilt of man. He bore the punishment of our sins, freed us from spiritual, eternal, and temporal punishments, and perfectly fulfilled the law. But ABELARD's view is found close by the side of this, that by so great a pledge of divine love we are impelled to confidence and love towards God, and thereby to holiness. This method of relieving human misery was peculiarly fitted for the purpose; nothing could more move and revive the human heart than the thought that God allowed his Son to share our sufferings.

ROBERT PULLEYN says,—It pleased God to connect the redemption of men from Sin with the cost of Christ. He might have redeemed us in a different way, but he chose this method in order to make us sensible of the greatness of his love, and of our sins.\*

Since ANSELM's time, therefore, two opposing views of Redemption were developed; the one party considered the peculiar manner in which it was accomplished as something objectively necessary, and denied its efficiency from this objective nature; the other supposed a subjective connexion between the two, as if it had pleased God to connect the price of Redemption with the sufferings of Christ, because this was best fitted to effect the moral transformation of men.

### 3. THE APPLICATION OF REDEMPTION, JUSTIFICATION, AND SANCTIFICATION.

ALTHOUGH the prevailing tendency in the Church life was to externalize, and much that favoured it was imbibed from Scholasticism, yet the leading teachers of Scholasticism are not chargeable with the reproach of setting up a mere outward sanctity. They sought to impart vitality to the outward: they wished to exhibit the inner process of the development of the Christian life, to prove how it is rooted in the disposition and is connected with Redemption and sanctification, and were very far from being satisfied with a mere faith of authority. This is clear from what has already been said in the Introduction, and appears also in their more precise state-

\* Ut quantitate pretii quantitatem nobis sui innotesceret amoris et nostri peccati.

ments on the various relations of this idea. ANSELM comprises the whole doctrine of Faith and Morals, in the question, how Man appropriates Redemption to himself. The doctrine of the Bible throughout consists in showing how we can become partakers of divine Grace, and live under its influence. He says,—“The mere idea does not make Faith, although this cannot exist without an object; in order to true faith the right tendency of the will must be added, which grace imparts.”\* He distinguishes† between *credere Deum*, *Christum*, and *credere IN Deum*, *IN Christum*; the former denotes a mere outward faith which only retains the form; the latter denotes the true, living faith, which lays hold of communion with God (*credendo tendere in divinam essentiam*): the former is valueless and dead, the latter contains the power of love, and testifies its power and its life by love. The Faith which is connected with Love, cannot be inoperative; it proves its vitality by so operating. HUGO of St. VICTOR‡ develops the general idea of faith in connexion with the religious nature of Man. Faith marks the manner in which invisible blessings dwell within our souls (*quodam modo in nobis subsistunt*), the real vital communion with God, his true existence in the human soul. For divine things cannot be apprehended by us, through the senses, the understanding, or the imagination, since they have nothing analogous to all these, but are exalted above all images. The only vehicle of their appropriation is faith. We can have no higher argument for the reality of divine things than Faith, since all that can contribute to the consciousness of anything, must have a certain analogy to it. Now, like divine things, Faith is exalted above all. Two elements meet in it—the tendency of the disposition, and the matter of cognition. This latter is the objective of Faith, but its essence consists in the tendency of the disposition, and although this is never altogether without the former, yet it constitutes the value of faith. BERNARD agrees with HUGO in his view of the nature of Faith, and as

\* De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio, c. 6.

† Monologium, 72, cf. 75.—Ergo quoniam quod aliquid operatur, in esse sibi vitam. sine qua operari non valeret, ostendit, non absurde dicitur operosa fides vivere, quia habet rectam dilectionis sine qua non operaretur; otiosa fides non vivere quia caret vita dilectionis.

‡ Liebner, p. 435.

the latter declared himself opposed to the prevalent intellectual tendency, so also did he. Even now, he says, we often find a great difference of knowledge with equal Faith; many who believe with confidence, have only scanty ideas; thus many in the Old Testament retained a firm faith in God, expected certain redemption from him, and received salvation by this faith, although they knew not when and how Salvation would come to them.

ABELARD's expressions are also important.\* Faith, he says, always refers to the Invisible, never to the Visible. But how is this? when Christ said to Thomas, "Because thou hast seen me, thou hast believed." What Thomas saw before him was one thing; what he believed was another. He confessed the man whom he saw to be the Lord, in whom he believed. He saw the flesh, but he believed in the God veiled in the flesh. We have noticed, that in opposition to the quantitative valuation of good works, he strongly urged that everything depended on the disposition. Only to it he ascribed a merit before God, since the rest depended on circumstances. When attacked on this subject, he explained himself in his apology: I confess, he said, that all who are equal in love to God and their neighbour, are equally good, and equally meritorious, and that the same merit remains although the intention of the good will is hindered in the execution.

Not merely ABELARD, but also most of the other Schoolmen understood by *Justificatio per fidem* not objective Justification, but a subjective character of the disposition, which proceeds from Faith, the true inward sanctification in Love which arises out of Faith. But this subjective view did not satisfy many; it gave no certainty; it tended in part to an ascetic life, or to a one-sided state of feeling; in part it prompted to a firm attachment to the priesthood as the source of grace. BERNARD, on the other hand, was led by the experiences of his life to a more objective view,—“No one is without Sin;† for all righteousness it is enough for me that He is gracious to me who has redeemed me. Christ is not merely righteous,‡

\* Sentent. c. 4.

† Sermo on Solomon's Song, 23, § 15.

‡ Ibid. 22, § 8.—*Quam ob rem quisquis pro peccatis compunctus esurit et sitit justitiam credat in te, qui justificas impium et solum*



but righteousness itself. He who is justified from his sins and strives after the holiness without which no man can see the Lord, listens to the call, 'Be ye holy, for I am holy.' The heavenly birth is the eternal Predestination by which God has loved Man." He urges that the divine Intuition is not bounded by Time, and takes no notice of it; in it those are exhibited as sinless who pass through life in a progressive purification. In other passages he mingles the Subjective and the Objective; \* Fear precedes in order that Justification may follow. Lastly, the righteous live by faith, but doubtless it is the faith that works by love. ALANUS also approximates to the objective view when he raises the question, †—Why do we speak of Justification by faith, and not by love? He answers,—because Justification proceeds from the grace to which Faith directs us. ROBERT PULLEYN thus develops the doctrine. The righteous man living in the Lord, already sanctified by faith, receives good works as marks of his faith and righteousness, and of growth in them; not as if his righteousness was increased by his works, but Faith begets the internal righteousness, and from this the good works proceed. But faith must always increase, so that a Christian becomes clearer in knowledge as he becomes warmer in love. A dead Faith is idle; even the wicked possess it; true Faith is always active.

The Scholastic doctrine on this point received a fixed form through PETER LOMBARD.‡ He makes a threefold distinction in Faith; *Deum credere*, *Deo credere*, and *in Deum* or *Christum credere*. The two first amount merely to holding a thing to be true; but the last is the Faith by which we enter into communion with God. With such a faith Love is necessarily connected, and this faith alone is justifying. Love is the effect of this faith, and the ground of the whole Christian life. Applying to Faith the Aristotelian distinction between the Form as the formative principle (*εἶδος*, *forma*), and the inorganic material determined by it (*ὑλη*, *materies*), PETER distinguishes faith as the *qualitas mentis informis*, the mere material of Faith, and the *fides formata*, when the vivifying power of Love is added to it, which forms and determines it.

justificatus per fidem pacem habebit ad Deum. Qui ergo justificati a peccatis sectari desiderant sanctimoniam, &c.

\* Ep. 107, § 4.

† Regula, 93.

‡ Sentent. iii. Dist. 28.

The *Fides formata* is true Virtue, and this Faith, active through Love, alone justifies.\*

#### 4. THE RELATION OF GRACE AND FREEDOM.

THE Dialectics employed by the Schoolmen were capable of maintaining in form the co-operation of Grace and of Free Will, but they were too much prejudiced in favour of the Augustinian doctrine, to recognize a real importance in free Self-determination, and hence their language was not free from ambiguities. ANSELM, following ARISTOTLE† distinguishes between *δύναμις* and *ἐνέργεια*, that is, *potentia* and *actus*. No capability of a created being can by itself be rendered efficient without outward influences, which allow the *potentia* to become *actus*; but still the capability exists. The Eye sees only by virtue of the Sunlight; yet even in the dark the eye has the capability of seeing. Thus the corrupt Will always retains the capability for goodness, although they can be rendered efficient by the entrance of the *gratia efficax*.

ROBERT PULLEYN says, As often as Grace offers itself to any one, he either acts so as to co-operate with grace, or rejecting it, he persists in doing evil. Grace is the first cause of all good; a share also belongs to Free Will, but it is subordinate. The *meritum* of it is, when it ceases to withstand the divine Will. According to this we might suppose that this Schoolman ascribed some power to Free Will, and did not admit *gratia irresistibilis*. But everything turns on his idea of Freedom; he might conceive of it in opposition to mere outward compulsion, and make it consist in this, that a development takes place only from the internal nature of Man, so he believes himself free to act because he is wholly determined from himself; yet this would allow of his being determined by a higher necessity. In fact it was PULLEYN's opinion that when efficacious grace is communicated by God to Man, it so attracts his Free Will, that he follows it without opposition. Although Grace recovers him who errs, it does not force him against his will, but is so powerful, that it can convert the most perverse. Accordingly Free Will is still only

\* *Fides quam ipsi dæmones et falsi Christiani habent, qualitas mentis est, sed informis quia sine caritate est.*—*Ibid.*

† *De Libero Arbitrio*, and *De Concordia Præscientiæ et Prædestinationis, Gratiæ et Liberi Arbitrii*.

the form of grace operating irresistibly as stated in AUGUSTIN, and in the book, *De vocatione gentium*.

Among the Mystics, who attach greater importance to the practical, we might expect that Free Will would be more strongly asserted; but in BERNARD of CLAIRVAUX,\* it is only the appearance of a Freedom conditioning Grace. We become attached to goodness and advanced in it by Grace. Take away Free Will, and there is nothing which can be led to salvation; take away Grace, and the cause of salvation is wanting. Deliverance cannot be effected, unless both are there. God is the Author of Salvation, Free Will is only susceptible of it; it co-operates with Grace, since it suffers itself to be saved. Hence God can only so operate on Men, because they are endowed with Free Will. BERNARD contrasts freedom with the compulsion of sin and of misery; the first kind is the freedom of Nature; the second the freedom of Grace; and the third the freedom of Glory. Grace aims at arousing the free will. Man is not saved against his Will; for if the Will is changed from evil to good, Freedom is not taken away; it is only transformed. He presupposes in this, that the nature of the Will was originally a free criminality and a consequence of original Sin. Yet his representation, taken altogether, leads to the Augustinian view. RICHARD of ST. VICTOR, in his work, *On the state of the inner man*, says;† How can the Will of Man be other than truly free? and will not allow it to be called enslaved. Grace is often offered freely to the careless; often it is suddenly withdrawn from our efforts. Free Will can win grace, and grace win it; grace may be withdrawn from it, because it is never found without fault. Notwithstanding these strong expressions, RICHARD also occupies the Augustinian standpoint.

Just so PETER LOMBARD, in whose writings besides, we first find the distinction between *gratia gratis dans* and *gratia gratis data*, which was afterwards applied in various ways by the Schoolmen. The first is the efficient principle of grace, grace as *imparting*, or God himself; the second is grace imparted, the divine as the animating principle of life (*qualitas informans*), the disposition brought into existence by God, true internal Virtue.‡

\* De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio.

† De Statu Interioris Hominis, P. i. Tract. i. c. 23.

‡ Lib. ii. Dist. 27.

## d. THE DOCTRINE OF THE SACRAMENTS.

THE peculiar catholic element of the Middle Ages is very prominent in the statements which expressed the development this doctrine had attained. The Schoolmen could not but place what they found in the Church doctrine, in connexion with their fundamental principles: this was not done purposely by them, but their own religious life was determined by the spirit of the Church. But under the influence of their principles, differences were now formed among them, and especially in this earlier period of Scholasticism: hence also many traces of Christian truth may be noticed, which were at variance with the prevalent doctrine. The Schoolmen accepted the Augustinian definition of the Sacraments, but it did not fully satisfy them. The definition which they desired, needed to contain everything which at that time was supposed to belong to the idea and to the efficiency of the Sacraments. HUGO of ST. VICTOR\* defines a Sacrament as *materiale elementum ex similitudine repræsentans, ex institutione significans, ex sanctificatione continens aliquam invisibilem et spiritalem gratiam*. A Sacrament, therefore, is distinguished from all other holy symbols by the following particulars: in the first place, it must have a close analogy with the thing represented; secondly, it must have been selected by Christ for that purpose, in order to represent this definite object; thirdly, this invisible divine operation, its magical operation, is really transferred to the outward sign, inasmuch as the outward sign acts by itself, for which purpose it was instituted. Here we have the foundation of the whole Catholic idea of the Sacraments. In the *Summa sententiarum*, he says,† The Sacrament is *visibilis forma, invisibilis gratiæ, in eo collatæ*. Here we see the same characteristic, that the *invisibilis gratia* is really communicated to the outward sign. PETER LOMBARD expresses himself to the same effect; "the Sacrament presents an image of Grace and the cause of it." HUGO, in his treatise, *De Sacramentis fidei*, distinguishes three

\* De Sacram. lib. i. p. ix. 2. Compare Summa Tract. ii. 1; Liebner, p. 423.

† Sent. iv. 1.—Sacramentum proprie dicitur, quod ita signum est gratiæ Dei et invisibilis gratiæ forma, ut ipsius imaginem gerat et causa existat.

classes of Sacraments: the first, those on which salvation especially depends (Baptism and the Lord's Supper); the second, those which are not necessary to salvation, but yet useful for sanctification; the number of these is indefinite; and thirdly, that which serves to qualify for the administration of the other Sacraments,—priestly Ordination.

The Schoolmen inquired on what account such signs were necessary for Christianity, and endeavoured to explain why so much efficacy was attributed to the Sacraments. HUGO alleges the following reasons—since Man had estranged himself from internal communion with God, and dissipated himself in the outward world, he must be led back through the outward to the inward. Moreover, since Man fell by Pride, he must be led back to God by self-humiliation, which consisted in his receiving from these outward things what was necessary for his inward life. ROBERT PULLEYN also adduced the last reason; through Pride man fell, his salvation must proceed from the opposite quarter. The rational Man who was destined to rule over Nature, must humble himself before the sensible elements, to receive grace through them. We here recognize the lowering of the idea of Humility to an outward act.

If, on the one hand, Schoolmen were led to attach too much importance to outward things, on the other hand, they were led to a reaction against this externalisation, and guarded themselves against further excesses in this respect. HUGO of ST. VICTOR says, Man must seek his salvation *in* these things, but not *from* them; he derives the saving efficacy, not from the element as such, for the cause of it is only God, and he seeks for salvation, not from the sacraments, but from him, though he receives it in them. The external part of the Sacraments is therefore only the medium of salvation.

The question was raised, what relation the operation of the Sacraments had to Faith? and on this point the principles of the Schoolmen led them to make many remarks which were at variance with the Church views. ROBERT PULLEYN says,—outward baptism only represents that which Faith effects at baptism; faith blots out sins; baptism indicates this. HUGO disputes the unconditional necessity of outward Sacraments; as, where there is Love, the *meritum* of man is not lost, although the good work cannot be performed, so the operation of Salvation is not obstructed if the longing after the Sacra-

ment is present in the heart. Here, therefore, is the doctrine that in such cases the *votum* occupies the place of the Sacrament. Only since it is the divine appointment that this saving operation is to be received through the medium of the Sacraments, a contempt of the divine appointment tends to perdition, if it be neglected when there is a possibility of attending to it.

THE NUMBER OF THE SACRAMENTS. Although the application of the idea of a Sacrament was still undetermined, yet we find that *Baptism* and *the Supper*, *Confirmation*, *Penance*, *Ordination*, and also *Marriage*, were already universally acknowledged as Sacraments. One more was still wanting in the early ages, the *unctio extrema*. Yet traces are found that in antiquity sick persons, while prayer was offered for them, were anointed with oil, a usage which received support from the Epistle of James v., and the Gospel of Mark xvi. . When after the irruption of the barbarous tribes, the Church was established among them, it was needful to counteract the heathen usages of amulets and charms, and anointing was chosen in order to substitute a Christian usage. The newly converted nations were required to adopt the Christian rite. At first the Laity were allowed to give Extreme Unction, but afterwards it was confined to the Priests. The Council of Pavia (A.D. 850), says in its eighth Canon, that holy Sacrament, enjoined by James, is to be more distinctly acknowledged by Christian communities; when desired with Faith, it effects the forgiveness of sins, and the bodily health can be restored. Thus this ceremony was added as a seventh Sacrament. DAMIANI, who enumerates twelve Sacraments, mentions among them the Extreme Unction.\* HUGO expresses himself indeterminately; but the first who publicly taught in the Church the doctrine of Seven Sacraments, is OTTO of BAMBERG, the Apostle of the Pommeranians; he mentions this number in a catechetical discourse which he delivered in Pommerania,† A.D. 1124. PETER LOMBARD adheres to the number of seven—*baptismus, confirmatio, eucharistie, pœnitentia, unctio extrema, ordo, conjugium*.‡ Of the *unctio extrema*

\* Sermo, 69.

† Gieseler, in his Church History (II. ii. 453), doubts the credibility of the account, since the Discourse which the biographer communicates is scarcely genuine.—[JACOBI]

‡ Lib. iv. Dist. 2.

he says, that if the Sacrament be administered with devotion and Faith, the Man will thereby be relieved both in Body and Soul : if it do not contribute to the health of the Body, it will to that of the Soul.

### 1. OF BAPTISM.

IN defining the terms used respecting this Sacrament, much difficulty was found in settling the relation of the *res sacramenti* to the *sacramentum*. The question was proposed, how this effect could take place in unconscious infants, in order to explain the fate of unbaptised children who were believed to be lost. The Catharist sects in their polemics,\* aimed to set aside the proofs adduced from passages of Scripture ; they either impugned the Sacrament of Baptism altogether, and regarded John's as the only Water-baptism, while they asserted that Christ's baptism was the baptism of the Spirit, and that it consisted according to the *consolamentum*,† in the impartation of the Holy Spirit by the laying on of hands ; or they rejected Infant Baptism, and retained only the Baptism of adults.

### 2. OF THE LORD'S SUPPER.

IN the Berengarian controversy the doctrine of Transubstantiation was victorious, yet there were not a few symptoms of a continued reaction. ANSELM, PETER LOMBARD, and HUGO, occupied themselves with refuting the opinion that the Body was present, *non re neque vera citer, sed significatione*. The Bread in the Supper was only called the body of Christ in the same manner as Christ is also called a Rock. PETER LOMBARD says, that the advocates of the merely spiritual Presence appeal to the 6th chapter of John's Gospel. The Catharists of the twelfth and thirteenth Centuries also attacked the Church doctrine ; they either explained everything in the Lord's Supper as only symbolical ; that Christ by his body and blood only intended his doctrine and his words, which would be Bread and Wine for the soul ; or they admitted merely a spiritual presence of Christ, and in interpreting the

\* Chr. U. Hahn Geschichte der Ketzer in Mittelalter bes. im. 11, 12, 13 Jahrh. (History of the Heresies in the Middle Ages, particularly in the 11th, 12th, and 13th Centuries), 2 vols. 1845, 1847.

† A Catharist Ritual, edited by E. Kunitz, 1852, p. 23, 59.

words of the Institution gave similar explanations to those which were afterwards brought forward at the Reformation. They appealed to John vi., "the flesh profiteth nothing," or understood the words *τοῦτό ἐστι* as used *δεικτικῶς*, so that Christ indicated by them his own proper body. Many understood the doctrine thus, that the mode is marked out by which the Natural is sanctified through Christianity, the sanctification of our daily food by Faith and Prayer. PETER of BRUIS\* even maintained, that the Supper was not instituted by Christ as a rite of perpetual observation; that he only once distributed his body and blood among his disciples. This expression is obscure; perhaps he meant to say that Christ had observed this rite once for all. The Polemics of those schoolmen were directed, perhaps, not merely against these sects, but against persons within the pale of the Church who adhered to similar opinions. ABELARD says, that the important controversy whether the Bread was merely a symbol or the substance of the Body, had not yet terminated. ZACHARIAS of CHYRSOPOLIS remarks: there were some who can scarcely be found out who agreed with the condemned BERENGARIUS, and yet joined the Church in censuring him, but only because he had rejected the form of the Church Terminology, and expressed himself so barely. He did not follow the usage of Holy Writ, which often puts the symbol of a thing for the thing itself. He should not have raised a discussion on this subject. Among the mystical Theologians, such as RUPERT of DEUTZ, who otherwise were faithful to the Church doctrine, we find here a near approach to a spiritual view. He impugns those who maintained that the unworthy receive at the Lord's Supper only the *figura* or *signum corporis Christi*. He speaks of a *translatio* and *conversio*—that the Bread is not merely in name the Body of Christ, but in effect. Yet he says,—It is not the method of the Holy Spirit to annihilate the substance which he appropriates for his own gifts; the substance in an invisible manner is potentiated, so as to be what it was not before. He compares the union of the bread and wine with the Body and Blood of Christ, to the union of the divine and human natures in Christ. His remarks favour the notion that the

\* Petri Venerab. Abl. Cluniac. ep. ad Arelatensem, &c. Episcop. adv. Petrobrusianos Bibl. Patr. Lugdun. xxii. 1033. Hahn, i. 408. Gieseler, Kirchenges. II. ii. 536.



substance of the bread and wine was penetrated by the body and blood of Christ connecting themselves with it. BERNARD of CLAIRVAUX, in his life of MATTHIAS, Archbishop of Armagh, makes mention of an Irish clergyman, who would not recognise the true body of Christ in the Supper, but only a sanctifying power. It is remarkable that in many pious men of this age doubts were raised respecting Transubstantiation, and this was the central point of the temptations with which they had to combat. But this doctrine was connected with the whole standpoint of the age, with the one-sided predominant supernatural element, the tendency to the Magical. The perpetual self-humiliation of Christ was contemplated as in the culminating point of grace and of miracle; the Priesthood was placed here as the organ of mediating between heaven and earth, and thus we may say, that the peculiar spirit of the Middle Ages gave objectivity to its essential characteristic in this doctrine. Hence, if a doubt arose respecting it, it proceeded in many instances, not from a reaction of a pure and Christian consciousness, but from a one-sided direction of the Understanding, which would have extended itself by logical development to other objects of Faith. When in such conflicts, the doctrine of Transubstantiation maintained its ground, it was regarded as a victory of the Christian standpoint over that of the world. For one who lived in the peculiar spiritual atmosphere of the Middle Ages, as in his native element, it was necessary to conceive of the Presence of Christ in the Supper after such a mode, and the Schoolmen were completely imbued with this form of feeling and thinking. The dialectic development which they gave it, had only the merit of greater spirituality, and of purifying the representation from many monstrosities. ANSELM\* writes to an Abbot,—The design of the Supper is to connect the believer in body and soul with Christ. Does any one ask, how the unchangeable body of Christ can be masticated by the teeth? I answer, that must be left to God. The Substance of the bread and wine is not left behind, but the marks of their outward appearance, and thus something might be done which did not affect that which was their substratum. In saying this, he allows the distinction of the *res sacramenti* and *figura*. After the consecration the Bread and Wine might be still called *figura*,

\* Epp. lib. iv. 106, 107.

since the eye of Faith saw one thing, and Unbelief another. HILDEBART of MANS was the first who used the term *Transubstantiatio*; he strove to soften the coarseness of the representation. Although Christ according to his human nature is in Heaven, yet he imparts himself to us daily; his Body is spiritual food, and operates spiritually in us. The Nature of Body itself forbids Ubiquity; but Christ's Body is present on every Altar by a supernatural agency. HUGO says: only the sensuous man will ask, what becomes of the Body of Christ at the Supper; his bodily presence serves only for the advantage of men, and that so long as the sensible distribution lasts, after that the spiritual Presence is experienced.\* PETER LOMBARD brings forward various opinions without a definite decision of his own; he rather inclines to the view that the *accidentia* are *sine subjecto*, and to this decision the Schoolmen were driven, when they maintained Transubstantiation and yet shunned the transference of sensuous changes and coarse expressions to the Body of Christ, or when they were not willing to admit that what was an object of the senses in the Supper was merely apparent and docetic. At the Lateran Council, A.D. 1215, Transubstantiation was declared to be an article of faith by Innocent III.†

The practice of INFANT COMMUNION continued in the Western Church to the twelfth century. The more palpable distinction between the Sacraments of Baptism and the Lord's Supper necessarily effected an alteration, and the Scholastic Age was suited to make the distinction a matter of consciousness. Yet the discontinuance of the practice was owing first of all, not from a purely dogmatic interest, but from a superstitious motive, from a fear of spilling the wine in administering it to children. Among those who endeavoured to settle the question was HUGO of St. VICTOR:‡ he says, this Sacrament must be given to new-born children in the form of blood (*in specie sanguinis*) by the finger of the Priest, since they naturally suck. He quotes a passage from AUGUSTIN, in which Infant Communion is prescribed. If, he says, in presenting it to children any danger should arise, it should

\* De Sacram. ii. p. viii. c. 6.

† Transubstantiatur Panis in Corpus Christi, &c. potestate divina.

‡ De Sacramentis Cæremoniis, &c. i. c. 20. Neander's Ch. H. vii. 475.

rather be omitted; nor let us be alarmed by AUGUSTIN, for AUGUSTIN himself says that it cannot be doubted that every one who has been made a member of the Body of Christ by Baptism also has a share in his Body and Blood. Thus the practice fell into desuetude.

WITHHOLDING OF THE CUP.—In the earlier Church no trace is found of any other than the full participation of the Lord's Supper according to the words of the Institution. It was a mark of Manicheism if any one at the public celebration of it refused the wine; and LEO the GREAT threatened such persons with Excommunication.\* GELASIUS expressed himself likewise against it. In a passage which GRATIAN has preserved† he says—We have been informed that some persons wish to partake of the Body of Christ without the Cup; they ought rather to keep back from the Sacrament, since they cannot partake of it without committing a great Sacrilege. Only one exception appears in ancient times, when the consecrated bread was taken home for daily use, or when the wine alone was given to very young children. The superstitious anxiety not to spill any of the Wine, which was increased by the doctrine of Transubstantiation, first of all led to giving the sick only bread dipped in Wine. And thus at the beginning of the twelfth century in England, it was here and there the custom to give dipped bread to the laity at the usual communion: one LAMBERT opposed this practice, but ARNOLD, bishop of Rochester,‡ and RUDOLPH, Abbot of Cologne,§ defended it. Yet PASCHAL II. declared|| that no human innovation should be introduced; Bread and Wine were each communicated by the Lord, and hence the custom must be retained in the Church. But now the idea of the Priesthood and of a Sacrifice exerted a greater influence, and it appeared enough if only the Priests partook of it. The change, too, was promoted by the doctrine which ascribed power to the Church to make changes in the administration of the Sacraments. The Schoolmen contributed their share also to make the withholding of the cup more general, since they developed the doctrine of the *concomitantia corporis et sanguinis Christi*;

\* Sermo. 41.

† Decretum Gratiana, p. iii. De Consecratione Distinct. ii. c. 12.

‡ D'Achery Spicilegium, ii. p. 470.

§ Bona de Rebus Liturgicis.

|| Ep. 32.

that is, the position, that in either of the two forms the other was contained. Although the Body and Blood, says ANSELM,\* are taken separately, yet the whole Christ is received only once, and not twice. The divided participation is not according to the example of Christ, who intended to show that believers must be joined to Christ both in soul and body. ANSELM, therefore, does not say that one form is not sufficient; but he would have both forms administered, because Christ so instituted it. Also PETER LOMBARD says—Christ is to be taken in a double form, in order to show that Redemption relates to the whole Man, to the Body and to the Soul; only we are not to imagine that in the bread merely the Body is taken. The first advocate of withholding the cup is ROBERT PULLEYN;† in order that Christ's appointment in reference to the Sacrament should not be altered, it is only necessary for the Priest to take the Body and Blood separately. According to the appointment of the Church, which might be altered at its pleasure, the Body only is given to the Laity, in order that the Blood may not be spilt. Nor do they lose anything thereby, since the Blood is given with the Body. To persons dangerously ill the Blood only might perhaps be given; they would still receive enough.

FOLMAR, head of the monastery of Traufenstein, in Franconia, in the twelfth century, declared himself against the doctrine of the *Concomitantia*; he appears to have been a man disposed to free inquiry, who was disgusted with the superstitious legends, and attempted to form a different conception of the presence of Christ in the Supper; but he was hampered by reference to the Church, and never attained to clear views. After the ascension Christ appeared no longer corporeally on earth; a ubiquity of his Body is inadmissible. After its connexion with the divine nature the human still retained its natural qualities, and a human Body could not be in two places at once. This might have led him further, but he did not draw the consequences; he only maintained that in the Bread was contained the true Body of Christ, but without the bodily members, and the Blood of Christ in the Wine, but without the Flesh. The whole Christ was indeed present in both forms, but not in all his parts (*totus sed non totum*).‡

\* Ep. 107.

† Sentent. p. viii. c. 3.

‡ Pezii Thesaurus Anecd. I. p. ii. 221. Biblioth. Patr. Lugd. t. xxv.

His distinction of the *natura verbi et corporis* led also to this point, and brought upon him the charge of Nestorianism. As his opponent, GERHON of Reichersberg, maintained the ubiquity of the Body, he, on the other hand, was charged with Eutychianism.

THE SACRIFICE OF THE MASS.—PETER LOMBARD calls the Sacrifice of the Mass the *memoria* and *representatio* of the Sacrifice of Christ. Christ was daily sacrificed in a Sacramental manner. The Sacrifice of Christ himself was not repeated, for as there was only one Body of Christ; so there was only one Sacrifice; but on account of the weakness of men this Sacramental offering was made.\* The doctrine of the Sacrifice of the Mass acquired a special importance from its connexion with Penance and the forgiveness of Sins committed after Baptism. But the doctrine of Penance stands again in close connexion with that of Purgatory.†

### 3. PENANCE.

PETER LOMBARD divides this Sacrament into three parts: I. The *Compunctio cordis*; II. The *Confessio oris*; III. The *Satisfactio operis*. The theory was founded on the principle that without Church penance the forgiveness of sins could be obtained only by internal contrition and the confession of Sins. The power conferred on the Priests to bind and to loose consisted only in pronouncing sentence, and this was only valid as far as it agreed with the divine judgment. Hence PETER distinguished between forgiveness of sins by God, and Absolution *in facie ecclesiæ*. Punishment is only due, supposing a person neglects from contempt the Sacrament of Penance and Absolution when the observance is possible. Notwithstanding the whole doctrine of a necessary confession, Church penance and absolution might be formed by certain links—so far it was firmly held that Remission of guilt was effected completely and only once by Baptism, but yet special satisfaction was required by God for sins which violated the baptismal vow. Prayers and Alms were regarded as such voluntary Church punishments and satisfaction made to the Priest. Whoever neglected to render these, would have to render, it was believed, so much additional satisfaction to the divine justice in the punishments of the *ignis*

\* Sent. iv. Dist. xii. q. 7.

† Ibid. iv. Dist. xvi.

*purgatorius*. Thus the juridical view prevailed continually to a wider extent, and the Priests had the power to change the heavier punishments to lighter ones in virtue of the merits of Christ. Yet PETER added, that without any Church penance a person might be freed from purgatorial fire, if the contrition was great enough to be substituted for such punishment. The Sacrifice of the Mass and Intercession of the Church for the dead would suffice to free suffering souls from the purifying fire. But we may see into what straits these men were brought when they wanted to bring everything in actual practice into agreement with their system. PETER LOMBARD supposes the case, that a rich man and a poor man die; for the latter there are only the ordinary masses and good works, but the rich man can have more masses read for him; will the rich man have any advantage? He answers at once, the rich has no advantage before the poor, both attain the like result; the same effect follows from different causes. But with this answer he did not satisfy the Church, for according to it, it was not necessary to call in the Church's aid. He therefore said in addition that the rich would obtain not a more complete, but a speedier release from Purgatory.

The externalizing of Repentance called forth opposite statements. ABELARD, in his work, *Scito te ipsum*, reproaches the Bishops, and asks, If they could impart absolution so easily, why did they not do it out of pure love, instead of taking money for it? He disputes the application of the passage respecting the power conferred on Peter of binding and loosening; this was not said in reference to certain offices, but related to the Apostles and those who were like-minded with them.

## THE SCHOLASTIC AGE.

## SECTION SECOND.

(CENTURY XIII.)

## THE GENERAL HISTORY OF DOGMAS.

THE result of the conflict between the dialectic and Church tendency was, that although the former did not gain the victory, it was more moderately applied. In the thirteenth century the dialectic spirit obtained a fresh impulse through the influence of the Aristotelian Philosophy, which till the twelfth century had been known only from some separate works of ARISTOTLE, and through the medium of a Latin translation. At this period the acquaintance with ARISTOTLE became much more complete; his writings of every class were known, partly from the older Latin versions, partly from Arabic versions brought from Spain, and partly from recent translations.\* The obscurity of the translations exercised the acuteness of the readers. The application of this Philosophy to Dogmatics met at first with so much more violent opposition, because certain conclusions were unfairly deduced from it which seemed dangerous to Christianity. GREGORY IX. in A.D. 1228 addressed an admonitory letter to the University of Paris against the extravagant use of Philosophy. A celebrated professor, SIMON of TOURNAI,† who made very frequent use of ARISTOTLE, was thereby brought into disrepute, and the story connected with this fact is characteristic of the spirit of the times. He had made a transition from Philosophy to Theology and met with such success, that no hall could contain his hearers. On one occasion he brought forward all the arguments against the Trinity, and announced that on the next occasion he would refute them and prove the truth of the dogma. This excited still more attention, and

\* Jourdain, *Recherches Critiques sur l'Age et l'Origine des Traductions Latines d'Aristote et sur des Commentaires Grecs ou Arabes employés par des Docteurs Scholastiques.* Par. 1819, 1843.

† Jo. Launoi *De Varia Aristotelis in Academia Parisiens. Fortuna.* Par. 1662; Vitemb. 1720.

crowds flocked to hear him; enraptured with his demonstration, his hearers entreated him to commit his lecture to writing. He then arrogantly exclaimed:\* "O my dear Jesus, how many thanks are due to me for employing my acuteness in thy favour!" Suddenly he lost his speech, remained dumb for two years, forgot all he had learned, and was obliged to begin again with the elements. This account is certainly not true to the letter. Even among his contemporaries there were very different versions of it. According to one of these, he blasphemously asserted that the world had been led astray by three deceivers, MOSES, CHRIST, and MOHAMMED;† but they all agree as to the latter part of it. But according to other accounts SIMON does not appear to have been a man who would make assertions of this kind. The BENEDICTINES, who composed the Literary History of France, mention the Lecture,‡ and state that they had read it. Perhaps some matter of fact gave occasion to the formation of this legend. But the Aristotelian Philosophy suited too well the spirit of the Age to render its suppression practicable, and it even obtained the protection of the Popes. Its formulas, in which might be comprised every possible subject, were suited to the most extensive application. The Platonic philosophy in the preceding age had introduced an intuitive mystical element into Dogmatics, and thus had served as a means of defending the doctrine of the Trinity. The Aristotelian philosophy, on the contrary, called forth a dialectic negative tendency; although not during this period, in which the consciousness of the Church was too strongly developed, and a too powerful religious spirit reigned, to allow the negative influence of ARISTOTLE to become effective. No longer were such large concessions made to the philosophical standpoint generally, and to the ancient Philosophy, as had been made by ABELARD, although these were better understood, and perhaps for that very reason, Antiquity was no longer idealised, and the ancient and Christian standpoints were more dis-

\* Matthæus Paris, a. 1201. On the other side Henric. Gandavensis (1280) *De Scriptorib. Ecclesiast. Fabricii, Bibl. Eccles. ii. 121, Dum vimis Aristotelem sequitur, a nonnullis modernis hæreseos arguitur.*

† Thomas Cantipratens, *Bonum Universale de Assib. ii. c. 48, 5. Gieseler, II. ii. 143.*

‡ T. xvi. 388.



tinctly kept apart. Equally powerful as ARISTOTLE, at this period, was Neo-Platonism, which operated directly through translations from the Neo-Platonists, and indirectly through the writings of AUGUSTIN and the PSEUDO-DIONYSIUS. Thus, consciously or unconsciously, two authorities exerted great influence over the age, the Church and the Aristotelian-Neo Platonic Philosophy. But now both mixed, and that not unconsciously, so that these men may be charged with transporting the Aristotelian element to that of the Church, or that of the Church to the Aristotelian; yet men were conscious of the general Antagonism existing between these views, but it was conceived of, not as an antagonism between Antiquity and Christianity, but between Reason and Revelation. Hence men could discern in ARISTOTLE what was irreconcilable with Church doctrines, and what was insufficient, to which Revelation must add something new and higher; only there was the error of regarding ARISTOTLE as the absolute limit of Reason, where it formed a junction with Revelation. It must certainly be granted that in particular instances the Aristotelian-Platonic element mingled itself involuntarily in the conceptions formed of Christianity, and the Antagonism to Christianity by the introduction of the ideas of Antiquity was obliterated. But this happened only in those cases in which an unconscious reaction of the ancient standpoint had taken place in the Church spirit itself, which then sought and found a support in ARISTOTLE. In general, the influence of this Philosophy was a formal one; the material influence was that of the Church and of the strictly Catholic spirit.

The influence of the ARABIAN PHILOSOPHY\* was of less importance for the development of Christian doctrines. Among the Arabians there were various shades of Philosophy; one which held fast to the letter of religious Tradition; another which wished to unite ARISTOTLE with Islam; a third, negative, which stood in direct opposition to religious belief. The latter was that which penetrated into the West, and appeared in the Church in the form of a negative reaction, and would have been more powerful had the great men of the thirteenth century acted as a counterpoise to it.

\* A. Schmoelders, *Essai sur les Ecoles Philosophes chez les Arabes et notamment sur la Doctrine D'Algazzali*. Par. 1842. Ritter, *Gesch. d. Christ. Philos.* iii.

The Church Theocracy, the peculiar element of the Middle Ages, was carried to its height since the time of INNOCENT III., and Scholasticism governed the System. In the Church we see, on the one hand, extreme secularity; on the other hand, an entire renunciation of worldly things, which found its representation in various communities, and principally in the order of MENDICANT FRIARS. They were from the first filled especially with the Church spirit of the Middle Ages, and were the support of the Papacy. But in their quiet manners and their sphere of life their thoughts became concentrated; the tendency inward to contemplation, speculation, and mysticism found here its nourishment. Along with the restless doings of many of the secular Clergy and bishops, the bloom of the scholastic knowledge of this age sprung from these monasteries, for the most distinguished champions of it proceeded from them, and partook of this Church-theocratic spirit. But now against this tendency that of Church Freedom was aroused, which dreaded the great dependence of the Church and Science on Monkery. On the part of the Secular Clergy, and especially of the University of Paris, a zealous opposition was raised against the mendicant friars; at the head of the opposite party stood the free-thinking WILLIAM of ST. AMOUR, at Paris. If we may judge from the few productions of his we possess, he was in his mental constitution altogether different from the great scholastic Theologians; he had a more moderate, clear, and sober understanding. But that Spirit of Speculation in the Church was favoured by the atmosphere of the Age; yet a far more preponderating Interest attached to the internal and supernatural element.

Among the FRANCISCANS the following are the most distinguished:—ALEXANDER of HALES (*Doctor irrefragabilis*), educated in the monastery of Hales, in the county of Gloucester, studied at Paris, became a Professor of Theology there, and died A.D. 1245. His *Summa Universae Theologiæ*\* comprehends Dogmatics and Morals. BONAVENTURA (JOHN of FIDANZA, *Doctor seraphicus*), born A.D. 1221, of a Florentine family, one of the first who embraced with enthusiasm the idea of FRANZISKUS of ASSISSI; he entered this order, became teacher of Theology at Paris, afterwards Cardinal and General of the Franciscans; he died A.D. 1274, at the Council of

\* Editions: Venet. 1576; Colon. 1622; 4 voll. f. Cramer, vii. 161.

Lyons. In his writings\* the mystical and dialectic Theology are blended; the leading idea of his Order, the Imitation of Christ in entire self-denial, had the greatest influence over him.

Among the DOMINICANS, ALBERT MAGNUS was conspicuous, born at Laningen, not far from Dillingen, A.D. 1193, of an ancient noble family. He became a Dominican in A.D. 1223, and taught at Paris and Cologne. About A.D. 1260 ALEXANDER IV. made him Bishop of Regensburg; but he relinquished this office about A.D. 1262, and returned to the University of Cologne, where he died A.D. 1280. ALBERT was an universal genius, who struck out new paths in every direction, and made scientific discoveries.† One of the most influential Schoolmen, a Teacher of Centuries, was ALBERT's great Scholar, THOMAS AQUINAS (*Doctor angelicus*). He was born about A.D. 1225 or 1227, at Rocca Secca, near Aquino, in the Neapolitan territory. Irresistibly attracted by the life of the Order of the Dominicans, he entered as a youth about A.D. 1243. His Mother was at first not averse, but when she wished to visit him, and the Dominicans, who sacrificed all domestic feelings to their Order, refused her admission, she withheld her consent, and endeavoured, through her other son, who was in the service of the Emperor FREDERIC II., to take him away from the Order. But here the originality and firmness of his great soul were made apparent. Though they tried to compel him by imprisonment, he would not swerve from his determination. In the solitude of his dungeon he occupied himself with reading the Scriptures and PETER LOMBARD. His mother herself at last assisted him to make his escape; he let himself down by a rope from the window, and was joyfully received by the Dominicans. They sent him to Cologne, in order to study under ALBERT. No one suspected what there was in the silent, meditative youth, and he was called *bos mutus*. But when, on one occasion, he

\* *Commentarius in 4 libros, Sententiarum, Breviloquium* (ed. C. J. Hefele, Tubg. 1845). His mystical writings: *Itinerarium Mentis in Deum*; *De Septem Gradibus Contemplationis*, &c. Opp. ed. Romæ, 1588, 8 t. f. Venet. 1751, 13 t. f. *Histoire Littéraire de la France*, xix. 266, ff.

† *Commentarius in 4 libros, Sententiarum*; *Summa Theologiæ. Commentaries on Aristotle*. Other philosophical or physical works: Opp. ed. Petrus Jammy Lugd. 1651, 21 t. f. Quetif et Echard *Scriptores Ordinis Prædicatorum*, i. 162. Ritter, *Christl. Philosophie*, Bd. 4.

greatly distinguished himself in a disputation, ALBERT said, "This dumb ox will fill the whole world with the sound of his voice." About A.D. 1255 he became Professor of Theology at Paris. As Rector of the University, during a very active life, and often travelling, he wrote in twenty years the greater part of his works, which treat of a vast variety of subjects. It is said of him that he could dictate compositions on different subjects at the same time. It characterises his theological speculations that he read daily some edifying books, for, as he expressed it, we should take care that nothing one-sided arise in our speculations. He used to begin his lectures and writings with prayer; and when in any inquiry he could find no solution, he would fall on his knees and pray for illumination. While the originality and deep philosophy of his lectures brought a great multitude of hearers to him at Paris and Naples, his sermons were so simple, that the most uneducated could understand them. King LOUIS IX. of FRANCE used to ask his advice in affairs of State. On one occasion he invited him against his will to dinner, when he was occupied with a very difficult inquiry. During the meal he became quite abstracted, and all at once cried out, "Now at last I have found it!" His Prior reminded him that he was seated at the king's table; but the king immediately allowed a secretary to come and write down his thoughts. AQUINAS was distinguished among the Schoolmen for clearness of development, and the harmony between his thoughts and their expression.\*

WILLIAM of AUVERGNE, born at Aurillac, and at last bishop of Paris,† was a theologian distinguished for depth and clearness, and for maintaining the balance between speculation and the fervour of the Christian life.

\* *Commentarii in 4 libros Sententiarum; Summa Theologiæ* (P. i. prima secundæ, secunda secundæ, P. iii. unfinished). *Summa Theologiæ Fidei contra Gentiles*, 4 t. Opp. ed. Antwerp, 1617, 18 t.; Paris, 1660, 23 t.; Venet. 1745—60, 28 t. 4; Vita, *Acta Sanctorum Mart.* i. p. 655. A. Tauron, *Vie de St. Thomas D'Aquin avec un Exposé de sa Doctrine et des ses Ouvrages*, Par. 1737, 4. Bernardi de Rubeis *Dissertatio Critica et Apologetica De Gestis et Scriptis ac Doctrina St. Thomæ Aquinatis*, Venet. 1750. Quetif et Echard *Scriptores Ordinis Prædicatorum*, i. p. 271. *Histoire Littéraire de la France*, xix. 288. Jourdain, pag. 434. Ritter, *Chr. Philosophie*, iv. 257.

† *De Fide et Legibus; De Universo*. Opp. ed. Paris, 1674, 2 t. f.

ROGER BACON (*doctor mirabilis*) possessed higher originality; he was an English Franciscan, who pursued his studies at Paris, became a teacher at Oxford, and died there A.D. 1294. He was powerfully influenced by a man celebrated for his liberal views, ROBERT GROSSETETE, or CAPITO, Bishop of Lincoln, to whom also many later reformers of the fourteenth century, such as WYCLIFFE, were warmly attached. ROGER BACON developed peculiar ideas and tendencies in every department of knowledge, which exposed him to much persecution and repeated imprisonment, from which he was rescued only by the intervention of powerful friends. His principal treatise is the *Opus majus*,\* which is occupied with the Sciences generally; he combated the one-sided supremacy of ARISTOTLE, and even the authority of the Fathers; he pointed out errors in their writings, and appealed to the original sources of theological knowledge. He was distinguished for his knowledge of languages, and made himself familiar with the original Scriptures. In a treatise on the advantages of Grammar, he endeavoured to prove the necessity of linguistic studies, in order better to understand the Bible, which he asserted every layman ought to study in the Original. He disputed the authority of the Vulgate, in which he detected mistakes. The Bible, according to his view, ought to be the Supreme Law, to which every department of Life and Knowledge must be subjected. A reformatory germ lay in this exaltation of the Bible above the authority of the Church and Tradition. Theology he placed at the head of all the Sciences; Revelation is the completion and perfecting of human reason; in all Knowledge, including philosophical and theological, harmony necessarily reigns.†

JOHN DUNS SCOTUS (*Doctor subtilis*) forms the close of this Period; a Franciscan, from Dunstan, in Northumberland; he became a Professor of Theology at Oxford, Paris, and Cologne, and died A.D. 1308. HENRY of GHENT (*Gandavensis*) had already excited an opposition against THOMAS AQUINAS, which DUNS SCOTUS carried still further, and thus founded the School of the Scotists, in opposition to that of the Thomists. He was not destitute of depth of thought, and his acuteness

\* Ed. Samuel Jebb, London, 1733, fol.

† Biographia Britannica, iv. 616. Histoire Littéraire de la France, xx. 227. Jourdain, p. 413. Ritter, Chr. Philosophie, iv. 473.

was extraordinary, but he was inferior <sup>to</sup> AQUINAS in clearness and dexterity, and indicates a separation of the harmonious relation of the religious Life and Thought; hence we find a predominance of the Understanding and a fondness for frivolous distinctions; his thinking is wanting in simplicity, and his language abstruse; his investigations lose themselves in minutiae.

Hitherto Scholastic speculation had been controlled by Christian experience; its great masters had combined warmth of feeling with depth and acuteness of Intellect; but with DUNS SCOTUS began the intellectual formal tendency which led continually to greater barrenness and inanity; he marks the period when Scholasticism began to decline.

The peculiar method of this Dialectic consists in starting questions on all sides respecting an object, arranging the arguments *pro* and *contra*, and lastly giving a decision, the so-called *conclusio* or *resolutio*. This method was far more developed than in the former period; it exercised acuteness in a high degree, but also promoted Sophistry. It was fostered by the desire to maintain harmony with the traditions of the Church. Instead of clearing away Errors by the free spirit of Science, and by the help of their own often purer principles, the Schoolmen only confirmed them more in the Church. In what was set up as antithetical, as *contra*, there was much which was again brought forward by the later opponents of Revelation. The Schoolmen, therefore, by their own inquiries were led into doubts; but since these were combined with a cordial pious faith, these Thinkers knew also how to find the means for allaying them. It was important for the development of the Church that through it there should be effected a union of the religious and Scientific Interests, a union arising from the free development of Reason in connexion with Faith. It had this important consequence, that a reaction of the Natural Reason against Christianity, which we have seen already germinating, was overcome at this time by the power of the religious Scientific Spirit. Many times

\* *Quæstiones in libros 4 Sententiarum*; (Opus Anglicanum sive Oxoniense) ed. Hugo Cavellus, Antwp. 1620, 2 voll. f. *Quæstiones Quodlibetales*, xxi. Philosophical writings: Commentaries on Aristotle. Opp. ed. Lucas Wadding, Lugd. 1639, 12 t. f. Baumgarten-Crusius, *De Theologia Scoti* (Progr.), 1826. Ritter, iv. 354.

repulsed, the opposing tendencies of Secular Culture at last broke forth irresistibly, and led the way to a new process of development. Then the reaction followed, for the greater part in a conscious Rationalism, but partly in a Mysticism, which unconsciously contained a rationalistic Element.

The former (the reaction of rationalism) was realized in the appearance of those remarkable men, AMALRIC DE BENA,\* in the district of Chartres, at the beginning of the thirteenth Century, and DAVID DE DINANTO. The doctrine they taught was derived from Aristotle, but their contemporaries pointed to quite a different source. ALBERTUS MAGNUS, for example, in his *Summa*,† names the work of DAVID DE DINANTO, *De tomis*, which may remind us of the treatise of JOHN ERTGENA, *De divisione naturæ*. And so we find that MARTINUS POLONUS (A.D. 1271), in his supplement to MARIANUS SCOTUS, quotes passages which were ascribed to AMALRIC, and are found word for word in SCOTUS.‡ Another important work besides exerted an influence which was erroneously ascribed to Aristotle, the treatise *De causis*, which rather contains PLOTINUS's System of an immanent necessity of Reason, and of the necessary development of the Universe from the Absolute down to the farthest limit, the Hyle. Although its contents contradicted the Christian views of Teleology, Freedom and Evil, yet THOMAS AQUINAS and others strove to Christianize the ideas.§ AMALRIC, in the University of Paris, had proceeded from dialectic inquiries to Dogmatics; at first nothing contrary to the Church or to Christianity in its full extent was observable; only surprise was excited by his asserting, that as no one can be saved without believing in the sufferings and resurrection of Christ, so neither can he, without having the conviction that he himself is a member of Christ. In this sentiment we may perceive an anticipation of Protestant Ideas, and some have really thought that AMALRIC was a Witness of the Truth, who had expressed, only in the form of Mysticism, the immediate relation to Christ. But

\* Engelhardt, Kirchengesch. Abhandlungen, p. 251. C. U. Hahn, Theol. Stud. u. Krit. 1846. Amalrich v. Bena u. David v. Dinanto v. J. H. Kronlein, ebendas. 1847. Ritter, Gesch. d. chr. Philos. iii. 625.

† Tractatus iv. Questio xx. 2; De Tomis, hoc est, De Divisionibus.

‡ Martini, Pol. Chronic. ed. Antvp. 1574.

§ Thomas Aquin. Opp. ed. Paris, 1660, t. iv. Jourdain, p. 212.

he shows himself to be very different in his cast of thought. He stands on the mystic-pantheistic point of JOHN SCOTUS. He regards the whole Universe as a manifestation of the divine Being, a development of God in all existence, the *ô* in his Theophanies. We may see in him how easily a one-sided Speculation terminates in Pantheism,—Reason will acknowledge no bounds, and derive everything from one causality, and hence will not acknowledge the relative Independence which is involved in the Freedom of the creature.

The Abbot JOACHIM of FLORIA, in Calabria, had prophesied an Age of the Holy Spirit which would be distinguished by a purer development of Christianity and a more spiritual Religious instead of Ceremonial Service; when the Religion of Intuition would be supreme, instead of an intellectual scholastic Christianity. This idea was cherished by the adherents of the Pantheistic Party. In the Old Testament God revealed himself as the Almighty, in the New Testament as the Logos. Now, instead of the Incarnation of the Logos in one subject, there is that of the Holy Spirit in all who know the Truth. Practical errors are said to have been founded on the maxim, that if men only live in the intuition of God all other things are indifferent. A strict party of the Franciscan Order likewise misinterpreted that doctrine of JOACHIM'S. In the writings of FRANCIS of ASSISI representations are to be met with of the relationship of Man to Nature, of a brotherhood of all created Beings. Among the spiritual men of his Order, one Party explained this pantheistically, and spoke of an age of the Father and the Son, and after that had passed away the Age of the everlasting Gospel would begin, in which the Spirit would abolish all Forms.

A still more conscious Pantheism proceeded from the Philosophy of the Spanish Arabians, especially the Aristotelian AVERRHÖES, who taught that there was one spirit in all men, ignoring individuality, and denying personal Immortality. This doctrine met with no little acceptance, so that traces of it are to be found out of the circle of professed scholars. In the biography of THOMAS AQUINAS a licentious knight is mentioned, who, on being exhorted to repentance, answered, that he was as sure of being saved as PETER, for the same Spirit was in him. Frequently the doctrines of AVERRHÖES were not openly expressed, but their abettors concealed their unbelief



under the garb of Orthodoxy. From this resulted the pretended contrariety between theological and philosophical Truth, which might have been made the vehicle for spreading every kind of Unbelief without correction. It was part of the merit of the Schoolmen to combat this distinction, and to point out that there can be no absolute contradiction in human nature.

In these conflicts an extraordinary man held a conspicuous place, RAYMUND LULLI,\* born at Majorca, A.D. 1226. Till his thirtieth year he had been quite a man of the world, and was known only as an author by his songs; yet the hidden seed of Christian education was not lost, and a conflict was developed in his soul between his worldly tendencies and his new religious aspirations. One night, while composing a love-song, the image of the crucified Saviour was presented vividly to him; he sought to lose the impression, but in vain. By degrees his mental activity took quite a different direction; along with the power of Imagination, which had early shown itself, other extraordinary powers were brought into exercise; intensity of feeling, joined with uncommon profundity and acuteness of thought. His multifarious scientific and philosophic interests still remained in close connexion with the practical religious; he was inflamed with a desire to spread the Gospel among all unbelievers, for the purpose of making Christianity the ruling religion of the World. As the Crusades had terminated so unfortunately, he thought of a different method than force of subjecting all heathen nations to Christianity, by the power of conviction, and hence strove to find the means of representing to all men the truth of Christianity. This took in his mind the form of an opposition to the Arabian Philosophy. He conceived the plan of a general scientific doctrine, which would demonstrate the principles of all truth in all the Sciences, especially the Christian dogmas, and endeavoured to carry it out in his famed *Ars generalis*, an absolute Formula for the treatment of all the Sciences. However much he prided himself on this supposed discovery, it seems to have been one of the unfortunate attempts of a

\* Opp. ed. Mogunt. 1722, in ten vols., but of which the seventh and eighth seem to have been lost. His writings have not been sufficiently used, for the least important, the *Ars Generalis*, has been chiefly noticed. Hence his importance has not been adequately estimated even by Ritter.

self-confident formalistic intellectual tendency, and remarkable only for the mixture of imagination and intellect. But far more important are his other dogmatic and ethical writings, which award him a place among the profoundest and most acute of the Schoolmen. In a life full of ardent activity he was able to pursue his mystical and speculative studies, and to compose a multitude of philosophical and theological treatises. Several times he attempted to make known Christianity in North Africa, and disputed with the Arabian Philosophers; but he was cruelly persecuted, and suffered martyrdom at Bugia, A.D. 1315. It was a leading object with him to prevent the spread of the principles of *AVERRONES* in Theology. He combated, on the one hand, this contradiction between theological and philosophical Truth, while, on the other hand, he advocated Free Inquiry in opposition to those who would only admit the Faith of Authority.

As Pantheistic views were so widely spread at this period, the opposition made to them will in part account for the influence gained by the Dualist views of the *CATHARISTS*.

## SPECIAL HISTORY OF DOGMAS.

### A. THE DOGMAS WHICH BELONG TO THE INTRODUCTION IN DOGMATICS.

THE treatment of Dogmatics was cultivated by the Schoolmen of this period for the purpose of adding a section to the *Prolegomena* of Theology, in which they occupied themselves with questions which hitherto had been so accurately investigated; on the Sources of theological knowledge—the relation of Revelation to Reason—the necessity of Revelation—the relation of faith to knowledge,—whether Theology is a Science, and what authority it has for being one; whether it is a theoretic or practical Science; what is its chief object, and wherein its Unity consists; what relation it has to other Sciences, especially to the different parts of Philosophy. The decisions on these points were connected with the question—what is the peculiar nature and seat of Religion, whether knowledge or feeling; what is the central point of Christianity in comparison with other Religions? On these questions the differences were founded which separated the Schoolmen in various

directions. But what distinguished the deepest thinkers among them was, that they agreed in sharply defining the peculiar province of theological knowledge in connexion with Religion, and did not as yet mingle Dialectics with Religion, however much it finally prevailed; they also placed the essence of Religion in the disposition, and hence in all knowledge presupposed the substance of what was to be known in the religious experience of the disposition. Hence they kept in the same direction as ANSELM, and adhered to the principle expressed by AUGUSTIN, *Fides præcedit Intellectum*.

ALEXANDER of HALES answered the question whether Theology is a Science, in the following manner:—He made a distinction in the application of the idea of Science; Science relates either to the completion of the knowledge of Truth—in which case it has to do with Knowledge as such, that is, theoretical; or the Knowledge relates to religious Experience, and of the latter kind is theological knowledge.\* This Knowledge can only proceed from the disposition. Theology demands the human Soul, since it rouses the affections, the tendencies of the disposition, by the principles of goodness, the fear of God, and love. The relation of Knowledge to Faith is therefore the reverse of what it is in the other Sciences, since Theology first of all produces Faith, and after the Soul has been purified through Faith working by Love, the result is the Understanding of Theology. In logical Science, on the contrary, rational Knowledge† produces Faith. If the former have produced faith, then the internal grounds for such conviction will appear. Faith is then the light of the Soul; and the more any one is enlightened by this light, so much more will he apprehend the reasons by which his Faith is proved. There is indeed a Faith which does not rise so high as Knowledge, which satisfies itself with probabilities; but Christian Faith is different.

\* *Certitudo speculativa and certitudo experientiae; or certitudo secundum intellectum and secundum affectum, quod est per modum gustus.*

† *In logicis ratio creat fidem, unde argumentum est ratio rei dubiæ faciens fidem; in theologicis vero est e converso, quia fides creat rationem, unde fides est argumentum faciens rationem. Fides, enim, qua creditur, est lumen animarum, quo, quanto quis magis illustratur, tanto magis est perspicax ad inveniendas rationes, quibus probantur credenda.*

This proceeds from Experience—appeals to the Revelation of the highest Truths, and hence stands above all Knowledge. Accordingly he distinguishes even between a speculative certainty of an intellectual kind and that of inward Experience, of Feeling which is founded in the surrender of the Soul to Truth, or in Love. He meets the objection that if we seek proof for the objects of Faith, its value will be taken away. Nothing can be more certain to Man than his faith. In refutation of the objection he gives a threefold purpose, for which *ratio* is to be made use of, for the development of Faith.

(i.) For the advantage of the Believer himself, in order that he may come to an understanding of the Truth believed: the grace of Faith itself enlightens our reason for that purpose.

(ii.) In order to lead the simple to more perfect faith, as the less advanced are led to the love of God by temporal blessings, so they are led by rational arguments to a higher stage of faith.

(iii.) In order to bring back Unbelievers to the Faith, he who would support his cause only by Reason would draw his proofs from Reason, and then certainly Faith would lose its value; but as for him who does not support himself on Reason, but trusts to the witness of the highest Truth by itself, to him Reason serves not for proof, but he supports himself on the internal experience of divine things; here the word of the Samaritans is applicable: "We believe now not on thy testimony, but because we have experienced it ourselves." Theology was in his esteem a practical Science, for it has to do with the divine life and assimilation to the Holy Spirit. Its object is the Divine Being as made known through Christ in the work of Redemption.\* He states the objection, that even in Theology mention is made of the Works of Creation, but rejoins that everything else was made in reference to that first event; the Restoration of Man cannot be treated of without discussing the Fall, which again leads to the doctrine of Creation. Secular Science has to do with the works of Creation, but Theology considers everything in connexion with the New Creation, the Restoration of Man.

BONAVENTURA distinguished, in reference to the objects of Faith, between their relation to Reason left to itself, which acquires knowledge by its own efforts—and to Reason which by the gift of Faith is potentiated to something higher, and is

\* *Scientia de substantia divina cognoscenda per Christum, in opere reparationis.*

transformed by the influence of the new divine life. Faith raises the spirit to give assent to divine Truths; Science leads to the understanding of what is received by Faith. The Conviction attained by Faith does not proceed from rational demonstration, but from love to Him who makes the Revelation. Although the truths of faith may be compared with other objects of knowledge, yet they are distinguished by this, that they operate on the disposition and the feelings. The doctrine that Christ died for us, for example, excites the soul to love and devotion.

ALBERT THE GREAT defines Christianity as practical Science, for although it is occupied with the investigation of Truth, yet it refers everything to the life of the Soul, and shows how Man by the truths it reveals must be formed to a divine Life. It treats of God and his works, not in reference to abstract Truth, but to God as the supreme good, to the salvation of Men, to the production of piety in the inner and outer Man. He also distinguishes various kinds of certainty: the theoretical, which merely relates to knowledge (*informatio mentis*), and the certainty of immediate consciousness (*informatio conscientiae*). The knowledge obtained by Faith is more certain than that derived from other sources; but we must distinguish between the *fides informis* and the *fides formata*; the first is only a means to knowledge, but the second is an immediate consciousness. Man is attracted by the object of faith just as moral truth leads him to Morality. All Knowledge and Truth come from God, but they are imparted in different ways; our Reason has the capacity to perceive Truth, as the Eye possesses the faculty of sight. Natural light is one thing, and the light of grace is another. The latter is a higher stage, an assimilation between him who knows and the thing known, a participation of the divine Life.

THOMAS AQUINAS endeavours to prove the necessity of Revelation, and to refute the objection of Rationalism, that Man, who stands at the head of the Creation, would be placed below all the rest, if he were not furnished with all the powers which are necessary for his destiny, he replies: On this very account a Revelation is necessary, because Man is exalted above all other creatures, and because he is destined for a super-terrestrial end, an end which transcends the limits of Natural Reason.\* Revelation also serves to render man

\* Illud, quod acquirit bonitatem perfectam pluribus auxiliis et

humble, in opposition to that Pride to which natural Reason is prone. Even in the knowledge of truths to which Reason can attain by its own power, Revelation has the advantage of making them generally known, for few can attain to them in the way of rational inquiry, and their knowledge would not be free from error. He denied the contradiction between philosophical and theological truth; the truths of natural Reason cannot be at variance with those given by Revelation, since God is also the Author of Reason. What opposes Reason cannot proceed from God.\* If we admit such a contradiction, it would follow that something false might be the object of faith, which would be an absurdity. In his inquiries respecting the relation of faith to knowledge he says:—A faith of authority resting on human opinion is the weakest of all things; but it is otherwise with divine Revelation. Yet Theology makes use of human Reason, not, indeed, to prove the truths of Revelation, but to deduce other truths from it. As other Sciences obtain their principles from other sources, and then draw inferences from them, so Theology proceeds from those which are made known by a higher light. But since Grace does not nullify Nature, but perfects it, and as the natural inclinations of the Will serve the divine principle of the Christian life, so also will Reason serve the Truths of Faith.† We may dispute with opponents if they admit some of our Principles, for then they may be shown to be illogical. But when our opponents deny altogether the Authority of Revelation, the truths founded upon it cannot be proved to them. Yet there are in all Creation certain Analogies to Divine Truth which may be employed to illustrate revealed Truths, though not sufficient to understand and prove them; but whatever is set in opposition to those truths may be con-

motibus est nobilius eo quod imperfectam bonitatem acquireret paucioribus vel per seipsum, et hoc modo se habet homo respectu aliarum creaturarum, qui factus est ad ipsius divinæ gloriæ participationem.

\* Principiorum autem naturaliter notorum cognitio nobis divinitus est insita, cum ipse Deus sit auctor nostræ naturæ. Hæc ergo principia etiam divina sapientia continet. Quicquid igitur principiis huiusmodi contrarium est, est divinæ sapientiæ contrarium, non igitur a Deo esse potest.

† Cum gratia non tollat naturam, sed perficiat oportet, quod naturalis ratio subserviat fidei, sicut et naturalis inclinatio voluntatis obsequitur caritati.

tradicted as only seeming reasons, since there can be no self-contradictory proofs. Therefore this method must rather be applied to the instruction and comfort of believers. If through Reason we can attain only a slight knowledge of the highest things, yet it is always most delightful. He raises a doubt whether Theology is a science, since it treats of such a variety of objects, and he endeavours to determine the Unity which connects them. He makes the Unity to consist in their treating everything in relation to God and Divine Revelation. Then he asks whether it is a theoretical or practical Science, and replies that both qualities are to be found in it, but it is more speculative than practical. This assertion may seem to be inconsistent with the fact, that AQUINAS held the same views on the relation of Faith to Knowledge as the Schoolmen already named. But the discrepancy vanishes if we understand the assertion in his peculiar sense. He goes upon the Aristotelian principle that the Intuition of God is the highest destiny of the Spirit, which will be first attained in everlasting life. Now, since Theology is occupied rather with divine things than with human actions, and its highest end is the contemplation of God,\* on this account he calls it a speculative Science.

DUNS SCOTUS met the assertion of the necessity of Revelation, from the standpoint of Philosophy, by the principle that Man requires no supernatural knowledge, but can obtain everything necessary for fulfilling his destiny by his natural Reason. Were it not so, the work of God in his Creation would be incomplete. He refutes this objection by an acute distinction. The idea of the Supernatural may be formed in a twofold manner; supernatural either in relation to the receptive power of Reason, or to the operating cause by which certain knowledge is imparted to human Reason. In reference to the capability of knowledge implanted in Reason we can say, that no knowledge is supernatural, for Reason is so constituted as to take in all knowledge; it has a natural inclination for imparted knowledge, and all such knowledge contributes to its perfection, it is *intellectus possibilis*. But it is different as to the second point, which refers to the efficient cause, and the

\* Quia principalius agit de rebus divinis, quam de actibus humanis, de quibus agit, secundum quod per eos ordinatur homo ad perfectam Dei cognitionem, in qua aeterna beatitudo consistit.

mode of imparting knowledge. In this respect we may say, that some knowledge may be supernatural to Reason, although Reason is naturally constituted so as to receive it, and finding satisfaction in it; lastly, it is supernatural so far as it must be communicated by a supernatural efficient principle, and equally, whether this Revelation be internal or external. We do not, therefore, deny, that there is a certain province which Reason might be able to cultivate by its own powers, a Highest from the standpoint of human Reason, only that this would not be sufficient to attain salvation and the destiny of human nature. If it be objected that Man would then sink below the level of other creatures, since he would not have everything in himself, which belongs to his destiny,—he replies, if our happiness consisted in the possession of the highest knowledge to which we can attain by reason, we should not say that Nature was defective in the highest creature. Now, let us grant that Reason could attain so far; but beyond this there is still a higher end to which Reason cannot attain by its own natural powers. Precisely in this is shown the dignity of human Nature, that in virtue of its receptivity it is adapted to receive something more into itself than what it can reach by its own power. Its endless receptivity raises it above the whole Creation. Scotus therefore maintains something supernatural in the divine communications. The necessity of the communication is, according to him, grounded in this, that the blessedness to which man is destined proceeds, not from natural necessity, but from Free Will and the grace of God, and is attained by the method which the divine wisdom has appointed. Here he brings this doctrine into connexion with the divine Will. Scotus therefore also belongs to those who did not regard the antagonism between the Supernatural and the Natural as absolute and irreconcilable; but, while admitting the necessity of the former, at the same time they tried to show the Harmony between both.

Scotus also was the individual who first of all entered into a fuller inquiry respecting the Origin and Contents of the Bible.\* He exhibited the evidence for its Divinity, and its sufficiency for the religious necessities of Man. As proofs of its divine origin he adduced the Prophecies, the agreement of the Bible with itself, the Authority of the

\* Sentent. Prolog. Qu. 2.



Writers, the conscientiousness of those who transmitted it, and the agreement of its contents with Reason. What is more reasonable than that Man should love God above all, and his Neighbour as himself? These are the fundamental Principles from which everything else is to be deduced. Also the absurdity of the errors opposed to it, speak in its favour, as well as miracles and the unchangeableness of the Church. The Articles of Faith contain nothing by which the Perfection of God is not set in a still clearer light, and what contradicts them, encroaches on its perfection. As to the other point, the Sufficiency of Scripture, he says, if everything necessary is not verbally stated in the Bible, yet everything may be deduced from its principles. He meets the objection that the Bible contains much that is superfluous, and not necessary for Salvation, and rejoins—that what appears to us superfluous, is yet important for the development of Truth. In this respect, for example, the Historical is very important.

DUNS SCOTUS inquires what forms the essential contents of Theology. He is not disposed, like ALEXANDER of HALES, to accept Christ as such, for not all the essential truths of the Bible are referable to him; the doctrine that the Father begat the Son, and the truths which relate to the divine Will, cannot *virtualiter* be contained in the doctrine of Christ, for these truths would not be the less necessary even if the Logos had not become Flesh. In his opinion, the *primum subjectum* of Theology, is the doctrine of the Divine Being. At the same time he agrees with those who regard Theology as a practical Science, and shows that all the Truths which relate to the Divine Being, also tend to produce a peculiar determination of the life in reference to God.

WILLIAM of PARIS develops in a peculiar manner the fundamental ideas respecting the nature of Faith. He distinguishes between the standpoint where conviction proceeds from the Objective, the rational knowledge of the Objective, and where it depends on the Subjective element, the believing disposition.\* The latter method is that of religious conviction. Man rises by virtue of his disposition above the reaction of the Understanding. This theologian considers as belonging to the essence of Faith, boldness and power of

\* De Fide, c. 1; aliud est credere ex probabilitate sive ex evidentia ipsius crediti, aliud ex virtute credentis.

spirit, firmness of character in conflict with the reactions that tend to Unbelief. Boldness overcomes the darkness of intruding doubt, and by its own inward light suppresses that which brings darkness. It is somewhat original, that in Faith he gives prominence to the practical element of a conflict against the reactions of natural Reason, and discerns in it an act of spiritual bravery.\* Above all other operations of the mind is that of Faith, which accomplishes its object by a combative power†—a profound psychological mode of contemplation.

ROGER BACON did not enter deeply into these inquiries, yet his discussions on the relation of Philosophy to Theology deserve consideration. Theology develops immediately the contents of Scripture; Speculation is the link between Scripture and natural Reason. It receives what is true in earlier speculation, and connects with it those truths which Reason might indeed know of itself, but which it would never have found without the impulse which Revelation gives it. Christian philosophy can therefore be reconciled with Faith, since it asserts rational truths which every wise man admits, although if left to himself he would not have known them.‡ This corresponds not only to Christian Philosophy, but also to the Christian consciousness, which must bring all truth to divine Truth, to be subordinate to it and serve it.§

RAYMUND LULLI maintained the agreement of Knowledge and Faith, partly from apologetic motives, and partly in opposition to the Theory of AVERROES. "Elevate thy knowledge," he said, "and thy love will be elevated. Heaven is

\* Manifestum, quod credere improbabilia fortitudinis est atque vigoris nostri intellectus, sicut amare molesta et ignominiosa fortitudinis est et vigoris nostri affectus. Fortitudo intellectus, quæ tenebras improbabilitatis irrumpat et vincat et luminositate propria ea, quæ illa abscondere contendit, lucida et aperta, hoc est credita faciat.

† De operationibus intellectus solum credere bellum habet, omne bellum bellica virtute seu fortitudine agendum est.

‡ Philosophi infideles multa ignorant in particulari de divinis, quæ si proponerentur iis, ut probarentur per principia philosophiæ completæ, hoc est per vivacitates rationes, quæ sumunt originem a philosophia infidelium, licet complementum a fide Christi, reciperent sine contradictione, et gaudent de proposita sibi veritate, quia avidi sunt et magis studiosa quam Christiani.

§ Propter conscientiam Christianam, quæ valet omnem veritatem ducere ad divinam, ut ei subjiatur et famuletur.—Opus Majus, p. 41.

not so high as the love of a holy man.”\* This language shows how intimately connected he regarded knowledge to be with the religious life of the Soul. On the question whether Theology is a Science, he distinguishes between what lies in its nature and essence, and what it is under certain circumstances. The essence of the Spirit in the strict sense is the *intelligere*. Only when the Spirit cannot rise to knowledge, mere Faith takes its place ; as the image of an object occupies the Fancy when the thing itself is not present. But in a strict sense Theology is Science, since the *intelligere* belong to the essence of the *Intellectus* in a strict sense. Since God is in the highest sense good and great, he imparts himself to the created *Intellectus* as far as it is capable of receiving his perfection. The Spirit is made in order to refer itself with all its powers to God ; hence it must be able to appropriate Him above all other objects.† He states the objection, How can a finite Spirit comprehend the Infinite ? and answers, As he who tastes only a drop of the Ocean perceives its saltness, so the human spirit attains a sufficient knowledge of the Trinity ; but more than this it cannot attain. In a disputation between *Fides* and *Intellectus*, the latter says to Faith, Thou art the preparatory step by which I attain to a right state of the Soul in order that I may soar to higher things.‡ When the Intellect rises through Knowledge to the stage on which Faith already stands, Faith rises from this point still higher.§ In his treatise on the Contemplation of God,|| he carries on an

\* De Centum Nominibus Dei, Opp. t. vi.—Eleva tuum intelligere et elevabis tuum amare. Cælum non est tam altum, sicut amore sancti hominis. Quo magis laborabis ad ascendendum eo magis ascendes.

† Disputatio cremitæ et Raimundi super aliquibus dubiis quæstionibus sententiarum Petri Lombardi. Aliud objectum illi minus principale esset illi magis appetibile, quam suum objectum magis principale quod esset impossibile, et idem esset suo modo de voluntate, cui theologia non esset proprium objectum ad amandum ; et sic de memoria ad recolendum quod est valde inconveniens.

‡ Quod tu, fides, sis dispositio et præparatio, per quam ego de Deo sum dispositus ad altas res ; nam in hoc, quod ego per te suppono credendo, per quod possum ascendere, habituo me de te et sic tu es in me et ego in te.

§ Quando ascendo in gradum, in que tu es intelligendo, tu ascendis credendo in altiorum gradum supra me.

|| Concordantiæ et Contrarietates inter Fidem et Rationem.

inquiry on the agreement and disagreement of Faith and Reason. As Faith stands on a height and does not descend to rational grounds, so Reason rises to those lofty subjects which it brings down to Knowledge. If Faith stands aloft and Reason ascends to it, then they are both in harmony, because Faith elevates Reason, and by its lofty soaring, strengthens and ennobles it, so that it attempts to attain by Knowledge to that which Faith has already reached. If Reason cannot attain those heights of Faith, yet at least the more it strives, the higher will Faith rise. They reciprocally elevate each other; hence there is harmony and good-will between them. It is the nature of Faith to ascend higher than Reason, because the activity of the latter is compounded of the Sensuous and the Intellectual; Faith, on the contrary, is simple, and stands above the loftiest height of what is known by the Intellect. No contradiction can exist between them. Faith calls Reason from mere capability into real activity,\* when it embraces the law of Religion with Love. Reason confines the *Intellectus* within its limits, since it cannot pass beyond them; but true Faith frees and enlarges the *Intellectus*.†

## B. THE DOGMAS OF SPECIAL DOGMATICS.

### a. THE DOCTRINE OF GOD.

#### 1. PROOF OF THE DIVINE EXISTENCE.—THE IDEA OF GOD IN GENERAL.

ARGUMENTS FOR THE BEING OF GOD The Schoolmen of this Period perceived the error in ANSELM's form of the Ontological argument, but they also recognised what was true in it, namely, that the idea of God is something fundamental to the Spirit of Man and undeniable, and this proof they sought to employ. In this sense ALEXANDER of HALES says,—the idea of God is a *habitus naturaliter impressus primæ veritatis*, and is founded on the connexion subsisting between eternal

\* Facit venire rationem de potentia in actum.

† Sicut ratio captivat et incarcerat intellectum hominis intra terminos, intra quos est terminatus, quia non habet, cum quo eos possit ampliare et extendere, ita vera fides liberat et magnificat ipsum intellectum, quia non constringit eum intra terminos, intra quos ratio habet eum terminatum.

Truth and the moral nature of Man. But we must distinguish between a *cognitio in habitu* and *in actu*. The habitual lies at the basis of human consciousness; the actual is the developed idea. In reference to the former, the idea of God is undeniable; in reference to the second, a twofold tendency of the soul is possible—in proportion as it either turns to the Revelation of the highest Truth, or allows Worldliness and the lower powers of the soul to govern it. In the latter case, the consciousness of God may be wanting, and the fool will say, 'There is no God.' This writer distinguishes also between the idea of God in general (*ratio communis*) and the particular application of it (*ratio propria*). The former is true even in Idolatry, for that testifies of an idea of God as its foundation, though the application of it is erroneous.

THOMAS AQUINAS says,\*—The knowledge of God in a certain confused manner is implanted in all men. Since Man is so created that he finds in God his highest good, so in striving after Happiness, striving after God is at the foundation; but all men do not attain to this consciousness. As to the evidence for the being of God, he distinguishes between what is so in itself, and what is subjectively evident. In itself the idea of God is evident, for every one who admits it into his consciousness; but this is not the case with all men; wherefore the Fool can say in his heart, 'There is no God.' But, on the other hand, no one special proof can be given for the being of God. The design of this proof consists in bringing the undeveloped consciousness to him from the works of God in Creation; but the effects are not adequate to their cause; they do not allow us to infer the Infinite.

In reference to the contrarieties in the mode of apprehending the idea of God, the peculiar standpoint of AMALRICH, and DAVID of DINANTO, is to be noticed. The latter described God as the *principium materiale omnium rerum*, and in reference to the three departments of Existence distinguished three principles†—matter the first indivisible principle of the

\* *Cognoscere Deum esse in aliquo communi sub quadam confusione est nobis naturaliter insertum.*

† Concil. Paris, a. 1209, in Martene Thesaur. Anecd. iv. 163. Albertus Magnus, Summa P. I. Tract. iv. Quæstio 20, Membrum ii. ed. Lugd. t. xvii. f. 76. Thomas Aquinas, in Sententias, l. ii. Dist. xvii. qu. i. art. i. ed. Venet. t. x. p. 235. On Amalrich, see Gulielmus Armoricus

corporeal world; in reference to the spiritual world—spirit the first indivisible *res* from which proceeds the Soul; and in reference to the ideas of God—the first Indivisible in the eternal Substances. Between these three principles no distinction could exist, for otherwise they must be referred back to a higher principle of Unity. There are therefore three relations of the one divine Being to the corporeal, the spiritual, and the ideal worlds. As THOMAS AQUINAS states,\* the school of AMALRIC described God as the *principium formale* of all things, which would indicate a more idealistic mode of conception. According to their hypothesis, God is the one subject in all,—Nature is his body,—he alone is the true Being—all objects of the senses are only *accidentia sine subjecto*. Thus they explained the doctrine of Transubstantiation as a symbolical representation of this Pantheism. The consecration of the Priest represented symbolically what existed independently of it. In every Christian God became man; in the whole of Humanity there was an Incarnation of God, for the consciousness of Man was a form of appearance for the Absolute; God was conscious of himself in human consciousness. In this sense we are to understand the expression that every Christian must have the conviction that he is a member of Christ; God is in him as in Christ.

From this standpoint this party adopted the division of History which had been proposed by JOACHIM OF FLORIS—into the ages of the Father, the Son, and the Spirit; the Age of the Father in the Old Testament; the Age of the Son in the Christian era, which is the era of the Incarnate Logos, of positive Religion, and of a visible Cultus; and the Age of the Spirit, when God is worshipped only in the form of the Spirit, when the consciousness is shared by all that God has become Man, and there is no more need of a positive Revelation, since the one self-sufficient reason has become self-conscious. A priest belonging to this sect, as he was led to the stake, declared, that so far as he existed, they could not burn him, because he was God himself.

The Schoolmen, on the contrary, advocated the Personality

De Gestis Philippi Augusti in Bouquet rer. Gallic. Scriptt., continued by Brial. xvii. 83. Martinus Polonus (1271) Chronicon, ed. Antvp. 1574.

\* Summa, P. 1. qu. iii. art. 8.

of God. ALBERTUS MAGNUS says,\* God is the causal Being, as the efficient, formal cause, and as the final cause, but not the material and essential being of things. He is the archetype of all existence, which all are designed to represent; but as the Archetype he maintains his separate existence, and exists apart from created things. To the same effect, AQUINAS says, God is the *esse omnium effective et exemplariter*, but not *per essentiam*.

## 2. THE DOCTRINE OF THE TRINITY.

THE example of AUGUSTIN was followed in tracing an analogy to the Trinity in the human spirit, but yet it was carried out in a peculiar manner. ALBERT MAGNUS says,—there is no excellence among the Creatures which is not to be found in a much higher style, and as an archetype, in the Creator; among created beings it exists only in foot-marks and images. This is true also of the Trinity. No artistic Spirit can accomplish his work without first forming to himself an outline of it. In the Spirit, therefore, first of all, the Idea of its work is conceived which is as it were the offspring of the Spirit, in every feature resembling the Spirit, representing it in its acting.† Thus, therefore, the Spirit reveals himself in the Idea of the Spirit. Now, from the acting Spirit this idea passes into reality, and for this purpose the Spirit must find a medium in outward action. This medium must be simple, and of the same substance with him who first acted, if indeed the latter is so simple that being, nature, and activity, are one in him. From this results the idea in reference to God, of the formative Spirit, of the planned Image, and of the Spirit by which the Image is realized.‡ The Creation in time is a Revelation of the eternal acting of God, the eternal generation of his Son. The Revelation of God in Time for the sanctification of Nature, is an Image of the eternal procession of the Spirit from the Father and the Son. Our love is only a reflection of the divine love; the Archetype of all love is the Holy Spirit,

\* Sicut paradigma, a quo fiunt et ad quod formantur et ad quod finiuntur, cum tamen intrinsecum sit, extra facta formata et finita existens, et nihil sit de esse eorum.

† Format ex se rationem operis et speciem, quæ est sicut proles ipsius intellectus, intellectui agenti similis in quantum agens est.

‡ Spiritus rector formæ.

who, like all love, proceeds from God. The one Love spread abroad through all holy souls proceeds from the Holy Spirit.\* Love in God neither diminishes nor increases, but we diminish or increase it in ourselves according as we receive this love into our souls, or withdraw from it.

AQUINAS distinguishes the *esse intelligere*, and *velle* or *amare*, in God. We cannot, he says, sufficiently prove by Reason the relation of the Persons to the Unity of the Essence in God, but if once admitted, it may be shown, that the divine Persons are derived from God as the perfect ground and cause of all things. The derivation of the creatures from God, represents but imperfectly the perfection of the Divine Essence. Hence the Revelation of God leads us back to the perfect image which the divine perfection includes in itself,—the Son, the principle and archetype of the manner in which the creatures are derived from God, and as the origin of creatures from God's free love leads back to a principle which is the ground of all God's free communications, so it is this principle of love under which form everything proceeds from God. But the *procedere* in the form of Love, is the Holy Spirit. As far as the Father and the Son are personally distinguished, they become united by love, which is the Holy Spirit. Since God knows himself, he knows all things. This, his Self-knowledge, a *procedere secundum intellectum*, is the divine Word. As God the Father knows himself and all creatures, and expresses himself in the Word whom he has begotten, so far this Word represents him and all creatures in a perfect manner, and so he loves himself, and all creatures in the Holy Spirit.

RAYMUND LULLI says: the goodness of God cannot be thought of as inoperative; God must always be represented as active in it, and communicating himself. But we must also think of Him as the All-sufficient. Without the doctrine of the Trinity, the Creation must be regarded as necessary, in order that he might communicate himself to it, and then his Perfection would be dependent on the Creation. This can only be avoided by the doctrine of the Trinity, which represents God in his eternal self-revelation and communicative-

\* Una caritas diffusa per omnes animas sanctas per spiritum sanctum, ad quam sicut exempla omnis dilectio refertur et comparatione illius et assimilatione caritas dici meretur.



ness. For self-communication belongs to the nature of the Supreme Good, and this, in its highest perfection, is exhibited in the doctrine of the Trinity. The Principle of all Existence is the Father, the mediating Instrument is the Son, and the Holy Spirit is the end and rest of all.\* Therefore the Holy Spirit cannot again generate another Person; all that can be desired finds its accomplishment in Him. The Father and the Son refer themselves through love to the Holy Spirit, as the final aim. Inasmuch as Love in God is not a thing produced, it is his Nature. As far as the Father knows himself as a Father he begets the Son. Since the Father and Son contemplate themselves through love they beget the Holy Spirit. The distinction of the divine Persons shows us that the divine perfections are not inactive on account of their inactivity.† Since God is equally God in acting as in being he must have different persons in his essence. No substance can be without distinction; without distinction it would be nothing.‡

### 3. THE DOCTRINE OF THE CREATION.

THE Schoolmen agitated the question whether the End of the Creation is the glory of God or the happiness of the creatures. BONAVENTURA gives the following opinion:—God's highest aim must be his own glory, for it is said, God created all things for himself; not as if it was necessary for him, or in order to increase his glory, but in order to reveal and communicate it, in which the highest well-being of his creatures consists. Thus there is no contradiction between the two Ends, but one is subordinate to the other. Should any one say that such a highest End is egoistic, the answer is, that it is one thing with God and another with the Creature; for in

\* See the *Liber Proverbiorum*, the section on the Son of God: *Qualibet divinarum rationum est principium per patrem in filio et per filium est medium et per spiritum sanctum est quies et finis. Id, propter quod spiritus sanctus non producit personam, est, ut appetitus cujuslibet rationis in illo habeat finem et quietem. Quia pater et filius per amorem se habent ad unum finem, ille finis est Spiritus Sanctus.*

† *Distinctio divinarum personarum est ut divinæ rationes non sint otiosæ de infinitate.*

‡ *Quia Deus est tantum Deus per agere, quam per existere, habet in sua essentia distinctas personas. Nulla substantia potest esse sine distinctione; sine distinctione non esset quidquam.*

God there is no distinction between the general and the particular good; he is the original basis of all Good and of the highest Good. If He, from whom all other goodness is derived, were not to perform all his acts on account of himself, the effect that proceeded from him would not be truly good. Since the use of the creatures depends altogether on their relation to the Supreme Good, everything proceeds from the love of God, since he makes all things tend towards himself. Should any one say that it belongs to all creatures to seek their own well-being, we answer, that a twofold tendency in creatures must be noted; first, there is Nature in its perverted state, according to which it makes itself the centre; secondly, there is the perfect nature of created Nature in its original State, which rises above itself to God, and seeks the honour of God more than its own private advantage. What is the highest end of Creation must also be the same for human actions. BONAVENTURA endeavoured to prove how this end could only be realized by rational creatures. It is true that in all creatures there is an unconscious Revelation of God, but the Image of God is only in the rational. Since God is the highest Light and the Supreme Goodness, he has created all things for the communication of Himself. A perfect Revelation would be impossible, if there were not beings who understood it. Rational creatures are requisite for all; hence all other creatures are related not immediately to God, but only through the medium of rational Beings.

THOMAS AQUINAS regards the beginning of Creation as an object of Faith; we cannot prove it by argument nor refute the Eternity of Creation, for even by this the divine Causality is not denied, since we might regard God's act of Creation as not a successive act performed in time; and the Universe, although it had always been, is not to be considered eternal like God, but as in the succession of an infinite series of moments of Time.\*

#### 4. THE DOCTRINES OF PROVIDENCE, THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNIVERSE, AND MIRACLES.

It was ABELARD's endeavour, which was carried on to a greater length by the Schoolmen of this age, to connect the idea of

\* Summa, P. 1, qu. 46, art. 2.—Esse divinum est esse totum simul absque successione; non autem sic est de mundo.

Miracle with an all-comprehensive divine plan of the Universe, and to point out the Harmony between the Natural and the Supernatural. They noticed and refuted many things which have been brought forward in later times on the side of the Rationalists against the admission of Miracles. ALBERTUS MAGNUS says:—As in Nature it is the same power which produces the creatures and guides the development of each individual, and the influence of which extends over their whole Organism and their individual members, the Power which binds the whole and the parts together, so there is in the Creator the same power by which he created the World, which appoints each individual his place, and guides all things in due connexion, so that each corresponds to its own Standpoint. If we consider it as it is in God, we describe it as Providence, that is, the original *forma* and *ratio* in the divine Reason, by which all things are conducted to their proper End. But if we consider it as active in the Creation, in its presentation in the development of the Universe, as the order of the Universe which proceeds from that Archetype, as though it were embodied in the Creation, and as active in the connexion of the development of natural objects and free agents, we call it *fatum*. Providence, the *ordo rerum in mente*, is the *exemplar*; *fatum* is the *exemplatum*. This idea does not necessarily include that of unconditional necessity, but only states the divine order of the Universe as phenomenal.

ALEXANDER of HALES attributed to *fatum* the effects proceeding from Free Will. Fate (according to him) is a higher law which guides the working together of all causes in the phenomenal world, and to it belong also the free causes, the effects of which harmonize with those of natural causes in a manner corresponding to their peculiar character. The effects of Free Will are only prevented from transgressing the bounds of Providence. On the relation of God to Evil he says, God knows the Good as well as the Evil, as if the Light which could see itself and its effects, would know that one thing is receptive of light, and another not so. God has permitted Evil in order that the beauty of Goodness might shine forth more clearly, and be so much more illustrious. This agreed with the older theory of Evil as a foil of Good. But ALBERT MAGNUS took a different view. The Will of God, he says, is in the whole arrangement of efficient causes that which leads

and impels all the others to effect that which he wills. Without this God would not be present in all efficient causes and in all events; but he is, potentially, present in them, and communicates to them power and form. In this connexion the doctrine of Miracles is peculiarly modified; the question is, how anything could happen *supra* and *contra naturam*. He distinguishes the different meanings of the term *Nature*, which sometimes signifies the unchangeable law of Providence, whereby everything is led to its destined end; against Nature in this sense God can do nothing, else he would contradict himself.\* But Nature also signifies the Law, by which the whole Creation is guided, in order to fulfil God's Council, the *dispositio obedientialis*. Nature in this sense is related to the former, as *fatum* is to *Providentia*, as the copy in the phenomenal world is to the connexion of the Archetypal Order of the Universe in the Divine Mind. Nature also in this sense represents a Divine Law, against which God can do nothing without contradicting himself. But the term is also used in a third sense of the common course of Nature, which is only a part of Nature in the second sense, and in relation to this something may be admitted which is *contra naturam* and a miracle. Further, he lays down principles which are founded in the divine Word, and are patterns for all that exists, according to which everything is framed, and which determine when and how all things must be brought into existence, the *causæ primordiales*. Upon them rests everything which comes to pass in the works of Nature and of Grace, or in the kingdom of Glory, or according to the common course of Nature. If we look at these original causes of the first Creation, God also in this respect has done nothing against the original course of Nature, for he has placed in them the causes of the Miracles which are to take place in the course of development.† What we call Miracle, and what Nature effects, all serve equally for the realization of the

\* *Potentia sive rationes sive virtutes ad miracula non sunt inditæ materiæ mundi, nisi per potentiam obedientiæ, per rationes autem causales in Deo sunt. Sicut non potest facere contra seipsum ita non potest facere contra rationes illas et contra opus suum sapienter dispositum.*

† *Quod Deus non faciat contra legem naturæ æquissimam et naturalissimam, quam ipse naturæ indidit, sed contra consuetum et nobis notum cursum naturæ.*

eternal divine Idea. But in the connexion in which we speak of a Miracle we must distinguish between the *contra naturam*, which, as to its seed and germ, is not contained in Nature;\* and the *præter Naturam*, which indeed does not contradict, but which, according to the course of Nature, would only follow in gradual development, and now arises suddenly through a higher operation, an accelerated process of Nature;† and lastly, *supra Naturam*, the summit of the Wonderful, whereby Nature is brought to a higher stage and perfected, as, for example, in the Incarnation and Redemption.‡

THOMAS AQUINAS distinguishes the *ordo rerum*, as far as it depends on the first cause, and is in the divine Reason. In relation to this God can do nothing contrary to the Order of Things, else he would contradict his own Will. But if we regard the *ordo rerum* as far as it depends on the qualities of subordinate causes, God can do something *præter ordinem*, since He is not subject to the cosmical connexion of causes, but rather the order of the Universe which depends upon it, has been appointed by his free Will, and proceeds from Him. In relation to the divine Omnipotence nothing can be called a miracle, only in relation to the powers of Nature.§ A miracle in an absolute sense is what happens *præter ordinem* of all created Nature.|| But since we do not know all its powers we call that a miracle which happens contrary to the Order known to us, and this is a Miracle in a relative sense.

##### 5. PREDESTINATION AND PRESCIENCE.

THE Augustinian doctrine of Predestination had the ascendancy in this age of Scholasticism, yet a departure from it was gradually prepared by ALEXANDER of HALES, and more was ascribed to Free Will. Yet ALBERTUS MAGNUS and THOMAS AQUINAS maintained more logically than AUGUSTIN an unconditional necessity, without running into the extravagancies of

\* Quod seminaliter non inest in ipso.

† Hoc quod secundum ordinem naturæ paulatim operantis prodineretur, velocius et repente producit.

‡ Quod in potestate naturæ nullo modo potest esse et tamen ad naturam se habet ut perfectio naturæ.

§ Dicitur aliquid miraculum per comparisonem ad facultatem naturæ, quam excedit.—Summa, i. qu. 105, art. 8.

|| Hæc proprie miracula, quasi in se ipsis et simpliciter mira.

the Predestinations which were so injurious to the religious feelings. Their skill in Dialectics rendered it possible for them to escape the dangerous consequences. For that purpose they invented a number of distinctions which have since been generally received. They distinguished between a *necessitas consequentia* and a *necessitas consequentis*, a *necessitas ordinis*, and a *necessitas rei*, that which existed on the supposition of a certain connexion, and that which was necessary in itself, or a hypothetical and an absolute necessity. ALBERT says:—Whatever God knows beforehand in an immutable manner may still be mutable in its actual appearance; at once necessary and free. We must only distinguish the necessity as far as anything is known beforehand by God, in a certain connexion, and the absolute necessity as far as we contemplate the phenomenon in itself. Nothing evil can come from God; he, as the Supreme Good, can only be a Source of good. Everything created by God is good, and so far tends to good. The capability of turning aside and the actual aversion comes not from God, but from the Creature, and so far is created from nothing. When the Supreme Cause communicates existence and the power of acting, and the Second cause by virtue of its mutability turns away from the influence of the Supreme Cause, a disturbance ensues of what was originally good, which is evil. Thus the architectonical art imparts to the hand of the workman the tendency to make a straight line; but if his hand trembles the straight line is not drawn, although the tendency proceeded from the Art. By this definition the free Will may be considered as a certain form in which the divine Will is accomplished. But more of of Necessity is implied when he says:—The divine Will is the first in the whole succession of efficient causes, by which it moves and guides to effect what God wills and as he wills it. Since ALBERT proceeds on the assumption that God's eternal acting is not conditioned by temporal causes, he regards it as of the essence of the Catholic Faith that Predestination is founded only in the acting of the predestinating God, and not from without. The ground of it is the Divine Love, in virtue of which he chose before the Creation certain persons to Salvation; although they were not yet brought into existence they were always present as predestinated. To the

divine act equally belongs the rejection from God's presence (*abjectio*), and the drawing of divine Grace in Time.

The Monism of THOMAS AQUINAS is expressed in the most unqualified terms. He asks, whether God knows Evil, and affirms it. He knows Evil as he knows the Good and wills the Good; not as if God's knowing were the cause of Evil,\* although it is the cause of the Good by which Evil is known. He has produced all things in order to communicate his Goodness to created Beings, and to represent himself to them by means of it. Because he could not be represented by any one creature he has brought them forth numerous and diversified.† Hence the Universe has a greater share in the divine goodness than individuals. But it belongs to the completeness of divine Revelation that it must include all the stages of perfection, and hence also creatures which are good in such a way that it is possible for them to fall away from Goodness. But it is founded on the nature of things that what may possibly fall away from God, at some time actually falls away. The whole series of created Beings is better and more complete, if there are some creatures in it who really fall away from Goodness.‡ Without this Evil, much that is good would not be realized, and therefore God did not prevent the Fall. Consequently Evil appears necessary for the exhibition of the divine harmony of the Universe. But in order not to ascribe the causality of Evil to God, AQUINAS distinguishes Evil into *positive* and *negative*. All in the evil act that belongs to existence

\* Unde patet, quod malum, quod est deviat a forma et a fine, non causatur a scientia Dei.—Sentent. i. dist. 38, qu. 1, art. i.

† Produxit res inesse, propter suam bonitatem communicandam creaturis et per eas representandum, et quia per unam creaturam sufficientur presentari non potest, produxit multas creaturas et diversas, ut quod deest uni ad representandam divinam bonitatem, suppleatur ex alia, nam bonitas quæ in Deo est simpliciter et uniformiter, in creaturis est multipliciter et divisim, unde perfectius participat divinam bonitatem et representat eam totum universum quam alia quæcunque creatura.—P. i. qu. 47, art. i.

‡ Et inde est, quod ad completionem universi requiruntur diversi gradus rerum, quarum quædam altum et quædam infirmum locum teneant in universo. Et ut uniformitas graduum conservetur in rebus, Deus permittit aliqua mala fieri ne multa bona impediatur.—I. 23, 5. Ipsa autem natura rerum hoc habet, ut quæ deficere possunt, quandoque deficiant.—48, 2.

and acting in the proper sense of the term is to be referred to God as the original cause ; but the *negative*, the *defectus*, is not produced by God, but proceeds from the defect in the Second Cause,\* for where many causes are arranged together the last Effect does not necessarily proceed immediately from the first, but from the nearest cause, since, according to its nature, the power of the first is received into the second. Everything is subject to Divine Providence, but not all in the same way. One part of his creatures God has so constituted, that they attain their end by a natural necessity, but to others he has added besides this principle, that of the Will. Thus the divine Providence operates through both, but in each according to its kind. God's knowledge of the salvation of Men AQUINAS supposes not to be conditioned by the knowledge of the quality of their works, since he does not arrive at the knowledge of effects through subordinate causes, but through himself. It corresponds with this unconditionality of the divine knowledge, not to distinguish in God between what proceeds from Free Will and what proceeds from Predestination. Divine Providence produces its effects through the effects of subordinate causes, so that the same thing may be accomplished equally by Predestination and by Free Will. Whatever happens is not necessary in order that Predestination may be accomplished, but because the Order which the divine Wisdom has appointed is maintained. Free Will, therefore, according to AQUINAS, is not a power of self-determination which must be traced back to the will itself, but is one of the forms in which the Divine decrees are realized. God operates in all beings, he says, but so that every\* being is active according to the peculiar constitution given it at its Creation. In natural things he operates so as to give them power for action ; in Beings possessed of Free Will, so that he communicates the power for action, and at the same time where he operates the Free Will is active.† But the destiny and aim of the act remain in the divine Will. Thus God operates in the Free Will according to its need and peculiar con-

\* Et similiter quicquid est entitatis et actionis in actione mala redicatur in Deum sicut in causam ; sed quod est ibi defectus, non causatur a Deo, sed ex causa secunda deficiente.

† Ut virtutem agendi sibi ministret et ipso operante liberum arbitrium agat.



stitution ; and even when he transforms it, it is in such a way that Man freely does that for which the tendency is given him, and suffers no compulsion.\* Man, therefore, believes that he is free. It would involve a contradiction to say that a man does not will that for which a direction is given to his Will. He sets aside the difficulties of Predestination by a comparison ; we can as little ask why this or that person is predestinated as in natural things any reason can be given why, since one substance lies at the basis of everything, one portion of it exhibits itself as Fire, another as Water, since God from the beginning has ordained these things ; it depends on the divine Will, as it depends on the Will of the builder that this stone should occupy a certain place, this or that in the Wall.† He distinguished a twofold mode of viewing things in reference to Necessity and Contingency.‡ God knows all things as present,§ and by virtue of this presence everything is necessary in his sight. But Succession and Contingency belong to Time, and as far as we contemplate things in relation to Time they appear subject to Accident and Contingency.

RAYMUND LULLI shows great profundity and acuteness in his treatment of this doctrine, but he also failed in the attempt to maintain freedom in the face of his speculations. He says :—The World and all its parts are from Eternity through the ideas in the Divine Reason, and in this respect the Universe was *One*. Nevertheless when God created the World, he did not place any part of the ideal Existence out of himself, else the idea would have undergone a change, which was impossible, because God himself is the Idea.|| But he willed to create out of nothing what he had with himself from Eternity through the idea.¶ God's creating and upholding agency are only to be distinguished as immediate

\* *Etiamsi voluntatem hominis in aliud mutet, nihilo minus tamen hoc sua omnipotentia facit, ut illud, in quod mutatur, voluntarie velit.*  
—Sentt. i. 25, 1, 3.

† *Summa, i. 23, 5.*

‡ *Sunt futura contingentia, suis causis proximis comparata.*

§ *Ejus intuitus fertur ab æterni supra omnia prorit sunt in sua præsentialitate.*

|| *Idea esset alterata et non æterna, quod est impossibile quum idea sit Deus.*

¶ *Sed divina voluntas voluit quod de nihilo esset creatum hoc, quod ab æterno habuit per ideam.*

and mediate agencies ; but everything is to be referred back to his creative Act, whether he operates immediately, or mediately through the Creatures.\* The mediating instrument is here the *vis conservativa* in things themselves, which everything coming from without serves to aid and excite. He applies the distinction of immediate and mediate agency to the doctrine of Predestination. The Predestinated, he says, is God himself according to the Idea, for the Idea and God are the same.† This Predestination is, therefore, infallible and unchangeable. But as far as Predestination relates to Man created in Time, it is something new, something which has a beginning ; and although the newly-created Man is not in his essence different from the Ideal Man, yet he is different as phenomenal, as far as he stands in the Form of quantity, space, and time. Here God does not operate immediately and necessarily, but mediately through the agency of Man. He predestinated PETER by virtue of the merits of his good works, as he gives warmth by means of the Sun and fire. RAYMUND denies that Predestination is a compulsory thing ; this would be at variance with the divine Wisdom and rectitude. But yet for God everything is necessary which is developed in Time, and the possibility that it should happen otherwise is only an assumption arising from the weakness of abstract thought ; thus at the basis of his System there is the same necessity as in that of THOMAS AQUINAS.

#### b. ANTHROPOLOGY.

##### OF MAN'S ORIGINAL STATE, THE FALL AND ITS CONSEQUENCES.

THE distinction made by the earlier Schoolmen between what was founded in the original constitution of Man and what was added by Grace, so that in a certain sense grace was necessary even in the primeval state,—was held by the Theologians of this Period. They also deduced the necessity of Grace from

\* Et quia creatio ita est per creare creaturam, quæ conservat aliam creaturam, sicut est per creare illam creaturam conservatam, ergo sequitur, quod creatio et conservatio sint idem.

† Una prædestinatio, quæ est Deus, et alia prædestinatio, quæ est effectus et in novo subjecto sustentata et creata, et hoc sine mutatione divini intellectus, qui non mutatur per suum effectum, quum suus effectus non sit novus in quantum in ea, sed est novus quoad se ipsum, quum ex nihil de novo sit productus.

the general relation of Man to God. They attached a twofold meaning to the idea of Grace in this relation ; they so termed the divine *concursus*, which relates to all creatures, generally ; from this is to be distinguished the special *concursus*, which fits Man to accomplish what he is not competent for, with only the assistance of the general *concursus*. When the relation of Nature to Grace is treated of, the *concursus* in the higher sense is intended. These theologians understood by Grace a quality imparted to the Soul, a *donum infusum*, and distinguished in its operations a certain communication which the grace coming from without brings, but which is limited to separate endowments, such as working miracles and Prophecy, but which does not presuppose the existence of the divine life as an animating principle—the *dispositio ad salutem* is still wanting. This is the *gratia gratis data*. On the other hand, the communication by which a peculiar divine impress, a permanent divine life, *gratia* as a *habitus* is bestowed on Man, whereby he becomes acceptable to God, is the *gratia gratum faciens*, and identical with Salvation, the *salus ipsa*. ALEXANDER of HALES defines the *gratia gratis data* as the gift which is communicated to rational Creatures, in order to make them capable, as far as depends on this gift, to labour for the eternal salvation and improvement of others. It is the more remote preparation for salvation, mere dead faith, knowledge without life. Through the *gratia gratum faciens* salvation itself is added.

An objection was made to the views of the Schoolmen, which they did not leave unnoticed. Why, it was asked, if every other being is furnished with everything requisite for fulfilling its destiny—why must a higher grace be added to human nature? ALEXANDER of HALES replied,—This is owing to the higher nature and destiny of Man, which transcend the limits of Earth. He is created for assimilation to God, for an end which lies above the powers of all created beings. On this account a higher Element must be added, the divine life, which restores this assimilation. Only by the congenial the congenial can be produced.

BONAVENTURA says :—As light is an influence which makes the bodies that assimilate themselves to it resemble the source of light, so is Grace an influence of the divine Spirit, by which Man is assimilated to this its source. He connects with this

what he had assumed to be the highest end of Creation,\* that God had created all things for his own glorification in his self-revelation, which presupposes the existence of rational creatures, who would be capable of appreciating the Supreme Good, and employing all other good things for that end. The *Vestigia Dei* are in all Nature, but the *Imago Dei* only in Man. The position of Man in the Universe not only shows that he is capable of communion with God, but also that God can reveal and communicate himself to him in this manner. From his origin he carries with him the light of the divine countenance.† On the other hand, his Reason is in harmony with Nature; in it the whole Universe is, as it were, contained, is inscribed upon it, and so planned as to be represented in it. As the whole Universe represents God in a sensuous totality, so rational creatures represent Him in a spiritual totality in the Form of Spirit.‡ Bonaventura distinguishes between the *imago* and *similitudo* of God in Man, and makes the former consist in the intellectual qualities,§ the latter in those of the disposition or the heart.|| by virtue of which only communion with God can be realized.

THOMAS AQUINAS represents God as the *primus motor*, as the Cause from which all effects are to be derived. In one respect everything True and Good is to be derived from God, but we must distinguish what rests upon the powers imparted at Creation, and what is derivable from the Grace afterwards added. Of this the whole World presents analogies; everywhere we have to distinguish what lies in the structure of a Being according to its original Creation, and the operations for which a Being is capacitated by the addition of a new Principle. There are certain actions of Water which take place according to the qualities of its nature as created; there are others which are not produced till the new power of fire is added.

\* Summa, ii, 16, 1.

† Propter hoc fert in se a sua origine lumen vultus divina.

‡ Quia rationalis creatura et intellectus quiddammodo est omnia, et omnia nata sunt ibi scribi et imprimi omniumque similitudines depingi, ideo, sicut totum universum repræsentat Deum in quadam totalitate spiritali, nata alia in se spiritaliter continere.

§ Virtus cognitiva, potentia cognoscendi.

|| Virtus affectiva, potentia diligendi, qualitas in qua principaliter assimilatur anima Deo, est in voluntate sive affectione.

What relation do the *pura naturalia* bear to *gratia*? The answer to this question is important as it regards the doctrine of Man's Original State and his Freedom. With it is connected the determination of the question whether the *justitia originalis* is necessary for realizing the destiny of Man, or whether it is only added accidentally, for on this depend different conclusions respecting Original Sin. The distinction is particularly important, whether the *dona naturalia* and the *dona gratiæ* are to be distinguished only in thought, so that both existed equally from the beginning in the *justitia originalis*, or whether Man was created at first, and first received the *dona gratuita* in consequence of the *dona naturalia* having been employed according to his Free Will, so that the attainment of them was preceded by a *meritum* on Man's part. According to such a view ALEXANDER OF HALES supposed Man to be created first in his *puris naturalibus*, and then the higher development of Nature follows by the *informatio per gratiam*. According to this view Man needed grace from the beginning, but it was to be attained by the determination of his Will. The original relation of the latter to Nature is distinguished from the present in this respect, that it required Grace only for its higher culture, not for its transformation. Man in relation to Grace was *informis negative*, without the higher form of life, but not *informis privative*, as he was after the Fall. Hence *gratia* is *informans*, not *reformatans*. THOMAS AQUINAS proceeds on the general assumption that matter and the Form of things were created together, but were brought to perfection gradually in Time. Man indeed was created first of all in *puris naturalibus*; but these pure natural powers could not be inoperative, but from the beginning must turn to God according to their destiny,\* and thus Man acquired Grace, which was indispensably requisite for the *originalis justitia*. Man possessed the *rectitudo primistatus*; he was in every respect such as his destiny required.† Reason acted in subordination to God. But the harmonious relation to him was not founded merely in Nature, but Grace is requisite for it. Man needed from the beginning

\* In Sentt. ii. 29, 1, 2.—Quum homo creatus fuerit in naturalibus integris, quæ otiosa esse non poterant, in primo instanti creationis ad Deum conversus, gratiam consecutus est.

† Summa, i. 95, 1.

*Gratia* as *forma superaddita*, in order to complete those operations for which his own nature was not sufficient. AQUINAS therefore adopted the first view, which only admitted an intellectual distinction.

The difference between Nature and Grace was also expressed by a double Standpoint of love to God. BONAVENTURA thus expressed the distinction :—There is a standpoint of Love to God which is grounded in the original Constitution of a rational nature as far as it belongs to the Essence of all created Beings to subordinate themselves to the whole, and God is the Being to whom the whole of Creation refers itself. Hence, even on the Standpoint of pure Nature, Self-love must be subordinate to the love of God. In a fallen State the Will of the Creature has taken a direction by which Man withdraws himself from God, and substitutes himself for the Supreme Good. On the Standpoint of mere Nature, among the Heathen, there was a Love which tended to subordinate the interest of the individual to the general weal ; but the Standpoint of Christian *caritas* goes still farther ; it is a Love which regards the supernatural destiny of Man. This communion with God as the Supreme Good is something supernatural ; it is not founded in the powers of Nature.

DUNS SCOTUS proceeds in the track of ALEXANDER OF HALES. In order to withdraw the will of a rational creature from all subordinate pleasure, something must be given to it which attracts it with greater power than all the pleasures of his lower Nature ; and as such an object is not given in the natural Will, something supernatural is required for the Will by which the end of its destiny is rendered more attractive for it than created things can be. This is, therefore, a *donum supernaturale*, and is required for *justitia originalis*. This view led to the statement, that lust or desire was implanted in the *pura naturalia*, and was only checked by a power from without. According to the pure Christian view, human Nature can only reach its destiny through the divine life by which it is filled ; but here the case is represented as if human Nature must be potentiated through the Divine coming to it from without, which we must regard as something supernatural and superhuman ; the germ, therefore, of the tendency which has such important consequences in Catholicism. If the antagonism

of Sensuousness against Reason were only held back by an outward restraint, *justitia originalis* would also be something given from without, and the immediate consequence would be that the disposition towards Sin existed already in the *pura naturalia*. Hence DUNS SCOTUS says there is no distinction between the Standpoint of the *pura naturalia* and the *justitia originalis*; it commences with the transgression of Duty. This mode of thought is allied to the ancient distinction between human Virtue and the divine Life which exerted its influence on Dogmatics and Morals. Hence arose the ascetic tendency in the morals of the Schoolmen, the doctrine of the *consilia evangelica* as superhuman perfection, the contrast of the Cardinal and the Theological Virtues, while the Christian principle is nothing else than the restoration and perfection of human nature. If, as according to the view taken by AQUINAS, Nature and Grace were united from the beginning, and are only intellectually separated, certainly the conclusion that in consequence of the Fall pure Nature only is left, is in a great measure checked, for AQUINAS also admits a deterioration of Nature by the forfeiture of Grace.

The doctrine of Original Sin is conditioned by the doctrine of the Original State of Man.

The CATHARISTS maintained that a Soul of divine descent, a higher Spirit, banished by Satanael to a body, was in the first man. From this one all human souls descended, and hence came Sin. Thus the propagation of Original Sin, the Unity of Mankind, and the relation of Redemption to all may be explained.

AQUINAS combated the view of the Traducians, according to which Sin was transferred by propagation, for this would not explain the participation in guilt. Mankind must be regarded as an ethical person, and so far Adam's Sin was the sin of all men. In original Sin AQUINAS recognised two elements, one privative, the other positive. The first was the loss of the Harmony of original righteousness; the second consisted in an *inordinata dispositio*, a discordance which took place between Reason and Sensuousness, and in a *languor naturæ*. DUNS SCOTUS, on the contrary, regarded it only as *privatio*; it was the loss of that Grace which repressed the strife that is founded in man's sensuous nature, and preserved harmony.

In connexion with the doctrine of Original Sin must be

noticed the relation of the VIRGIN MARY to the universal sinfulness. THOMAS AQUINAS did not hold with the doctrine of her Immaculate Conception.\* He says :—In the Holy Scriptures we find nothing more than that the Mother of Christ was honoured by Grace before all others. On some individuals, as Elijah and Jeremiah, the distinction was bestowed of being sanctified from their birth ; and this was true also of Mary, who was purified from her personal sin, but not from the guilt that is attached to human nature universally, for this would have encroached on the prerogative of Christ as the common Redeemer. Nor is the Feast of the *immaculata conceptio* a proof to the contrary, for this was only introduced because it cannot be determined at what time her Purification took place. The predisposition to sin (*fomes peccati*) was indeed not extirpated, but was restrained by the superabundant grace which she received in her sanctification. The habitual Original Sin did not become actual Sin, since the operations of grace repressed the evil inclinations which existed in the constitution of the Soul, and preserved her sensuousness from every irregular movement ; but after the birth of Christ she became altogether freed from the *fomes peccati*.† DUNS SCOTUS, on the contrary, maintained the *conceptio immaculata*, and established it in the following manner.‡ As Christ is the universal Redeemer and most perfect mediator, it follows that in reference to one person he exercises this Mediatorship in the most perfect manner ; accordingly, she was not only freed from Sin, but preserved from all Sin, actual as well as original. Mary is not thereby placed on a level with Christ, but God anticipated the effect of original Sin in her, as when fire is brought near inflammable matter, and yet this is not burnt. Yet in pronouncing his judgment he expresses himself problematically and temperately ; God could effect either that she should never, or only for an instant, or for a long time be encumbered with original Sin, and at last be freed from it. Which of these three actually came to pass only God knows. Yet his arguments paved the way for the doctrine which was afterwards expressed more strongly by RAYMUND LULLI. When

\* Summa, p. iii. q. 27, art. 1.

† Credendum est, quod ex prole redundaverit in matrem totaliter fomite subtracto.

‡ In Sentent. iii. dist. 3, quæst. i. § 9.



the birth of Christ took place, and it was requisite that Mary should be a worthy organ of it, she must have been born free from original Sin.\*

## C. THE DOCTRINE OF THE REDEEMER AND HIS WORK.

### 1. THE OBJECTIVE SIDE.

THE question whether the Sinlessness of Christ consisted in a *non posse peccare* or in a *posse non peccare* was decided by DUNS SCOTUS in favour of the latter; but yet it was only in a certain connexion that he placed the possibility, and without mingling the actual weakness of Christ's human nature, like THEODORE of MOPSUESTIA. The human Nature of Christ, he says, could in and by itself sin (*de se erat possibilis peccare*), since it was endowed with Free Will, and this can incline itself to Evil or to Good; but in union with the divine nature it was at the same time so confirmed in goodness, that it became sinless. He also believed that the sensuous impulses of human nature must be admitted to exist in Christ as far as *concupiscentia* necessarily forms part of a sensuous nature. But it belongs to the essence of a rational nature that the *concupiscentia* is adjusted according to the measure and order of reason, and this we assume to be the case in Christ.

Many discussions arose out of the question whether Redemption was to be considered as taking place only on account of Sin, and therefore as the Restoration of the fallen human race, or whether it would have taken place had there been no sin, and hence whether this union of God with human nature was necessary for the harmony of the Universe. These questions were variously answered according as the Work of Redemption was contemplated on the negative or the positive side, as simply a realization of the destiny of Man, or as a restoration from the Fall. BONAVENTURA regards the positive view as more in accordance with the judgment of Reason, the negative more in agreement with Scripture, since it regards the restoration of the human race as the cause and

\* Nisi beata virgo fuisset disposita, quod filius Dei de ipsa assumeret carnem, scilicet quod non est corrupta nec in aliquo peccato sive actuali sive originali, filius Dei non potuisset ab ipsa assumere carnem, cum Deus et peccatum non possunt concordari in aliquo subjecto.

end of the Incarnation of God. Also in this way the interests of piety are more firmly supported, for otherwise God appears dependent on the perfection of the Universe, since the necessity is assumed that without this union of God with Man God's works cannot attain to their perfection; but God is exalted above the Universe. An incitement to devout feeling is contained also in our knowing that God became Man, in order to free Men from Sin. Lastly, as the Incarnation of God is a transcendent fact, it presupposes a want on the other side which it has to make good. AQUINAS on this question points out\* that what is founded only on the will of God, independently of all merit on the part of the creature, is made known to us only by the Scriptures as the revelation of the divine Will. From that source alone we learn that the Incarnation was designed to be a remedy for sin. Had Man not sinned he would only have needed inward illumination; but since through Sin he has sunk down into sensuousness, God must present salvation to him through a sensuous medium. For the perfection of the Universe, the natural relation of the Creation to God would be sufficient as the end of all. But the personal union of the Creature with the Creator passes beyond the limits of Nature, and transcends the perfection which belongs to its original Constitution, so that human Nature, since God makes Evil subservient to Good, is raised after Sin to a higher stage.† DUNS SCOTUS, on the contrary, says:—The glorification of the human Nature of Christ in union with the divine Essence is supreme, and it is not probable that this could be made to depend on anything subordinate, such as the Sin of Mankind. Therefore, apart from this, and for his own sake, was his Incarnation made a part of the scheme of Creation.

RAYMUND LULLI likewise pointed out that from the beginning it had been the end of Creation; the Incarnation of God can certainly be traced to no other cause than the divine Will, but it is required by the Creation. This is a work of free Love; yet that being once granted, we recognise its highest perfection to consist in God's entering into this union with the

\* Summa, iii. 1, 3.

† Ad perfectionem universi sufficit, quod naturali modo creatura ordineretur in Deum, sicut in finem. Hoc, autem excedit limites perfectionis nature, ut creatura uniatur Deo in persona.

Creature. On this rests at the same time his highest glorification, and we cannot say that it was only brought about by Sin, but rather that God owed it to himself.\* After Sin the Incarnation was necessary, in order that the end for which the World was created might not be nullified, but be accomplished, in spite of the derangement.†

Further, the Schoolmen discussed whether the necessity of the method in which Redemption was effected by Christ could be proved. AQUINAS maintained that there was no absolute proof for it. Since Redemption proceeded from the free Will of God, it sufficed to prove that this method was not impossible, and that it was suitable. Supposing that Man had been redeemed by an Angel, his perfect restoration could not have been effected, for Man would have remained dependent on a creature. The visible appearance of God was necessary, in order that Man might be led from the visible to the knowledge and love of the invisible. Setting out from the contemplation of the divine Omnipotence, other possible modes of Redemption might be imagined, but this method must have ever been the most suitable. On the other hand, if regard be had to Man's standpoint, no other method was possible than that which was chosen by God, since Man by himself alone could render no satisfaction. If the relations to God and Man are combined, it must be allowed that another method of Redemption was possible, but none so suitable as this. The union of God with Man must give Man the strongest assurance of attaining the highest happiness, which consists in immediate union with God. Men might have easily been led to despair by the consciousness of the breach between themselves and God. But since Redemption has been effected, the longing after Salvation is far stronger, and Men have acquired a new consciousness of the dignity of their nature. Hence from this time they have desisted from the worship of all created beings. In these ends AQUINAS found the importance of the work of Redemption. As he here joins his own ideas with those of ANSELM, he agrees also with him in the opinion that the satisfaction rendered by Christ furnished what was requisite from its intrinsic worth. Like ANSELM, he proceeds on the principle that for an injury something must be given which

\* *Alias Deus non solveret debitum sibi ipsi et suis dignitatibus.*

† *Ut satisfaceret illi fini, ad quem mundus fuit creatus.*

the injured party would value as high as, or higher than, what had been lost by the injury. Christ's Satisfaction is not only *sufficiens*, but *superabundans*. If we find elsewhere the various instrumentalities of grace scattered, such as the offices of Law-giver, Priest, and King, all these are united in Christ, the fountain of all Grace. He is the Mediator between God and Men, as far as he communicates what is divine to them, intercedes for them, and makes satisfaction for their sins. Christ is not like one single person, but the mystical head of the members which belong to him, inasmuch as what he has done is for their benefit.

On the other hand, in INNOCENT III. we find no trace of ANSELM's views. Expressing himself popularly, he revived the ancient notion of satisfaction given to Satan. The end of Redemption he places on the one hand in the Subjective, inasmuch as God by the Revelation of his love moved his enemies to love, and reduced pride to humility. But he also connected with it an objective importance, and was the first who represented the Satisfaction of Christ as a reconciliation between the divine attributes of mercy and justice. The justice of God required the adequate punishment of all, but his mercy would not permit this; hence God took upon himself the punishment which was due to his justice. This was the first assertion of the *satisfactio vicaria passiva* among the Schoolmen.\*

A modification of ANSELM's theory is given by WILLIAM of PARIS.† It holds good of spiritual as well as of bodily ills, that they are cured by their opposites.‡ In the first sin and all following sins, pride, disobedience, and cupidity were contained. Pride was in that the most conspicuous; hence Redemption must commence with its opposite; God the all-sufficient appeared in Christ, under the form of a servant. He submitted to the obedience which man ought to have rendered, and assumed his poverty. This alone could be an adequate remedy, and an adequate satisfaction, and could only

\* *Modum invenit, per quem utrique satisfaceret tam misericordię quam justitię; judicavit igitur, ut assumeret in se pœnam pro omnibus et donaret per se gloriam universis.*—Sermo, i. fol. vi. ed. Colon. 1575.

† *De Causis cur Deus Homo.*

‡ Cap. 5.—*Quod contraria contrariis curantur tam in spiritualibus quam in corporalibus.*

be rendered by God as Man. The antagonism has been reconciled; through Love Man must be led to communion with God;\* hence God revealed his love by partaking of Man's nature, and of his sufferings. God must become Man, that Man may become God.†

DUNS SCOTUS differs from the above as the Representative of the more subjective view of the work of Redemption. According to this, the effects of Redemption do not stand in a necessary and adequate relation to it, so that according to its character and nature it must have this importance and produce these effects, but they follow because it pleased God, to annex Redemption to this price. Everything which is good, is good because God has willed it. Hence that merit has so much merit as God was pleased to attribute to it. When God had accepted it, it was so far necessary. He examines, what the sufferings of Christ could effect in themselves, and what according to the divine decree. It might be said;—Christ suffered for righteousness, for he had seen the sins of the Jews, and since he wished to convert them, and held it to be his duty, not to be silent upon it, the consequence of this was his death; he died for truth and righteousness. But in fact he really presented his sufferings to the Father for us; for if Man could have been redeemed in any other way, he was under so much greater obligations to God, since forgiveness was not necessary, and for this reason God had so redeemed Men in order thereby to excite them to love Him. According to his view, therefore, Redemption was not connected with the sufferings of Christ, *ex insito valore*, but because it so pleased God, *ex divina acceptilatione*. Possibly a good Angel or a Man begotten without sin might have served for the Redemption of Humanity, if God had been willing to adopt such a method. This difference in the doctrine of Satisfaction was kept up in the succeeding age.

## 2. THE SUBJECTIVE SIDE. APPROPRIATION OF THE WORK OF REDEMPTION.

THE essence of sanctification was everywhere regarded as

\* Quia amor amore convenientius accenditur, sicut ignis igne, decuit Deum amorem nostrum amore suo accendere.

† Quid mirum est, Deum esse factum hominem, participatione humanæ naturæ, ut homo ~~etiam~~ fieret Deus, congruenti sibi participatione deitatis.

founded in the disposition, in the inner Christian life. AQUINAS gives the following summary—Christ is our Head, inasmuch as He operates upon us by his merits; but the Head can only extend its influence to the members that are connected with it. Although Christ's merits are sufficient to cancel Sin, yet for that purpose, connexion with the Head is presupposed. The means of this are Faith and Love. Hence, he says, the merits of Christ have a being in the Soul according to its different powers; in reference to the *intellectus* by faith; to the *affectus*, the disposition, by Love; and to the conduct by the imitation of Christ. But these are only three different relations in which Man appropriates the merits of Christ. He defines Faith to be an act of the Spirit which assents to divine truth in virtue of the tendency imparted to the Spirit through the Will influenced by Divine Grace.\* He distinguishes between the theological and the ethical virtues, and reckons Faith among the former, as representing the peculiar Christian principle. Man required this new principle in order to become fit for the supernatural in his destiny. The theological Virtues have their first relation to the Intellect, which receives the principles imparted by Revelation, for they can be known only in the divine light; and this is effected through Faith. If the Will directs itself to the end presented by faith as attainable, the idea of Hope arises, and as far as a spiritual communion with that which constitutes the end of Humanity is required, the idea of Love is produced.†

We have remarked how the Schoolmen, after AUGUSTIN, conceived of *justificatio* not as objective justification, but a subjective sanctification of which faith is the instrument and which is realized in Love. AQUINAS thought the *infusio gratiæ justificantis* necessary for the forgiveness of sins on the part of God, and allowed successive steps in *justificatio*; first of all the communication of grace—then the tendency of the Free Will to God—then that by which it departs from Sin; and upon this, the forgiveness of sins. In the act of faith is contained the admission that Man is made righteous by the Redemption of Christ.

\* *Actus intellectus assentientis veritati divinæ ex imperio voluntatis a Deo motæ per gratiam.*—Summa, ii. 2, 1, 4.

† Neander, *Wissenschaftliche Abhandlungen*, Herausg. v. J. L. Jacobi, 1851, p. 42.

This subjective view of *Justificatio* had important consequences. The question arose, how could a Man have confidence that he had received the forgiveness of sins? ALEXANDER of HALES contended, that on this point there was a peculiar knowledge—since neither the cause nor the effect fell within the province of human knowledge; yet a certain feeling of knowledge might be possessed upon it;\* only it is not infallible, but verifies itself by experience in the feelings when these three signs concur, light, peace, and joy. God does not will either to give us complete certainty, or to leave us wholly in uncertainty. If Man experienced nothing of the sweetness of the divine life, he would not be attracted to the love of God; if he had perfect assurance it would easily seduce him into pride.

AQUINAS also is of opinion† that no one can have perfect certainty on the subject; only there are signs, if proper attention be paid, such as, that a man has his joy in God, that he despises the World, and is conscious of no gross sins. A presage may thus be formed of his forgiveness.

The consequence for the practical Christian life was that men were led to dwell too much on their subjective feelings; and hence the tendency to enthusiastic feelings and visions by which assurance was sought for. On the other hand this assurance was sought for in painful ascetic efforts, and there was danger of a onesided tendency to rely on external works. Hence it is evident, how important it was for practical Christianity that the Reformation appeared as a counteractive.

When the question was canvassed, what Man could do in order to be a partaker of grace, the idea of *meritum* was introduced. In this expression we must take account of the Latin *usus loquendi* which lies at its basis, and which does not always include the idea of merit. The Schoolmen distinguished between a *meritum de condigno* and a *meritum de congruo*. The former affirmed *merit* in the strict sense; and this cannot possibly exist in the relation of the creature to God, and for that reason the Schoolmen denied that Man

\* *Scientia affectus per experientiam rei in affectu.*

† *Nullus certitudinaliter potest scire se habere caritatem, sed potest aliquibus signis probabilibus conjicere.*—In libr. i. Sentt. dist. 17, qu. 1, art. 4.

could make himself worthy of divine Grace. But the *meritum de congruo* or *imputativum* is something different; this presupposes that God has connected the impartation of Grace with certain conditions. Here therefore is a relation of the impartation of grace which rests on the moral order of the World. When Man performs his part, on which according to this arrangement, grace depends, he earns this *meritum* as it may be called, though not in the proper sense of that term. Grace appears conditioned by the free susceptibility of Man. All the Schoolmen are agreed in presupposing a certain preparation, a preparatory form for the operation of grace. But the fundamental principle was carried out in various ways, and this difference forms one of the points of variance between the Franciscan and the Dominican Theologians.

ALEXANDER of HALES introduced a real deviation from the Augustinian type of doctrine. He always presupposes that Grace cannot be merited as a debt. All men are in the same lost state, but God in his love is willing to bless them by the communication of his grace. He has only affixed the condition that Man does what he is able to do according to the power of his free Will which still remains to him. God alone can make Man capable by his Grace, but if Man does his part, the divine preparative grace will be imparted to him. This communication of God's love surrounds him like a light, which shines everywhere, but there must be a susceptibility to receive it, and according to this its operation is determined. A rich man distributes alms,—one stretches out his hand, another does not; hence the preparatory grace is imparted to the one and not to the other.

On the other hand THOMAS AQUINAS, supposes no such condition depending on free self-determination, as appears from his work on Providence. He has certainly an assumption, formed according to the Aristotelian categories which affirms that no effect can ensue but on susceptible materials. Thus also the effect of Grace is realized only in a definite susceptibility, but this is referred exclusively to God's act from whom every impulse comes. Everything which is requisite to make men susceptible of Salvation, belongs also to the effects of Predestination. The consequences of his presuppositions lead further than AUGUSTIN, since according to them it neces-



sarily follows that even the Freedom of the first man before the Fall is not to be viewed in a manner different from this.

#### d. THE DOCTRINE OF THE SACRAMENTS.

THE Schoolmen were not satisfied with accepting the doctrine of the Sacraments as simply ordained, but wished to prove their necessity in the scheme of Christianity. They were especially led to these discussions by their conflict with those who attributed only a symbolical meaning to the Scripture Sacraments.

THOMAS AQUINAS regards the sufferings of Christ as the general cause of Salvation for men, but it needed special means in order to apply this universal cause to all single instances. The Sacraments are the means by which men are enabled to appropriate the blessed consequences of Christ's sufferings. They must be connected with visible signs, since it is consonant to human nature to ascend to the Spiritual through the Sensuous. And Providence takes care of all creatures in a manner suited to their nature. Moreover, Salvation must proceed from that part which is the seat of the disease. Man through sin has turned to the things of sense; the reaction must also proceed from the same quarter. Lastly, human activity relates peculiarly to sensuousness which easily leads to superstition; through the Sacraments a higher employment is given to sensuousness, and thereby that seduction is avoided. As the incarnation and sufferings of Christ took place in the sensible World, so also sensible means serve for their appropriation. AQUINAS endeavours to prove the necessity of the Seven Sacraments on the principle that the whole life should be consecrated to God's grace; its gradual development from birth to death was surrounded by the Sacraments. (i.) The birth of the spiritual life takes place in Baptism (ii.) The growth to maturity is through Confirmation (iii.) the nourishment of the spiritual life is through the Lord's Supper. If Man were bodily and spiritually sound throughout, he needs nothing more; but for the healing of his sickly state he requires (iv.) Penance; (v.) the promotion of his recovery by certain means is signified by Extreme Unction. Moreover it is of importance that Man should

receive religious consecration for the business of life; this for the spiritual life takes place in (vi.) Ordination, and for natural propagation (vii.) by Marriage.

The question was variously handled, how the divine co-operation in the Sacraments is to be conceived. According to one view, a divine agency and effect inheres to the Sacraments objectively, and the New Testament Sacraments are distinguished from those of the Old by communicating the Divine while the latter only indicated it. But the difficulty must occur, how this should be communicated to the sensible element, since there was a wish to guard against the deification of the objects of sense. It rendered the decision more difficult, that the Church doctrine had connected the efficacy of the Sacrament, the objective justification, with the outward operation, *ex opere operato*, and that the Schoolmen were obliged to admit this prevalent notion into their system.

ALEXANDER of HALES ascribed to the outward signs, a supernatural power communicated to them, a power which was wonderfully communicated to the corporeal *agens*. So far they are causes of Grace through the objective working, *ratione operis operati*, in contradistinction to that which proceeds from the subjective tendency of the disposition. Yet he adds the sentiment, that this effect is not to be ascribed to the outward element in itself, but to it as combined with the whole rite. A justifying power is indeed ascribed to the Sacraments in and for themselves, but yet God is the efficient cause from whom alone everything proceeds; the Priest is only the ministering Organ, and the Sacraments place Man in a condition to receive the divine communication.

AQUINAS combats a remarkable representation in which we recognise the reaction of a more liberal spirit against the Church views. To many it was a stumbling-block that the Sacraments should be regarded as *causæ gratiæ*; they wished only to affirm that God had connected the operation of his grace upon the soul with the condition of the rite, and that Grace accompanied the use of the Sacraments. As when a king wishes to distribute a treasure, and connects with the reception of it by each person the condition, that he should show a leaden penny, so the Sacraments stand in relation to grace. AQUINAS on the contrary vindicates the view held by the Church; that in the Old Testament the Sacraments are

only symbols of *gratia justificans*; and that in the New, God indeed is the *principalis causa gratiæ*, but the Sacraments are *causa instrumentalis*.

DUNS SCOTUS combats the view that the Sacraments are the signs of divine Grace, of Faith, of righteousness received, and designed as marks to excite the remembrance of that Grace; yet he does not altogether agree with AQUINAS. He maintains that the reception of the Sacraments cannot be called such an arrangement, to which by virtue of an inward necessity (*per formam intrinsecam*) the effect described is joined, but this effect is connected with the Sacraments by virtue of the agency of God which does not produce these effects according to an absolute but a hypothetical necessity, a relative necessity, grounded in the appointed divine power, inasmuch as God has resolved to connect his grace with this condition, and the Church is assured, that he is willing to communicate it to him who receives the Sacrament.

The Schoolmen ascribe a different effect to the different kinds of Sacrament. According to ALEXANDER of HALES it is twofold; 1. Certain Sacraments distinguish the receivers from all other persons by a distinct spiritual power; 2. Others operate by a reaction and free from indwelling sin. In reference to the first, the *impressio characteris* proceeds from the Sacrament, a phrase attributable to AUGUSTIN who thought that the mark of the *militia Christi* was impressed on a Christian at Baptism. ALEXANDER ascribes the effect of such a character to Baptism, Confirmation, and Ordination. He regarded it as an inherent power (*impressio perpetua*), which he inferred from the circumstance, that these Sacraments are not to be repeated.

AQUINAS assigns a twofold efficiency to them, considered as being an antidote to sin, and as imparting a capability for the worship of God. With the former no communication of character is connected, but there is with the second. Character is derived from a certain assimilation to the priesthood of Christ, and on that account is indelible. But still there is a threefold relation of the Sacrament to the *character spiritalis*, as far as this indicates a certain spiritual power which is adapted for what belongs to the worship of God. Here we have to notice the rite itself and the ability it confers whether as an

active or receptive Organ. Such a rite is the Lord's Supper, and with this no communication of such a character is connected; for this Sacrament does not confer ability on a man to accomplish anything else relating to the worship of God. But those Sacraments which imply a receptive or active capacity, communicate a character; Baptism in reference to the first; Confirmation and Ordination, in reference to the second.

#### 1. THE DOCTRINE OF THE LORD'S SUPPER.

THE doctrine of Transubstantiation in which it was believed that the miracle of the Incarnation was continually repeated and through which the dignity of the Priesthood by whom the miracle was performed reached its culmination, was so much the centre of the mediæval religious system, that it was the least doubted of any point. AQUINAS endeavoured to prove its necessity; either Christ must be present by a change of place, or since is this not admissible, by Transubstantiation. Only thus we can conceive of a real Presence of Christ and since the Host is adored, without Transubstantiation adoration would be paid to a created thing. We do not find the necessity of this doctrine so absolutely maintained by DUNS SCOTUS. In his judgment the language of the Bible might be understood to mean something else than Transubstantiation. For this meaning he gives no other reason than the decision of the Church as illuminated by the Holy Spirit, by which we must abide.

From recognising that this doctrine is not founded on the Holy Scriptures, men would be led to adopt a different view. It is remarkable that about A.D. 1264 a Master in the University of Paris\* addressed a letter to CLEMENT IV. in which he vindicated the University against the imputation which the pontiff himself is said to have expressed, that the opinion prevailed there that the Body of Christ was present at the Supper only in a symbolical sense.† Towards the close of the thirteenth century, a theologian, the Dominican JOHN of PARIS (called *pungens asinos*) who at the same time advocated the cause of his sovereign against BONIFACE VIII. distinguished himself as an opponent of the doctrine of Transub-

\* Boulaei Historia Universitatis Parisiensis, t. iii. pag. 374.

† *Esse sicuti signatum sub signo.*

stantiation. He attempted to prove against AQUINAS that a real Presence without Transubstantiation was conceivable, and maintained that the Bread and the Body of Christ stood in the same relation to each other as the two Natures in Christ. According to this view, all the predicates of the Body of Christ might be transferred to the Bread and Wine without giving offence; for example, in this sense it might be said the Body of Christ was broken; this view was also favoured by the words of the Institution. Yet he was not disposed absolutely to condemn the doctrine of Transubstantiation, in deference to the authority of the Pope and the Lateran Council of A.D. 1215. But in spite of this submission to the Church he was prohibited from reading and disputing in A.D. 1304.\*

As a consequence of the doctrine of Transubstantiation, the opinion was entertained that the Body of Christ was there even independently of the administration. Hence such questions were raised as, whether a mouse could partake of the Body of Christ, and much perplexity was felt in answering them. Many persons were shocked at such representations. BONAVENTURA says, However much may be urged in favour of this opinion, pious ears will dread to listen to it. Also INNOCENT III. in his treatise *De mysteriis Missæ*, expresses himself against the possibility of such a desecration. He says, As far as it relates to us, Christ's Body retains the resemblance to perishable food; but as to what concerns itself, it does not lose the reality of an indestructible Body. That, which outwardly appears (*species*) may be bitten or defiled, but all this cannot affect the presence of the Body of Christ.

On WITHHOLDING THE CUP no decision had been made in the former Period; in this age it gained the victory. ALEXANDER of HALES maintained, that the Blood of Christ was contained specially in the Wine, and his Body specially in the Bread, yet that Christ wholly was under each of the two forms. The Blood was connected with the Body by the *concomitantia unionis*, an expression which he was the first to use. But he did not infer from this that the Supper must be partaken of in one form. When he proposes a question on this topic he says, The *concomitance* is in favour of it, but on the other hand the Institution by Christ is under two forms. He decides

\* See his *Determinatio*, edited by Peter Allix, London, 1686.

that certainly in virtue of the *concomitance* the Supper can be taken under one form. The Church had introduced the custom in order to guard against spilling the blood. He quotes legends to prove that in the breaking of the Bread the dish had been filled with blood. The distribution of Christ relates only to the manner in which the Supper was taken from the person who consecrated it. The reception of the Supper under the two forms was indeed more efficacious, but the usage of the Church must be followed.

ALBERT the GREAT was in favour of the complete distribution of the elements, because the Institution of Christ ought to be followed; but AQUINAS vindicated the administration in one kind. For the right administration of the Sacrament completeness was required as to the Sacrament itself, and on the part of the communicants, reverence. The former was the concern of the Priest; as to the latter, the withholding of the cup was introduced and retained by the Church, as a seasonable custom, on account of the diversity of the communicants. BONAVENTURA declared himself in favour of withholding the Cup, which was constantly becoming more general.

## 2. PENANCE.

THE decisions given by PETER LOMBARD respecting the three parts of penance, were retained and confirmed by the legal sanction conferred by Innocent III. on Auricular Confession (*confessio auricularis*). ALEXANDER of HALES distinguishes between ATTRITIO and CONTRITIO. The former is the penance which does not proceed from true love to God, but from fear, and hence can present no disposition of the soul that is acceptable to God, but only serves as a preparative; *contritio*, on the contrary, is that true anguish for sin which proceeds from Love; *attritio* is the *terminus a quo*, *contritio* is the *terminus ad quædam*. All agree in this, to regard *contritio* as a necessary condition of the forgiveness of Sins and salvation; but a special satisfaction to the divine Justice is required for past sins, Penance as *opera pœnalia*. In substitution for the punishments inflicted by God, those voluntarily submitted to, which the Church prescribes, might serve. They can procure exemption from the severer punishments of the *ignis purgatorius*. This doctrine gave great importance to ecclesiastical punishments, and to the Priest who was authorized to prescribe

to each individual the proper acts of Penance, and to select such as were most salutary for him, as being especially opposed to his own sins. Under these views, the juridical inspection and treatment of ecclesiastical penance became more fully developed, and with it was connected,—

#### THE DOCTRINE OF INDULGENCES.

ORIGINALLY an Indulgence was only a remission of certain kinds of Penance which were exchanged for a fine. In the Crusades the custom arose of a general or plenary Indulgence (*indulgentiâ plenaria*), with which was connected the remission of all Penance, provided the Crusade was undertaken in their stead. Yet the Church did not always mean by an Indulgence, the remission of sins in the strict sense. The Schoolmen tried to prove that the Church was authorized to give such indulgences on certain grounds. At the same time they developed the doctrine of the Treasury of merits which the Church had to dispense, and employed it for establishing the theory of Indulgences. At the foundation of this dogma was the Christian idea of fellowship in all goodness, which was brought about by the Spirit of Christ. But this idea was applied sensuously, and there was connected with it the erroneous distinction between the Standpoint of perfection, and that of fulfilling the Law. It was supposed that the saints had suffered more than was necessary for the satisfaction which they had to render to the divine justice for their own sins. Thus the representation was formed of the *Thesaurus meritorum* or *supererogationis*. ROBERT PULLEYN, who first of all propounded it, only mentions the treasury of Christ's merits, and adds, that the merits of the Fathers were made acceptable to God through Christ. It was further concluded that the Church as the Steward of this treasure of the merits of Christ, and of the Saints, could appropriate a portion to any one on good grounds, in substitution of the punishments of the Church which he would otherwise have to suffer. Therefore by virtue of the possession of this treasure, indulgence from the punishments of the Church was granted under the notion that the receiver had spiritual fellowship with the treasure. Hence true *contritio* was required as the condition, and regard was had at first to the help which was thereby obtained for accomplishing some pious work. But the doc-

trine of Indulgences was not always propounded in this connexion. Many declared that the Indulgence could only for any one as much as his faith and devotion demanded, and thus the doctrine of Indulgences became very subjective and vague. WILLIAM of AUXERRE set forth six conditions of Indulgences, but added, that if these terms were always expressed, the laity would not be so ready to purchase indulgences. The Church, indeed, sometimes conceals the six conditions; but if she deceives the faithful, she does not utter falsehoods. THOMAS AQUINAS vindicates the doctrine of a treasure of merits, and quotes for it Col. i. 24. He also bears testimony to the grievous unspirituality of the system of Indulgences, and quotes the opinion of some respecting the silence of the Church, that, like a mother who stimulates her children to good behaviour by showing them an apple, she makes use of a *pia fraus*; but he rejected this notion as palliating falsehood. We see that, however what was erroneous in connexion with the Church doctrine, might be spiritualized by the Schoolmen, yet in practice the disgraceful consequences would still manifest themselves

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### THIRD PERIOD OF THE SCHOOLMEN,

FROM THE FOURTEENTH CENTURY TO THE REFORMATION.

Bossuet, *Geschichte*, fortgesetzt von Cramer, vii. 791. Ritter *Gesch. der Christl. Philosophie*, iv. 547.

### GENERAL HISTORY OF DOGMAS.

SCHOLASTICISM in the thirteenth century had reached its highest point, and was followed by a period of Transition. Of such periods, it is true that they are important for development on the whole, for the general tendencies which intersect one another, but not in an equal degree for the development of particular doctrines. The characteristic of this Period was on the one hand that the old Church theocratic standpoint had reached its climax, and that now corruption spread by a more rapid growth. In vain attempts were made to check it, and reactions gave rise to new tendencies called forth by antagonism. We here see in part the dawn of a new Chris-



tian era, witnesses of revived truth, and forerunners of the Reformation, and although they partially succumbed to the supremacy of what was old, yet they prepared the way for victory. On the other hand, middle schemes were formed which attempted to improve the old system without adopting the new. These also prepared the way for the New Creation, although by their inconsequence they were not in a condition to make head against the ruling tendency. Along with the omens of the Reformation, others also appeared of a destructive tendency, which might have overturned the Positive in Christianity; but it was repressed by the power of the Reformation, though it again made its influence felt at a later Period.

The greatest minds of the Scholastic Theology had exerted themselves in the former period. Others now followed, who repeated what the originals had said. The opposition of the schools of the Thomists and Scotists was still further developed. But a few distinguished men still appeared among them. In the fourteenth century, DURANDO of ST. PORCIANO, a Dominican, was a man of note among the Thomists. From A.D. 1313 he was Teacher of Theology at Paris, died Bishop of Meaux A.D. 1333, and had the title of *Doctor resolutissimus*.\* Among the Scotists was FRANCISCUS MAYRON.† But more eminent still was the Franciscan, WILLIAM of OCCAM, Teacher of Theology in Paris, then Provincial of his Order in England; from A.D. 1328, protected by LEWIS of BAVARIA, for whom he combated; and died A.D. 1347; he was styled *doctor singularis, invincibilis, venerabilis inceptor*.‡ In the preceding period Realism had gained the victory, since its dogmatic positive tendency suited the confidence of conviction which the age cherished. But now, when the Mediæval Theology neared its destruction, and Scepticism gained ground, Nominalism found an entrance, which favoured it by its subjective mode of view, and of which WILLIAM of OCCAM was the new founder. Thus, to the conflict of the Thomist and Scotist schools, that of the Nominalist and

\* *Opus super Sententiæ Lombardi*, ed. Paris, 1508; Venet. 1571.

† Franciscus Mayron de Digna (Digne in Provence), died A.D. 1325. In *Sentent. de Univocatione entis. de Primo Principio*. Venet. 1520.

‡ *Quæstiones super Quatuor Libros Sententiarum*, Lugd. 1495. *Centi logicum theologicum quodlibeta, tractatus de Sacramento altaris*.

Realist was added,—an antagonism which would be very important in dogmatic controversies. In WYCLIFFE, a chief representative of the Reformatory tendency, we recognise also one of the ablest advocates of Realism. He showed himself as such, in his treatise, *De universalibus realibus*, which still remains unpublished. In the Hussite controversy, at the University of Prague, the opposition of the Realist and Nominalist tendencies coincided with that of the reformatory and anti-reformatory. We might from thence infer that Nominalism had connected itself with the interests of the existing Church standpoint, and Realism with that of the Reformation; but this cannot be substantiated, as is evident from the connexion of Realism with the Church tendency in the former period. On the other hand, JOHN WESSELL, one of those who laboured most powerfully for the Reformation, was a Nominalist. It often depended on the peculiar subjective views of the Theologians, whether they were inclined to Nominalism or Realism, and introduced philosophical controversies into those of theology. GABRIEL BIEL of SPIER (died A.D. 1495)\* closes the succession of schoolmen, in whom we find many elements of an independent thinker. In proportion as Scholasticism sank, and lost itself in barren subtleties, it gave less satisfaction to the awakened, living, religious craving, and the reaction of other tendencies became stronger.

NICHOLAS of CUSA† had acquired notoriety by the part he took in the conflict of the Council of Basle against Eugenius IV.; but, at a later period, became unfaithful to the more liberal Church standpoint. His treatise, *De docta ignorantia*, is directed against scholastic dogmatism, and shows the insufficiency of human knowledge. A peculiar reaction appeared at Toulouse, in RAYMOND DE SEBONDE.‡ Since

\* *Collectorium ex Occammo*; or, *Commentarii in libb. quatuor Sententiarum*, Tubg. 1502, 2 voll. *Expositio Canonis Missæ*, Tubg. 1499.

† Nicolaus Chryftz (Krebs of Cues, on the Moselle, born A.D. 1401, died 1464, as Cardinal.) *De Catholica Concordantia*, libri 3; *De Docta Ignorantia*, Opp. Paris, 1414.

‡ Teacher of Natural Philosophy, Medicine, Philosophy, and Theology, in Toulouse. *Theologia Naturalis*, ed. Francf. 1635, 61. See Niedner, *Kirchengesch.* p. 555. On the literary history, see Dr. C. L. Kleiber, *De Raimundi quem vocant de Sabunde vita et Scriptis*, Berol. 1856. Dr. Kleiber has compared the Parisian manuscripts of the

Scholasticism multiplied dogmatic questions, discussed the articles of faith in huge volumes, and the Bible was closed to the laity, he wished to present a religious system for every one. He attempted this in his *Liber Creaturarum*, or *Theologia Naturalis*, a name which he first of all used; but he understood by it, not like later writers, a certain general religious doctrine of reason, but the doctrines of the Christian religion. He spoke of human nature as restored by Christianity, and reckoned as the *religio naturalis*, all the principal Christian truths, as those to which all nature points. Nature and Holy Writ are the two books of Divine Revelation, which are given to Man, and supplement each other. By sin man lost the key for understanding the Revelation in Nature; by the Revelation of Grace it is restored to him. Man is the first letter in the Alphabet of Creation, the Microcosmos, and the key for understanding the universe. But he has lost himself in outward objects, and must first be brought back to himself, in order to understand both himself and Nature.

When the corruption of the Church was examined, some of its causes could not but be traced to the decay of Theological study. Scholasticism served to support the ancient canon-law; hence, men of a practical reformatory tendency, aimed at an improvement of Theology, and returned to the study of the Bible and the older Church doctrine. Among these are to be classed the celebrated Parisian Theologians of the fifteenth century: NICHOLAS of CLEMANGE,\* A.D. 1393, Rector of the

*Theologia Naturalis*, the oldest of which gives the most exact information respecting the circumstances of Raymond; it calls him Raimundus Sabiende, for which another manuscript has Sebeide. Dr. Kleiber's supposition, that by this Sabædo in Spain is meant, and that Sabunde, or Sebonde, is a corruption, has so much more probability, as no town is known which bears the latter names. That oldest manuscript says, that the work was begun in Toulouse about 1404, and finished about 1436. Dr. Kleiber, besides, makes it probable that another work, related throughout in its contents to the *Theologia Naturalis*, but written in the form of a dialogue, which appeared under various names, *Quæstiones Disputatæ*, *Quodlibeta*, *Viola Animæ*, did not proceed from him, but was a popular summary of his *Theologia Naturalis* by another hand. Dr. Kleiber also rightly maintains that from the Apology of Montaigne for Raymond, it does not follow that the *Theologia Naturalis* was written in Spanish, but rather the contrary.—[JACOBI.]

\* Opp. ed. J. M. Lydius, Lugd. Batav. 1613. Also Hermann von der Hardt in der Gesch. des Concils von Constanz. Nicolas de Clemange, sa Vie et ses Ecrits, par Ad. Müntz. Strasb. 1846.

University, then private secretary to Benedict XIII., died about A.D. 1440. PIERRE D'AILLY,\* A.D. 1375, a teacher; A.D. 1389, Chancellor of the University; A.D. 1396, Bishop of Cambray; A.D. 1411, Cardinal; died 1425. JOHN CHARLIER DE GERSON,† A.D. 1381, teacher; A.D. 1395, Chancellor of the University; died A.D. 1429. These men wished, at the same time, a freer church development in the practical department, and sympathized with the kindred reactions, which had, at an earlier period, striven for emancipation from the absolutism of the Papacy, and for an independent relation of the State to the Church;—reactions which already had been active in the conflict of LEWIS of BAVARIA with JOHN XXII. and his successors. To this movement belongs the protest of the strict Franciscans against the secularization of the Church, which in WILLIAM of OCCAM especially, was connected with freer efforts, and led to new inquiries respecting the limits of ecclesiastical power, and its relation to the secular. The treatise, *Defensor pacis*,‡ by MARSILIUS of PADUA and JOHN of JANDUNO, was of service, for the development of more liberal views of this relation. Many things may be found in it which border on Protestantism. The tendency was strengthened by the reaction against the corruption of the Papal government at Avignon, and the schism which was principally active in the Councils of Pisa, Constance, and Basle. At these Councils, the principles of the above-named Parisian theologians operated against the absolutism of the Papacy, and in favour of a more moderate form; but since these men, both theoretically and practically advanced only half-way, and would not attack the ancient edifice of doctrine and government, they became, at the same time, the opponents of those who attacked the evil at the root, and strove for a thorough purification of doctrine and the Church, in conformity to Holy Writ. Still the influence which they had in the spread of purer knowledge, is not to be lightly estimated.

\* Comment. in libb. quatuor Sententiarum, ed. 1550, 4to.

† Opp. ed. Ludov. Ellies du Pin, Antv. 1706, 5 voll. Vita in Herm. v. d. Hardt. Concil. Constantiens. i. 4, 26. Essai sur Jean Gerson par Ch. Schmidt, Strasb. 1839.

‡ *Defensor Pacis, sive Adversus Usurpatam Romani Pontificis Jurisdictionem Marsilii Patavini pro Invictissimo et Constantiss. Imperatore Ludivico IV. Bavarico a Tribus Rom. Pontiff. Indigna Perpresso Apologia Recens.* Franc. Gomarus, Francof. 1612.

The energetic reformatory tendency was, in part, led by those who, under peculiar circumstances, continued to work unmolested in their age; partly by those who succumbed in conflict with the reigning elements of the age, but by their very defeat prepared the way for a new development.\* Among the men of this pure evangelical spirit, JOHN WYCLIFFE † is conspicuous, a teacher of Theology at Oxford. He made the most vigorous attacks on the prevailing Church doctrine; and his reformatory tendency was connected with his views of Christian faith, and these again with his realistic philosophy. Among his writings, which have been made known through the press, the most noted is his *Trialogus*, a Dialogue between the true and the false theology.‡ Very different from him was the Bohemian martyr, JOHN HUSS.§ WYCLIFFE's peculiar excellence consisted in his speculative theological system, in the thorough systematic consequence in the theoretical, as well as practical department, which allowed this unbending man to shrink from no consequences. On the other hand, Huss's originality lay in the Practical, which predominated far above the Speculative. He was stirred up by WYCLIFFE, but also may have formed himself, independently of him, by his own deep Christian feelings, and under the excitement

\* Ullmann, Die Reformatoren v. d. Reformation, Hamb. 1841, 2 vols.

† The History of the Life and Sufferings of John Wycliffe, by John Lewis, London, 1729. The Life and Opinions of John de Wycliffe, by Rob. Vaughan, London, 1829, ed. 2, 1831, 2 vols. [This work was rewritten and published in 1853, under the title of John de Wycliffe, D.D., a Monograph, with some account of the Wycliffe MSS. in Oxford, Cambridge, the British Museum, Lambeth Palace, and Trinity College, Dublin. By Robert Vaughan, D.D.] C. F. Jäger, Joh. Wycliffe, 1854. F. Böhlinger, Die Kirche Christi u. ihre Zeugen, Zürich, 1856. Neander, Kirchengesch. herausgeg. von K. F. Th. Schneider, p. 252. L. Flathe, Gesch. d. Vörläufer der Reformation, Lpzg. 1835, 86. G. Weber, Gesch. der akatholischen Kirche u. Secten von Grossbritannien, Lpzg. 1845. Lewald Ztschr. f. Histor. Theol. 1846, 1847. Lechler, ebendas. 1853, 54, üb. Wycl. u. b. Lollharden.

‡ Ed. L. L. Ph. Wirth, Lips. 1753.

§ Historia et Monumenta, Jo. Hus atque Hieronymi Pragensis, 2. t. Noremb. 1715. Hermann v. d. Hardt Concilium Constansense Hulsiténkrieg. darinnen Begriffen das Leben, die Lehre, der Tod Mag. Jo. Hussi, durch Zachunam Theobaldum, Nürnberg. 1621, 4to. Palacky, Gesch. von Böhmen, 1845, Bd. 3. Abth. 1. Neander, Kirchengesch. vi. p. 449.

which his official activity as a preacher gave him, in his reformatory striving against the surrounding corruption. But as he did not proceed to carry out his principles, his reformation was less thorough than WYCLIFFE'S. That, moreover, WYCLIFFE was aware how effective practical Christianity, within the pale of the religious orders might become, for the purification of the Church, is shown by a remarkable prediction of his, which was fulfilled by the Reformation. He says: "Let us suppose the case, that some Brother whom God condescends to teach, should be converted to true Christianity, forsake false doctrine, and obtain or conquer for himself freedom from Antichrist, in order to return to the original doctrine of Christianity, then would such a man build up the Church like Paul."

In Germany and the Netherlands, many witnesses of evangelical truth laboured in a quiet manner to prepare the way for the Reformation. Among these, JOHN WESSEL of GRONINGEN\* is distinguished, whose dogmatic tendency, like LUTHER'S, originated chiefly in practical grounds.

The same Dialectic Art, by which the schoolmen had fortified the ancient Church doctrine, was capable of taking an opposite direction, when the ecclesiastical and Christian spirit had evaporated, as we frequently find, that weapons which have served for the ingenious defence of a cause, have afterwards been turned against it. The distinction between a philosophical and a theological truth, had already served, in the thirteenth century, to propagate an unbelief that opposed the Church, under the guise of external authority. Scepticism and Negation now exerted themselves with increasing force; the Aristotelian Philosophy began to assume a hostile position towards Theology, and many varieties of conscious or unconscious hypocrisy were practised; arguments of Reason were put forward, which contradicted the Church doctrine, but then the insufficiency of Reason was acknowledged, and submission was professed to the authority of the Church. There was now a want of men, who, like the profound, acute, and humble schoolmen of an earlier period, would have been able to repel the opposition. WYCLIFFE, on his part, zealously

\* Mag. Wesseli Gansfortii Opera quæ inveniri potuerunt omnia, Groningæ, 1614, 4to. Joh. Wessel ein Vorgänger Luthers, von Dr. C. Ullmann, Hambg. 1834. Diss. Reformatoren von der Reformation, i.

combated the distinctions of theological and philosophical truth : there were those who thought that the light of Faith was contradictory to natural light ; but there could not be two lights conflicting with one another. A natural light of this sort would be darkness, and we could only speak of the opposition of a false light of diseased reason to the light of Faith. In consequence of sin, Natural Light was subject to a defect, which God remedied by imparting his Revelation. PETER POMPONAZIO of PADUA and BOLOGNA, an acute Aristotelian, was a renowned representative of this tendency, died A.D. 1526. In his treatises on Immortality, Fate, Free Will, Predestination and Providence, he first of all represented as philosophical truth the doctrine of the Aristotelian Philosophy. He wished to show that no supernatural Revelation, no interference of God could take place in the universe, but only a développement according to established laws. He was not disposed, indeed, to regard all positive Religion as delusion and fancy ; but, like the modern Pantheism, to explain its appearance, as necessary from its standpoint. It was a phase in the development of the spiritual world, which preceded the scientific development. The change of Religions was an historical necessity ; if a new Religion appeared, it was specially inspired by Nature, and had higher powers in itself, which were requisite to overcome the force of custom. In the Founders of the new Religions, the powers of Nature were concentrated and potentiated, and qualified to do great things which were not miracles, but operations of Nature, from which everything proceeded, therefore, they were called Sons of God. As such a Religion had peculiarly intensive and extensive power, so must the Founder be able to impart it to others, to attract them—as the loadstone attracts iron. But in all these religions, the higher powers gradually vanish, and they come to an end. Christianity is no exception ; all things belonging to it become antiquated ; miracles cease ; its end seems to be impending. These things, indeed, are not to be promulgated openly, because the people are not prepared for them ; *nam homines isti non philosophi sunt sicut bestie*. Yet he seems afterwards to have retracted this view of Religion. If some wonders appear, which can only be explained on supernatural grounds, then the whole system falls, since in that case, a Revelation must be acknowledged. He

adduces as miracles: the standing-still of the sun; the feeding of the five thousand; the darkness at the crucifixion;—these, and such like, cannot be explained as mere effects of the potentiated powers of Nature. Can we venture to believe that he found there a limit to explanation, and was forced to acknowledge a different system? Certainly, no one under other circumstances, could, with uprightness, maintain such a distinction of philosophical and theological truth. Such phenomena may occur in times of internal discord, and if we could find in POMPONAZIO only an internal necessity for his system, we might believe that he honestly represented this discord. But it is evident, that from his standpoint, he could easily have disposed of those facts; and it is not credible that any one who otherwise seems to have lacked inward necessity for the reception of Christianity, would have admitted it on these considerations. POMPONAZIO was a hypocrite, and philosophical truth was to him the only object of conviction.

As in the first ages, so now, revived Platonism—that which found a place in the Academy at Florence, exerted an invigorating impulse on the religious sentiment. At the same time the study of the classics revived and came into collision with the Scholastic Theology. It was adapted to exert an influence on the restoration of a purer evangelical Theology, when it supported the reaction of a biblical tendency against the ancient standpoint; but in Southern countries the interests of *Æsthetics* and of the Intellect, not that of the Heart, were pursued after a one-sided manner. Thus a pagan mode of thinking spread itself with the love of Antiquity, and Christianity was regarded only as an instrument of popular restraint. It was different when classical studies began to be cultivated in Germany. The deep feeling peculiar to the Germans connected the religious Interest with the scientific; the new studies equally occupied the whole Man. From this standpoint a renovation of Theology was prepared; it only wanted the new material principle in order to revive. Among the men who here prepared the way for the Reformation ERASMUS of ROTTERDAM is to be mentioned. His peculiar talent lay in the department of criticism and classical Studies;\*

\* See especially *Enchiridion Militis Christiani*, 1503; *Moriæ Enchorium*, 1508; *Ratio Veræ Theologiæ*; *Ecclesiastes, sive de Ratione Concionandi*. Opp. ed. Jo. Clericus, Lugd. Bat. 1703, sqq. 11 vols. fol.



the positive dogmatic tendency was not congenial to him. The great freedom with which he passes judgment on the ancient dogmatic distinctions in the preface to his edition of HILARY of POICTIERS is characteristic. His works contain the germ of many new investigations, which, even had the Reformation not come to pass, would have called forth a more critical development of Theology. MELANCTHON discerned this with great historical sagacity.

MYSTICISM,\* which at an earlier period had reconciled itself to Scholasticism, now appeared sometimes in opposition. But in the mystic Theology we must distinguish between a more speculative and a more practical tendency; one more contemplative, and the other more allied to historical Christianity. Throughout we find in the former the greater danger of transgressing the proper limits of the human mind; by striving after absorption in God men easily fell into a pantheistic self-idolatry. The standpoints that had been formerly overcome entered afresh into Christianity; ancient ascetic Mysticism, its dreamy absorption in God, and the disposition to strip the divine Being of all personal characteristics and essential attributes. As this existed in the ancient Religion of India, in Buddhism especially, so it was revived in MASTER ECKARD† and the Beghards.‡ We recognise the marks of such aberrations in the heretical propositions of the Beghards, which were condemned about A.D. 1330 by JOHN

*Compendium Vitæ Erasmi*, by himself; and *Erasmi Vitæ*, by Beatus Rhenanus, in *Opp. t. i. Burigny. Vie d'Erasmus*, 2 vols. Par. 1757. Germ. Transl. by Henke, Halle, 1782. S. Hess, *Erasmus von Rotterdam*, Zurich, 1790. A. Müller, *Leben des Erasmus von Rotterdam*, 1828.

\* H. Schmid, *Der Mysticismus des Mittelaltens in seiner Entstehung Periode*, Jena, 1824. Ch. Schmidt, *Essai sur les Mystiques du 14me Siècle*. By the same, *Etudes sur la Mysticisme Allemand au 14me Siècle*, Par. 1847. And his *Joh. Tauler von Strassburg*, 1841. Röhrich, *die Gottesfreunde und Winkeler am Oberrhein* *Zeitschr. f. Histor. Theol.* 1840. Helfferich, *die Christl. Mystic.* Ullmann *Reformatoren vor d. Reformation*, ii. F. Pfeiffer, *deutsche Mystiker des 14 Jahrh.* Lpz. 1845, vol. i.

† Predigten unter Denen v. Tauler in d. Ausg. 1521, 1522. Quetif et Echard *Scriptores Ord. Prædicator.* i. 507. Docen, *Miscellanien z. Gesch. d. deutsch. Litterat.* i. 138. Ch. Schmidt, *Meister Eckart Theol. Stud. u. Kritik.* 1839. Martensen, *Meister Eckart, e. Theol. Studie.* Hamb. 1842. Ritter *Gesch. d. Chr. Philosoph.* iv. 498.

‡ Mosheim, *de Beghardis et Beguinabus*, ed. Martin, Lips. 1790.

XXII. They were the adherents of the Sect of the free Spirit and of free knowledge (*liberæ intelligentiæ*); they taught,—God is neither good nor evil, as He is neither black nor white; God is glorified equally in Evil as in Good; even the wicked praise God; whoever prays for anything positive commits injustice, for he prays for the negation of Goodness and of God. The predictions of the Abbot JOACHIM respecting the age of the Holy Spirit were received; namely, that a pure internal Religion was to follow the age of the Revelation of the Son, in the Sacrament of the Church, during which the Holy Spirit indwells and reigns, everything proceeds from the intuition of the Divine Being, and men depend on no outward Authority. To one part of this Sect assertions of the following kind were attributed:—Every believer is Christ himself; an Incarnation of God takes place in all of them; and the name of Christ is only the symbol of this universal fact. Each one of them created the World. Hell and Heaven are only poetical fictions; there is no other eternal life, excepting the abdication of personality, the re-absorption into God. There were signs of phenomena, which were kept back by the intervention of the Reformation, but came forward first in a more distant age. On the other hand, the mild practical mysticism combated this negative, mystic, pantheistic Rationalism, as was the case with RUYSBROCK. This tendency, where the Religion of the Heart was cherished in opposition to that of the Understanding, and was impelled to a living surrender to Christ, formed a laboratory in which the materials were prepared for the Reformation.

## THE SPECIAL HISTORY OF DOGMAS.

### A. THE HISTORY OF INTRODUCTORY DOGMAS.

#### I. THE STATEMENTS RESPECTING THE ESSENCE OF THEOLOGY.

DURAND was distinguished by his investigations respecting the essence of Theology. The question whether Theology is a Science he answered by the distinction of a twofold view of Theology: Theology is either a *habitus*, in the popular sense, when the assent is given to what the Holy Scriptures affirm, or a *habitus* in the sense of a Science, inasmuch as it explains and vindicates the contents of Holy Writ on rational principles. As the central point of Christian doctrine, he did not

place God as God, but God as Redeemer. The doctrine of Redemption is, therefore, the prime article, and contains *implicite* all the other fundamental doctrines, such as the doctrine of the Trinity, a remark which is of importance for right views of the Trinity. It is remarkable how he expresses himself opposed to all human Authority in Religion:—"In the things which belong to Faith we must trust the Scriptures more than Reason; but whoever would renounce his Reason on account of a human authority would place himself on a level with the beasts; this would be forcibly to suppress the light of Reason (*incidere in insipientiam*). Truth is most holy, and even Reason teaches how God the Father is to be praised.

## 2. ON TRADITION AND THE HOLY SCRIPTURES AS SOURCES OF KNOWLEDGE.

THUS far in the course of Mediæval development there were heard only occasional utterances, particularly of sects, against the pre-eminence which the Traditions of the Church held among the sources of the knowledge of the Christian faith, and against the dependence of the exposition of Scripture upon it. It was different in the Period before us. The formal principle of the Reformation was asserted more frequently and plainly, and the reactions of the Christian consciousness followed, which endeavoured to make the interpretation of the Bible independent of the authority of the Church. The most distinguished Reformers, WYCLIFFE and WESSELL, emphatically announced this principle, and it was at the basis of the ideas of HUSS. The great movement which originated with the latter caused also the Theologians of the opposite party in the Church to enter on the investigation of this principle, and to impugn it. A more decided impulse was given to it by the vindication of the administration of the Sacrament in both kinds to the Laity. On this account GERSON wrote against the Hussites a treatise on the literal sense of Holy Writ. He and the other reformatory Theologians of Paris wished, on the one hand, to exalt the authority of the Bible in opposition to the Mediæval tendency; but, on the other hand, as they were not willing to let the principles of the old system sink into abeyance, they were necessitated to call to their aid other sources of know-

ledge besides the Scriptures. GERSON first of all asserted as a fundamental maxim that the literal sense of the Bible was the only true one—that all things necessary to salvation were plainly contained in the Bible, and that no true doctrine could be at variance with the Bible. From this we might have expected a different result from that at which he arrived ; the literal sense must be explained according to the sense of the Church, under the guidance of the Holy Spirit, and not according to the arbitrary opinion of every individual. The interpretation of the Church is made known through its representative, a General Council. In holding this or that Gospel to be genuine, we believe the Church. Christ and the Apostles revealed the literal sense, the Martyrs confirmed it, and the Church by its decrees, through its Councils, has collected together what has resulted from the development of doctrine. This is, therefore, a decisive rule of Interpretation. Every one must subject himself to the decision of the bishop in his own diocese, but he may appeal from this to the Pope, and farther, as the last resort, to the decision of the General Council, in which the highest authority is vested. With still greater decision, and with a sophistry remarkable for its effrontery, NICOLAUS of CUSA defended the higher authority of Tradition, advancing many things which have since been expressed from a quite different standpoint. In his letter to the Bohemians he says :—The Church existed before the Holy Scriptures. Christ founded the Church without letters, and the Apostles published the Gospel before they wrote anything. The Church does not exist for the sake of the Scriptures, but the Scriptures for the sake of the Church. We might conceive of the possibility of a Tyrant's destroying every copy of the Scriptures. But it cannot be, he concludes, that the existence of the Church and its doctrines should depend on anything so accidental as the destruction of written documents. The Holy Scriptures may be expounded differently by every one ; how, then, can we discover the true doctrine, if we have no rule ? But divine Truth has always been in the Church, and the agency of the Holy Spirit by whom this truth is always maintained ; the Spirit giveth life, the Letter killeth. He places the two in opposition, without considering that they go together ; only we must abide by the Spirit ; the Church is not bound to the letter of Scripture. When the Letter, in

consequence of the altered wants of the Age, is no longer fitted for edification, the Church takes what is most suitable; hence it explains the same passages differently at different times. How great the latitude which is thus given to the Spirit appears even more distinctly from what follows; the intelligence of the Church is developed with its practice; this is the living Spirit. When the Church apparently interprets differently from the literal signification, this is not an alteration of Christ's commands, for the Church is Christ's body, and does nothing but what Christ wills; He reveals his mysteries according to the changes of Time, as is most suitable, partly by silent Tradition, partly by common examination, or by the verbal Decrees of Councils. When the Church settles anything by them it proceeds from the same Spirit by which the Scriptures were inspired. As in the New Testament we find Baptism only in the name of Christ, but afterwards we find it performed in the Church in the name of the Trinity; and in the first age a community of goods, and thus a renunciation of worldly possessions, which at a later period was confined to the Monks; so other decisions of the Church bear a similar relation to the words of Holy Writ.

## • B. THE DOGMAS OF SPECIAL DOGMATICS.

### a. THE DOCTRINE OF GOD.

#### 1. THE DOCTRINE OF THE TRINITY.

WYCLIFFE\* attempts to show that the Trinity is a necessary truth of Reason, and that there are traces of it in PLATO. God has the ability to know Himself and all other existences; this *potentia* is the Father. As far as he can do this he knows himself in a necessary manner. This realized Self-knowledge is the Son. God cannot know himself without reposing in himself, and this inward satisfaction is the Holy Spirit, by virtue of whom he loves himself.

#### 2. THE DOCTRINE OF PREDESTINATION, GRACE, AND FREE-WILL.

THE Controversy that from the time of ALEXANDER of HALES had sprung up between the FRANCISCANS and DOMINICANS, the SCOTISTS and THOMISTS, advanced still further. The externalism in the practice of the Church was also connected

\* Jager, p. 23. Bohringer, p. 153.

with Pelagianism and Semi-Pelagianism, and the notion of a *meritum* in Man was joined to this in various ways. In opposition to it the Augustinian and Thomistic element, which traced everything to the divine Grace, reappeared, and was carried to the greatest lengths; under its influence Pelagianism was seen in every assertion which in any way affixed conditions to the operations of grace. On this standpoint the Englishman THOMAS BRADWARDINE (*doctor profundus*) is worthy of notice; he was teacher of Theology at Oxford, A.D. 1325, Archbishop of Canterbury A.D. 1348, and died A.D. 1349. To combat the Pelagianism of his age he published his treatise *De causa Dei adversus Pelagium et de virtute causarum*, in three books.\* He places the whole and each part of the Universe under an unconditional Necessity. Everything which happens is a necessary fulfilment of the divine plan of the Universe. The divine will is the efficient cause, to which everything else is alike subservient; even the actions of rational beings are not exempt from this universal law. Hence he impugns the distinction of a divine will and a divine permission in reference to Evil, and endeavours to show that even this forms a necessary part of the divine Plan, but that moral Imputation is not thereby nullified, since Evil subjectively contradicts the Will of God. He strives to set aside all the subterfuges of his opponents for vindicating any *meritum* whatever, even a *meritum de congruo*; he even opposes those who admitted a *gratia præveniens*, and only maintained that it depended on the receptivity of Man to accept it or not. From this System it strictly followed that the independence and contingency of the Free Will are only a semblance; and since this applies to the Fall, Supralapsarianism would be involved in it.

It is remarkable that all the reactions of the Christian consciousness for the recovery of evangelical Truth from the mixture of Christian and Jewish elements proceeded from the Augustinian standpoint. They were excited partly by the influence of AUGUSTIN, and partly determined by that opposition which it involved against mere external good works and Pelagian principles. Thus we see here preparatory measures for that which became still more conspicuous at the

\* Ed. H. Savilius, Lond. 1618.

Reformation. If in some the Augustinian view stands in immediate connexion with its practical Christian tendency, in WYCLIFFE it is chiefly conditioned by his philosophical system.\* His doctrine of ideas is developed in opposition to the Nominalist view of the relation of Thought and Being, and of an infinite series of possibilities, and leads him according to his own strict logic to the admission of an unconditional Predestination. He maintains that God's omnipotence consists in realizing whatever is possible; thus God's omnipotence and the actual Creation are counterparts of one another.† Sin cannot be included in this; it does not follow that it was only an accident, but it is a *defectus*, something Negative, of which it cannot be affirmed that it was created; God is the cause of the sinner's punishment, but not the cause of Sin; it is a *deordinatio*, and hence cannot be traced back to the divine plan of the Universe. God himself is the cause of Predestination and Prescience, for all knowledge is in him not acquired or given, but internal and necessary, and therefore determined by nothing appertaining to the Creature. Everything is founded in the divine Ideas; these are essentially the divine Essence itself. In a formal respect it is thus shown in what manner God knows all things.‡ God knows nothing except what really exists, and everything possible is actual, since God knows it as if it existed.§ Evil is contradictory to the divine Ideas; God therefore knows it by means of Good, that is, on account of its deviation from his ideas, as we know Darkness by means of Light. Here was an approximation to the Pantheistic scheme of a necessary development of God in the Universe. WYCLIFFE in vain sought to escape the ethical consequences of his speculative Ideas, which he did not conceal from himself. He even says,—“Can, then, the wicked excuse themselves on account of their sins?” He answers,—“If they could, they would do it; but I know not who can—

\* Neander vi. herausg. v. K. F. Schneider, p. 316. Böhringer, p. 139.

† Sicut Deus ad intra nihil potest producere, nisi absolute necessario illud producat, sic nihil ad extra potest producere, nisi pro suo tempore illud producat.

‡ Idea est essentialiter natura divina et formaliter ratio, secundum quam Deus intelligit creaturas.

§ Deus nihil intelligit nisi quod existit, dum potest existere, et sic omne quod existere potest existit.

as I know not what man would break my head and say it is necessary. I should say to him also that he is blameable."

### b. ANTHROPOLOGY..

#### THE DOCTRINE OF ORIGINAL SIN.

DISPUTES arose between the Scotists and Thomists on the question of the freedom of the Virgin Mary from Original Sin. In the year 1387 the Dominican, JOHN of MONTOSONO, put forward the assertion that it was expressly against the faith to teach that not all, Christ excepted, had been defiled with original Sin, and that it was so to teach this of the Virgin Mary. That it was equally against Holy Writ to except one human being besides Christ as to except ten.\* As the dispute was prolonged, the Council of Basle, about A.D. 1439,† announced the decision that Mary, by special, prevenient, and efficient Grace, had never been subject to the actuality of original Sin; so that she was always free from original Sin and actual Sin. This opinion was to be regarded as pious, and agreeing with the Catholic faith, Reason, and the Holy Scriptures. But the recognition of the Basle Council was a matter of dispute between the papistical and the more liberal party. In A.D. 1483 SIXTUS IV. issued a command to let the controversy cease, and ordained that those who maintained that the doctrine that Mary at her conception was freed from all original Sin, was a heresy, were to be condemned, and whoever uttered it in preaching was to be excommunicated. He imposed equal silence on the other side, since nothing had been yet decided.

#### c. THE DOCTRINE OF THE CHURCH.

The idea of the Church had hitherto been undisturbed in the Western Church, for the opposition of particular sects could effect nothing against it. But now the reaction of the freer Christian spirit appeared. Even on the Catholic Standpoint a difference was stirred respecting the relation of the changeable and unchangeable in the development of the Church; on

\* *Chronique du Religieux de St. Denys, publiée par L. Bellaguet, Par. 1839, 4to. D'Argentré, Collectio Judiciorum de Novis Erroribus ab Initio, xii. sec. usque ad annum 1632. Par. 1728, iii. t. f. i. ii. 61.*

† *Sessio 36; Mansi xxix. 183.*



the position of the Papacy in respect of the Church ; whether the Pope was to be regarded as its representative or Sovereign Head ; whether the general Councils or the Pope stood highest The University of Paris especially was the seat of reaction against the tendency which had prevailed since the Pseudo-Isidorian Decretals, and the Chancellor GERSON was foremost in the controversy.\* He regarded the whole Hierarchical Order in general as necessary for the Organism of the Church. Agreement in this was necessary for the Unity of the Church, and this Unity he viewed simply as outward. Hence, from his point of view, the idea of the Church as a visible Institution continued by the succession of the Bishops under the primacy of the Pope is placed foremost. This outwardly defined Organism effectuates communion with Christ ; and out of its pale there is no communion with Christ and with the Holy Spirit, therefore no salvation. So far he held firmly the ancient foundation of Catholicism, but he severed himself from the opposite party by distinguishing the essential and unessential, the unchangeable and the changeable in the Organism. He regarded as essential and necessary the existence of a visible Supreme Head and the Episcopal system, and he pronounced the assertion that an invisible Supreme Head sufficed, to be Heresy ; but on the relation of the Roman Church to ecclesiastical government he laid down no unchangeable Law ; the Papacy ought to serve for the benefit of the Church, and meet its various necessities. GERSON, indeed, acknowledged that the Church, as it had given birth to the Primate, so it must always the power to reinstate him ; it might even exist provisionally without him, its invisible Head. The Universal Church then took its power into its own hands. But the highest representation of the Universal Church is given in a General Council, and every individual must submit his own subjective judgment to this. In GERSON's tendency, therefore, we recognise the return to the more ancient form of Catholicism.

The more spiritual view of the Church was carried out far more logically in the *Defensor Pacis*, which denied that an external Primacy, like that of the Pope, was necessary for it.

Protestant principles were displayed most plainly in the

\* De Modis uniendi et reformandi Ecclesiam in Concilio Universali, 1410, in Herm. v. d. Hardt. Concil. Constantiens, t. i. P. v.

men who were in the strict sense Reformers. WYCLIFFE regards communion with Christ as primary, including the communion with believers, and from that the idea of a Church is first derived, as of a Body forming itself from within, from the common relation of the consciousness to Christ. He defines the true Church as the community of the redeemed or of the predestined; only these are members of the holy Church; but many who are so called are enemies of the Church, and belong to the Synagogue of Satan. Hence a visible Head of the Church is not necessary; as long as Christ is in Heaven the Church has in Him the best Pope, and distance cannot hinder Him from being with his Church even to the end. HUSS took the same direction, but expressed himself later respecting this doctrine, when he already anticipated the decision of his fate. In his treatise *De Ecclesia*, A.D. 1413, he declares that the Catholic Church is the Community of Saints; where two or three are united in Christ, they form with Christ the Church. He combats the idea of a necessary outward unity of the Church. To the same effect, WESSEL,<sup>4</sup> in his treatise *De Communionē Sanctorum*, says: By the true Unity of the Church all are connected who have in common one Faith, one Hope, and one Love, and are thereby connected with Christ, under whatever ecclesiastical superiors they may find themselves. The Unity of the Church under a Pope is only an accidental thing.

#### d. THE DOCTRINE OF THE SACRAMENTS.

##### 1. OF THE SACRAMENTS IN GENERAL.

THE reactions against the Catholic idea of the Sacraments increased. That the Sacraments really and literally are the cause of grace had already in the former period given offence. DURAND also now declared that the Sacraments are not necessary nor sufficient in themselves for the salvation of Men, since God has not so necessarily connected with these Elements the Power by which he upholds and redeems men in Nature and in Grace that he cannot work without them. They are the *causa sine qua non* Grace can be communicated, since, according to an appointment of God, every one who receives the Sacrament receives also Grace (provided he offers no impediment), but not through the Sacrament, but

from God. He makes use of the illustration that occurs elsewhere, of a King who promises to bestow an alms on condition of the receiver bringing a leaden penny. The Sacrament can impart no *character spiritalis*, for it is absurd to suppose that material things can effect such a communication to the spirit. PETER D'AILLY also holds the opinion that the Sacraments are not *causæ effectivæ gratiæ*, but *causæ gratiæ sine quibus*; therefore they are only causes in a figurative sense, since this impartation of Grace in the participation of the Sacrament takes place, not by virtue of their own power, but of God's free Will. WYCLIFFE departs most widely from the received doctrine. He sets out from the usual definition, and then says: According to this every visible Creature is also a Sacrament, since it is a visible form of the invisible Grace of the Creator, represents the image of his Ideas, and becomes for created Beings a cause of imitation and of knowledge. Thus, also, the publication of the divine word may be called a Sacrament as a sign of divine Grace. Hence he considers the sevenfold number of the Sacraments as unfounded. All of them cannot be proved from Scripture—for instance, Confirmation; it is an assumption on the part of the Bishop, since the Holy Spirit is previously given at Baptism. As little can be said on behalf of Extreme Unction, since here the higher efficacy is ascribed to prayer.

## 2. THE DOCTRINE OF THE LORD'S SUPPER.

DOUBTS respecting the doctrine of Transubstantiation were raised more frequently, and were only repressed because Theologians could not withdraw themselves from subjection to the doctrine of the Church. Several of the Schoolmen agreed that they could adduce for this doctrine no other reason than the authority of the Church, and that the Bible and Reason led to a different conclusion. WILLIAM of OCKHAM endeavoured to show that the arguments of THOMAS AQUINAS for the doctrine of Transubstantiation were not sufficient. In the New Testament it was, indeed, expressly said that the body of Jesus was taken; but the doctrine of Transubstantiation could not be inferred from that, for there were other ways of explaining the presence of Christ in the Supper. That view, for instance, was more agreeable to reason and Scripture, which supposed that one substance served as the basis of the

other. But since the Church, through Innocent III., decided the contrary, its sentence must proceed from a revelation. DURAND remarks: It appears to be a reflection on the divine power to maintain that the Body of Christ cannot be present at the Supper otherwise than by Transubstantiation. The words of the Institution also admit the view that the Body of Christ was really contained in the Sacrament (*corpus Christi realiter contentum esse in elemento*). Yet the decision of the Church is contrary, in which we are not allowed to suppose an error. Thus, also, PETER D'AILLY: If it is possible that one created thing is upheld by another, it is possible that the Body of Christ is connected in this manner with the Bread. This mode of viewing the subject is permissible in itself, and more easy to apprehend; and we should accept it, if it only agreed with the authority of the Church. This statement is memorable, since it gave rise to the first doubt in Luther's mind respecting the doctrine of Transubstantiation, as appears from his treatise on the Babylonian Captivity. WYCLIFFE impugns the doctrine of Transubstantiation most decidedly, as contradicting both Reason and Holy Writ. By the absurd doctrine of *accidentia sine subjecto* an altogether new order of the Universe would be introduced; the event is not to be thought of as a Miracle, for it is an absurdity; we cannot understand how any one can really say that the Bread is the Body of Christ, if the Bread is no longer there. He says: Satan's cunning strove, long after the delusion, to mislead the Church into this heresy. When, through his Anti-Christ, he first brought it so far that it no longer held the Sacrament to be Bread, but a detestable accident, he could bring it to believe everything he wished; for example, that in whatever vices a prelate may indulge, yet it can never be credited by the people, on account of the dignity of the Clergy. He declares himself against a connexion of such a kind as many of the older theologians admitted: that the two substances were connected, like the divine and human natures in Christ, since otherwise all the predicates of the Bread might be applied to the Body of Christ, and inversely, which yet is not admissible. Notwithstanding this, he would not maintain a merely symbolical importance, but admitted a *signum efficax* as involved in the general idea of the Sacrament as well as in this special case of the Supper. The consecration did not

mark an alteration of the nature of the bread, but a potentiating of it. Christ is everywhere present in a spiritual manner, but he is present quite in a different manner, namely, *habitudinaliter*, in the Supper. When Christ called John the Baptist Elias, and yet John said that he was not Elias, both are consistent with one another, for Christ calls him so in a figurative sense, and he denies it in a literal one; but he was Elias not in a merely symbolical sense, but in a certain real sense, as far as he represented the power of Elias. So it is also with the relation of the Bread and Wine to the Body of Christ. As Man in an Image does not think of the matter of it, but directs his thoughts to that of which it is the Image, so must believers direct their devotion, not to the material substance, but to Christ. WYCLIFFE's opposition to Transubstantiation was connected with his realistic view of the objectivity of general Ideas. In this philosophic theory HUSS also agreed, and PETER D'AILLY, who, at the Council of Constance, argued in favour of Transubstantiation, hence objected to him that he denied it as a Realist. But HUSS would not allow it; and since he was not so deeply imbued as WYCLIFFE with the theological and the philosophical, the consequences could not be ascribed to him to which the latter was open. HUSS was not the man to keep back his convictions. In his writings he contented himself with combating the ancient legends of the appearances of Christ at the Supper, and bringing forward the spiritual view; he confined himself to the practical, and did not enter on dogmatical investigations.

THE WITHHOLDING OF THE CUP.—While HUSS was at Constance his friend, JACOBELLUS of MISA, appeared at Prague and maintained the necessity of restoring the communion in both kinds. HUSS, when asked in prison respecting it, frankly expressed his opinion:—Certainly, according to the Institution of Christ, as the Evangelists and Paul testify, and according to the usage of the most ancient Church, the participation is to be retained. Yet he laid no peculiar stress upon it, and advised the laity to ask permission of the Pope. A written controversy arose upon it between the Hussites and the Catholics. The former appealed to John ch. vi. which they referred to the Supper. JACOBUS was not willing to admit the conclusion from the

*concomitantia*. If it was said that the full participation was only for the Priests, he rejoined that if this assertion were correct, the same might be affirmed of the entire Supper. The desecration of the Supper was urged in case the cup was offered to unworthy laymen. He replied that there were many priests who were much more unworthy than pious laymen. The Council of Constance passed six resolutions against the Hussites, in which it is said that Christ instituted the Supper under two kinds; but by the custom of the Church it was established that it should be distributed, not after a meal, as at its Institution; and just so the Church has ordained on rational grounds the communion in one kind. Let no individual oppose this; and whoever stubbornly resists let him be punished as a heretic. GERSON, about A.D. 1417, wrote a tract to vindicate this decree, in which he supports a bad cause with ridiculous arguments: the wine may be turned to vinegar; it would foster the notion that the laity are equal to the Priests in dignity, &c. The Council of Basle came to an agreement with the Bohemians by which liberty was granted for the laity to receive the Supper in both kinds. But in order not to damage the decrees of Constance it was stated, that believing laymen were not bound by the command of the Lord to receive the Supper in both kinds; it was the Church's business to decree how it was to be taken by the non-clerical; under each form there was the whole Christ. The commendable custom of the Church, to administer it under one form, was to be regarded as a Law

### 3. THE DOCTRINE OF PENANCE AND THE *THESAURUS SUPEREROGATIONIS*.

CLEMENT VI., in A.D. 1343, issued the *constitutio unigenitus*, in which for the Jubilee Year 1350 he granted a large indulgence, and founded it on the treasure of merits. Christ, it declared, had gained a treasure for his Church, the management of which he had committed to Peter and his Successors, in order that, for pious and rational causes, they might offer indulgence to the truly penitent, either for the total or the partial remission of temporal punishments; and this treasure could never be exhausted, on account of Christ's infinite merits, and the constantly increasing, superabundant virtues of the righteous. The crying abuse of indulgences

called forth fresh and more numerous adversaries. Many would allow of no other treasure than the merits of Christ. GERSON, indeed, did not venture to invalidate the grant of indulgences in itself, but he wished to trace it back to its original intent, as a release from certain punishments for sins. The Church could only free from punishments which were in its power, and which it could inflict; only Christ and God could acquit from punishment and guilt. WYCLIFFE, on the other hand, impugned with this doctrine that of Penance in general. Every believer, on account of his communion with Christ and His spiritual Body, had a share in all good works according to the measure of his worthiness. He spoke emphatically against the traffic which worldly-minded Antichrists carried on with the forgiveness of sins, and declared that only confession of sin before God was necessary to obtain forgiveness. The Church Confession was indeed salutary, but not necessary. HUSS also controverted these points. But WESSEL in this respect approaches very near LUTHER's principles; true repentance, he says, proceeds from the Love of God, not from fear. The sentence of the Priest is no judgment on Sin; God forgives it to every one who feels true penitence and sorrow. The imposition of any other penance and punishment is at variance with the merits of Christ. The doctrine of making satisfaction to God by works is blasphemous, for thereby the doctrine of the High priesthood and perfect sacrifice of Christ is touched upon. Hence he particularly attacks Indulgences; everything depends on the susceptibility of Man for Grace; what man is not able of himself to appropriate can be appropriated to him by no one else; there is, indeed, a treasure of the Church, but only for him who knows it; God and Christ are the true treasure of the Church.

#### 4. THE DOCTRINE OF PURGATORY.

THE Dogma of the *ignis purgatorius* had not hitherto been openly established; this took place in the conferences with the Greeks, at the Councils of FLORENCE and FERRARA, A.D. 1438 and A.D. 1439. Only those who had practised true penitence, and had died in love to God and Christ before they had accomplished the fruits of Penitence, were, after death, cleansed by the purifying fire; and for lessening the

severity of this purification the prayers of believers, masses, sacrifices, &c., avail. To support these views appeal was made to 1 Corinth. iii. 12, 13, and 2 Maccab. xii. 45. The Greeks so expressed the doctrine, that souls would be punished, because they were destitute of divine light; but they would be set at liberty by Prayers, Sacrifices, and Masses. WESSEL\* took a more spiritual view of this doctrine; the purifying Fire is for those who have not yet been altogether penetrated by Love, a spiritual Fire of Love, purifying the Soul from the remaining dross, and consisting in a longing after union with God; so that it is not so much a punishment as a preparatory step to Blessedness.

### THIRD PRINCIPAL PERIOD.

#### THE DEVELOPMENT OF DOCTRINE SINCE THE REFORMATION.

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For the German Reformation.—Luther's Werke, Wittenberg, 1539-59; 12 vols German, 1545-58; 7 vols. Latin, Jena, 1555-58; 8 German, 1556-58; 4 Latin. Two supplementary volumes by Aurifaber, Fisleb. 1564-65. The German writings in the Altenberg edition, by J. Ch. Sagittarius, 1661-64, 10 vols.; Leipzig edition, 1729-40, 22 vols. fol. J. G. Walch, Halle, 1740-50, 24 vols. 4to. Dr. M. Luther's Briefe, Sendschreiben und Bedenken. Herausg. v. Dr. W. M. L. de Wette, Berl. 1825, 6 vols. Melancthon's Werke in Corp. Reformatorum, ed. C. G. Bretschneider, continued by Bindseil, 1834, especially the *Loci Communes Theologici*, 1521, 1535, 1543, 1559. *Die Symbolischen Bücher der Lutherischen Kirche*, Herausg. 1580, Dresd. A. Rechenberg, Lpz. 1677. C. M. Pfaff, Tüb. 1780, J. H. Tittman, Meiss. 1817, Hare, 1837. B. C. Loscher, *Vollständige, Reformations Acta u. Documenta (1517-19)* 3 t. 4, Lpz. 1726-29. D. E. Kapp, *kl. Nachlese einiger zur Erläuter, d. Refrmtgesch. wichtiger Urkunden*, Lpz. 1727, 4 t. 8. Strobel, *Miscellanea*, Nürnberg, 1778. By the same, *Beiträge zur Litterat.* 1784. C. G. Neudecker, *Urkunden aus d. Reformatszeit*, Cass. 1836. *Altentstücke aus d. Ztalt. d. Reformat.* 1838, 2 vols. L. C. Forstemann, *Neues Urkunderb. zur Gesch. der Kirchenreformat.* Hamb. 1842, 4. V. L. a Seckendorf, *Commentarius Historicus et Apologeticus de Lutheranism*, libb. iii. Lpz. 1688-1694, against Mainbourg's (the Jesuit) *Histoire du Lutheranisme*, Par. 1680, 4. W. C. Tentzel, *Histor. Bericht. vom Aufg. u. erst Fortgang der Reformat.* Lpz. 1718, 2 vols. J. G. Walch, *Streitigkeiten innerh d. Luth. Kirche*, 5 vols. 1780. By the same, *Streitigkeiten Ausserh. d. Luth. Kirche*, 5 vols. 1733. C. A. Salig, *Gesch. der Augsb. Confess. (1517-62)* Halle, 1780, 3 vols. 4. G. J. Planck, *Gesch. d. Entsteh. Veränderung u. Bildung unsres protest. Lehrbegriffs bis zur Concordienfml.* 1781-1800, 6 vols. 2nd ed. Vols. 1-8, 1791-98.

\* *De Purgatorio, quis et qualis sit ignis Purgatorius*, ed. Groning. p. 826.



For the Swiss Reformation.—Huldreich Zwingli's Werke, v. M. Schuler u. J. Schulthess, Zür. 1828, 8 vols. Especially his *Commentar. de Vera et Falsa Religione*, iii. 1646. J. Calvini Opp. Amst. 1667, 9 vols. Especially his *Institutio Religionis Christi*, ed. Tholuck, 1834, 1846, 2 t. *Lettres de Jean Calvin, recueillies pour la première fois*, p. Jules Bonnet, *Lettres Françaises*, t. i. Par. 1864. *Die Bekenntnisschriften d. Reform. Kirche Zusammengeest.* v. Augusti, 1830. Niemerger, 1840. *Miscellanea Tigurina*, 8 vols. 1722-24. J. C. Fussli, Beiträge zur Reformationsgesch. der Schw. 1741-53, 6 parts. J. J. Simler, Sammlung alter u. neues Urkunden zur Beleuchtung der Kirchengesch. besonders der Schweiz. 1767, 2 vols.

The contemporary historians, Val. Anshelm (1526), Bern. 1825-33, 6 vols.; H. Bullinger (1532), 1838-40, 3 vols.

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#### A. THE HISTORY OF INTRODUCTORY DOGMAS.

##### THE DOCTRINE OF THE SOURCES OF KNOWLEDGE.

THE question respecting the highest sources of the knowledge of Christian faith and practice necessarily was first brought under fuller discussion at the Reformation. It could not maintain itself against the Catholic Church without making an attack on Tradition, and holding fast the principle that the Christian truth is to be derived from the Holy Scriptures alone. But if it is further asked whether this was the Principle which was first of all conceived and developed with clear consciousness, it will readily be perceived that this alone did not constitute the peculiar principle of the Reformation, since at a later period some appeared who in this respect agreed with the Protestants, and yet, like the Socinians, departed widely from the Doctrine of the Reformers, and made quite a different application of that principle. Accordingly, an originally different relation of the religious consciousness to Holy Writ is hereby pre-supposed. Generally the founding of a Church is not commenced by consciously undertaking the task of forming a new doctrine from Holy Writ; a new Life and a new religious community do not originate from such reflections. Socinianism did proceed in this way, but it gave birth to nothing that had vitality. Where a new living Church is formed, the truth of Holy Writ operates in a peculiar manner on the religious life of the Founder; a

peculiar tendency is elaborated, according to which the Holy Scriptures are studied and viewed. One truth of it is not accidentally set up as a central point, but it depends on the religious consciousness how it is affected by the Holy Scriptures; and although there are various types of doctrine in the New Testament, yet it is not accidental, whether a person feels attracted by this or that. Lastly, the acknowledgment of Tradition as a fountain of knowledge and a rule for the Christian faith, and the limitation of the authority and the peculiar Exposition of Holy Writ, first proceeded from a totally different doctrinal principle. Hence, also, the opposition against this principle led men to place Holy Writ in the right relation to the religious consciousness. That revolution of the religious consciousness to Catholicism, consisted in withdrawing that consciousness from its immediate relation to Christ, and placing the Church between. Thus the reaction of the Christian consciousness was realized at this point, for it returned from its mediated position to the immediate relation to Christ, where it enjoyed independence of the authority of the Church. We find this connexion indicated in the manner in which WYCLIFFE brings forward the principle of the normative dignity of Scripture. "When we truly believe in Christ," he says, "the authority of Holy Writ will be greater than that of any other writing." He makes various applications of the idea of Scripture which were connected with the Scholastic Theology and mode of development, but yet led to that presupposition. Holy Writ is equivalent to Jesus Christ, the Book of Life, or the truths contained in this book. Further, the collection of the particular writings which we call the Scriptures are signified by it. But this is not to be understood literally of this collection of writings on parchment, but of their contents, the *sententiæ sacræ*. From the view of the divine Word in Christ we first arrive at the treasures of Holy Writ. In WYCLIFFE, therefore, we see the acknowledgment of the divine Word derived from the immediate relation of the religious consciousness to Christ. The same was the case with LUTHER. His Reformation set out from the recognition of Christ as the only source of Salvation, with a rejection of all other mediation. Preparation for this development was made during his residence in the monastery. His peculiar religious convictions remained at first in the

forms of the existing doctrinal type, and with a recognition of the authority of the external Church. But from this internal principle he was gradually led to adhere no longer to the decrees of the Church, but to examine the Scriptures for himself. Yet before he had consciously developed the principle that the Holy Scriptures must be the highest source of knowledge his doctrine had already been formed upon it, and unconsciously he was guided by the principle to admit nothing which was at variance with the Scriptures. Controversy first brought him to carry out this principle with scientific consciousness. If we wish, therefore, to make use of these later designations, we must say that the formal principle had been formed in his mind out of the material; both are combined in the one principle, that the historical Christ is the only source of salvation and of knowledge, in opposition to the mediation of an outward Church for salvation and the knowledge of salvation.

In modern times it has often been urged as a distinction between the Lutheran and Reformed Churches, that although both agree in this twofold principle, yet that one or the other has preponderated. Some truth lies at the basis of this statement, but we cannot acknowledge it as true in this form. As to the charge of a one-sided over-valuation of Holy Writ, by viewing it out of its connexion with History and the material principle, and falling into a slavish adherence to the letter, when the externalizing of the formal principle was further developed, we do not find these faults generally in the distinguished men of the Reformation. But when, at a later period, the movement was checked, and the Bible was, in a one-sided manner, in opposition to Catholic principles, asserted as the source of Christian knowledge, the same defect was found equally in both Churches; neither in the one nor the other did the formal principle stand in living connexion with the material, and in both the idea of Inspiration was evidently carried to too great a length. In LUTHER's Reformation it was a striking characteristic, that everything proceeded from CHRIST as the central point, and the reformatory development extended only so far as the connexion with the material principle could be shown, so that much of the ancient was left, and the dogmatic tendency remained predominant, while the application to ecclesiastical life continued proportionately sub-

ordinate. On the other hand, under ZWINGLI and CALVIN the Reformatory tendency did not proceed with the same moderation from this central point, but from the beginning there was a marked effort to reform everything by means of it, and to realize the idea of the kingdom of God—to restore its original forms, and to remove everything which was at variance with it. Hence the attempt to frame the Church on the Apostolic model. As far as the idea of the kingdom of God predominated, the stronger influence of the Old Testament found also a point of connexion. A variety of outward conditions, especially the political relations under which the Reformation was developed, thus came into consideration.

While the principle of acknowledging the supreme authority of Holy Writ was in this way developed in LUTHER'S Reformation, it was first of all scientifically stated by MELANCTHON on the occasion of the Leipsig Disputation, in which ECK attacked a statement made by that reformer in one of his letters which thus acquired notoriety. He says\* that it is a duty to abide by the pure and simple meaning of Holy Writ, as, indeed, heavenly truths are always the simplest; this meaning is to be found by comparing Holy Writ with itself. On this account we study Holy Writ, in order to pass judgment on all human opinions by it as an universal touchstone. As the Catholic Church made the Interpretation of Holy Writ dependent on Tradition, and could prove many doctrines only by the latter, the controversy principally turned on the doctrine of the supreme source of knowledge, and the contrary tenet especially was brought under discussion at the Council of TRENT. As it was there treated, in A.D. 1546, no little perplexity arose how the relation between Tradition and Holy Writ was to be determined. A Carmelite monk, ANTONIO MARINARI, delivered a remarkable address.†

\* *Contra Eckium Defensio, Corpus Reformatorum, ed Brotschneider, t. i. p. 113.*—Puto non temere fieri, sicuti sententiis Sancti Patres variant, quemadmodum solet (solent?) ut iudice scriptura recipiantur; non (ne?) ipsorum nempe variantibus iudiciis, scriptura vim patiatur. Quandoquidem unus aliquis et simplex scripturæ sensus est, ut et celestis veritas simplicissima est, quem collatis scripturis e filo ductuque orationis licet assequi. In hoc enim iubemur philosophari in scripturis divinis, ut hominum sententias decretaque ad ipsas ceu ad Lydiam lapidem exigamus.

† Paul Sarpi *Geschichte des Trident. Concils, Uebersetzung von Rambach, Thl. i. p. 172.*

There was certainly this difference, he remarked, between the Old and New Testament, that in the latter the doctrine was no longer confined to the letter, but propagated itself as a living spirit. The Church existed before the Scriptures, but yet Christ did not forbid his Apostles to commit his doctrine to writing; and as soon as a written exposition of it existed along with the verbal annunciation, both sources of knowledge must possess equal authority. But if two sets of Articles of Faith were proposed, the greatest perplexity would arise, for then a criterion must be sought to distinguish the two; and how could it be explained why the Apostles had written down one thing, and not another? How could it be supposed that the Apostles were prevented from writing down anything which was truth? Hence, like the Fathers, we could hold nothing firmly respecting the relation of Scripture and Tradition, and only make use of Tradition when it was needful. This gave great offence. In the fourth Session of the Council\* it was decreed that the source of knowledge for Truth relating to Faith and Discipline was contained in the Bible and the oral Tradition which was handed down from Christ's mouth by the Apostles; or, under the inspiration of the Holy Spirit, it is come down from them to us, from hand to hand; that all things relating to Dogma and Morals are to be drawn from the Holy Scriptures and Tradition, which is evermore preserved in its integrity by constant Succession. Both are to be received with equal piety.

In the EVANGELICAL CHURCH, on the contrary, Tradition could only avail as a historical witness of the Truth, but required another criterion, the divine Word in Holy Writ, to distinguish between the True and the False. LUTHER expressly guarded himself against being misunderstood, as if he wished to introduce a new legislation for the Church,

\* Sessio iv. Decretum de Canonicis Scripturis: hanc veritatem et disciplinam contineri in libris scriptis et sine scripto traditionibus, quæ ad ipsius Christi ore ab Apostolis acceptæ aut ab ipsis Apostolis Spiritu Sancto dictantæ, quasi per manus traditæ, ad nos usque pervenerunt; orthodoxorum Patrum exempla secreta, omnes libros tam veteris quam novi testamenti, cum utriusque unus Deus sit auctor, nec non traditiones ipsas, tum ad fidem, tum ad mores pertinentes, tamquam vel ore tenus a Christo vel a Spiritu Sancto dictatas, et continua successione in Ecclesia Catholica conservata, pari pietatis affectu ac reverentia suscipit et veneratur.

independent of Holy Writ, with the Confessions, which always pre-supposed the importance of Holy Writ as the only normative source. Also, in the *Formula Concordiæ*, when there had been already a departure in practice from free principles, and too much had been ceded to Church Authority (a limitation which the Formula itself promoted), the same principle was thus expressed : \* Holy Scripture is the only Rule by which all teachers and doctrines are to be tried ; all Church Symbols are only witnesses for the Faith. This principle was firmly retained in theory, though in practice it was not adhered to ; but unconsciously a Catholic element again mingled with it. Only the extreme defenders of the symbolical Books went so far against the freer tendency of Pietism in the seventeenth Century, that they ascribed even to the symbolical Books a certain Inspiration, in order to deduce from it their infallibility.

But yet the Catholic doctrine of Tradition contained a truth which even the Evangelical Church could admit, the acknowledgment of a continued development of the Christian consciousness, the importance of an historical witness for the development of the Truth, only that in it Christian and un-Christian Tradition went side by side. The Evangelical Church had paid too little attention to the historical connection with Antiquity. On the other hand, reactions arose, especially that of GEORGE CALIXTUS,† who wished to lead

\* *Form. Concordiæ Epitome* i. 1.—Credimus, confitemur et docemus unicam regulam et normam, secundum quam omnia dogmata, omnisque Doctores æstimari et judicari oporteat, nullam omnino aliam esse quam prophetica et apostolica scripta cum veteris tum novi Testamenti, sicut scriptum est Ps. cxix. 105 ; Gal. i. 8.—2. Reliqua vero sive patrum sive neotericorum scripta, quocunque veniant nomine, sacris literis nequaquam sunt æquiparanda, sed universa illis ita subjicienda sunt, ut alia ratione non recipiantur, nisi testium loco, qui doceant, quod etiam post apostolorum tempora et in quibus partibus orbis doctrina illa prophetarum et apostolorum sincerior conservata sit.—8. Cætera autem symbola et alia scripta, quorum paullo ante mentionem fecimus, non obtinent auctoritatem judicis ; hæc etiam dignitas solis sacris literis debetur, sed dumtaxat pro religione nostra testimonium dicunt eamque explicant, &c.

† *De Præceptis Christianæ Religionis Capitibus*, 1613 ; *De Causa hodierni Odii Philosophiæ et Solidæ Eruditionis*, 1619 ; *Epitome Theologiæ Positivæ*, 1619 ; *Epitome Theologiæ Moralis*, 1634 ; *De Auctoritate Antiquitatis Ecclesiasticæ*, 1639 ; *De Universalis Primævæ Ecclesiæ Auctoritate*, 1640 ; *Scripta Facientia ad Colloquium Thoruni*, 1645 ;

back in the historical direction, prompted by the desire to promote pacific measures as far as the controversial spirit that had hitherto prevailed would allow. CALIXTUS believed that the common foundation of the Christian Truth was to be found in the Tradition of the first five Centuries, to which existing controversies might be referred. He developed his opinion in his remarks on the *Commonitorium* of VINCENTIUS LERINENSIS, edited by him in 1629, whose principles he wished to revive. These statements formed the subject of the Syncretic Controversy. Amidst the attacks made upon him, CALIXTUS confined himself to asserting that the Holy Scriptures alone must be regarded as the prime authority, trustworthy in itself, and Tradition as subordinate. But his theory of Tradition then was something wavering and yet arbitrary, since it was illogical to limit himself to the recognition of the first five centuries. But his Statements might have led to an examination of the Idea of Tradition.

In the REFORMED CHURCH a similar reaction led back to the more historical view. It proceeded from JAMES ARMINIUS,\* and found its chief supporter in HUGO GROTIUS.† On account of his Irenical tendencies, the latter took the same path in his remarks on the Irenical opinion of the Dutch theologian, GEORGE CASSANDER,‡ and in his *Via ad*

Habitu, 1645; *De Tolerantia Reformatorum circa Quæstiones inter ipsos et Augustanam Confessionem Professos Controversas Consultatio: Desiderium et Studium Concordiæ Ecclesiasticæ*, 1650; Henke, Georg Calixtus u. seine Zeit, 1853. Ueber die Synkretischen Streitigkeiten Abr. Calov. *Historia Syncretistica. d. i. Christ. Wohlbegründetes Bedenken üb. d. Kirchenfrieden u. Christ. Einigkeit*. Gress. 1682, 85, 4to. J. G. Walch, *Religionstreitigkeiten der Luther. Kirche* i. p. 216. Planck, *Geschichte des Protestantischen Theologie von der Concordienformel u. s. w.* p. 90. H. Schmid, *Gesch. der Synkretist. Streitigkeiten*, 1846. W. Gass, *Calixtus u. der Synkretismus*, Berlin, 1846.

\* Arminii Opp. Theologica, Lugd. Bat. 1629. 4to. G. Brandt, *Vita Arminii*, ed. Moshemius, Bonon. 1726. *The Life and Death of James Arminius and Episcopus*, London, 1772. Brandt, *Historie der Reformation en Ontrendt de Nederlanden*, Amsterd. 1671—1704, 4 voll. Jacob Regenborg, *Historie der Remonstrantur*, Amsterd. 1704, 3 Thle. Deutsch, Lemgo, 1781.

† Heincr. Luden, *Hugo Grotius nach seinen Schicksalen und Schriften*, Berlin, 1806. Opp. Theol. Amsterd. 1679.

‡ *De Atque Religio inter Catholicos et Protestantibus Controversis ad Ferdinandum I. et Maximilianum II. Consultatio*, Colon. 1566, ed. H. Grotius, Lugd. Batav. 1642.

*pacem ecclesiasticam.* He himself declared that Tradition was a source of knowledge, but that it was more difficult and toilsome to elicit the truth from it. The essential doctrines of Salvation are no doubt contained fully in the New Testament. Since all truth rests on the evidence of two witnesses, both are to be made use of. But all these Statements were not sufficiently certain, and did not lead to a more exact investigation. In modern times a more historical tendency has called forth doubt respecting the genuineness of certain writings of the Canon, which have had the effect, on the other side, of enhancing the authority of Tradition. But still only thus much has been the result, that though Tradition has weight as a witness, yet a higher source of knowledge is required, in order to distinguish between Christian Truth and what is foreign to it.

In reference to SOCINIANISM,\* the question may be proposed, whether it agrees with this formal principle of the Reformation, or whether Reason does not occupy in it the place of the supreme source of Knowledge. Indeed, if we judge of this System by particular doctrines, it may seem that it rests on rationalistic principles. Yet it will appear that it does not proceed alone from such a tendency, but can be developed only on the supposition of a source given by Revelation. It is here of great importance to distinguish the principles and their application, what is consciously expressed, and what unconsciously lies at the foundation. The best explanation of this tendency will be obtained from the genetic development of the doctrine. Socinianism agreed with the Reformation in its negations, in waging war against Church authority and Scholasticism, and likewise in its practical interests. But in the Practical it set out from quite a different point; it sprung, not from a distinct Christian principle, but only from a general religious interest, and hence

\* Bibliotheca Fratrum Polonorum, Irenopoli (Amsterdam), 1656, 8 t. f. Catechesmus Racoviensis, ed. Oeder, Francf. 1739. J. G. Walch, der Streitigkeiten Auserhalb der Lutherischen Kirche, Th. i. 562. Rambach, Einleitung in der Religionsstreitigkeiten der Evangelischen Kirche mit den Socinianen, Koburg. 1753. Ziegler, Lehr. Begriff der Socinianer in Henkes neuem Magazin, Bd. 4, p. 201. O. Fock der Socinianismus in der Gesamtentwicklung des Christ. Geistes nach seinem Histor. Verlauf u. Lehrbegriff, Kiel, 1845. Baur, Lehre von der Dreieinigkeit, iii 164. Dörner, Lehre v. der Person Christi, ii. 751.



was not intimately connected with Christian doctrine; the formal principle was, therefore, not grounded in the material. All that appeared of practical importance was connected with the juridical point of view. Its founder was LÆLIUS SOCINUS\* (died A.D. 1562), a priest of Sienna, from whom his nephew, FAUSTUS SOCINUS† (died A.D. 1604), received its fundamental doctrines. He studied the Scriptures from a juridical interest; he wished to establish his jurisprudence firmly on the principles of divine right, as the source of all human equity. This fact is instructive in forming a judgment of his tendency, for it is evident that such an interest was not suited to enable him to arrive at a deeper view of Christianity. When he examined the Scriptures he discovered the contradictions between the Bible and the existing Church. The prevalent Scepticism in Italy, the Deism and Atheism, had not left him untouched in personal intercourse with men who were infected with these errors; yet the religious faith was sufficiently powerful in him to form a counterpoise to the consequences of doubt. He, therefore, never fell into total Unbelief, but he became perplexed about the Faith he had hitherto held. The Church doctrine could not help him, and he endeavoured now to form a doctrinal scheme of his own. There was no distinct central point of his own religious life from which he started; he examined the Scriptures on a regular plan for the original doctrine, took journeys, and formed acquaintance with foreign Theologians. His juridical point of view and his cold intellectualism placed him in opposition to deeper speculation and the mystical Element: what was more intensely Christian was excluded. He had no internally grounded supernatural Standpoint, but a one-sided Understanding, which outwardly submitted to Supernaturalism, and a one-sided intellectual Supernaturalism, which contained the germ of Rationalism. Hence the supernatural Element, which was added only from without, needed only to be set aside, and Rationalism took its

\* Orelli Lælius Socinus Baseler wissensch. Zeitschr. Bb. 3, Heft. 3. Trechsel Lælio Sozeni und die Antitrinitaner seiner Zeit, Heidelb. 1844.

† Opp. Irenopoli, 1656, 2 t. Vita Faust Socini (by Samuel Orcipeovius), 1636, 4to., and Opp. F. Socinii, t. i. Joshua Toulmin, *Memoirs of the Life, Character, and Writings of F. Socinus*, London, 1777, 8vo.

place. It was altogether an empirical standpoint, so far from Idealism, that it formed its exact opposite, and the relationship to Ebionitism was much greater than to Gnosticism. In the work of FAUSTUS SOCINUS, *De auctoritate Scripturæ Sacræ*, which he wrote in behalf of Supernaturalism, we may recognise an extravagant view of it. He here asserts with earnestness that the doctrines of Christianity can only be derived from the Holy Scriptures; as to what concerns human Reason, it is, in his esteem, very subordinate in reference to matters which proceed from Revelation. In the second chapter he shows that Religion is in nowise a matter of Nature and Reason; that if there is a true Religion, it could only be a revealed one. SOCINUS did not merely distinguish between the doctrines of Religion derived from Reason, and those from Revelation, or natural and positive, but he went farther; he maintained that there was no Natural Religion whatever, and that all religious Tradition was to be traced to a divine Revelation as its basis. He appealed to the account of Missionaries in the Brazils, that tribes were found without any Religion. The denial of all Natural Religion led him to the forced interpretation of those passages in the Epistle to the Romans in which the opposite is affirmed. That nevertheless he recognised a moral Law independent of Revelation, a power of Conscience, which could even exist where men knew nothing of God, has an important bearing on the whole dogmatic standpoint of Socinianism. On this scheme the Ethical and the Religious are without any internal connexion; and as Religion comes only from without, and is met by no religious nature in Man, to which it can attach itself, that place is not to be found in the Spirit, in which all Religion must develop itself. Hence it is self-evident that Dogmatics are quite extraneous to human nature. The relation in which this Supernaturalism stood to Reason will be shown by the following statements. The Socinian JOHN CRELL, Preacher and Professor in Cracow (died A.D. 1633), says: \* “Mysteries are indeed exalted above Reason, but they do not overturn (*evertunt*) it; they by no means extinguish its light, but only perfect it.” Another, MARTIN RUARUS, had a memorable controversy on this subject with the Lutheran Theologian, ABRAHAM CALOVIVS. The

\* De Deo et ejus Attributis.

former combated the assertion of Reason being made captive to the obedience of Faith, and regarded it as founded on a false interpretation of Scripture. What must become of us, he said, if Reason were fettered? There is no other organ but this given by God, in order to find out the meaning of Holy Writ when it has been disturbed by false exposition. Here Reason appears only as the organ of Man for Scripture Inquiry and exposition.\* But if from the Socinian standpoint it was maintained, along with the Evangelical Church, that the Bible contained nothing contradictory to reason, its advocates went very arbitrarily to work in the application of this canon. Many axioms of a contracted Understanding were laid down by the Socinians as undeniable laws of Reason; and since they had determined that nothing in Revelation was at variance with these axioms, they interpreted the Bible in a forced manner. Among the axioms which ANDREW WISSOWATIUS† laid down in his dogmatical work, and which, as he said, nothing in Scripture could contradict, are some which would only be received as axioms from the standpoint of Socinianism. The transition to Rationalism was already visible. Everywhere the consequences made themselves felt, that the formal principle was laid down, not under the suppositions of the corruption of human nature, of the disturbance of the Reason by Sin, the need of Redemption, the consciousness that the reason is first made free by Regeneration—suppositions which are made by the Evangelical Church; and according to the Socinian view, it required only the Understanding, not an immediate religious consciousness, in order to understand the Holy Scriptures, and to deduce from them the doctrines of the Christian Faith. Faith must here proceed only from a logical conviction, without a union of the Intellectual and the Practical.

It was a one-sided subjective tendency which made its appearance in Socinianism. Here it took the path of the Understanding, and led to Rationalism; but it could also take that of the Feelings, and then assumed the form of MYSTICISM.

In the Mysticism of the Middle Ages we already distinguish

\* Zeltner, *Historia Crypto-Socinismi Altorphinæ Academicæ Infesti* Lips. 1729.

† (Arsenius Sophianus) *Religio Rationalis sive de Rationis Judiciis in Controversiis etiam Theologicis Adhibendo*, 1685.

between a reaction of the Christian consciousness and a certain Rationalism in the form of a pantheistic and idealistic Mysticism, the injurious effects of which were only turned aside and checked by the Reformation. It now first came forward as a power of positive religious enthusiasm. In the Reformation we recognise, indeed, two tendencies operating in harmonious connexion, the reaction of a subjective living Christianity, in opposition to Scholasticism, and the outward mechanism of the *opus operatum*, which shows itself in the doctrine of Faith; and, on the other hand, the reference to the objective of the Divine Word, which was necessarily connected with the idea of Faith; but in the religious ferment which was excited at the Reformation, and in the strong opposition of the subjective religious consciousness against the lifeless objectivity, it happened that the subjective tendency separated itself from the objective and became one-sided. We find the first symptoms of it during the residence of LUTHER at the Wartburg, A.D. 1520, among the ZWICKAU PROPHETS,\* and since that time this subjective one-sidedness has frequently made itself felt in the form of MYSTICISM.† Men came forward who charged the Reformers with introducing a new Bibliolatry, who lightly esteemed the Bible, and exalted the inward Light above it. THOMAS MUNZER‡ declared that if God had wished to convert Man by a book, he could have caused a Bible to fall from Heaven. We may even at this time see a rationalistic germ springing out of this Mysticism. LUTHER mentions§ that about A.D. 1525, at Wittenberg, people were to be met with who maintained that the Holy Spirit was nothing but the natural Reason. This tendency is more clearly represented in THEOBALD THAMER,||

\* Schneider, Bibliothek der Kirchengeschichte, ii., iii. Corpus Reform. i. 533.

† Erbkam, Geschichte der Protest. Sekten im Zeitalter der Reformation, 1848.

‡ Historie Thoma Munzers von Ph. Melanchthon. Luther's Werke von Walch. xvi. 199. Leben, Schriften, und Lehren Thoma Munzers von G. Th. Strobel, 1795. L. v. Baczko in Woltmann's Zeitschr. für Geschichte und Politik, 1840.

§ Luther's Briefe von de Wette, ii. 641.—Novum genus prophetarum ex Antwerpis hic habeo asserentium, Spiritum Sanctum nihil aliud esse quam ingenium et rationem naturalem.

|| C. A. Salig, Geschichte der Ausburger Confession, Bd. 3. Neander

who was a native of Alsatia, and for a long time Professor at Marburg, where he made himself noted for his extreme Supranaturalism and polemic zeal; in the Smalcald War he accompanied the Hessian army as military chaplain. By the immorality which he discovered in his intercourse with the rude soldiery he saw that he was deceived in his ideal expectations of the Reformation, became dissatisfied with it, and laid the blame especially on the Lutheran doctrine of Justification. Engaged in controverting this, he turned more and more against the formal principle. He now advanced in a mystical, rationalistic direction, various elements of which existed in his mind. Instead of the authority of the divine Word as the supreme source of religious Belief, he laid down three sources: the Creature, the Spiritual Conscience, and the true Holy Writ. The defect of the Lutherans was, that they had only one source; the Conscience is the *Deus Revelatus*, it is Christ in our hearts; the letter without us cannot testify of the Truth within us apart from the Conscience; in the Conscience is the living Word, and the Divinity of Christ; all the truth of the Gospel is already founded in it. He appealed to this fact, that Christian precept: Do not to another what thou wouldst not have done to thyself, which is the chief maxim of Christian morals, is also to be derived from the Conscience. The question arises, what need is there of Revelation, if everything already exists in the Conscience? He says: The heart of Man is like a flint, from which the hidden fire must be struck out. Nothing new is brought to it, but what is already in it is aroused. Accordingly, Historical Christianity is not to be absolutely rejected, but its special value consists in bringing to open view what exists in the human soul. Christ is only the example of the highest virtue. The inward Word of Conscience lies already in the heart; the oral Word and the Letter only confirm it, in order that we may be without excuse at the Last Day. To PHILIP, Landgrave of Hesse, he wrote: \* "Although animals cannot speak as we do, yet I am sure that your Grace better understands the cry of the hounds than if some one read Hebrew." His opposition against the Reformation and the rough treatment he

Theob. Thamer, der Repräsentant und Vorgänger Moderner Geistesrichtung, 1842.

\* Th. Rommel, Philipp der Grossmuthige, 1830, Bd. 3.

experienced at last led him back to Catholicism. He could easily attach himself to the Catholic Anthropology, and his hatred of the Reformation made him welcome to the Catholic party. He now represented the Tradition of the Catholic Church be to a progressive development of Christianity, which, according to his notions, was like a progressive revelation of Reason, and accused the Reformation of setting itself in opposition to this progress.

Mysticism was afterwards called forth repeatedly by the onesidedness of literal orthodoxy. It assumed in England the most systematic shape, and was embodied in a remarkable phenomenon—the sect of the QUAKERS.\* England, during and after the Revolution in the reign of Charles I., was in the greatest religious ferment, in which the most opposite tendencies germinated, from a stiff adherence to formalism, to a completely spiritual internal tendency; rationalistic, deistic, pantheistic, and mystic elements, were found co-existing with High Churchism. During this period lived GEORGE FOX,† a shepherd, who, while engaged in this occupation, gave himself up to religious meditation. He adopted the notion, that all controversies are only owing to men's withdrawing from the Inward, and attending to the Outward. The sect, of which he was the founder, developed this sentiment, and carried out, consequentially, the doctrine of the Inward Light. All other sources of knowledge were subordinate to this. All external order was excluded in the constitution of the Church.

\* *Catechesis et Confessio, quæ Continet Narrationem Dogmatum, quæ Creduntur ab Ecclesiis Quacerorum*, Rotterd. 1676. German, Leipzig, 1752. W. Penn, *A Summary of the History, Doctrine, and Discipline of Friends*, Lond. 1692. Evans, *An Exposition of the Faith of the Religious Society of Friends in the Fundamental Doctrines of the Christian Religion*, selected from their early Writings, Philadelphia and York, 1829. *Rules of Discipline of the Religious Society of Friends*, with *Advices*, being *Extracts from the Minutes and Epistles of the early Meetings held in London from its first Institution*, London, 1783, 3 ed. 1834. Gurney, *Observations on the Religious Peculiarities of the Society of Friends*, London, 1824. *Observations on the Distinguishing Views and Practices of the Society of Friends*, 7 ed. Lond. 1834. Croesii *Hist. Quakeriana*, Amst. 2 ed. 1696. Sewel, *Gesch. vom Ursprung, Zunehmen und Fortgang der Christen so Quäker genannt werden*, Holland, Amst. 1717.

† *Collection of Christian Epistles written by G. Fox*, London, 1698, 2 vols. fol. *Journal of the Life, Travels, and Sufferings of G. Fox*, London, 1691.

ROBERT BARCLAY\* gave development to these principles. He says that highest source of knowledge—Divine Revelation and Illumination—is something internal, trustworthy, and self-evident, which necessitates well-ordered, susceptible Reason to accept it by the indwelling evidence, not less than the principles of the universal truths of Reason in earthly things.† Holy Writ is a *declaratio fontis*, not the original source of knowing the Truth; it is no adequate rule for doctrine and morals, though it gives a true and credible testimony to the original source of knowledge. It is subordinate to the Holy Spirit, from whom it derives its excellence.‡ It is worthy of notice, that he argues for the subordination of Scripture to the Inward Light, on the same grounds as Catholicism pleads for the necessity of Tradition. He points to the many contradictory interpretations of the Bible, which require a higher criterion, and this can only be found in the inward Divine Word. The subjective tendency, if carried out to its consequences, might lead to entirely giving up the Objectivity of Divine Revelation. There are two parties among the Quakers, one of which, forming the majority, firmly holds the peculiar Christian doctrines given in Revelation; the other, represented particularly by the American, ELIAS HICKS, opposes this acknowledgment as a restraint in matters of Religion, and inclines to the Deistical tendency.§

A phenomenon, which appeared in Germany, on the border of the ancient, and of a new section of the development of Theology, is deserving of notice; it was a subjective Rationalism, veiled in onesided Mysticism, the omen of a future Idealism, which denies the reality of History. This we find in an enthusiast, with whose character we have first become acquainted in modern times, DANIEL MÜLLER.|| He was a

\* *Theologia vere Christianæ Apologia*, 1676; Latin and English.

† Thesis 2.—For this Divine Revelation and Inward Illumination is that which is evident and clear of itself, forcing by its own evidence and clearness the well-disposed understanding to assent, irresistibly moving the same thereunto, even as the common principles of natural truths move and incline the mind to a natural assent.

‡ Thesis 2.

§ Bennet, *The History of Dissenters during the last Thirty Years*, 1808—38, London, 1839. *Evangel. Kirchenzeitung*, 1838, p. 806; 1839, p. 782; 1840, p. 141.

|| Keller, Daniel Müller, *Religiöser Schwärmer des Achtzehnt. Jahrh.*, Leipzig, 1834. *Ilgen. Ztschr. für Histor. Theologie*, 1834.

man of a low condition in life, and born A.D. 1716, in Nassau, at the time of the Pietist movements, when various indications of an inward religious life made their appearance in Germany, and many opposing circumstances excited a longing for a new development of the Church. At first he attached himself to the secondary effects of Pietism, and busied himself with JACOB BOEHME, and other Mystics. For a long time also he was engaged in historical studies, and his Mysticism became connected with an historical Scepticism. At this juncture also, there was the commencement of a rationalistic reaction, especially by the appearance of the Wolfenbuttle Fragments. But neither of the two parties—neither the Church nor the Rationalistic—suited him. He wished to maintain the authority of the Bible against the new Scepticism, and to insist on its Inspiration in the most unqualified sense. But, on the other hand, he was not satisfied with Orthodoxy; he was led to a peculiar religious Idealism, by which he wished to establish a harmony of all religions. An original Revelation was at the basis of all of them, the symbols of which had been misunderstood. Everything in the Old Testament and the New was to be understood symbolically; it was the garb of God's inner Revelation, and of the eternal revelation of the divine Logos. Everything historical, as such, is untrue; it is only the clothing of ideal truth. In this view of the Life of Christ, although proceeding on quite different principles, he was the forerunner of the modern mythic school, and combated the belief in the historical miracles of Christ, on grounds very similar to those brought forward by STRAUSS. If such miracles, he says, as feeding the five thousand, had actually happened, all the Jews would have received Christ, and would not have crucified him. To those who wished for such miracles, Jesus said: "This adulterous generation seek after signs and wonders, but none shall be given them, save the sign of the Prophet Jonah," which meant the three days of Christ in the literal grave.

Gradually, as reason became more autonomic, it threw off the mystic and supernaturalist garb, and claimed to be the only source of the knowledge of the Faith. Thus Rationalism openly appeared. This tendency first attached itself to Theology, in the Reformed Church of Holland. It was in the seventeenth century, when the Arminian Controversy had

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given birth to a spirit of free inquiry, in opposition to Orthodoxy. To this was added the influence of DES CARTES and SPINOZA, and the criticism of BAYLE. But the name of Rationalism, which was employed about this time, had a different sense. From the standpoint of the old dogmatic Scholasticism, everything appeared as THEOLOGIA RATIONALIS, which deviated from this slavish adherence to the letter. This term, moreover, was used to designate the tendency of those who, in fact, adopted the principle, that everything must be derived from reason. Thus that profound mystic, PETER POIRET,\* designates the standpoint of an Idolatry of Reason, which opposed all Revelation, and denied all inward and outward experience of it,—which made Religion to consist in knowledge, under the names of *ideistæ et rationalistæ*. A very influential work in this development was published by a physician, LEWIS MEIER, a scholar of SPINOZA, entitled *Philosophia scripturæ sacræ interpret*.† The arguments which Catholics and Quakers had employed against the supreme authority of Scripture, were here applied in favour of Reason, which was held up as the only sure criterion in Religious Controversies. Thence the tendency spread to Germany, at first, gradually; afterwards, owing to the freer religious tendency which was occasioned by the Pietist movements, and through the influence of the Wolfian philosophy, the soil was prepared, and it reached here to a more logical completeness, and now turned itself against both Orthodoxy and Pietism. In the development of Rationalism, two modifications chiefly are to be distinguished: in the first place, empirical Rationalism, which saw in Christianity a certain temporary clothing of universal religious truths, and to which Revelation was only a training-school for the truth, an arrangement of Providence, in order to lead Reason to a knowledge of it. It valued Christianity, therefore, as the most complete clothing of Natural Religion, but ignored its historical character. Only the acknowledgment of such religious truths remained, which, in this form, had become matters of

\* *Cogitationes Rationales de Deo, Anima et Malo*, 1677, 1685, 1715; directed against Spinozism. On his writings, see J. G. Waleh, *Einleitung in die Religionsstreitigkeiten Ausserhalb der Lutherischen Kirche*, Thl. iv. p. 911.

† *Amst.* 1666.

consciousness only through the influence of Revelation, such as faith in a personal God, in moral freedom, and in personal Immortality. Against this standpoint, a fundamental study of History, which taught a more correct knowledge of Christianity, a deeper view of the religious nature of Man, and a deeper speculation, must equally be opposed. On the other hand, Rationalism could not fail to attain to greater consistency; for in it there was the struggle of Reason to bring its subjectivity to its highest pitch, and everything which claimed to be acknowledged as an external authority, was a stone of stumbling to it. Hence Rationalism must reach a point where Reason would recognise only itself in all things. In its consequential development, not merely in Theology, but also in Philosophy, it overstepped the deistical form, in which the older Rationalism was confined, and became Pantheism. Thus it was the result of this process, that all existence was melted down in the crucible of a self-idolizing Reason.

## THE SPECIAL HISTORY OF DOGMAS.

### A. THE INTRODUCTORY DOGMAS.

#### THE DOCTRINE OF INSPIRATION.

As the Scholastic Theology was occupied so little with the Interpretation of the Bible, it was not led to the more exact discussion of this Dogma, which was still so undefined. But freer exegetical inquiry about the time of the Reformation led to it, in a similar manner to what had already taken place in the Antiochian School. To the germs of a new development which are to be found in ERASMUS of ROTTERDAM, belong also his sentiments relating to Inspiration. He had been attacked by ECK, on account of certain expressions in his commentary on MATTHEW, respecting the defects in the language of the Apostles. ECK proceeded on the assumption of a verbal Inspiration, and charged ERASMUS with heresy, when he professed love and esteem for him. ERASMUS justified himself in a letter, written A.D. 1528.\* He did not deny the miraculous gift of tongues, yet he did not admit that all their knowledge of languages proceeded from that. Why should a knowledge be granted to them in a supernatural manner,

\* Epp. ii. 26.

which they could attain in a natural way? He found marks of the latter, in their mode of speaking Greek; we ought not to require that the Holy Ghost should teach them the purest Greek. It was not our business to prescribe in what manner the Spirit should operate on their minds. He so guided the sacred writers, that they still remained men; and we do not ascribe all things in the Apostles equally to miracle. ERASMUS, therefore, would distinguish between the divine agency and human conditionality. Christ, he says, allowed his disciples to err, even after they had received the illumination of the Holy Spirit; only not to the injury of the doctrines of Faith. How do you know whether Christ did not wish to reserve for himself alone the honour of entire freedom from error?

The discussions excited at first no wider influence, for the great movement of the Reformation was too much controlled by dogmatic interests, to allow of progress in the way just indicated. But LUTHER, on the other hand, arrived at a freer view of the idea of Inspiration.\* The positive religious interest gave him this freedom; he set out from the doctrine of Justification by Faith, and since he firmly grasped this vital principle, he formed a judgment on other points with so much greater freedom, which corresponded to his unprejudiced truthfulness. From that central point was developed not a mere intellectual, but a dogmatic tendency, of deeper vitality. He had not, indeed, leisure and time, fully to develop his idea of Inspiration, but he makes it sufficiently intelligible in many scattered expressions. In his preface to the Epistle of JAMES, he says:† What Christ does not teach, that is not apostolic, even though PETER or PAUL preach it;‡ and again, what Christ preaches, that is apostolic, even if JUDAS and HEROD preached it. Therefore, the more or less anything treats of Christ himself, his doctrine or his work, so much greater or less importance has it for Christianity as doctrine, for Christ himself is the central point of doctrine, since He is the ground of salvation. The more anything refers itself to Him so much the more is the communication of the divine spirit to be acknowledged therein.‡ On the same epistle, he says: Wherefore the Epistle of JAMES is a downright strawy Epistle

\* Bretschneider, *Luther an unsere Zeit*, p. 190.

† Opp. Walch, t. xiv. p. 149. *Erlanger Ausg.* lxi. p. 115 and 157.

‡ See *Vorrede auf das Neue Testament*, p. 105.

(compared with JOHN's Gospel and the Epistles of PAUL and PETER), for it has nothing evangelical in it. The Gospel of JOHN, the Epistles of PAUL, especially the Epistle to the Romans, and the first Epistle of PETER, he pronounces to be the very kernel and marrow of all the books of Holy Scripture; for in these there is not much of mighty deeds and miracles, but it is shown admirably how Faith in Christ overcomes Sin, Death, and Hell. We would not deny that from this point of view he allows himself to err in several onesided judgments on the Books of the Canon, but the significance is always important which the material principle of the Reformation had in them for the apprehension of Holy Writ. He also lays a stress on the Human in the Apostles, when he says of the Council of the Apostles at Jerusalem, that the Holy Spirit allowed JAMES to make a false step in some things.\* The Prophets, he says, had, without doubt, studied Moses, and the latter Prophets the earlier, and their good thoughts inspired by the Holy Spirit, were written in a book; but if hay, straw, and wood, were sometimes used by these faithful teachers and inquirers, and they did not build with pure silver, gold, and precious stones, still the Foundation remained; the fire of that day would destroy the rest, as PAUL says (1 Cor. iii. 12, 13).† On the quotations from the Old Testament, in the address of STEPHEN, he gives his opinion that it is unnecessary to take so much trouble to bring the dates of STEPHEN into agreement with MOSES. STEPHEN was no historian, but rested satisfied with the fact, that this history had been given by MOSES, and did not trouble himself about particular circumstances.‡ Also, he did not entirely overlook the irregularities of languages arising from human influences. He finds them in the Epistle to the Galatians, and says: But it pleased the Holy Spirit to retain such; for PAUL speaks with great earnestness, and a person in that state cannot pay attention to arrange all his words by the rules of art.§

If this track had been followed, a sounder idea of Inspi-

\* Walch, viii. p. 1042.

† Vorrede zu Wenzeslaus Lenk's Annotätiones zu den fünf Büchern Mosis. Walch, xiv. 170. Erlang, lxiii. 379.

‡ Zu Apostelgesch. vii. Band i. 1160.

§ Commentar zum Galaterbrief, Walch, viii. 1737.

ration and a corresponding system of Interpretation might have been formed. But the dogmatic development of the Protestant Church did not follow this impulse; since, in opposition to the Roman Church, they firmly held the Holy Scriptures to be the only source of the knowledge of the faith, they were wont to regard it as a rigid Code, and took no account of its mode of origination, and the peculiarities belonging to it. A onesided supranaturalism was added, and led to the mechanical idea of Inspiration, which regarded the writers as blind organs of the Holy Spirit. Grammatolatry and a more unbending Dogmatism prevailed; the Bible was treated as a dogmatical book—the Human, the Manifold, and the Historical, were left misunderstood. This, again, produced a reaction, which proceeded to a denial of Inspiration altogether. This reaction, which occasioned fresh investigations of the idea of Inspiration, proceeded from two quarters: first, from the formal principle, since unprejudiced study and examination of Scripture effected a modification, and then from the material principle, when, from the inmost centre of religious consciousness, Holy Writ and its origination were viewed. In the one case, there was a onesided intellectual tendency; in the other, a vital religious feeling. The first was true of the Socinians. FAUSTUS SOCINUS was far from lowering the authority of the Bible: he even composed, in vindication of the Scriptures, his treatise, *De auctoritate scripturæ sacræ*.\* Only by an immediate divine Revelation could the truth, as he thought, be communicated to the Sacred Writers. He appeals to 1 Cor. vii., where PAUL distinguishes what he said from what Christ said. But he believed that the operation of the Divine Spirit might not equally refer to everything. In reference to the Historical, the love of Truth and the Memory of the Apostles were sufficient for faithful tradition.† He found nothing to

\* Opp. t. i.

† Repugnantiae porro aut diversitates, seu verae, seu quæ videri tantum possint, quæ in rebus sunt parvi momenti, eas sunt quæ pertinent ad historiam. Qua in re aliud nihil est opus, nisi ea videre, quæ scripsit Joannes, qui Chrysostomus est dictus, in Proœmio commentariorum suorum in Evang. Matthæi. Ubi—plene huic quorundam objectioni respondet, contra auctoritatem nominatim quatuor Evangelistarum et fidem eorum narrationibus adjungendam summa est, eos nihil prorsus inter se dissentire in iis historiæ partibus, quæ alicujus sint momenti. Et quod in quibusdam rebus minimis inter se differant

perplex him, when the Apostles differed from one another in their account of unimportant facts. It served rather to establish their credibility, since we may see from it, that they did not write in concert.

To this side, moreover, belonged the Remonstrants, who also modified the idea of Inspiration by their distinction of essential and unessential. HUGO GROTIIUS says that we cannot, in a strict sense, speak of the Inspiration of the Historical portions of Scripture. For the Historical there was no such need of Inspiration; it was sufficient that the memory and carefulness of the writers were vigorous. He supports his opinion by the fact that LUKE, in the Introduction to his Gospel, appeals, not to Inspiration, but to the original records made use of by him, in order to establish the credibility of his narrative. The books of LUKE are canonical, not as inspired, but because pious and trustworthy. He distinguishes between Inspiration, in the strict sense, and a certain pious movement of the soul, a kind of aptitude, which impelled to deliver doctrines that were salutary for the life.\* Certainly, in GROTIIUS, there is a lack of a lively intuition of the connexion between the Dogmatic and the Ethical, when he attempts to carry out these distinctions. To the same effect, SIMON EPISCOPUS says: The Spirit left the sacred writers to their liability to err, in the narrative of circumstances and facts, for which natural knowledge and memory were sufficient. He notices the objection, that if they erred in such things, they might also, in essential cases, and replies that God did not commit what was important to their weakness, but to His own constant guidance.†

On the other side there was the same reaction of a freer spirit and of the immediate religious Life against the yoke of a onesided Dogmatic which controlled the Interpretation of

*hoc non salum illis non minuere, sed augere etiam debere auctoritatem et fidem. Hinc enim apparere eos non scripsisse quidpiam ad ipsis communi consensu confictum, reque vera diversos Scriptores fuisse, qui rei gestæ veritate impulsæ, idem re ipsa, aperte scripserunt.*

\* *Votum pro Pace Ecclesiastica, Opp. Theol., Amsterd. 1679, t. iii. p. 672.—Vox Spiritus Sancti ambigua est, nam aut significat afflatum divinum, qualem habuere tum prophetæ ordinarii, tum interdum David et Daniel aut significat pium motum sive facultatem impellentem ad loquendum salutaria vivendi præcepta.*

† *Institutiones, iv. 4.*

the Scriptures; this appeared in PIETISM and the UNITAS FRATRUM, and effected a freer movement and greater independence in the department of Scriptural investigation: and for the reason that ZINZENDORF referred everything to the central point he became freer in other points, and sometimes expressed himself about them in a remarkable manner; for instance, respecting the apparent discrepancies, and the forced Harmonies, the defects of which did not escape his notice.\*

The reaction against the despotism of Dogmatics led to another extreme. As before, only the Divine was sought to be known, so now, only the Human; and as before, men wished to find undeviating unity, so now they only looked for contradictions. Hence it was the function of the new development of Theology which proceeded from the reawakened Christian consciousness, to gain, if possible, a new view of the idea of Inspiration, which might equally satisfy the claims of Faith and of Science. In the departments of Apologetics, Dogmatics, and Exegesis, the object to be attained was a new creative development of theological Science.

## B. THE DOGMAS OF DOGMATICS STRICTLY SO CALLED.

### a. THEOLOGY.

#### 1. THE DOCTRINE OF GOD IN GENERAL.

THAT which constituted the central point of the Reformation did not lead at first to a more exact discussion of Theology in the strict sense. It is characteristic of the exhibition of the special principle of the Reformation, that MELANCTHON in the first edition of his *Loci*, gave himself full scope in Anthropology and Soteriology, but left out theological Dogmas along with many other subjects.† MELANCTHON gives an account of it in remarkable words which prove his sound practical interest, but at the same time show how by giving that interest a one-sided prominence, injustice might be done to the Scholasticism

\* Planck, *Gesch. der Protest. Theologie von der Concordienformel* An, p. 278.

† Herman von der Hardt, *Historia Litteraria Reformationis*, P. iv. p. 30.

of the Middle Ages. We would rather, he says, adore these Mysteries than examine them. Men ought not to bestow too much pains on the *Loci*, concerning God, the Trinity, and Creation. Not without nice discrimination he marks all these as Mysteries. What have the Schoolmen, he goes on to say, gained by busying themselves with these things alone? I could more easily overturn what they have said, than use their proofs, by which it were possible even to prove erroneous doctrine. Whoever does not know the doctrines of Sin, the Law, and Grace, I cannot call him a Christian. To know Christ is to know his benefits, which is what these Schoolmen do not teach.

On the other side, the reaction came against the older Standpoint, and made itself felt especially in reference to the divine attributes in SOCINIANISM. Its juridical point of view, which rejected the depths of Christian Dogmatics as mystical, renders its conception of the doctrine of the divine Attributes very inadequate. It is not an unprejudiced examination of the doctrines of the Bible, but in an abstract manner, God is recognised as a Lawgiver, as far as it is necessary for a motive to moral life. In the *Institutiones religionis Christianæ* of FAUSTUS SOCINUS, and in the Racovian Catechism, everything that is to be taught respecting God is comprised in the

\* Introduction, p. 31.—*Mysteria divinitates rectius adoraverimus, quam investigaverimus. Imo, sine magno periculo tentari non possunt; id quod non raro sancto viri etiam sunt experti. Et carne filium Deus, Opt. M. induit, ut nos a contemplatione majestatis suæ ad carnis adeoque fragilitatis nostræ contemplationem invitaret.*—Proinde non est, cur multum operæ ponamus in locis illis supremis, de Deo, de unitate, de trinitate Dei, de mysterio creationis, de modo incarnationis. Quæso te, quid ad secuti sunt jam tot seculis scholastici Theologistæ, cum in his locis solis versarentur? Nonne in disceptationibus suis, ut Paulus ait (ad Rom. i. 21) vani facti sunt dum tota vita nugantur de universalibus, formalitatibus, connotatis, et nescio quibus aliis manibus vocabulis! Et dissimulari eorum stultitia posset, nisi evangelium interius et beneficia Christi obscurassent nobis illæ stultæ disputationes. Jam si libeat ingenioso mihi esse in re non necessaria, facile queam evertere, quæcunque pro fidei dogmatis argumenta produxerunt, et in his quam multa rectius pro hæresibus quibusdam facere videntur, quam pro catholicis dogmatis? Reliquos vero locos, peccati vim, legem, gratiam qui ignorant; non video quomodo Christianum vocem. Nam ex his proprie Christus cognoscitur. Siquidem hoc est Christum cognoscere, beneficia ejus cognoscere; non quod isti docent; ejus naturas, modos incarnationis contueri.



Dogmas of the Unity, Eternity, Omnipotence, Justice, and Wisdom, since the conviction of these divine attributes suffices, to impel to the observance of the commands of God revealed by Christ. For this object it is not necessary to know anything of the essential goodness of God, as far as by that is meant something different from the *rectum* and *æquum* of the divine government. The Catechism does not treat the doctrines of God's Infinity and Omnipresence as necessary; it is enough for the doctrines of Religion to know that God by his knowledge and agency extends Himself everywhere; but this is already contained in his Power and Wisdom. SOCINUS regarded the idea of the divine Omnipresence as too mystical and questionable as far as it led to a sensuous and pantheistic filling of all things by God. Hence in an erroneous manner he kept God and the World apart, and while he endeavoured to assign ideas of Space to God, he attributed to him a limitation in reference to Space by excluding Him from the World. Hence he believed that the Scriptural expressions—"God filleth Heaven and Earth"—"God is not far from any of us"—ought to be corrected. In such passages he finds only a reference to the universal agency of God. Like him, JOHN CRELL impugns the doctrine of the divine Omnipotence in his treatise *De Deo et ejus attributis*.

FAUSTUS SOCINUS had a real practical interest in view, namely, to maintain Man's free agency and to impugn the doctrine of absolute Predestination. But from a horror of the latter doctrine he also denied the unconditional divine Prescience; for he could not harmonize the free agency of a created being with an unconditional foreknowledge; and since he firmly maintained the Freedom of Man, absolute Prescience must be denied. It belonged to the axioms of Reason, with which no doctrine of Revelation could be at variance. It was sufficient that God was present by His Power and his Knowledge; that thus he knew all human operations alike at their origination, and hence would prevent everything which was contrary to his designs. Consequently God becomes acquainted with History as events arise, and according to them forms his plan of the Universe. The doctrine of the divine Providence and Government is not thereby damaged, but rather set in a right light; for to what purpose would be the constant guidance of God, which is identical with Providence, if God had once for

all foreknown and determined everything? If it were objected that thus a certain relation to Time is attributed to God, he admitted this; without Succession there can be no infinite Duration; and in reference to God there is Past, Present, and Future. The later Dogmatics of the Socinians retained this principle. They asserted that God cannot foreknow a truth that is not determined, a contingency.

The REMONSTRANTS from their practical point of view made a near approach to the Socinians on this question. CONRAD VORSTIUS, in his treatise on the divine Attributes,\* expressed himself in a similar way; so did EPISCOPIUS, only with far greater modesty than SOCINUS. He found it difficult to admit the divine Omnipresence, because conceptions of space are not easily avoided in connexion with it. Yet he was not unaware of the difficulties on the other side. He preferred to determine nothing respecting it with absolute certainty. I would rather, he said, with Holy Writ observe the *ἐπιχεν*, and leave the decision respecting the *modus* of the divine Presence to God and the future Life.

♦

## 2. THE DOCTRINE OF THE TRINITY.

THE spirit of inquiry once aroused by the Reformation, gradually turned to the doctrine of the Trinity, and there were indeed at first tendencies which proceeded not from LUTHER's *material* principle, but from a speculative or onesided practical tendency, like that of the Socinians, or which by an investigation of the ancient Church doctrine and Holy Writ, led to a reaction against the current doctrine of the Trinity. It was in part an unbridled fondness for novelty, an unsteady movement, which after the old restraints had been broken through, and the spirit of inquiry was awakened, gained the ascendancy in those who commenced their inquiries not from an immediate religious interest, and whose interest in religion was far more theoretical and intellectual, and in whom there was not the befitting moral depth and purity. This fondness for novelty was the strongest, where attempts had been made to suppress all free movements—in Italy. But the reaction was not confined to this spot. Even earnest and

\* Tractatus Theologicus de Deo sive de Natura et Attributis Dei, Steinfurt, 1610. A. Schweizer, C. Vorstius Theol. Jahrb. v. Baur u. Zeller, 1857.

religious men indulged doubts, which the form of the doctrine of the Trinity as laid down in the Creeds might excite; especially would the formal principle of the Reformation require them to compare the Dogma with the Bible. At the beginning of the Reformation it had been assumed that the Symbolic doctrine of the Trinity was that of the early Church, and there was a desire to restore these dogmas again. But a more accurate study of the oldest doctrine made it evident, that that form of doctrine was not the original one, and so much the more were the ancient forms put forward in preference to those in current use. Hence also among the opponents of the Church doctrine of the Trinity appeared shades of the Semi-Arian and Arian kind: and others which revived the Samosatensian or Sabellian view, since they denied the pre-existence of Christ's divine nature.\*

JOHN CAMPANUS belonged to the Arian school.† He was a native of Cleves; for a long time he resided in Wittenberg as a teacher with his pupils; he took a share in the religious movement, but endeavoured to form a system of his own. With that aim he busied himself with examining the Fathers, principally on account of the doctrine of the Trinity. This formed a special point of contact between him and WICEL,‡ who also was anxious to restore the ancient doctrine of the Church. Yet in CAMPANUS the speculative interest was far more predominant, and in WICEL the practical; and it would be unfair to class them together. The less at that time the laws of historical development were understood, the easier was it for CAMPANUS to come forward on the ground of the ancient forms, as an opponent of the Catholic and Protestant Church

\* Christopheri Sandri, *Bibliothecæ Antitrinitariorum*, Freist (Amsterd.), 1684. F. S. Brock, *Historia Antitrinitariorum maxime Socinianismi et Socinianorum*, 2 t. Regioni, Lips. 1774—84. F. Trechsel, *Die Protestant. Antitrinitarier*, Heidelb. 1844.

† J. G. Schelhorn, *Amœnitates Litterariæ*, Bd. xi. Book ii. p. 244. Trechsel, i. 26.

‡ His principal work, which aimed at uniting the Catholic and Protestant communions according to the form of the ancient apostolic church, is entitled, *Via Regia sive de Controversiis Religionis Capitibus Conciliandis Sententia*, 1584. Strobel's *Beiträge*, Bd. 2. Strück 1 und 2. Rienacker, in *Vaters Kirchen Histor. Archiv*. 1825 u. 26. Neander, *Commentatio de G. Wicello*, Berol. 1839, 4to. Neander, *Das Eine u. Mannichfaltige des Christ. Lebens*, Berlin, 1840. Holzhausen in *Niedner's Zeituhr*, 1849, p. 352.

in reference to the doctrine of the Trinity. According to his view the Son of God was begotten before the Creation and Time of the essence of the Father as a subordinate Hypostasis. He denied the personality of the Holy Spirit, and regarded him as the divine Essence in general, or as the common energy of the Father and the Son. The leaders of the Arian party were\* VALENTINE GENTILIS, of Cosenza, who after moving in Switzerland, Savoy, France, and Poland, returned to Bern, where he was beheaded in 1566;† MATTHEW GRIBALDUS,‡ PETER GONESIUS, who attempted to spread Antitrinitarianism in Poland,§ and with whom was associated STANISLAUS FARNOVIUS.|| They were warmly opposed by the strict Unitarians.

LEWIS HETZER belonged to the second school (beheaded at Constance, A.D. 1529),¶ who denied every distinction in the Trinity. Also CLAUDIUS of SAVOY,\*\* who taught respecting Christ that he was called God, inasmuch as he had received the fulness of the divine Spirit beyond all other beings. The Father dwelt in him through the divine Spirit, and all through him might be animated by the Father. Many persons class with him OCHINO, who was first a general of the Capuchins, then an active propagator of the Reformation in Italy, and in the course of his unsettled life adopted a great variety of opinions. His Unitarian views are inferred from the nineteenth and twentieth of his Dialogues,†† in which he so

\* Heberle, *Tübinger Zeitschr. für Theologie*, 1840.

† Walch, *Streitigkeiten ausser der Luther. Kirche*, iv. 121. Valentini Gentilis Justo Capitis Supplicio Bernæ affecit; *Brevis Historia Auctore Benedicto Aretio Bernensis Ecclesiæ Doctore Theologo*, Genév. 1567, 4to. Valentini Gentilis impietatum Explicatio ex Actis Publicis Senatus Genevensis Optima Fide Descripta cum Præfatione Theodori Bège in Calvini Tractatus Theologici, Amsterd. 1667, p. 568. Bock, i. 1, 869, ii. 427. Trechsel, ii. 316.

‡ Bock, ii. 456. Walch, 124.

§ Lubienic, *Historia Reformationis Polonicæ*, Freist (Amsterd.), 1685, p. 101. Walch, 139. Sandii *Bibliotheca Antitrinitariorum*, p. 40.

|| Sandius, p. 52.

¶ Breitingen, *Aneodot de Ludov. Hetzero in the Museum Helveticum*, 1751, t. vi. Dietrich *Tübinger Zeitschr.* 1834, 4to. Bock, ii. 231. Trechsel, i. 13.

\*\* Trechsel, i. 55.

†† XXX. Dialogi, Bant. 1563. Struve de Vita, Religione et Fatis Bernhardi Occhini Sevensis. Schilhorn, iii. M'Crie's *History of the Reformation in Italy*. Trechsel, ii. p. 221.

treats of the Trinity as to present the arguments against it with greater point and urgency, than those in its favour, which he is suspected to have done designedly. But we cannot from this determine with certainty his private opinion.

But the most remarkable person of this class was MICHAEL SERVEDO,\* a Spaniard, a man of great acuteness and power of imagination, in whom were to be found many indications of a future theological development. We cannot make his doctrine harmonize entirely with any of the more ancient schemes; it was peculiar and bore the greatest analogy to the early Gnostic view. It is an important fundamental principle, that not the doctrine of the Trinity but that of the historical Christ is the centre of the Gospel, and that Salvation depends not on a certain speculative view of the Trinity but on the acknowledgment of Christ, in whom alone God reveals himself, and by whom alone we attain to the divine life. The article respecting Christ was the original article of faith of the Apostolic Church. The deeper knowledge of the mode in which God was in Christ was not so general a thing at that time. He spoke against the doctrines of a mathematical invisible Son of God and the abstract knowledge of God. God in his essence is unimaginal, inconceivable. We should know nothing of him, had he not brought himself near to us, and accommodated himself to the nature of the Creature. No one knows God who does not know the way in which God willed to reveal Himself to us. As a knowledge of God cannot be brought to us without that form, so neither can there be communion with God if He does not bring Himself near to us through such a form. The form for the Revelation of God in the World is the Logos, the form for the communication of His essence to human Spirits is the Holy Spirit.† The Holy Spirit is a

\* *De Trinitatis Erroribus*, 1532. *Christianismi Restitutio*, Viennæ, 1553. Rilliet, *Relation du Procès Criminel Intenté à Genève en 1553 contre M. Servet*, rédigée d'après les *Documenta Originalia*, Genève, 1844. *Calvini Fidelis Expositio Errorum Serveti*, 1554, in his *Tractat. Theol.* Mosheim, *Gesch. des M. Servet*, Helmst. 178, and *Neue Nachrichten von Servet*, 1750. Heberle, *Servets Trinitätslehre und Christologie in der Tübinger Zeitschr. für Theologie*, 1840, 2. Trechsel, i. Baur, iii. p. 46. Dörner, ii. 649.

† *Restitutio Christianismi*, lib. v.—*Quemadmodum Dei essentia quatenus mundo manifestatur, est verbum, ita quatenus mundo communicatur, est spiritus estque manifestationi annexa communicatio. Quemadmodum in verbo erat idea princeps creati hominis, ita in spiritu*

*modus deitatis*, as far as God communicates himself in Christ and through Christ (*modus dispensationis per Christum*); he is the *substantialis modus* of the divine Essence as it accommodates itself to Angels and Men. He (SERVEDO) speaks of God's being in all things, without however being a Pantheist, which many were disposed to make him. Here is rather to be observed an affinity, on the one hand, to the Gnostic doctrine of Emanation, and on the other, to Sabellianism. Like SABELLIUS he distinguishes between the Logos in himself as a form of the Revelation of God, and the hypostatical Logos in Christ, the former the ideal, the latter the real Being. In this sense he also speaks of persons as equivalent to characters, phases, under which the divine Essence presents itself. As out of Christ God cannot be known, so can He not be worshipped except through Him. In the adoration of God in Christ consists the worship of God in spirit and in truth. In Judaism, on the other hand, God was known only through Angels, who were a type of Christ. On this point he sometimes approaches to Gnostic Elements. In the Temple God was worshipped only in Shadows and Types; Christ appeared as the true Temple of God; hence the worship of God in Spirit as he dwells in us through Christ, is possible. Whoever worships out of Christ, prays to him after the manner of Jews, Mohammedans, and Pagans, and Christ becomes a mere nullity. In his interpretation of the Old Testament there are many things worthy of notice, which support the historical sense, and in which he revives the standpoint of the Antiochian School.

• FAUSTUS SOCINUS, in his opposition against all speculation and mysticism, and in his onesided Intellectualism, is the exact opposite of SERVETUS. His doctrine of the Trinity, also, is not in all points like the earlier. He impugns the Arian and Nicene doctrine of the Trinity, as well as every

erat idea creati spiritus. Prodebat cum sermone spiritus; Deus loquendo spirabat. Sermonis et spiritus erat eadem substantia sed modus diversus, p. 197. Substantialis in mundo fuit Dei manifestatio, sicut substantialis communicatio; sicut Deus Logos, ita Deus Spiritus. Verbum mandat, ut res fiat, spiritu vivificat. Sicut substantia verbi manifestata et vera est in Christi corporalibus elementis. Christus est Deus, a Deo profectus et natus; ipse primario, nos secundario per ipsum; ab ipso ore Christi proficiscitur in nos spiritus regenerationis. See Niedner, p. 682.

notion of a pre-existent divine nature of Christ. Respecting the Holy Spirit he teaches, like PAUL of SAMOSATA and SABELLIUS, that it was not a person distinct from God, but a certain operation of God, a power from on high for sanctification. When passages of the New Testament, in which personality is signified, were objected to him, he rejoined that they referred to God the Father, who manifested his agency through this power among men. His view of Christ agrees for the most part with that of PAUL of SAMOSATA, and differs only in his explanation of the term Logos; he understood by it not, like PAUL, the Logos as a divine power, but Christ, the Logos become Man, who is called the Word of God, because God through him reveals his Will and Decree (*Interpres divinæ voluntatis*). The passages in the New Testament which speak of the Creation by the Logos, he referred to the moral Creation effected by Christ. He allowed that Christ in many passages was called God, but asserted that this title denoted not nature, but power and authority, which were committed to him in God's name. He did not propound his antitrinitarian doctrine as essential to salvation; a person might be saved though in error, as to the Church doctrine of three divine persons, provided he connected with it the doctrine of the Unity of God, and acknowledged the will of God revealed through Christ, and practised and evinced love towards those who thought differently.

In consequence of these controversies, express declarations respecting the doctrine of the Trinity were made in the Evangelical Churches, for in the first article of the Augsburg Confession the older articles were confirmed, and the *Samosateni neoterici* were condemned. It has been questioned to whom this phrase referred. In point of time it would suit SERVETUS, but not as to doctrine; and so with CAMPANUS; we might rather refer it to HETZER. But we cannot tell absolutely what persons MELANCTHON had in his eye; for among the various enthusiastic sects of that age, many similar doctrines were set forth. Induced by these controversies MELANCTHON admitted the doctrine of the Trinity into the edition of his *Loci*, A.D. 1535. It is worthy of notice that from his confidential language we learn that he was not altogether satisfied with the Church representation of this Dogma. When SERVETUS made his appearance he wrote about A.D. 1533 to CAMERARIUS. "You

know that in reference to the Trinity I have always feared that these things would again break out. Good God ! what disturbances will be raised in the next age, whether the Logos and the Holy Spirit are Hypostases. I abide by those words of Holy Writ, which direct to pray to Christ, and attribute to him divine honours ; but I do not feel compelled to examine more accurately the assertions respecting Hypostases."

At the end of the seventeenth Century the opposition to the Church doctrine of the Trinity reappeared from the Arian and Semi-Arian standpoint, and the great revolution in the Protestant Theology which has since taken place, brought these controversies again under discussion.

#### b. THE DOCTRINE OF THE PERSON OF CHRIST.

ALTHOUGH SOCINUS attributed to Christ no pre-existent divine Nature, yet he recognised in him a man begotten in a supernatural manner, animated, enlightened, and endowed with peculiar powers by God, in order to make known the divine will to men. He regarded him as the only Mediator between God and Man, by whom alone men can be made partakers of salvation. The passages of Scripture in which it is said that the Logos was with God before his Incarnation, and mention is made of his coming down from Heaven, and of his going where he was before, SOCINUS might have understood as referring to Predestination, and to instruction imparted by God ; but he took another view. Disposed to an external supernaturalism, he did not acknowledge the immanent indwelling of God in Christ, a connexion with the Divine Being which implied a specific relation different from that of all other men ; but he favoured the representation of an external fact, an elevation of Christ to God, in order to be instructed by Him. Moses was to him the type of Christ ; as he had communion with God on Sinai, so Christ, the potentiated Moses, was honoured with higher intercourse with God ; he did not ascend Sinai, but was taken up to God in Heaven. This took place several times before he made his public appearance. Thus he explained John vi. 38. When it was objected that no account is given of such events in the Gospels, he replied that this was because they were not observed by any human being. After the Resurrection Christ was exalted to the right hand of the Father to the highest dignity next to Him ; he received from him the guidance of the kingdom of God—the highest



dominion over all next to God, so that he can help his people in all things. Christ, therefore, was to SOCINUS not God, but a deified man. He regarded the doctrine of the perfect Humanity of Christ as important in order to show what human nature had attained in him by his exaltation. He referred the name Christ principally to this highest kingly dignity to which he was raised. He must have received the ability to know the secret thoughts of believers, otherwise he could not rule over them. According to God's command worship was due to him. The reign of Christ will last till believers have attained eternal Salvation; then he will give it up to the Father.

The importance SOCINUS attached to his own doctrine is shown by his controversy with FRANCIS DAVIDIS, Superintendent at Clausenberg, an Unitarian: He found the doctrine of SOCINUS to be illogical, and denied the divine worship which he ascribed to Christ. His doctrine was the strict Ebionitish. What is said in Scripture of Christ's supremacy he referred in part to the supremacy of Christianity, and in part to the millennial reign of Christ; God alone ought to be worshipped; on Him alone Man may venture to place confidence. FAUSTUS SOCINUS was called to Siebenburg, in order to dispute with him, since it was important for the Unitarian Church not to damage their cause still farther by such startling assertions. We learn from the Disputation that SOCINUS decidedly repudiated the doctrine of FRANCIS DAVIDIS; he calls it a Jewish and impious view of Christ, and that God would not be dishonoured but glorified most of all by the true doctrine. Men who are led through Christ to God, can now apply to God with full confidence in all things which relate to Salvation. The doctrine of Christ's delegated Power is a necessary article of Faith, from which it follows that prayer can be rightly addressed to him; but otherwise that would not be a duty. Whoever is so strong in faith that he needs not this consolation, and can turn directly to God, has made great progress.

A new reaction of the old antagonism between the Alexandrian and the Antiochian Schools, in the doctrine of the person of Christ, reappeared in the controversy between the Lutheran and Reformed Churches on the Dogma of the Lord's Supper. LUTHER, in disputing with ZWINGLI, in order to establish the presence of the Body of Christ in the Supper, had asserted the

omnipresence of his human nature, but afterwards had not attached so much importance to this point. When, after the middle of the sixteenth Century, the dispute was revived, BRENZ again brought forward this proposition, and the zealous Lutherans have since advocated the doctrine of the ubiquity of Christ's body. ZWINGLI and CALVIN asserted, on the contrary, that although Christ, as to his Person, is present everywhere, yet in his human nature he cannot be omnipresent. MELANTHON and his school also declared themselves against this doctrine. In the *Formula Concordiæ* the Dogma of the Supper was determined against both parties, in the statement, to wit, that the human nature of Christ possessed this prerogative from his generation, but that in his state of humiliation it was held in abeyance. It was attempted to express this doctrine as spiritually as possible, and the introduction of the idea of Space was condemned. Meanwhile, a difference arose between its advocates. The Würtemberg Theologians, especially JAMES ANDREA and BRENZ, inferred from the *communicatio idiomatum* that the ubiquity was unconditionally and necessarily perpetual (*ubiquitas perpetua*). The *Formula* only said: Christ by his divine omnipotence can be present with his body wherever he will, and especially where he has promised to be, that is, at the Supper. This was specially confirmed in the *corpus doctrinæ Julium* (which was designed for Brunswick) at Helmstedt. CALIXTUS, in a dissertation upon it, says: We must rather be silent than assert anything certain without the warrant of Holy Writ.

Analogous to this was the controversy which broke out A.D. 1619 between the Giessen Theologians, MENZER and FEUERBORN,\* and those of Tübingen, LUKE OSIANDER and THUMMIUS.† Both sides agreed in acknowledging the *communicatio idiomatum*, but the Giessen theologians maintained that Christ exercised the divine attributes only in certain cases; those of Tübingen, on the contrary, that he always used them, only in a hidden manner.

#### C. ANTHROPOLOGY.

THE peculiarity of the doctrine of the Evangelical Church on

\* J. Feuerborn, *κενωσιγραφία χριστολογική*, Marb. 1627, 4to.

† *Ταπεινωσιγραφία Sacra*, Tubg. 1623, 4to.—See Schneckenburger, *Vergleichende Darstellung des Luth. u. Reform. Lehrbegriffs*, Herausgg. von E. Guder, Th. 2, p. 210. •

this point is closely connected with its material principle, namely, the doctrine of Justification by Faith. This is conditioned by the view it took of human nature and its need of Redemption. Hence the opposition against the Catholic Church was manifested in two directions. Here the authority of AUGUSTIN was felt, and a strictly Pelagian principle was not distinctly expressed; but the doctrine of the relation of the *pura naturalia* and *dona gratuita* in man's original state was so applied by many of the Schoolmen, that it gave a point of connexion for Pelagianism, and the view of Redemption and its operation on human nature was conditioned by it. It was the theory that proceeded from the Scotist School, that human nature was first of all created in *pura naturalia*, which through their merits obtained the addition of the *dona gratuita*, on which the *justitia originalis* is founded. According to this view, the disunion between sensuousness and reason, from which Sin proceeds, was already laid in the original constitution of human nature; its outbreak was only restrained by the operation of divine Grace. Accordingly, the *justitia originalis* appears not only as communicated from without, but Man experiences, in consequence of the Fall, no further alteration of his condition than that what was given him from without is withdrawn. Human Nature is only left to itself; in its peculiar constitution nothing is altered, only that sinfulness which already existed in it now breaks forth. Thus original sin is viewed merely on the negative side, with which is connected the notion of Evil that it has its seat in Sensuousness, and therefore is included in the natural Organism. Thus more importance is ascribed to the powers of Man on the natural Standpoint, in order to be able to merit divine Grace; and Redemption does not appear so absolutely necessary, in order to bring back human nature to its original standpoint.

Hence it is evident how the reformatory opposition must be directed to the doctrines of the Original State and of Original Sin. The *justitia originalis* must be represented as something belonging to the essence of human nature, without which Man could not be truly man, nor the Image of God exist in him. Thus in the Apology of the Augsburg Confession\* it is inferred that because Man was created in the

\* Apol. 1.—*Idque testatur Scriptura, cum inquit hominem ad*

*imago et similitudo Dei* that the wisdom and righteousness were implanted in Man which could apprehend God, and in which God could shine forth. Therefore the Religious and the Moral are here comprehended in one Idea. LUTHER has pointed this out.\* He regarded it as most important that *justitia originalis* must be not a mere accidental mark of human nature, but was necessarily required through its destiny for realizing its idea. Man cannot be truly man without the consciousness of God.

In reference to Original Sin, it was the great merit of the Reformers that they taught the recognition of Evil in its real depth, and, in opposition to the representation which placed Evil in sensuousness, drew attention to its proper root in the apostasy of the heart from God. This was important in reference to the doctrine of the conversion and transformation of men, and hence an important consideration in Morals.† As

*imaginem et similitudinem Dei conditum esse. Quod quid est aliud, nisi in homini hunc sapientiam et justitiam effigiatam esse, quæ Deum apprehenderet, et in qua reluceret Deus, hoc est homini dona esse data, notitiam Dei, timorem Dei, fiduciam erga Deum et similia.*

\* Commentary on Genesis, ch. 3.—Scholastici disputant, quod *justitia originalis* non fuerit connaturalis, sed ceu ornatus quidam additus homini.—Qua re disputant de homine et dæmonibus, quod etsi originalem *justitiam* amiserint, tamen naturalia pura manserint, sicut initio condita sunt. Sed hæc sententia, quia peccatum originis extenuat, ceu venenum fugienda est. Quin hoc statuamus *justitiam* non fuisse quoddam donum, quod ab extra accederet, separatum a natura hominis; sed fuisse vere naturalem, ita ut natura Adæ esset diligere Deum, credere Deo, agnoscere Deum, &c. Hæc tamen naturalia fuere in Adamo, quam naturale est, quod oculi lumen recipiunt. Quia autem, si oculum vitiosum reddas inflicto vulnere, recte dicas naturam violatam esse, ita postquam homo ex *justitia* in peccatum lapsus est, recte et vere dicitur naturalia non integra sed corrupta esse per peccatum.

† Conf. August. Artic. ii.—Item docent, quod post lapsum Adæ omnes homines, secundum naturam propagati, nascantur cum peccato hoc est, sine metu Dei, sine fiducia erga Deum et cum concupiscentia, quodque hic morbus, seu vitium originis vere sit peccatum, damnatum et afferens nunc quaque æternam mortem his, qui non renascuntur per Baptismum et Spiritum Sanctum. Damnant Pelagianos et alios qui vitium originis negant esse peccatum, et ut extenuent gloriam mereti et beneficiorum Christi, disputant hominem propriis viribus rationis, coram Dei justificari posse.—MELANTHON, Loci v. Peccatum originis est carentis *justitiæ originalis*, id est, est in natis ex virili semine amissio lucis in mente et aversio voluntatis a Deo et contumacia cordis, ne possuit vere obedire legi Dei secreta lapsum Adæ, propter quam corruptionem nati sunt rei et filii iræ, id est damnati a Deo, nisi fuerit

MELANCTHON defined Man's original righteousness to be the Light of the soul, by virtue of which it assents to the Law of God, the obedience of the heart to the sentence of the Law, so he says, on the other hand, of the state of depravity, that the Church not only punishes outward sinful acts, but the roots and fruits equally, doubts respecting the Will of God, the aversion of the human will from God, and the rebellion of the heart against the divine Law. The Reformers laid great stress on teaching men to recognise the essential principle of Sin as consisting in the want of a vital consciousness of God, in the aversion of the internal tendency of the Spirit from God.

This difference of the Protestant doctrine necessarily came under discussion at the COUNCIL of TRENT. But the Council found itself in greater difficulty, because the opposition of the Thomist and Scotist theories existed also among its own members. It was the policy of the Council to condemn the evangelical doctrine without offending the leading parties of the Catholic Church, and hence it was needful to conceal their opposition. PALAVICINI says\* that the Article on Man's original State was originally thus worded in the fifth Session, A D. 1546:—"Sanctitas et justitia in qua homo creatus fuerat." By this the Thomist party was favoured. But in order not to offend the other party, at the proposal of Cardinal PACHECO, the ambiguous word *constitutus* was substituted for *creatus*.† This difference has been perpetuated in the Catholic Church. But the renowned Catholic controversialist, Cardinal BELLARMIN, so represented the matter, that Man was created *in puris naturalibus*; and only through divine Grace *justitia originalis* was added as a golden bridle. This implies the assumption that, according to the constitution of the human organism, sensuousness strove against Reason, and that it is only curbed by the *frenum aureum*; but as soon as the curb was taken away by the first sin this opposition of the *concupiscentia* must break forth. He distinctly states that the condition of Man in *puris naturalibus* differed from that after

facta remissio. Si quis vult addere natos etiam propter lapsum Adæ reos esse, non impedio.

\* VII. 9.

† Sessio v. cap. i.—Primum hominem statim sanctitatem et justitiam, in qua constitutus fuerat, amisisse.

the Fall only, as that of a naked person from one who has been stripped of his clothes.\* Human nature is, therefore, not worse, and suffers not more from ignorance and weakness than on the standpoint of the *pura naturalia*. The corruption of human nature consists, not in a defect belonging to itself, but in the loss of supernatural gifts.

With this was connected the controversy between the Evangelical and Catholic Churches, whether Concupiscence has anything sinful in it or not. According to the Catholic Church it must be based in man's original constitution, and hence was defined as the *fomes peccati*, but not as in itself *peccatum*. The Council of Trent decreed† that Concupiscence proceeds from Sin, and inclines to Sin, but in the Regenerate is not truly and properly Sin.

In this connexion is to be considered the exception from the universal sinfulness which was accorded to the Virgin Mary. The Council of Trent declared that by virtue of a special privilege she had escaped all *peccata venalia*; it was not its intention to comprehend the Virgin under original sin. Yet it did not decide on these two disputed questions between the Scotists and Thomists, but renewed the decree of SIXTUS IV.

FAUSTUS SOCINUS, in his doctrine of Man's original nature and the consequences of the Fall, had much in common with PELAGIUS. He placed the Image of God, not in righteousness, but in dominion over Nature. Man was not yet defiled with any sin, but still he was not morally pure; the occasion of sinning was wanting to him, since God had as yet given him no command. According to his nature he was created mortal, but might have attained Immortality by a special and supernatural operation of Grace; on this account God warned him of death as the punishment of Sin. That all men now

\* De Controversiis, iv. 15; vi. 10.—Quare non magis differt status hominis post lapsum Adæ a statu ejusdem in puris naturalibus, quam differat spoliatus a nudo, neque deterior est humana natura, si culpam originalem detrahas, neque magis ignorantia et infirmitate laborat, quam esset et laboraret in puris naturalibus condita. Proinde corruptio naturæ non ex alicujus doni carentia, neque ex alicujus malæ qualitates accessu, sed ex sola doni supernaturalis ob Adæ peccatum omissione profiuit.

† Sessio v. can. 5.—Concupiscentiam, quam aliquando apostolus peccatum appellat, sancta synodus declarat ecclesiam catholicam nunquam intellexisse peccatum appellari, quod vere et proprie in venialia peccatum sit, sed quia ex peccato est et ad peccatum inclinat.

die, who, together with Adam, might have been kept free from death by a peculiar operation of Grace—all this SocINUS interpreted as a punishment for Adam. He totally denied the doctrine of Original Sin. Incapable of recognising the continuity of the moral life, he asks, How could a single sin produce such great effects? The inclination to Evil, about which it is still questionable whether it really exists in all, he deduces from the power of evil custom.\*

ZWINGLI, led on by his freedom of inquiry, diverged from the common view respecting the imputation of the first Sin. Original Sin is not, he says,† in a proper, but only in a metaphorical sense a crime; it is only a moral weakness. The source of Original Sin is selfishness; Adam allowed himself to be governed by it, and this Evil must now pass upon all men. Selfishness is not in a strict sense a crime,

\* *Prælectiones. c. 4.*—Ceterum cupiditas ista mala, quæ cum plerisque hominibus nasci dici potest, non ex peccato illo primi parentis manat, sed ex eo, quod humanum genus frequentibus peccatorum actibus habitum peccandi traxit et seipsum corrumpit, quæ corruptio per propagationem in posteris transfunditur. Etenim unum illud peccatum per se non modo non universos posteros, sed ne ipsum quidem Adamum corrumpendi vim habere potuit. Dei vero consilio in peccati illius pœnam id factum esse nec usquam legitur et plana incredibile est, immo impium, id cogitare, Deum videlicet omnis rectitudinis auctorem ulla ratione pravitatis causam esse, quæ tamen pravitas, quatenus, ut dictum est, per propagationem in hominem derivatur, peccatum proprie appellari nequit.—Concludimus igitur, nullum, improprie etiam loquendo, peccatum originale esse, id est, ex peccato illo primi parentis nullam labem aut pravitatem universo humano generi necessario ingentam esse, sive inflictam quodammodo fuisse, nec aliud malum ex primo illo delicto ad posteros omnes necessario manasse, quam moriendi omnimodum necessitatem, non quidem ex ipsius delicti vi, sed quia, quum jam homo natura mortalis esset, ob delictum illud suæ naturali mortalitati a Deo relictus est, quodque naturale erat id in delinquentis pœnam prorsus necessarium est factum. Quare qui ex ipso nascuntur, eadem conditione omnes nasci oportet; nihil enim illi ademptum fuit, quod naturaliter haberet vel habiturus esset. Catechismus Racoviensis, Quæst. 423; peccatum originis nullum prorsus est; quare nec liberum arbitrium vitare potuit, neque enim e Scriptura id peccatum origines doceri potest, et lapsus Adæ, quum unus actus fuerit, vim eam, quæ depravare ipsam naturam Adami, multo minus vero posterorum ejus posset, habere non potuit. Ipsi vero id in pœnam irrogatum fuisse nec Scriptura docet; et Deum illum, qui æquitatis fons est, incredibile prorsus est id facere voluisse.

† *De Peccato Originali Declaratio ad Urbanum Rhesium (1526),* Opp. iii. p. 627.

but it is the cause of all Evil. Since only Evil can come from it, Man is condemned. On these grounds ZWINGLI has been charged with extenuating Original Sin, and the question was discussed in the Conference at Marburg.\*

JOSHUA PLACEUS† propounded an analogous representation at Saumur. He also denied the special imputation of Adam's sin, and his doctrine was condemned by the Reformed Synod at Charenton, A.D. 1654; but several persons were dissatisfied with the decision. He afterwards took occasion to explain his meaning more distinctly—that he did not deny every kind of Imputation, but only what was immediate. WHITBY, the English divine,‡ used similar language. The Remonstrants§ took an intermediate position, whose doctrinal views were gradually developed. They also placed the Image of God in the dominion over Nature. EPISCOPIUS ascribed to Adam a natural innocence; he did not exactly contradict the notion of a moral perfection, only he believed it was not necessarily implied. PHILIP LIMBORCH declared that Adam's will before Sin could not be regarded as neutral; but till the Law was given him he had only a certain natural *rectitudo*, an *instinctus naturalis*. The other gifts of Man may be called *naturalia*, or *supernaturalia*; only we must take care not to extol them too much, if we do not admit that God withdrew those gifts at the Fall. The Remonstrants acknowledged a moral corruption of human nature as a consequence of the first Sin, only not to so great an extent as the Reformers. The principal

\* Die 15 Märburger Artikel vom 3 October, 1529, nach dem Wiederaufgefundenen Autographon der Reformatoren, veröffentlicht von Dr. H. Heppe, 2 Aufl. Cassel, 1854; art. iv. See Nitzsch Urkundenbuch der Evangelischen Union, 1853.

† Theses Theologicæ de Statu Hominis lapsi ante Gratiam, Walch, Streitigkeiten ausser der Luther. Kirche, iii. 890.

‡ De Imputatione Divina Peccati Adami Posteris ejus Universis in Reatum, Lond. 1711. Walch, iii. 994.

§ Apologia Confessionis: Peccatum originale nec habent pro peccato proprie dicto, quod posteros Adami odio Dei dignos faciat, nec pro malo quod per modum proprie dictæ poenæ ab Adamo in posteros demanet, sed pro malo infirmitatis vitio aut quocunque tandem alio nomine vocetur, quod ab Adamo justitia originali privato in posteros ejus propagatur, unde fit, ut posteri omnes Adami eadem justitia destitute, prorsus inepti et inidonei sint ad vitam æternam consequendam aut ut in gratiam cum Deo redeant, nisi Deus nova gratia sua eos præveniat et vires novas illis restituat ac sufficiat, quibus ad eam possint pervenire.—See Limborch, Theologia Christ. iii. 4, 4.



difference consisted in their opinion that the free self-determination for Good remained, and that Evil was only punishable when the evil tendency led conjointly with freedom to the actual perpetration of Evil. Adam, according to their system, was created mortal; but that he was obliged to die was for him a punishment of Sin; for other men, on the contrary, Death is a mere natural necessity.

#### d. THE DOCTRINE OF REDEMPTION.\*

FAUSTUS SOCINUS† impugned the doctrine of a *Satisfactio activa* and *passiva*. The Doctrine of the essential righteousness of God, which necessarily required the punishment of Evil, and the doctrine of the essential Mercy of God, had no place in his scheme, since God must either punish or forgive; and with the denial of those essential attributes the foundation of the whole Church was likewise taken away; but the sufferings of Christ, as a perfect fulfilling of the Law, still retained a place in his system. The sufferings of Christ were necessary; in the first place, as an example for Christians; secondly that he might be so much better fitted to help them in their sufferings; thirdly, as a pledge of the divine forgiveness of Sins announced through him, and as a seal of the covenant concluded with God; fourthly, his Death was necessary as the intermediate step for the Resurrection, through which he assured Men of their eternal Salvation, and by his Glorification attained the power of bestowing it. Hence the Resurrection of Christ is still more important than his death; the Scriptures lay a stress on his death, because Christ by his sufferings gave up everything; but by his Resurrection he even gained something. The division of Christ's works according to his priestly, kingly, and prophetic office he admitted, but in his own sense. He placed the Prophetic Office in the revelation of divine Truth, in the establishment of a Moral Law more perfect than the Mosaic, and in the promises of a future life. The priestly office he defined as the perpetual office of Christ for the *expiatio peccatorum*, that is, the freeing of believers from the punishment of Sin. The

\* Baur, *Geschichte der Lehre von der Versöhnung*. For the Lutheran doctrine, see Weiss, *Martinus Lutherus quid de Consilio Mortis et Resurrectionis Christi senserit*, Lips. 1845.

† *Prælectiones Theol.*

priesthood was first completed by his ascension to Heaven, for then Christ had the power to bring believers to eternal happiness. The name of the kingly office might indicate that in the exercise of his power he was not independent of God, but had received it from him; it is, therefore, to be regarded as the *minus regium* in a definite sense.

In this point the Remonstrants did not agree with the Socinians. To them it was of importance that Christ by his work of Redemption had accomplished something in reference to the relation of Man to God, which only in this form could be effected according to the will of God. They kept at a distance from the view of the Thomists, and approximated to that of the Scotists. HUGO GROTIVS\* sets out from the juridical standpoint, according to which punishment must serve to maintain the majesty of the Law, and might be undergone by one for others. God, by the punishment of Christ, wished to testify his hatred against Sin, to deter us from sin, and to manifest his love† to us. EPISCOPIUS only differs from this view, that instead of the idea of punishment he wishes to retain that of Sacrifice. In the Apology for the Remonstrants composed by him it is said: Christ, since he was Lord, according to the commission of his Father, endured death for us, and effected by it, that the Father who received this sacrifice as a sin-offering from Christ, on account of it has shown mercy to Mankind, since thereby Satisfaction has been made to the Justice of God.†

#### e. THE DOCTRINE OF JUSTIFICATION.

UNDER the idea of *Justificatio* has been understood, since AUGUSTIN's time, as we have shown above, not an objective act, but something subjective, transitive, making man internally righteous, by the communication of the divine life in fellowship with Christ. For the attainment of *justificatio*, moreover, Faith can be only the first step; it was not sufficient for justification, but Love must be added; the *gratia justificans* was first given in the *fides formata*, making man internally righteous. Since this external idea of Faith required that for effecting justification something must be added from without, the additional aid of the Church here

\* *Defensio Fidei Catholice de Satisfactione Christi*, 1617.

† Limborch, *Theol. Christ.* iii. 22.

finds its plea; and since Justification is subjective, no one can be absolutely certain that he possesses it.

This is the doctrine against which the Reformers brought forward the *objective* idea of Justification; and, on the other hand, corresponding to it, they regarded Faith as subjective, as the principle of the transformation of the whole inner life. This view was connected with LUTHER's peculiar religious development; in his mental conflicts his soul first found rest when he had learnt to look off from his subjective condition, and to fix himself alone on the objective of redeeming Grace. The Augsburg Confession\* and the Apology† present and discuss Justification under this aspect. Of Faith it is expressly remarked: it is not mere historical faith, but a faith by which a man assents to the divine promises;‡ it is, therefore, the surrender of the Will by which man actually appropriates the objective that is presented to him. This Faith cannot be without filial thankfulness and love to God, which impel Man to all goodness; but still it always remains defective, and hence can be no foundation of confidence.§ In this sense MELANCTHON wrote to BRENZ, A.D. 1531 :|| by Faith

\* Art. iv.—Item docent, quod homines non possunt justificari coram Deo propriis viribus, meritis aut operibus, sed gratis justificentur propter Christum per fidem, cum credunt se in gratiam recipi et peccata remitti propter Christum qui sua morte pro nostris peccatis satisfecit. Hanc fidem imputat Deus pro iustitia coram ipso. Rom. iii. et iv.

† Art. ii., iii.

‡ Apologia, art. ii.—Sed illa fides, quæ justificat, non est tantum notitia historię, sed est assentiri promissioni Dei, in qua gratis propter Christum offertur remissio peccatorum et justificatio. Et ne quis suspicetur, tantum notitiam esse, addimus amplius, est velle et accipere oblatam promissionem remissionis peccatorum et justificationis.

§ Ibid.—Hęc fides in illis pavoribus erigens et consolans accipit remissionem peccatorum, justificat, et vivificat; nam illa consolatio est nova et spiritualis vita.—Dilectio etiam et opera sequi fidem debent; quare non sic excluduntur, ne sequantur, sed fiducia meriti dilectionis aut operum in justificatione excluditur. Cf. art. iii. De Dilectione et Impletionem Legis.

|| Opp. vol. ii. p. 501.—Bretschneider. Tu adhuc hæres in Augustini imaginatione, qui eo pervenit, ut neget rationis justitiam coram Deo refutari pro iustitia, et recte sentit. Deinde imaginatur, nos justos reputari propter hanc impletionem legis, quam efficit in nobis Spiritus sanctus. Hęc imaginatio collocat justitiam in nostra impletionem, in nostra munditie seu perfectione et si fidem sequi debet, hęc renovatio. Sed tu rejice oculos ab ista renovatione et a lege in totum ad promiss-

alone we are justified, not because this is the root, and on account of its merit, but because it lays hold of Christ; on his account we are acceptable to God. Though there may be a new direction of the life, yet this cannot give peace to Man, wherefore not Love makes man righteous, but Faith alone. However much MELANCTHON laboured to secure the connexion between Justification and Sanctification from misapprehension, yet he felt it equally important to maintain firmly the Objective character of Justification. This interest proceeded from his own religious experience. In the same letter he says:—This representation is the Truth; it makes the glory of Christ visible, and is admirably fitted to cheer the conscience.

The Council of Trent firmly adhered to the opposite Catholic standpoint, pronounced an Anathema on the assertion that the *fides justificans* was nothing else than trust in the divine Mercy, or that this trust alone is that whereby we are justified. On the certainty of the consciousness of Justification it says:—As no pious person must doubt of the mercy of God, the merits of Christ, and the efficacy of the Sacraments,

sionem et Christum et sentias, quod propter Christum justi, hoc est accepti coram Deo simus et pacem conscientiae inveniamus, et non propter illam renovationem. Nam hæc ipsa novitas non sufficit. Ideo sola fide sumus justi, non quia sit radex, ut tu scribis, sed quia apprehendit Christum, propter quem sumus accepti; qualis sit illa novitas, etsi necessario sequi debet, sed non pacificat conscientiam. Ideo non dilectio, quæ est impletio legis, justificat, sed sola fides, non quia est perfectio quædam in nobis, sed tantum, quia apprehendit Christum.—Ego conatus sum eam (sententiam) in Apologia explicare, sed ibi propter adversariorum calumnias non sic loqui licet, ut nunc tecum loquor, etsi re ipsa idem dico. Quando haberet conscientia pacem et certam spem si deberet sentire, quod tunc demum justi reputemur, quum illa novitas in nobis perfecta esset? Quid hoc est aliud, quam ex lege, non ex promissione gratuita justificari?

Luther adds: Et ego soleo, mi Brenti, ut hanc rem melius capiam, sic imaginari, quasi nulla sit in corde meo qualitas, quæ fides vel caritas vocetur, sed in loco ipsorum pono ipsum Christum et dico: hæc est justitia mea; ipse est qualitas et formalis, ut vocant, justitia mea; ut sic me liberem ab intuitu legis et operum; immo et ab intuitu objecti istius Christi, qui vel doctor vel domatur intelligitur; sed volo ipsum mihi esse donum et doctrinam per se, ut omnia in ipso habeam. Sic dicit: ego sum via, veritas et vita. Non dicit: ego de tibi viam veritatem et vitam, quasi extra me positas operetur in me. Talia in me debent esse, manere et vivere, loqui, non per me an *etc. etc.* (2 Cor. 5) ut essemus justitia in illo, non in dilectionem aut donis sequentibus.

yet every one must fear in reference to his own weakness for his state of Grace, since no one can be convinced with the certainty of faith that he has obtained the divine favour.\*

The Evangelical doctrine of Justification met also with much opposition among those who did not agree with the Catholics. The onesided representation of the Lutheran zealots, who did not sufficiently point out the connexion of the Objective and the Subjective, contributed to this. Hence attempts were made to modify sometimes the idea of Justification, sometimes that of Faith. WICEL wished steadily to maintain the Protestant idea of Justification; but in the idea of Faith he followed the Catholic view. More frequent were the attempts to admit Faith in the sense of the Evangelical Church, but to join with the Catholics in the idea of Justification. Thus ANDREW OSIANDER,† Professor at Königsberg, who in the latter respect attached himself to the earlier Schoolmen. He accurately distinguished Justification from the satisfaction and Redemption through Christ. By these Christ had once for all gained for men the forgiveness of sins. But by *justificatio* he understood the impartation of an internal righteousness. He declared, that for the attainment of that *Justificatio*, men could in nowise do anything by the exertion of their own powers, but that it proceeded from the true, internal, fellowship with Christ, given by him. By Faith man becomes justified and sanctified, as far as he thereby

\* Sessio vi. can. xii.—Si quis dixerit, fidem justificantem nihil aliud esse, quam fiduciam divinæ misericordiæ peccata remittentis propter Christum vel eam fiduciam solam esse qua justificamus, anathema sit.—Cap. vii. Justificatio non est sola peccatorum remissio sed et sanctificatio et renovatio interioris hominis, per voluntariam susceptionem gratiæ et donorum unde homo ex injusto fit justus et ex inimico amicus, ut sit hæres secundum spem vitæ eternæ.

† Disputatio de Lege et Evangelio, 49 theses, 1549. An Filius Dei fuerit Incarnandus si peccatum non introivisset in Mundum; item de Imagine Dei, 1550. Disputatio de Justificatione, 81 theses, 1550. Von dem einigen Mittler Jesu Christo und Rechtfertigung, 1551. Lehnerdt, Commentationes Quattuor de Osiandro, Regiom. 1835, 37, 41, 42. Auctuarium ad Commentationem de A. Osiandro. Christian Salig. Vollständige Historie des Augsb. Confession, Buch vii. cap. 1, 2. J. G. Walch, Eintertung in die Religionsstreitigkeiten der Luther. Kirche, iv. p. 187. Baur, Brevis Disquisitio in A. Osiandri de Justificatione Doctrina, Tubg. 1831, 4to. Heberle, Osianders Lehre in ihrer frühesten Gestalt. Stud. u. Krit. 1844, p. 398.

receives Christ into himself, and the righteousness of Christ really passes into the inner life. He spoke against those who talked of an imputation of the righteousness of Christ, and not of a real communication of it. This harmonizes with his idea of an archetype of Humanity in God, according to which God created Man so that such a connexion of the divine essence with human nature as took place in Christ, was always necessary in order to attain its destined glorification. By virtue of their fellowship with Christ, it is realized for believers. The other theologians of the Evangelical Church agreed with him in this, in affirming such an inner life of fellowship with Christ in Man, only that Man must not place his trust in it.

SCHWENKFELD laid peculiar stress on the subjective reference. It is to be remarked, he says, that the righteousness of Faith is not to be thought of as something existing without us in Christ, as if it were only given from without, but righteousness must really be implanted with Christ in our hearts and souls through faith, so that it dwells in us, and we are thereby inwardly renewed. We must not only preach Redemption by Christ, but also Regeneration, Justification, and Sanctification.

SOCIUS agreed with the evangelical doctrine in the objective view of *Justificatio*; he also explains it to be a judicial act of God (*remissio peccatorum*). But as to the ground of Justification, he necessarily judges differently, according to his different view of the doctrine of Satisfaction. He rejected the Pelagian notion of the means of attaining Justification. Human virtue ever remains defective, and Justification cannot depend on that, but is founded only in the divine grace. The only condition of it is Faith in Christ, but this necessarily involves practical obedience. He would not admit that Sanctification is an effect of Faith; but maintained that the renovation of man already lies in the idea of Faith, which he defines as Trust in Christ, that is, not only to hold as true whatever he has taught, but also to esteem all this so highly as to do what he has commanded, and to hope for what he has promised. Hence, Faith in Christ involves that we do all which he has appointed as the conditions for the attainment of salvation. But that man is justified is not in virtue of the merit of Faith, but because God has connected it with this

condition.\* If we compare the Socinian and Lutheran doctrines, the latter supposes an internal necessary connexion between Faith and the renewal of the life: according to the former, the connexion is external, for the motives must proceed from Faith, which impel man to new moral strivings. According to the Lutheran doctrine, man is certain of his salvation through Faith, and needs to do nothing first towards it; yet in Faith there is founded an inward tendency of the divine life to good works. According to SOCINUS, Faith necessarily impels to the fulfilment of the conditions, on which Christ has promised heavenly blessings.

The view of the Remonstrants so far approximates that of the Socinians, that it includes in the idea of Faith that of practical obedience. Faith is the determination of the soul according to the Word of God, connected with faith in Christ, in virtue of which we embrace the doctrine of Christ, and trust in Christ, as Prophet, High Priest, and King, by whose grace alone we can attain salvation. Hence, Faith of itself begets true and active obedience. LIMBORCH defines justifying Faith, as the Faith that Christ is our Saviour, from whom we expect Salvation, under the conditions prescribed by him.†

#### f. GRACE, FREE WILL, AND PREDESTINATION.

SETTING out from the Augustinian scheme of doctrine, and combating the Pelagian tendency of the dominant Church, the Reformers gave prominence to the Augustinian views of Grace and Predestination. LUTHER, even before he became a monk, had been harassed by doubts respecting this doctrine; he needed entire resignation, unwavering confidence in the objectivity of divine Grace, in order to find rest, and, hence, was attracted by the rigid Augustinian tendency. But STAUPITZ counselled him, that in reference to the doctrine of Predestination, he should not seek after the hidden God, but keep to the God revealed in Christ. The practical retained the ascendancy, he gave less prominence to the harshness of the Augustinian system, excepting when controversy summoned him to it, especially in the controversy with ERASMUS, who, A.D. 1524,‡ attacked LUTHER's doctrine

\* De Justificatione, Opp. t. ii. Bibliotheca Patrum Polon. ii. p. 602.

† Theologia Christ. vi. 4, 22.

‡ De Libero Arbitrio.

of Grace, Free Will, and Predestination. In him likewise the practical interest predominated; he was less dogmatical, and dreaded nothing so much as extravagance. The exact determination of the relation of Grace to the Free Will, of the divine prescience and unchangeable decrees to the contingency of human actions surpasses the knowledge of man, and it is best to adhere to what is practically important, that man in all that is evil must blame himself alone, and trace all that is good to God. ERASMUS was not thoroughly Pelagian in his views, and only contended that it depended on the Free Will of Man to follow or not the Grace of God. He endeavoured to refute the arguments which were brought from the Bible for the Augustinian views. LUTHER, in his reply,\* developed the doctrine of absolute Predestination in the most pointed manner. He made Prescience and Predestination perfectly identical,—denied contingency, and inferred from the immutability of the divine will, that all events took place according to an unconditional necessity. We recognise here the fundamental principle of unreserved resignation to the divine will. He says, as long as man holds the belief that he can do something for his own salvation, he continues self-confident, and does not humble himself; but whoever despairs altogether of himself, is most near to that grace which leads to salvation.

- MELANCTHON, at first quite dependent on LUTHER, agreed with him on these points; in the first edition of his *Loci*, he maintained the nullity of Free Will in all matters relating to salvation, and attributed everything to Grace. The very term Free Will proceeded from profane Philosophy, not from the Bible; there could be no Free Will. Providence extending itself from one to all, seemed to him to be connected with the doctrine of absolute Predestination; an association of ideas which was common to the first Reformers.

We have remarked the same in ZWINGLI, who occupied himself still more fully with the exposition of the doctrine. There is an approach in it to Pantheism; only the element is not consciously conceived. In a letter to a friend, who had urged objections, taken from the Bible, he says: This is certain, that all things are governed by the divine wisdom, consequently, everything must take place according to an

\* *De Servo Arbitrio*, 1525.



immutable necessity; but still the ungodly cannot find an excuse in that. He was sensible what disastrous consequences followed from such a doctrine, and, therefore, adds: But let these things be stated with moderation, and only seldom; for only a few can attain such heights of spiritual insight. He expresses himself most harshly, *De providentia*.<sup>\*</sup> God is the Author of Evil as well as of Good. But if any man should say that the divine Providence has occasioned this or that crime, he does not express himself aright, for only the human act, not the event brought to pass by God is sin. Therefore, the guilty will justly be punished in this world and the next. If a distinction be made between God's Prescience and his Predestination, we shall wrong either God's omnipotence or his goodness; for either God foresees the wickedness, and cannot hinder it, or he foresees it, and will not hinder it. If the relation of God and Man were such as it was represented by LUTHER, and the other Reformers, we must unavoidably go beyond AUGUSTIN, and advance to Supra-lapsarianism. ZWINGLI expressly declared that Predestination extended even to ADAM's sin. It is, therefore, erroneous, that the harshest and most logical form of this doctrine was derived from CALVIN. We are led to this conclusion because another doctrine was held by ZWINGLI, with which CALVIN did not agree, the doctrine, namely, that the Heathen are not unconditionally condemned, in which ZWINGLI differs from AUGUSTIN, but without contradicting himself. The prevalent opinion of the condemnation of all unbelievers appeared to him repulsive, and to arise from misunderstanding the Bible. He wished the passages of Scripture that related to the subject to be taken synecdochally, namely, only of all who had the opportunity of becoming acquainted with the Gospel, and who would criminally remain in unbelief, because their unbelief was founded in obstinate resistance. From this nothing could be concluded as to the fate of the rest. He assumed as the immediate consequence flowing from Predestination, not the salvation of the predestinated, but the invisible operations of Divine Grace on the hearts of men, which make their existence known by the virtues they produce. With this was connected his doctrine of an invisible Church, which depended on the divine election, and was not connected with certain outward signs (*Sacramenta*).

<sup>\*</sup> Cap. vi.

Wherever he thought traces could be discerned of the operations of the Holy Spirit, he believed that this Revelation was also to be found. He had occupied himself with the study of antiquity, and had a partiality for it ; but he did not possess the right standard, by which to distinguish the ethical standpoint of Christianity from that of Antiquity. On this account he did not do justice to many manifestations of Christian piety, which he could not correctly estimate from his onesided Protestant standpoint. Even among the Heathen,\* he asserted, God had chosen those who worshipped him, and after death were admitted to his communion, for the divine choice is free. A Socrates was more pious and holy than all the Dominicans and Franciscans. To URBAN REGIUS he writes : How do we know what faith is written on the heart of any one by God ? and when we see that the uncircumcision keeps the law, why should we not know the tree by its fruits ? ZWINGLI inclined to the opinion, that the effect of Redemption extended from the sin of ADAM to the whole human race. This supposition did not detract from the effect of Christ's merits, but rather glorified them, if only it was firmly held that Redemption through him was the necessary and only means of salvation for all. From the first transgression, condemnation, indeed, passed on all, but this was counteracted by the present means of divine grace. The Holy Spirit can everywhere raise Man to God.

We find a similar view held by CÆLIUS SECUNDUS CURIO,† who, about A.D. 1554, published a Dialogue, in which he aimed to prove that the kingdom of God is greater than the kingdom of Satan. He appealed to the instance of CORNELIUS, in the Acts of the Apostles. God is at all times near to all who do good according to their ability. He would not say that men could attain to this by the power of their corrupt nature, but that it is the Grace of God which grants it to them.

The Polish reformer, JOHN LASKO, appealed to his agreement with ZWINGLI on this point. He says:‡ This view is, indeed, very far from the common doctrine, but it leads to a deeper view of ourselves and of Divine Grace.

In the Lutheran Church, the departure from the doctrine

\* De Providentia.

† Professor at Basle : died 1569. De Amplitudine Beati Regni Dei.

‡ Gerdesius, Servinium Antiquarium, t. iii. p. 449, Ep. ad Bullinam.

of absolute Predestination proceeded first from MELANCTHON. With his mild disposition, and his dread of carrying principles to an extreme, he could not always maintain an agreement with LUTHER in this harsh dogma. Investigating freely on all sides, he arrived, in his study of man's religious nature, and of the connexion of scriptural doctrines, at a view differing from LUTHER'S. This was one of the points in which he endeavoured to soften the original harshness of the doctrines presented, in a controversial form, at the Reformation. In the Augsburg Confession and Apology, he kept himself merely to what was of prime importance. In that document, it is said : \* " The Human Will has a certain freedom for the administration of *justitia civilis*; but without the Holy Spirit it has not the power to bring forth spiritual righteousness." After one quotation, when he adds: Man cannot begin, or at least not perfect this, without God, he introduces a different doctrine from the strict Augustinian. This is still more visible in the new edition of his *Loci*, A.D. 1535. He here expresses himself plainly against absolute Predestination, and against the opinion that the Free Will is excluded from all share in conversion. He states his sentiments most fully in the edition of A.D. 1543, and speaks against all who, with LAURENTIUS VALLA, would introduce a Stoical Fate. " These are difficult inquiries," he adds; " on this account, we must apply our minds to God's Revelation, who has promised to help those who call upon him. Above all, we must maintain, that God is present with his creatures, not as a Stoical God."† In the section on Free Will, he says, that the human will, even before Regeneration, could, in a certain manner, perform the outward works of the Law; but that even this is often hindered by natural weakness. Men must be fully aware of this

\* Art. 18.—De libero arbitrio docent quod humana voluntas habeat aliquam libertatem ad efficiendam civilem justitiam et diligendas res rationi subjectas. Sed non habet vim sine Spiritu Sancto efficiendæ justitiæ Dei seu justitiæ spiritualis, quia animalis homo non percipit ea, quæ sunt spiritus Dei, sed hæc fit in cordibus, cum per verbum Spiritus Sanctus concipitur. Hæc totidem verbis dicit Augustinus, lib. iii. Hypognosticon: esse fatemur liberum arbitrium omnibus hominibus, habens quidem judicium rationis, non per quod sit idoneum in eis, quæ ad Deum pertinent, sine Deo aut inchoare aut certe peragere; sed tantum in operibus vitæ præsentis tam bonis, quam etiam malis.

† Locus iii. De Causa Peccati et De Contingentia, fin.

evil, in order to estimate, in all their importance, the blessings of Christ.\* Free Will, also, cannot bring forth the true fear of God, true confidence and love towards God, nor the steadfastness in suffering which conquers Death. The Holy Spirit alone can effect this; and we obtain the spirit through the Word of God imparted to us. For the performance of what is good there must be the conjunction of the Word of God, the Holy Spirit, and the human will, which agrees with the Word of God, and does not oppose it.† This share, taken by the Free Will, he proves, from the internal conflict of all pious persons; otherwise, no such conflict could take place.‡ In the additions to the *Loci*, in the edition of A.D. 1548, he introduces the excuse of those who held the Epicurean notion, that Grace would be infused without any human co-operation. He says in reply: Men must be taught that Free Will does something, that it is the *facultas se applicandi gratiæ*. From many passages in his Letters, it is evident how much importance he attached to this doctrine. He frequently repeats the thought, when comforting others under the loss of their children: "God himself has implanted this love (*στοργή*) in our hearts, as a witness that we are not to think of Him as a Stoical God, but as a God of conscious paternal Love.

LUTHER also viewed the doctrine of Predestination, principally in its practical aspect. On the other hand, MELANC-

\* Locus iv.—Primum igitur respondeo: cum in natura hominis reliquum sit iudicium et delectus quidam rerum, quæ sunt subjectæ rationi aut sensui, reliquus est etiam delectus externorum operum civilium; quare voluntas humana potest suis viribus sine renovatione aliquo modo externa legis opera facere. Hæc est libertas voluntatis, quam philosophi recte tribuunt homini. Nam et Paulus discernens iustitiam carnis a spirituali, fatetur non renatos habere delectum aliquem et facere aliqua externa legis opera, manus a cœde, a fuito, a raptu continere, et hanc vocat iustitiam carnis.

† Cumque ordimur a verbo. concurrunt tres causæ bonæ actionis verbum Dei, Spiritus Sanctus, et humana voluntas assentiens nec repugnans verbo Dei. Posset enim excutere ut excutit Saul sua sponte; sed cum mens audiens ac se sustentans non repugnat, non indulget diffidentia, sed adjuvante etiam Spiritu Sancto conatur assentiri, in hoc certamine voluntas non est otiosa.

‡ Hæc sunt perspicua, si in veris doloribus in vera invocatione experiamur, qualis sit lucta voluntatis, quæ si se haberet ut statua, nullum prorsus certamen, nulla lucta nulli angores essent in sanctis. Cum autem sit certamen ingens et difficile, voluntas non est otiosa, sed languido assentitur, &c.

THON kept aloof from Semi-Pelagianism, since he admitted no merit on the part of Man. LUTHER must have observed a difference in MELANTHON, yet he appears not to have felt any serious umbrage on account of it, though he did not alter his own teaching. MELANTHON, about A.D. 1544, declared that LUTHER, in this point, agreed with him, but possibly he explained LUTHER's language too much according to his own view. Yet the parties of these two Reformers did not continue in the same friendly relation. MELANTHON left behind him a school which propagated this doctrine, and opposed to it was a party of more narrow-minded zealots for the letter of the Lutheran doctrine, of which the principal advocates were MATTHIAS FLACIUS,\* NICOLAS AMSDORF, WIGAND, and HESSHUSIUS. The division led to the *Synergistic Controversy*,† which came to a violent outbreak on the occasion of the Weimar Confutation, in A.D. 1558. The Representative of the Synergistic party was JOHN PFEFFINGER,‡ Superintendent in Leipsic, who taught to the following effect: That though the Will of Man cannot arouse itself to any spiritual work, and can only be aroused by the Spirit, yet the Will is not excluded from these works in such a manner as not to be also present. The Holy Spirit does not act with Man as a stone-cutter with a stone. Since with God there is no respect of persons, so there must be in Man the reason that some obey, and others resist the Holy Spirit. In accordance with these sentiments, VICTORINUS STRIGEL,§ Professor at Jena, maintained that to the Will of Man, corrupted through the Fall, nothing remained but the *modus agendi* for Good (that is, what belongs to the essence of a rational nature, in contradistinction from the acts of merely irrational beings, the *actiones*

\* J. B. Ritter, Flacius Leben u. Tod. 1723. Twesten, M. Flacius Illyricus mit Berlagen von H. Rossel, Berlin, 1844.

† Planck, Gesch. des Protest. Lehrbegriffs, v. 1, p. 685. Schenkel, Wesen des Protest. ii. p. 44. Salig, Gesch. der Augsb. Confession, iii. p. 216. See also Hepppe, Gesch. der Deutsch. Protest. i. p. 116. E. Schmid, Flacius Streit über die Erbsünde. Zeitschr. für Histor. Theol. 1849.

‡ De Libero Arbitrio, 1555. On the other side, Nicolaus Amsdorf Öffentlich Bekenntniß der reinen Lehre des Evangeliums, and Confutatio der jetzigen Schwärmer, Jena, 1558.

§ Otto de Victorino Strigelio Liberioris Mentis in Ecclesia Lutherana Vindice, Jena, 1848. Simon Musæus, Disputatio inter Flacium, Vict. Strigelium Vimarise Habita, Bremæ, 1568, 4to.

*naturales*). Man has not, indeed, the capability of accomplishing good, but he has the susceptibility for the influence of Grace. If the Will had not the capability of determining in any way whatever, Man would not be blameable for rejecting the salvation offered by Divine Grace.

Meanwhile, CALVIN\* appeared at the head of the *Reformed Church*. In reference to this controversy, nothing new proceeded from him; he only maintained against the reactions, the earlier doctrine of absolute Predestination, which, in him, was connected with a onesided tendency of Christian feeling, and a rigid logical consequence.† Like ZWINGLI, he regarded Prescience and Predestination as of equal extent, and even established the former by the latter; God in no other way foresees the Future, but as he has decreed. Hence, CALVIN allowed no contingency, even in the Fall; he says, How could God, who effects all things, have formed the noblest of his creatures for an uncertain end? What then would become of his omnipotence? The Infralapsarians must still allow such a Predestination, in the case of ADAM's descendants. It cannot have been in a natural way, that all lost salvation through the guilt of one. Yet he himself feels shocked at the thought; *decretum quidem horribile fateor*,‡ he says: Consequently, God created the greatest part of Mankind, in order to glorify him-

\* *Institutio Christianæ Religionis*, i. c. 16, iii. c. 21—24, ed. Tholuck, 1846.

† III. 21, 1.—Numquam liquido ut decet persuasi erimus salutem nostram ex fonte gratuitæ misericordiæ Dei fluere, donec innotuerit nobis æterna ejus electio, quæ hac comparatione gratiam Dei illustrat quod non omnes promiscere adoptat in spem salutis, sed dat aliis, quod aliis negat. Hujus principii ignorantia quantum ex gloria Dei imminuat, quantum veræ humilitati detrahat, palam est.

‡ III. 23, 7.—Iterum quaero, unde factum est, ut tot gentes, una cum liberis eorum infantibus æternæ morti involveret lapsus Adæ absque remedio, nisi quia Deo ita verum est? Hic obmutescere oportet tam decuces alloqui linguas. Decretum quidem horribile, fateor; inficiari tamen nemo poterit, quin præciverit Deus, quem exitum esset habiturus homo, antequam ipsum conderet, et ideo præciverit, quia decreto suo ita ordinarat. In præscientiam Dei si quis hic invehatur, temere et inconsulte impingit. Quid enim, quaeso, est cur reus agatur cælestis judex, quia non ignoraverit quod futurum erat? In prædestinationem competit in quid est vel justæ vel speciosæ querimonie. Nec absurdum videri debet quod dico, Deum non modo primi hominis casum et in eo posterorum ruinam prævidisse; sed arbitrio quoque suo dispensasse. Ut enim ad ejus sapientiam pertinet

self in them by his Primitive Justice, and the smaller by the revelation of His love.\* His opponents might give a reason, why God, who could have made them dogs, created them in His own image. Ought irrational brutes also to argue with God? All doubts may be silenced by the thought, that God's Will is the highest law and cause. Yet he did not rest here. The idea of an absolute omnipotence of God, not conditioned by Holiness, he looked upon as profane and appealed to the incomprehensibility of this Mystery. It is to be acknowledged, that by his dialectic development, he sought to evade the practically injurious consequences, and especially exalted the revealed grace of God, in the work of Redemption. Men ought to keep to the Word of God alone: and instead of inquiring respecting their own election, look to Christ, and seek in him God's fatherly grace. CALVIN laboured very much † to procure the universal acknowledgment of this doctrine in Switzerland, but met with serious opposition, among others, from the learned SEBASTIAN CASTELLIO.‡ In Geneva, CALVIN at last obtained the victory,§ and could then come to an understanding respecting it, with other Swiss Theologians. He attempted, but in vain, to get MELANCTHON on his side. MELANCTHON called him the modern Zeno, who wanted to introduce a stoical necessity into the Church, and expressed himself very warmly against him.|| CALVIN dedicated to him, A.D. 1543, his treatise on human

omnium quæ futura sunt esse præscium sic ad potentiam, omnia manu sua regere ac moderari.

\* III. 23, 1.—Contenta sit fidei sobrietas hac Pauli admonitione (Rom. ix. 22) non esse causam litigandi cum Deo, si ab una parte volens ostendere eam et nolam facere potentiam suam ferat in multa tolerantia et lenitate vasa iræ apparsa in interitum; ab altera autem notas faciat divitiarum suarum erga vasa misericordiæ, quæ præparavit in gloriam.—Mnime tamen consentaneum est præparationem ad interitum alio transire, quam ad arcanum consilium Dei; quod etiam paullo ante in contextu aperitur, quod Deus excitaverit Pharaonem, deinde quos vult induret. Unde sequitur absconditum Dei consilium abdicationis esse causam.

† Hundeshagen die Conflicte des Zwinglianismus Lutherthums u. Calvinismus in der Bernischen Landeskirche von 1532—53. Bern, 1842.

‡ Fuesslin, Seb. Castellio, Frankf. 1755.

§ Consensus Genevensis 1 January, 1552, in Niemeger's Liber Symbolici Ecclesiæ Reform. p. 218. Henry, Leben Calvins, iii. 1, p. 82.

|| Ep. ad Peucerum, 1 Feb. 1552. Corp. Reform. vii. p. 932.

freedom,\* to which he replied :† Since I hold firmly the principle that God is not the Author of Sin, I admit upon that a contingency in the weakness of our judgment. When CALVIN sent MELANCTHON his Confession of Faith, the latter was so excited, that he struck his pen through the whole passage on Predestination. CALVIN remarked that this was very unlike his *ingenita mansuetudo*, that he could not imagine how a man of MELANCTHON'S acuteness could reject this doctrine, and said reproachfully, that he could not believe that he held the doctrines he professed with a sincere heart. On account of a doctrine, to which Speculation had by no means led him, he reproached him with judging *nimis philosophice* concerning Free Will.

The majority in the Lutheran Church had, indeed, declared themselves against MELANCTHON and his Synergism, but his influence extended, in manifold gradations, beyond his school ; and it is to be ascribed to that circumstance, that even the majority of the zealots felt themselves compelled to depart inconsequentially from their original rigour. While the strictest form of the original doctrine of absolute Predestination triumphed in the Reformed Church, an opposition on this point also arose to the milder view of the Lutheran Church. A dispute at Strasburg was the special occasion of bringing the subject openly under discussion between the two Churches. On the Calvinistic side was JEROME ZANCHIUS ;‡ on the Lutheran, JOHN MARBACH. The dispute was settled through an accommodation proposed by BRENZ. It was the occasion of notice being taken of this difference in the *Formula Concordiæ*. There was a wish to avoid everything which would lead to Synergism ; but, at the same time, to shun the

\* Defensio Sanæ et Orthodoxæ Doctrinæ de Servitute et Liberatione Humani Arbitrii adversus Albertum Pighium. Opp. vii. 134.

† Corpus Reformat. v. p. 109.—Ego cum hypothesin hanc teneam Deum non esse causam peccati nec velle peccatum, postea contingentiam in hac nostra infirmitate judicii admitto, ut sciant rudes Davidem sua voluntate ultio ruere, et eundem sentio, cum haberet spiritum sanctum, potuisse eum retinere, et in ea lucta esse aliquam voluntatis actionem.—Nam a verbo Dei ordiendum est nec repugnandum promissioni sed ei assentiamur, nec disputemus antea, tunc nos assensuros esse, cum arcanum Deo decretum nobis monstratum fuerit. Assentientem autem Deus adjuvat, qui per verbum est efficax.

‡ An Italian ; professor at Strasburg, and afterwards at Heidelberg.



doctrine of unconditional Predestination. The *Formula Concordiæ* asserted, that after the Fall, not a spark of spiritual power was left, by which Man could, of himself, turn to Grace. With this assertion, the doctrine of a *gratia irresistibilis* might have been fairly connected; but such a consequence was expressly denied, and it was affirmed that God did, indeed, draw predestinated persons to himself, but not to conversion. This was such a change, through the influence of the Holy Spirit, that Man was able to accept the offered Grace of God. All who resist the influence of the Holy Spirit do not receive it. Thus it appears to be admitted, that Man possesses the power of resisting the influences of Grace; but, on the other hand, we have the contradictory assertion, that nothing depended on the susceptibility of Man. Verbally, this statement might harmonize with the Augustinian doctrine, according to which, Grace operated under the form of free Self-determination. But in the other articles, the Augustinian Particularism is plainly opposed, and the promise of the Gospel: "God willeth all men to be saved," is declared to relate to all men. At the same time, the subterfuge is cut off, which lies in the distinction of *voluntas signi* and *voluntas placiti*, which would be imputing to God two opposing wills. Predestination was referred only to believers, and represented as the eternal decree of God, to make all who receive the Gospel the heirs of eternal life; it is always to be viewed only in connexion with the whole work of Redemption, and the whole scheme of Salvation. In reference to the ungodly, the Prescience of God was accurately distinguished from Predestination. There was, therefore, a contradiction left unsolved in the *Formula Concordiæ*; it was stated that here were difficulties which no human understanding could overcome. In the statements directed against AUGUSTIN's mode of speculation, a point of connexion was given for further opposition against the rigid Augustinian system.

At the close of the sixteenth Century, SAMUEL HUBER\* engaged in a controversy both with the Calvinistic and the Lutheran party. First of all, as a preacher in Bern, he main-

\* A. Schmid, *Dissertatio de S. Huberi Vita, Fatis et Doctrina*, Helmst. 1708, 4to. Walch, *Religionstreitigkeiten der Lutherischen Kirche*, i. 176. *Walchii Bibliotheca Theol.* p. 645. J. Wiggers *Beitr. z. Lebensgesch. S. Hubers*, *Zeitschr. f. Histor. Theol.* 1844, 1.

tained against BEZA, that Christ died for all, and that God willed the salvation of all men. In consequence of this, he was deposed in A.D. 1588, and received into the Lutheran Church, first at Württemberg, then at Wittenberg, and in that place entered into controversy with ÆGIDIUS HUNNIUS,\* who more fully developed the doctrine of the *Formula*. HUBER found fault with the *Formula* of Calvinism because it asserted no general, but only a particular, election of Grace. In controverting the Calvinistic doctrine he had said that God had chosen not only Believers, but all Men, to eternal life. It would have been a more important point of dispute, if HUBER had held that the effects of Redemption were also extended to those who had not attained to Faith in this Life. But this he did not assert, and seemed at last to fall in with the Lutheran doctrine. He was of opinion that if God's general offer be made known, Men will divide themselves into two classes—some following the call, and others of their own fault, not attaining that Salvation, to which they were chosen by God through his Son. Manifestly he was influenced by the motive of representing the divine love in its Universality, but as he expressed himself, it appeared to be rather a conflict of Formulas. He may indeed have remarked the inconsistency of the *Formula Concordiæ*, as he appealed to the fact, that it nowhere appeared in Scripture that Predestination depended on Prescience of Faith; but he did not succeed in clearly developing his meaning.

In the Reformed Church we remark that Reactions again showed themselves, as before in the controversy respecting the Augustinian doctrine, against absolute Predestination, though it had been firmly settled by the Church. The greatest shock proceeded from JAMES ARMINIUS.† He was the pattern of a conscientious and zealously investigating theologian, who endeavoured to guard himself against all partiality. After studying at Geneva, where he was a hearer of BEZA, he returned as a zealous Calvinist to his native land. At that time an intelligent layman, KOORNHERT,‡ a man who was

\* De Providentia Dei et Æterna Prædestinatione, Francof. 1597. Opp. i. 653.

† Caspar. Brandii Historia Vitæ J. Arminii, Amsterd. 1724, ed. J. L. Mosheimius, Bruns. 1725.

‡ Werke, Amsterd. 1630, 3 vols. fol.

satisfied with none of the *Confessions*, attacked the Calvinistic doctrine of Predestination, and thus occasioned much controversy. There was a wish to refute him, and to vindicate Calvinism, but among the Calvinists themselves a difference arose. Some preachers in Delft believed that Calvinism could be easily defended if they substituted *Infralapsarianism* in the place of Calvinistic *Supralapsarianism*.<sup>\*</sup> Others were not satisfied with it. MARTIN LYDIUS, Professor at Franeker, called upon ARMINIUS to refute the preachers of Delft. ARMINIUS examined the arguments which had been brought forward; he was sufficiently a lover of Truth to admit their cogency, but at the same time perceived that they might be employed not merely against *Supralapsarianism*, but against absolute Predestination altogether. From that time he began to have doubts upon it. In a letter written A.D. 1597, he says,—“All the treasures of the World would not be valued by me so much as true knowledge respecting the doctrines of Providence and Predestination.” In another letter he says—“Not a day passes in which I do not reflect on these subjects.” He even reproached himself for being too much occupied with these speculative topics; I would gladly hold the right medium and not be kept back from other important duties of Piety. To this was added that in his pastoral visitations, especially during the spread of a contagious disease, he experienced that the doctrine of absolute Predestination was capable of occasioning great mental distress. He found that there was no other means of imparting tranquillity than pointing to the Objective, and showing that Justification might be obtained by faith in the forgiveness of sins through Christ. Hence he believed that it was most conducive to the rest of the Soul if the two divine decrees in Predestination were distinguished; first, God has decreed to bring only those to Salvation who believe in Christ on account of this Faith; secondly, the decree which relates to the impartation of this faith. The first he made especially prominent; the second was the more difficult point, which could not be so certainly decided. His doctrine was founded on this distinction, but was at first developed gradually with a particular design. He was engaged in controversy at Amsterdam, but still more

<sup>\*</sup> *Responsio ad Argumenta quædam Bezæ et Calvinii ex Tractatis de Prædestinatione in cap. ix. ad Rom. 1589.*

when he became Professor at Leyden (A.D. 1603), and a colleague of FRANCIS GOMARUS. In the midst of these disputes he died, A.D. 1609. At the head of his party two distinguished men made their appearance, UYTENBOGAERT\* and SIMON EPISCOPIUS.† In A.D. 1610, they presented a remonstrance to the States of Holland, in five Articles.‡ On election, it is said, God by an unchangeable decree in Christ before the World began, resolved to bring some persons to salvation through Christ out of fallen Humanity, who by the grace of the Holy Spirit would believe in him, and persist in so doing; but to leave those to deserved punishment who do not convert themselves. Christ, therefore, by his death, has obtained forgiveness of sin for all men, but only believers receive it. Man cannot attain this faith by his own will, but must first be renewed by the Holy Spirit in all his powers. On the co-operation of the Free-Will nothing further was determined, but on the mode of the operation of Grace, it was maintained that it was not irresistible. On the point whether those who were renewed in consequence of believing through Grace could lose this Grace again by their own neglect or not, a decisive opinion was deferred till it could be more closely examined according to the Holy Scriptures. But however temperately the five propositions were expressed, the adherents of strict Calvinism were dissatisfied with them; they gained the victory at the SYNOD of DORT§ (A.D. 1618 to 1619), which condemned the five Propositions, and asserted in opposition to them the unconditional election of grace, yet it was said, that according to God's eternal decree the Non-elect were left to their just doom. The Synod, therefore, kept within the limits of *Infralapsarianism*. Many of the moderately disposed, had wished for an express condemnation of the harsh propositions laid down by the *Supralapsarians*, but even in that they could not succeed with the extreme Party. Gradually

\* J. Uytenbogaert leven, Kerchelijke Bedienige ende zedige verand. Woording, 1646, 4to.

† Philipp. a Limborch, *Historia Vitæ S. Episcopii*, Amsterd. 1701.

‡ Walch, *Religionsstreitigkeiten Ausser d. Luth. Kirche*, iii. 540.

§ *Acti Synodi Nationalis Dordrechtii Habitæ*, Dortr. 1620, 4to. *Acta et Scripta Synodalia Dordracena Ministrorum Remonstrantium*, 1620, 4to. Joh. Halesii *Historia Concilii Dordraceni*; J. L. Mosheimius, *Latine vertit*. Hamb. 1724. *Præstantium ac Eruditorum Vivorum Epistolæ Ecclesiasticæ*.

the Remonstrants developed their doctrine still further in their Confession\* and Apology.† They understood by Predestination only the general divine decree by which all who believe are chosen to eternal life, and did not apply the expression to the method by which men are brought to believe.‡ In order to produce faith, it was said, arguments are required on the part of God for the Truth, to which the pious docility of disposition on the part of man offers no opposition. Hence Belief and Unbelief are decided by the different aspect of the human disposition to the offered Truth. The beginning, progress, and completion of all goodness is to be derived from Grace.

A fresh attempt to give a milder garb to the doctrine of absolute predestination again aroused a controversy within the Reformed Church. AMYRAUT (AMYRALDUS)§ Professor at Saumur, and PAUL TESTART,|| a Preacher in Blois, endeavoured to remove what was offensive in it by the distinction of a general and a conditional divine decree, from which their Theory derived the name of *Universalismus hypotheticus*. The general Decree was to bestow Salvation on all if they would believe. But this was nullified by the limitation that according to a peculiar and unconditional divine decree, only a definite number of elect persons would be brought to believe by God's irresistible Grace. They called the general will of God merely an abstract decree, but his special will *decretum efficax*. In virtue of that general Revelation of God all might attain to salvation, but the general call gives only a physical ability to believe, to which the inability caused by original sin stands opposed. This can only be removed by *Gratia efficax*, which God bestows only on the Elect. AMYRAUT agreed with

\* Confessio sive Declaratio Sententiæ Pastorium qui in Foderato Belgio Remonstrates vocantur. Super Præcipuis Articulis Religionis Christianæ, 1622. Drawn up by Episcopus; see his works, ii. p. 69.

† Apologia pro Confessione sive Declaratione Sententia, &c. 1628, also by Episcopus.

‡ G. Zeltneri Breviarum Controversiarum cum Remonstrantibus Agitatarum, Noremb. 1719.

§ Traité de la Predestination et de ses Principes Différents, Saumur, 1634. Moyse Amyraut, sa Vie et ses Ecrits, par Charles E. Saigey, Strassb. 1849. Moses Amyraldus von A. Schweizer in Baur's u. Zeller's Theologesche. Jahrb. 1852.

|| Tous les Synodes Nationaux des Eglises Reformées de France, par Aymon, t. ii.

ZWINGLI, in his views respecting the relation of the Heathen to Salvation. If ever any man turns to God and seeks to obtain salvation through divine grace, he will succeed, even though the definite historical knowledge of Christ is wanting to him. The National Synod of Alençon, A.D. 1637, declared against this doctrine but spared its advocates. The doctrine was treated more mildly by the Synod of Charenton, A.D. 1644. FREDERICK SPANHEIM was one of the warmest opponents of this theory; on the other hand, AMYRAUT was defended by DAVID BLONDEL\* and DAILLÉ.†

Also in reference to the doctrine of Predestination, the Catholic Church, against whose Dogma it was directed, found it needful to explain itself against the statements of the Reformers. But it was in a difficult position owing to its own divisions. The strict Augustinian party could never gain the ascendancy here; there was a dread of deciding for or against either of the two powerful parties, and hence the embarrassment felt at the Council of Trent. They wished to condemn the Protestant and yet to spare the Augustinian School; there remained therefore no other resource but ambiguity; according to the letter the Protestant doctrine was condemned, while the language was so ambiguous that both the Catholic parties could be satisfied. The apt dialectic formulas, the ambiguity in the use of the terms *liberum arbitrium posse*, and the like, sufficiently opened the way for that purpose. Among other things, the Council of Trent declared,‡ that those who were estranged through Sin from God were made capable of conversion by his quickening and assisting Grace, since they

\* D. Blondel, Actes Authentiques des Eglises Reformées, touchant la Paix et Charité Fraternelle, 1655.

† J. Dallæi, Apologia pro Duabus Ecclesiarum in Gallia Protestantium Synodis Nationalibus adversus F. Spanhemis Exercitationes de Gratia Universali, 1655.

‡ Sessio vi. c. 5.—Declarat (synodus) ipsius justificationis exordium in adultis a Deo per Christum Jesum præveniente gratia sumendum esse, hoc est, ab ejus vocatione, qua nullis eorum existentibus meritis vocantur, ut qui per peccata a Deo aversi erant, per ejus excitantem atque adjuvantem gratiam ad convertendum se ad suam ipsorum justificationem, eidem gratiæ libere assentiendo et co-operando disponantur; ita ut tangente Deo cor hominis per Spiritus Sancti illuminationem, neque homo ipse nihil omnino agat, inspirationem illam recipiens, quippe qui illam et abjicere potest; neque tamen sive gratia Dei movere se ad justitiam coram illo libera sua voluntate possit.

freely yielded to this Grace and co-operated with it. Man also does something, since he accepts that divine influence. It is easy to perceive how indefinitely all this is expressed. They also could admit this Canon who thought that Grace operated not quite independently of free Self-determination; for among other things it was said—if any one maintains that after the Fall Free-Will was altogether extinguished, this was to be held as a fiction introduced by Satan himself. Then, again, in this connexion, much depended on defining what was to be understood by freedom of the Will. Shortly after these Statements had been drawn up the Dominican, DOMINICO SOTO, and the Franciscan, ANDREA VEGA, though they set out from opposite standpoints, and on all points contradicted one another, both appealed to these decrees of the Council of Trent.\* For this contradiction, on the part of the Catholics, the wisdom of the Council has been extolled; but under the circumstances, the Council should have declared what was essential. It rather practised a diplomatic art, which was unworthy of an assembly of the teachers of the Church. The injurious consequences were apparent in the fresh Controversies which were always breaking out. By the influence of the Reformation, a reformatory tendency was also called forth within the pale of the Catholic Church, which attached itself to AUGUSTIN.† MICHAEL BAIUS (DE BAY) of the University of Louvaine, belonged to it. PIUS V., A.D. 1567, condemned seventy-nine propositions by him, but without explaining in what sense he condemned them. The Controversy was again agitated when the Jesuit, MOLINA,‡ about A.D. 1588, published a work on the agreement between Free-will, Grace, divine Prescience, and Predestination. He maintained that no man could be saved without divine grace; but that this

\* Sarpi, Geschichte des Tridentischen Concils, übersetzt von Rambach, ii. 443.

† Melchior, Leydeckeri Historia Jansenismi. Traj. ad Rhenum, 1695. Du Chesne, Histoire du Bajanisme, Douay, 1731.

‡ Gieseler iii. 2, p. 614.—Potest homo per vires naturæ cum solo concursu generali Dei assentiri mysteriis supernaturalibus, sibi propositis et explicatis (qualia sunt, Deum esse triunum in personis, Christum esse Deum et similia) tanquam a Deo revelatis actri mere naturali.—Homini tamen sic assentienti supernaturalibus mysteriis Deus ex certa lege a se cum filio sua statuta gratiam confert auxiliare, quibus ille credat ut oportet ad salutem.

would be imparted to any one who only used the powers left to him of his Free-Will; Grace would be granted to him in virtue of the effects of Christ's merits. He further distinguished between a necessary knowledge of God and a free and a mediate one,\* in order by means of the latter to hold fast the conditional Predestination of God. His System, therefore, is plainly remote from the Augustinian; it gave the impulse to a violent controversy between the Jesuits and the Dominicans. Pope CLEMENT VIII. allowed the matter to be examined in the *Congregationes de auxilium gratiæ*; but PAUL V. dissolved their sittings without coming to a decision.†

A new reformatory tendency, proceeding on Augustinian principles and combating Jesuitism, was commenced in the seventeenth Century, by the Abbot of ST. CYRAN‡ and CORNELIUS JANSEN, Bishop of Ypern. When after the death of the latter, about A.D. 1640, his work entitled *Augustinus* appeared,§ the Popes again knew not how to help themselves, but by condemning certain propositions extracted from it, without explaining the meaning. By this means the Jansenist Controversy only became the more violent.||

Though SOCINUS agreed very much with the Pelagians, yet not in this doctrine. He expresses himself more definitely than PELAGIUS, respecting the idea of Grace.¶ Owing to the force of habit, human Nature has acquired a great inclination

\* Id est, scientia futurorum contingentium dependentium a causa libera, ante actuale decretum divinæ voluntatis, volentis vel saltem permittentis illa futura esse vel futura absolute, vel futura sub conditione.

† J. H. Serry, *Historiæ Congregationum de Auxiliis Divinæ Gratiæ sub summis Pontificibus Clemente VIII. et Paulo V., libri iv.* 1700. Appendix, 1701, ed. 2, 1709.

‡ *Œuvres Chrétiennes et Spirituelles*, Lyon, 1679, 4 voll.

§ *Augustinus, sive Doctrina Aug. de Humanæ Naturæ Sanitate, Ægritudine, Medecina, adversus Pelagianos et Massilienses*, Lov. 1640, Paris, 1641, 3 tom. fol.

|| Leydeken, *Historia Jansenismi*, 1695. Gerberon, *Histoire Générale du Jansenisme*, Amsterd. 1700, 3 voll. Fontaine, *Mémoires pour servir à l'Histoire de Port-Royal*, Col. 1738, 2 voll. Reuchlin, *Gesch. von Port-Royal, Der Kampf des Reformatorischen und Jesuitischen Katholicismus unter Louis XIII. u. XIV.*, Hamburg, 1839, 44, 2 Bde. Sainte-Beuve, *Histoire de Port-Royal*, Paris, 1840. Ranke, *Die Röm. Päpste*, iii. p. 136.

¶ *Prelectiones Theologiæ De Libero Hominis Arbitrio deque Æterna Prædestinatione.*



to Sin, on account of which Man needs an outward and an inward help of God. The former by threatenings deters from Evil, and impels to Good by the promise of future blessings. The inward help of God consists partly in God's giving to believers a certain foretaste of the blessings promised to them, and partly by enabling them through his illumination plainly to understand his Will as contained in his revealed Word. So far the Holy Spirit is a pledge in the hearts of Believers. But he always speaks of the outward help of God, the outward Revelation in his Word as the principal thing, and the inward as only a support of the outward. It is therefore assumed that Faith itself is realized independently of all the influences of Grace, as this also is closely connected with his doctrine of the value of Faith. Throughout there is the same mistake respecting the nature of religious conviction; it is supposed to originate by a logical process. He supposes that the facts by which this doctrine is accredited, are of a kind, that the presentation of them is sufficient to bring every man who is not altogether depraved to belief and obedience. Nothing more is presupposed than a love of Truth, which allows itself to be instructed. On this account Faith is of such value in God's esteem, and is the ground of Justification. It is his aim to reject every operation of divine Grace which cannot consist with Free-Will, yet he would not thereby reject all divine operations. "We speak here," he says, "only of the common agency of God, and do not exclude such cases, in which God sometimes comes to Man's aid in a different way, for who can fully know God's proceedings?" In the Racovian Catechism the Holy Spirit is described as the power which God imparts to certain men, in order to distinguish them from others, and to consecrate them to his service.

#### g. THE DOCTRINE OF THE CHURCH.

THE whole Catholic Standpoint rests on this, that the relation of the religious consciousness to Christ is made to depend on the mediation effected by the Authority of the Church, and hence the latter was made the grand and fundamental point. On the contrary, the Reformation necessarily effected a revolution in the relation to the Church, from its material principle, from the immediate relation of the religious consciousness to Christ. The Reformers attained to their idea of the

Church, by setting out from the common fact of Faith in the Redeemer, and hence conceived it in an internal manner; so that in the Augsburg Confession,\* the Church is defined as the congregation of Saints, in which the Gospel is rightly taught, and the Sacraments rightly administered. The Catholic doctrine of a necessary Unity of constitution is combated, and it is asserted that for true Unity, agreement in the doctrine of the Gospel and the administration of the Sacraments is sufficient. The distinction between the invisible and visible Church is not, indeed, here applied, but this distinction naturally follows from the genetic development of this idea. But the concealment of this distinction occasioned a misunderstanding of the Donatist kind, as if every community in which there were unworthy members thereby ceased to be a true Church. In order to guard against this objection the Augsburg Confession† declared that although the Church in a strict sense was a community of Saints, yet in the present life many hypocrites and wicked persons are mixed with it. The distinction was therefore made between the proper and improper Church. But since the Catholic Theologians availed themselves of the indistinctness in the statements of the Confession, in order to charge the Protestants in their Confutation,‡ with Donatist errors, this Article was more fully developed in the Apology.§ The Church, as far as it was understood to be an outward community of Good and Bad, was distinguished from the Church in a strict sense, which was no other than the Kingdom of Christ. The Church in the highest sense is the community of Faith and of the Spirit in the souls of men; it consists chiefly in the inward joint participation of eternal blessings, but there are outward signs by which it may

\* Art. vii. — *Item docent, quod una Sancta Ecclesia perpetuo mansura sit. Est autem Ecclesia congregatio Sanctorum in qua Evangelium recte docetur et recte administrantur sacramenta. Et ad veram unitatem Ecclesiæ satis est consentire de doctrina Evangelii et administratione sacramentorum. Nec necesse est ubique esse similes traditiones humanas, seu ritus aut ceremonias ab hominibus institutas. Sicut inquit Paulus (Eph. iv. 5, 6): Una fides, unum baptisma, unus Deus et Pater omnium.*

† Art. viii. — *Quamquam Ecclesia proprie sit congregatio Sanctorum et vere credentium; tamen, cum in hac vita multi hypocritæ et mali admixti sint, licet uti Sacramentis, quæ per malos administrantur.*

‡ Art. vii. viii.

§ Apology. Art. iv.

be known. The kingdom of God is to be distinguished in the Old Testament and the New Testament sense; on the Old Testament Standpoint the Wicked might be reckoned as belonging in a certain sense to the kingdom of God, since all who were Jews by birth were separated from the Heathen by special Temporal promises; but the Church on the New Testament standpoint is a spiritual kingdom, that is, one which is not separated by civil usages from other nations, but its members are the true people of God, regenerated by the Holy Spirit. Here also the distinction comes in of the proper and improper Church. The arrogance is contradicted, with which the Romish Church calls itself alone Catholic, and it is maintained that the Article in the 'Apostles' Creed of the *Ecclesia Catholica* had for its object that the Church should be deemed to be not an outward community of certain Nations, but rather a community of men who are scattered throughout the World but who agree with one another in the Gospel, who have in common the same Christ, and Holy Spirit, and Sacraments, whether they adopt the same or different usages. The idea of the communion of Saints was guarded against misconstruction, as if it referred to subjective Holiness; the members of the Church are not holy in themselves, but because they are sanctified by faith in Christ. "The whole Christian Church," LUTHER says, "is holy, not in itself, but in Christ, and through the holiness of Christ.\*"

A stage is marked in the History of this doctrine by the development which ZWINGLI gave of it, in which for the first first time the two relations of the Idea are clearly distinguished and expressed. He also sets out† from the material principle of the Reformation; Christ is the Rock, on which the Church, that is, the community of believers, is built. From this he obtained the idea of a community of men all bound together by one faith and one spirit; let any one place all his trust in God through Christ, then he is in the Church, that is, in the community of all pious Christians. In his *Antibolum* (A.D. 1524) he distinguishes first of all the Church in the sense which includes all who have professed Christ, and are found in

\* See J. Kostlin, *Luther's Lehre von der Kirche*, Stuttg. 1853.

† *Uelegen und Grund der Schlussreden oder Artikel*, 1523. *Werke* i. p. 169. Art. viii. p. 201.

the outward community of Christians although they do not belong to true believers; and secondly, the Church as it is described in Ephesians v., which is without spot, inasmuch as only those are understood to compose it who believe in Redemption through Christ; they alone are the Church of Christ in the true sense. The community of the sanctified through Christ is the Church which cannot err, for it is founded on the Word of God. In his Confession to CHARLES V. he applies to the visible Church the phrase *ecclesia sensibilis*.

CALVIN presents very forcibly the idea of the Church as a community. He says, "By the Church we understand not merely the *ecclesia visibilis*, but the Elect of God, to whom even the dead belong." Hence he distinguishes the idea of the outward Church as of the peculiar Christian community, only through this can we obtain entrance to eternal life; out of its pale, there is no forgiveness of sins, no salvation. The marks of this Church are, that it publishes the Word of God in its purity, and administers the Sacraments, purely according to their institution. The Universal Church is so called inasmuch as it includes believers of all nations. Here the important point is not agreement in all things, but only in essential doctrines (*Instit.* lib. iv.).

In the form they gave to the idea of the Church, both LUTHER and MELANCTHON were especially influenced by the new tendency which proceeded from the opposition to the one-sided subjective tendency, which referred everything to what was internal, depreciated the Objective and Positive, and because no Church came near enough to its Idealism, tended to Separatism. At an earlier period the opposition against the externalism of the idea in the Catholic Church was the principal point kept in view; now the importance of the visible Church against the onesided maintenance of the idea of the invisible Church claimed to be acknowledged. While the Reformers were combating against this, the idea of the invisible Church was for a time held to be doubtful. MELANCTHON himself says, "These passages treat not of a Platonic Idea, but of a visible Church;" and LUTHER says, "They say the Spirit must do it. The merciful God preserve us from that Christian Church in which there are only saints." Hence the distinction of the visible and invisible Church was not taken from the Reformed Church by the Lutheran Church,

which occasioned great difficulties when they wished to guard themselves against misconstruction in controversy.

#### h. THE DOCTRINE OF THE SACRAMENTS.

THE Council of Trent\* confirmed the positions developed by the Schoolmen; the Sacraments of the New Covenant prevent the Grace of which they are the signs, and impart it really to those who do not offer any hindrance to it.

LUTHER, owing to his deeper conceptions of sin, rejected the justifying power of the External in the Sacraments, and referred everything to Faith. "Faith," he says, "must appropriate the Divine, all other things can be only signs for the operation and formation of Faith.† God has connected his promise with a sign, for the greater assurance and strengthening of our Faith. In every sacrament we must distinguish between the Word of divine promise and the outward sign, which has been ordained by God, to represent the word and the promise to sensuous men. The principal thing is the Word; man can be saved without the Sacrament, but not without the Word; I can partake of the Sacrament daily in the Mass, if I only keep before me the Word of Christ."

With this MELANCTHON agrees. "The sign was added to the promise as a certain testimony of the divine good pleasure towards us. Man ought to be as firmly convinced of the divine Grace in the Sacrament as if God wrought a miracle for him." He wished to have another name for the Sacrament,—*signum*, *symbolum*, *tessera*, *σφραγίς*. "Without the sign thou canst be justified, therefore it is not the sign which justifies; Baptism and the Supper are nothing, but are only attestations of the divine Will."

Thus we see that the Subjective in the doctrine of the Sacrament had a preponderating importance attached to it by LUTHER and MELANCTHON; still we may perceive a charac-

\* Concil. Trid. Sess. viii. canon 6.—Si quis dixerit sacramenta novæ legis non continere gratiam, quam significat, aut gratiam ipsam, non ponentibus obicem, non conferre, quasi signa tantum externa sint accepta per fidem gratiæ, vel justitiæ, et notæ quædam Christianæ professionis, quibus apud homines discernuntur fidelis ab infidelibus, anathema sit. Canon 8.—Si quis dixerit, per ipsa novæ legis sacramenta ex opere operato nonconferri gratiam, sed solam fidem divinæ promissionis ad gratiam consequendam sufficere, anathema sit.

† Non sacramentum, sed fides in sacramento justificat.

teristic of the Lutheran doctrine, that at the same time the Objective was enforced; for the outward sign had a meaning; it was instituted by God in order to seal the promise.

In the first respect ZWINGLI agreed with LUTHER, but differed from him by a onesided exaltation of the Subjective. Like LUTHER, he set out with putting Faith in opposition to the *opus operatum*. But he went further than that reformer; he wished to trace everything back to the spiritual, to make Religion free from all necessary references to the Visible. "God alone can operate," he said, "on the inner Man, and God's operation is bound to nothing. It is a self-deception, when Man believes that anything outward can operate on his inner life. Faith needs no outward sign for its excitement, for true Faith is not a mere opinion, but an immediate certainty, an inward Experience. He who once has this immediate experience, from him it cannot be hidden, and he needs no outward sign in order to be led to it." In his Confession he says,\* "The Grace effected by the Holy Spirit needs no guide; we never read in the Holy Scriptures that outward signs without fail bring the Spirit with them." It was, therefore, ZWINGLI's chief aim to bring back the subjective Christian consciousness to the immediate fact of Faith, of inward experience, and not to connect this with an outward sign. Hence the Sacraments had for him a different meaning; they only lead us visibly to the Church to which we already belong essentially and invisibly; therefore they are nothing but certain signs, through which a man is either admitted into the Church, or verifies himself as a member, as a *candidatus*, or as *miles ecclesiæ*. The Church, much more than himself, is assured of his faith. The sign is not for his own spiritual invigoration, but for a testimony to others. ZWINGLI also wished the term *Sacrament* to be discarded.†

\* Credo, imoscio, omnia sacramenta tam abesse ut gratiam conferant, ut ne adferant quidem aut dispensent. Nam gratia ut a spiritu divino fit aut datur; ita donum istud ad solum spiritum pervenit. Dux autem vel vehiculum spiritui non est necessarium; ipse enim est virtus et latio qua cuncta feruntur non qui ferri debeat; neque id unquam legimus in scripturis sacris, quod sensibilia, qualia sacramenta sunt certo secum ferrent spiritum, sed si sensibilia unquam lata sunt cum spiritu; jam spiritus fuit qui tulit, non sensibilia.

† Commentarius de Vera et Falsa Religione, De Sacramentis. Opp. iii. pag. 228.

A wide difference of the religious tendencies is here manifested; the Lutheran is more realistic, the Swiss more idealistic; they would have been developed differently even had no controversy broken out. But owing to special causes, the difference issued in an open rupture. The doctrine of the Supper had the greatest share in this event. The same opposition against enthusiastic tendencies during which LUTHER and MELANCTHON had altered their doctrine of the Church, had an influence on the formation of their doctrine of the Sacraments. In order to encounter the onesided subjective tendency, more weight was laid upon the Objective. Of this the Augsburg Confession\* testifies—since it teaches that the Sacraments are not merely appointed in order to be *notæ professionis*, but as witnesses and attestations of the divine Grace towards us, and given us to arouse and strengthen our Faith. The promises are offered and exhibited by the Sacraments. In the later editions of the *Loci*, MELANCTHON endeavoured to point out the higher aim of the Sacrament, and he represents that alleged by ZWINGLI as only subordinate.

This idea of the Sacraments was in a remarkable manner introduced into a conference which was held at Wittenberg, A.D. 1520, with SCHWENKFELD, who belonged to the inward and subjective tendency. He maintained that Christ only used the Sacraments as temporary symbols of a divine reality, the communion with Christ and his Spirit. He blamed the Lutherans for attributing too much to the Sacraments, since they called it a seal of Faith. BUGENHAGEN rejoined, Why not? men are weak in faith; they need the assurance of their Justification, which is granted to them by Christ's ordinance. On the other hand, SCHWENKFELD said,—“If I have Faith then I have the Spirit of God; but if I have not Faith, then the Sacrament cannot give me the Spirit.”

CALVIN occupied a middle position. On the one hand, he protested against the notion of a magical influence; and on the other, he held firmly to the Objective. The Sacraments

\* Art. xiii.—De usu sacramentorum docent, quod sacramenta instituta sint non modo ut sint notæ professionis inter homines, sed magis ut sint signa et testimonia voluntatis Dei erga nos, ad excitandam et confirmandam fidem in his, qui utuntur, proposita. Itaque utendum est sacramentis ita, ut fides accedat, quæ credat promissionibus, quæ per sacramenta exhibentur et ostendantur.

are not mere signs, but signs instituted by God which notify to men the divine promise; they are the outward symbols by which God seals the promises of his grace to our Conscience; they attest the weakness of our Faith, and at the same time our love to Him. The Sacraments effect this, not by any secret magical power, but because they are instituted for this end by the Lord, and they can only attain it, when the inward agency of the Holy Spirit is added, whereby alone the Sacraments find their way to the heart; they are therefore efficacious only for the predestinated.

LUTHER discussed the *number* of the Sacraments in his treatise on the Babylonish Captivity of the Church. "We can call everything a Sacrament," he says. "to which a promise of God is annexed." According to this definition more Sacraments can be reckoned than even according to the Catholic doctrine. He afterwards added the idea of a sign connected with a promise, and instituted for that purpose by God. According to this limitation he excluded the other (Catholic) sacraments, and retained only two, *Baptism* and *the Supper*.

Thus the Sacramental meaning of *Penance*, which at first he allowed, must needs be dropped; for it wanted the mark of a visible sign. He attained in this way to the idea of Penance to which his doctrine of Faith corresponds; Penance is nothing else than the way and return to Baptism, a repetition of it. MELANCTHON, in his Apology, states,—“It is of importance that we do not neglect the usages ordained in the Holy Scriptures; in other respects it matters not, if we number among the Sacraments some things, which serve for the instruction of Men; but if we define the Sacraments as usages which rest on divine institution, and with which a promise of Grace is connected, it is easy to judge what acts peculiarly belong to them; signs which are instituted without the divine sanction, are no sure signs of Grace. At that time *Absolution*, which LUTHER had rejected, was still reckoned as the *sacramentum pœnitentiæ*. Further, after MELANCTHON had protested against the Old Testament and Catholic idea of the Priesthood, he did not deny that in reference to the ministry of the Word it was allowable to speak of a Sacrament of Ordination, which had its appropriate sign in the laying on of hands. MELANCTHON also in other passages was inclined to



adopt it with a view to present the office of the Ministry in its high importance; but the power of the Protestant principle prevailed, and the number of the Sacraments was limited to two.

### 1. THE DOCTRINE OF BAPTISM.

THE principle of the Reformation according to its material as well as well as formal relation, might easily lead to a fresh examination of *Infant Baptism*, which, since the third Century, had been held in general repute. For Infant Baptism had received its Authority through Tradition, which, according to the Protestant principle, possessed no decisive weight. The question therefore was, in this respect, how the apostolic origin of Infant Baptism could be proved, and in reference to another point, how could Faith, from which everything in the Christian life must proceed, be shown in children. The Reformers had conformed to the prevalent usage, and were first called from without to the examination of it. The Zwickau enthusiasts who came to Wittenberg A.D. 1522, were zealous opponents of Infant Baptism; they raised a controversy upon it, and placed the Wittenbergers in a state of embarrassment. MELANTHON,\* in writing to the Elector, declared that Satan had attacked them in a weak place, for he knew not how he should refute those enthusiasts: he thought it best not to dispute on this subject, since this article was not of vital portance. On LUTHER the doubts of the enthusiasts could not make such a great impression; he knew how to relieve himself, though he put down objections more by bold assertions than by arguments. He granted that the Church had power not to baptize children, but his opponents could not prove that Infant Baptism was against Scripture; who could tell whether God did not implant Faith in early childhood as in sleep; moreover, at Baptism nothing else is done but to bring them to the present Christ, who always receives what is brought to him. These arguments prevailed, and thus the necessity of Infant-Baptism was established. The Augsburg Confession † maintained against the

\* Schneider, Bibliothek der Kirchengesch. ii. 320.

† Art. ix.—De Baptismo docent, quod sit necessarius ad salutem, quodque per Baptismum offeratur gratia Dei, et quod pueri sint baptizandi qui per baptismum oblatis Deo recipiantur in gratiam Dei. Dam-

Anabaptists that Baptism was necessary to Salvation, that children ought to be baptized who are presented to God by baptism. The Anabaptists were also on this account condemned, because they taught that unbaptized Infants might be saved. By the form of this Article, countenance might be given to Error, as if it taught the damnation of unbaptized children. In the new edition of his *Loci* MELANCTHON vindicated Infant-Baptism by the testimony of Tradition since the time of ORIGEN, and by the fact that the kingdom of God relates also to children. Moreover, forgiveness of sins could not be granted to those who are without the Gospel; consequently the Baptism of children is necessary; the command of Christ to baptize relates to all, therefore to children; lastly, Baptism came in the room of Circumcision. As to the effects of Baptism, he asserted that the Holy Spirit was imparted to children by baptism, and produced, according to their capacity, a new tendency towards God.\*

In ZWINGLI's doctrine of the Sacraments, Infant Baptism had a good position. He regarded it as a symbolical sign with which no higher influences were connected, by which the children of Christians were marked as Christians, and were bound to regulate their lives accordingly; and their Parents were pledged to train them up in a corresponding manner. In proof of Infant Baptism he also appealed to Circumcision, to the narrative in the Gospels that Christ invited children to come to him, and to the baptism of John; for as the latter had baptized in the name of Christ, who at the time was yet to be manifested, we might do the same in the case of children.†

CALVIN likewise compares Baptism with Circumcision; God signified, thereby, that he would be not only with the Parents, but also with their posterity. Baptism is a seal of a Covenant; Christ blessed children, commended them to their heavenly Father, and said that of such were the kingdom of Heaven; if children ought to be brought to Christ, why nant Anabaptistas, qui improbant Baptismum puerorum et affirmant pueros sine Baptismo salvos fieri.

\* Verissimum est in omnibus adultis requiri poenitentiam et fidem; sed de infantibus hoc satis est tenere: Spiritus Sanctus per baptismum eis datur, qui efficit in eis novos motus novas inclinationes ad Deum pro ipsorum modo.

† De Sacramento Baptismi. Opp. iii p. 571.

should they not receive the symbol of communion with Christ? Also in the New Testament mention is made of the Baptism of whole families, and the early use of Infant-Baptism allows the conclusion that it had come down from the time of the Apostles. Infant Baptism is also important for the Parents as a seal of the divine promise which is continued from them to their children; another reason is, that by baptism children are incorporated in the Church, and are so much the more commended to the other members. He believed in a certain influence in Infant Baptism, and answers the objection to it by saying, that although we cannot understand this effect, it does not follow that it does not take place. He appealed to the fact that John was filled with the Holy Spirit from his birth, and Christ from the beginning with the divine Nature; from his Humanity the principle of sanctification must overflow to men; and this would hold good of children.\*

## 2. THE DOCTRINE OF THE SUPPER.

A. W. Dieckhoff, d. evang. Abendmahlslehre in Reformationszeitalt. I. B. 1854.

THE diversity of doctrine respecting the Supper is founded in the difference respecting the doctrine of the Sacraments in general. It was precisely the idea which lies at the foundation in reference to the Supper, which gave occasion to the open expression of this contrariety.

LUTHER, at first in opposition to the Catholic Church, had here given prominence to the subjective element. Combating the efficacy of the *opus operatum*, he made everything dependent on Faith. From this point he could attain to a mere symbolical conception by which the Dogma of the Mass would have been at once annihilated. When he first occupied himself with these inquiries, the thought actually occurred to him whether the Bread and Wine at the Supper had not a mere symbolical meaning. "If any one," he writes, "five years before could have informed me, that in the Sacrament there is nothing but bread and wine, he would have rendered me a great service. I have suffered sore temptations respecting it."† But as it was now important for him to maintain the objective in the doctrine of the Sacraments, and more-

\* Institutt. Relig. Christ. lib. iv. cap. 16.

† To the Christians in Strasburg, 15 December, 1529. De Wette ii. p. 1574.

over, as the enemy of allegorical interpretation, he wished to understand the words of the institution literally, he came to the conclusion to reject the doctrine of Transubstantiation, but to hold firmly that the Body and Blood of Christ were truly present in the Bread and Wine. In his treatise on the Babylonish Captivity of the Church, where he first occupies himself with this subject, he calls Transubstantiation a scholastic subtle fiction. An expression of PIERRE D'AILLY had led him to perceive that the Schoolmen had already remarked the contradiction of this doctrine to Holy Writ; he acknowledges that it drove them to a forced interpretation of the words of the institution, and then says,—“Truly, if I cannot succeed in knowing how the Bread can be the Body of Christ, yet I will bring my understanding captive under the obedience of Christ. As iron and fire are two substances, and yet when mixed are one glowing substance, so it is with the connexion of the Body and Blood with the Bread and Wine.” LUTHER persisted in this tendency. His doctrine continued to be, that the Body and Blood were *with, in, and under* the Bread and Wine, and that both believers and unbelievers received them. This was essential; questions about the manner in which it took place, he discarded. This is important as an evidence of the peculiar Christian tendency of his Spirit. To PAUL SPERATUS, he wrote:—“Faith requires no more than to know that the Body of the living Christ is under the Bread and Wine. In this simplicity it perseveres, and despises curious\* questions.”

The other tendency is shown in ZWINGLI. He placed the mere subjective moment of Faith in much sharper opposition to the Catholic doctrine. All that is external can accomplish nothing, can be of no advantage to man for his salvation, can

\* De Wette, ii. p. 208, 13 June, 1522.—Sic ita contentio ab soluenda est, an sub pane, solum corpus virtute verborum sit, &c. Quid enim ut tu ipse judicas opus est rude vulgus his argutiis implicare, quod interim potest hac sana et tuta fide dirigi, scilicet quod credet sub pane esse corpus illius, qui est verus Deus et verus homo. Quomodo autem concomitantur ibi sanguis, humanitas, deitas, pili, ossa, cutis sint, eum non sint necessaria sciri, quid opus est fatigari? Fides ex his rebus et verbis neque docetur neque augetur, sed scrupuli seruntur, et dissensiones; fides non vult plus nosse, quam sub pane esse corpus Christi, sub vino sanguinem Christi viventis et regnantis; en hac simplicitate perseverat, contemtu questionibus curiosis.

only be a sign for Faith. The eating of the Body of Christ is to be understood in a spiritual sense; Christ has given his Body for the forgiveness of our sins. The eating of his Body consists in a personal appropriation of this privilege and blessing. He was fond of appealing to John vi. 63. His constant motto was, "The Flesh profiteth nothing; it is the Spirit that quickeneth." His doctrine on this subject was distinctly expressed even before the outbreak of the controversy. In his commentary on the sixty-seven Articles, which were framed by him at the recognition of the Reformation at Zurich, he says that several years before he had called the Supper a *commemoratio mortis et passionis Christi*. \* LUTHER called it a Testament; they agreed in the thing itself; to eat the Body and Blood of Christ is nothing else than the work of Faith which appropriates what Christ has gained by giving up his Body for us; if we firmly believe this, our souls will be nourished with the Body and Blood of Christ; Christ instituted the Supper in order to assure our Faith by a visible object; he well knew that in many other things LUTHER indulged the weak. In his book *De vera et falsa religione*, he says, †—The Supper is nothing but a commemorative feast by which those who firmly believe that they are redeemed by the death of Christ, bear witness of the death to which they owe their life, thank him and praise him. At the same time they testify that they are members of one body, and pledge themselves to live according to the doctrine and example of Christ. ZWINGLI was not led to these views at first by the exposition of single passages of Scripture, but rather by the development of his doctrine of faith. Yet certainly he was not conscious of doing violence to the biblical phraseology, but thought that his views were most favoured by it. The words of the Institution were on his side. He explained the *est* in a figurative sense, and compared with it similar passages of the Old and New Testament where *est* is used in a figurative sense, and it is said that one thing is another; as when Christ is called a rock, and the Word of God is called seed.

That this contrariety was not only brought into consciousness, but also obtained everywhere a great importance, resulted from the manner in which it was at first openly expressed. It

\* Werke i. p. 232.

† Opp. iii. p. 239. De Eucharistia.

was the time when the Reformation experienced its first troubles through the Zwickau enthusiasts, the Iconoclasts in Wittenberg; and the Peasants' War. As LUTHER, in his polemics, took a new direction in order to oppose the onesided subjective element, CARLSTADT\* came forward with a doctrine which he had hitherto developed in secret and which perfectly agreed with ZWINGLI's doctrine of the Supper. Like ZWINGLI, he also wished to discard the term *Sacramentum*. One difference existed between them in explaining the words of the Institution. CARLSTADT maintained that Christ spoke *δεικτικῶς*, that is, that he pointed to his Body when he said, "Take eat, this is my Body." The first person who after the commencement of the Reformation had propounded this doctrine, was the Netherland jurist, CORNELIUS HONIUS,† in a treatise published A.D. 1521.

CALVIN‡ did not agree with this view; he opposed those who explained the words "eating the flesh of Christ and drinking his blood," only of faith in Christ and the right knowledge of him. Whoever received the Supper in faith was truly and perfectly a partaker of Christ. This communion was not merely a communion of Spirit; the Body of Christ by its connexion with the divine Nature received a fulness of life which flowed over to believers. CALVIN, therefore, admitted something supernatural, but thought that the event took place not by virtue of the Body of Christ, which as such could not be in several places, but by virtue of the power of the Holy Spirit; a supernatural communication which no human Understanding could explain. This communion with Christ by which he communicates himself and all his blessings, the Supper symbolically represents;§ the Outward is indeed merely a sign, but not an empty sign, it really presents that which is signified by it, namely, the actual participation of the body of Christ by the power of the Holy Spirit. He explains

\* See Jäger, Andreas Bodenstein von Carlstadt. Ein Betrag zur Geschichte der Reformationszeit, Stuttgart, 1856, p. 428.

† Gerdesius, *Historiæ Evangelii Renovati Monumenta*, i. p. 228.

‡ Institutt. iv. cap. 17.

§ Dico, in cœnæ mysterio per symbola panis et vini Christum vere nobis exhiberi, adeoque corpus et sanguinem in quibus omnem obedientiam pro comparanda nobis justitia adimplevit; quo scilicet primum in unum corpus cum ipso coalescamus, deinde participes substantiæ ejus facti in bonorum omnium communicatione virtutem quoque sentiamus.

the words of the Institution metonymically, in the sense, that the sign is used for the thing signified ; he denied any bodily presence of Christ ; Christ does not descend to earth, but believers by the power of the Holy Spirit are raised to communion with him in Heaven.\* Christ also descends to them but by virtue of his Spirit and the Outward symbols ;† the Organ by which communion is attained, is Faith ;‡ he is presented to all, but received only by believers.§ The mere symbolical view depreciates the sign too much, and separates it from the Sacrament ; but the other view the sign is exalted too much, and thereby the nature of the Mystery itself is obscured.

MELANCHTHON in this controversy took a peculiar position and was grieved at its outbreak. In A.D. 1525, he said—In reference to the subject of the Supper I see nothing but that men will be involved in dark and profane disputes by which Souls will be drawn away from attending to what is essential in the doctrine. Yet at first he agreed with LUTHER's opposition against ZWINGLI, who also appeared to him to encroach upon the Objective in the Sacrament. He uttered some memorable words to ŒCOLAMPADIUS respecting it, "*You present the body of the absent Christ as in a Tragedy ; but I see that the promise of Christ stands—'I will be with you to the end of the World.'*" There is therefore in the Supper a com-

\* *Christus ad dextram Patris sedet ; h. e. in potentia et majestate et gloria Patris regnat. Hoc regnum nec ullis locorum spatiis limitatum, nec ullis dimensionibus circumscriptum, quin Christus virtutem suam, ubicunque placuerit, in cœlo et in terra exserat ; quin se præsentem potentia et virtute exhibeat ; quin suis semper adsit, vitam ipsis suam inspirans, in iis vivat, eos sustineat, confirmet, vegetet, conservet incolumes, non secus, ac si corpore adesset. Si oculis animisque in cœlum evehimur, ut Christum illic in regni sui gloria quæramus ; quemadmodum symbola nos ad eum integrum invitant ; ita sub panis symbolo pascemur ejus corpore, sub vini symbolo distincte ejus sanguine potabimur, ut demum toto ipso perficiamur.*

† *Dicimus Christum tam externo symbolo quam spiritu suo ad nos descendere, ut vere substantia carnis suæ et sanguinis sui animas nostras vivificet.*

‡ *Ego credendo manducari Christi carnem, quia fide noster efficitur, eamque manducationem fructum effectumque esse fidei dico.*

§ *Et sane rem illic signatum effert et exhibet omnibus, qui ad spirituale illud epulum accumbunt ; quamquam a fidelibus solis cum fructu percipitur, qui tantum benignitatem vere fide animique gratitudine suscipiunt.*

munion of the present Body. That Christ can be enclosed in a certain place in Heaven is an unworthy notion." About A.D. 1533, he wrote to the same, "For a long time the question respecting the Supper has occupied me, and it still appears to me safest, to abide by PAUL's account of the Institution, for the tragical meaning moves me not. I do not doubt, that the disciples at the Supper partook of the Lord's Body,—PAUL in one place calls it the body and blood of Christ, and if we depart from the divine Word there is no longer anything certain. If we look to the judgment of natural reason, there are also other doctrines which do not more agree with it than this article. But by a collection of testimonies of the Fathers which ŒCOLAMPADIUS\* published, MELANCTHON convinced himself that he had taken many spurious passages as genuine, and that only depended on firmly maintaining the real Presence in the Supper without determining more exactly respecting it. When CALVIN's middle scheme followed it was easy for MELANCTHON to come to an understanding with him. From this standpoint he made the alteration in the edition of the Augsburg Confession, R.D. 1540† (*Confessio variata*), since in the tenth article he not only left out the condemnatory clause against those who thought differently, but also instead of the words, 'that the Body and Blood of Christ are truly there and administered,' he substituted 'that with the Bread and Wine, the Body and Blood of Christ, *vere exhibentur*;' an expression by which also the Calvinistic doctrine might be easily conveyed. According to this he expresses himself differently in the edition of the *Loci*, A.D. 1543, and in the memorable opinion which he drew up for the Elector FREDERICK, on the occasion of the dispute respecting the Supper which broke out in the Palatinate—"It is best to keep to the words of PAUL, 'the bread which we break is it not the communion of the body of Christ?' and to discourse largely of the advantages of the Supper, in

\* Joannis Œcolampadii, De Genuina Verborum Domini, Hoc est Corpus Meum, juxta Vetustissimos Auctores Expositione Liber, Basil. 1529.

† Conf. Aug. 1530.—De cœna Domini docent, quod corpus et sanguis Christi vere ad sint et distribuuntur vescentibus in cœna Domini et improbant secus docentes. Conf. var.—De cœna Domini docent; quod cum pane et vino vere exhibeantur corpus et sanguis Christi vescentibus in cœna Domini.



order that men may be invited to the love of this pledge, and to the frequent use of it. *Koinwía* only designates the medium whereby we obtain communion with the Body of Christ; the Son of God is present among believers not on account of the Bread but of the Men."

In the doctrine of the Sacraments we find in one respect the agreement of two tendencies, which otherwise are totally different, that of the *Socinians*, and of the *Quakers*. In the latter the mystic-idealistic Element prevails, and the idea of the Christian consciousness is rendered prominent in a one-sided manner; in the former we see a onesided empirical Supranaturalism determined merely by the Intellect. But the agreement in the doctrine of the Sacraments relates only to single points.

The Socinians maintained that Baptism was not instituted by Christ as a religious rite available for all times; they explained the passages of Scripture referring to it symbolically, and particularly of spiritual purification by doctrine. FAUSTUS SOCINUS refers to PAUL's language that Christ sent him not to baptize but to preach the Gospel; therefore the commission given by Christ related not to baptism but to teaching; he maintained that the outward use of Water-baptism only applied to the reception of Jews and Heathens into the Christian Church; this symbolical rite had in itself no importance, and properly it ought only to be administered to those who passed over to the Church from another religious community; but since it was so ancient a custom, it might be retained; according to the nature of the case it should only be administered to adults; yet where Infant-baptism had been usual it might be observed, since after all nothing depended on a mere outward act.

In reference to the *Supper* SOCINUS certainly acknowledged that Christ intended a perpetual observance of the rite, but this rite could not be a seal and strengthener of Faith. How could anything which was taken from every day life, and in which there was nothing marvellous, serve to strengthen Faith? He would not even allow that the Supper ought to serve as a memorial of the Sufferings of Christ; it rather presupposed faith and the consciousness of what Christ had effected for us by his sufferings; he distinguished between a feast of remembrance, and one of grateful mention; only the

latter takes place at the Supper; it was instituted because Christ had done and given up so much for us.

The doctrine of the QUAKERS, as it is developed in BARCLAY'S Apology, stands in diametric opposition to that of the Catholics, which confounds the idea of the invisible and visible Church, and attributes great importance to the latter; while the Quakers give prominence to the idea of the invisible Church and ignore that which relates to the essence of the visible. With this is connected their opposite views respecting the doctrine of the Sacraments. The Catholic Church attributes too much to the outward and firmly holds the *opus operatum*. The Quakers merely look at the ideal element; they urge that the term Sacrament does not occur in the Bible; that the whole subject generally is unscriptural, on which account Protestants ought so much the more to keep aloof from it; it belongs to the peculiarities of the Christian standpoint, that the religious life is bound to no kind of outward signs and symbols; that exactly in this point it is distinguished from the religion of the Old Testament, and is the pure Religion of the Spirit. The adulteration of it has proceeded from this, that in proportion as value has been attributed to shadows and images, the Essence, the Idea, has been neglected. Hence have arisen the many controversies respecting these external things, which have always diverted the attention from the essence of purely spiritual objects. Baptism, they maintained, was not instituted by Christ himself, and they explain the passages relating to it symbolically; Christian Baptism and JOHN'S Baptism are to be distinguished; the latter was symbolical, a Water-baptism, but Christ's baptism is that of the Holy Spirit, it is the internal Regeneration, and Water-baptism would be altogether foreign to it. Although such a rite might have been administered here and there in the primitive Church, it does not follow that it was prescribed to be perpetual, it was rather a condescension to the sensuous weakness of Men, who could not be raised all at once to the highest standpoint of the Gospel; when PETER baptized the family of CORNELIUS, this might be compared to his conduct in relation to the Jewish ceremonies which he still observed, the one was as little designed to be perpetual as the other; all such instances must be attributed to the influence of the earlier sensuous standpoint;

PAUL on the contrary said, that Christ had sent him not to baptize but to preach the Gospel.

The Quakers equally denied the perpetual observance of the Supper as an outward Rite. What is eternally binding is something internal and spiritual, and is symbolically represented in the Supper. When mention is made of partaking of the Body of Christ, it relates not to his material Body, but to his spiritual, the divine seed by which he imparts his divine life the communion of the higher life with him is intended. BARCLAY appeals particularly to John vi. here, to eat the Flesh of Christ and to drink his blood is a spiritual act which must be continued through the whole life in Christ. JOHN, who most of all gives prominence to the spiritual nature of Christianity, never mentions the transaction from which the Institution of the Supper is derived: but only the idea on which it is founded; Christ administered the Supper only as a farewell meal, and on that occasion he also intimated that his disciples in future at such meals should remember him; when he calls the Bread and Wine his Body and Blood, he directs their attention from the material to the Spiritual for the same reason that the Supper is perpetually observed, the symbolical act of feet-washing ought to be observed which JOHN records; it is therefore that Christ only intended to refer to the idea. When it was urged that PAUL celebrated the Supper in the Corinthian Church, BARCLAY replied that PAUL condescended to the sensuous weakness of his contemporaries.

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\* *Carmen de ingratias*, v. 92, sqq. :—

Quem Christi gratia cornu  
 Uberiore regens, nostro lumen dedit ævo,  
 Accensum vero de lumine : nam cibus illi  
 Et vita et requies Deus, est omnisque voluptas  
 Unus amor Christi est, unus Christi est honor illi.  
 Et dum nulla sibi tribuit bona, fit Deus illi  
 Omnia, et in sancto regnat sapientia templo.

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